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Monday, November 22, 2004
John Beckwith
Another quality shortstop to muddy up the waters for us.
John (You Can Call Me Grandma) Murphy
Posted: November 22, 2004 at 09:47 AM | 379 comment(s)
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"The lure of the East, New York and big time, had no particular appeal for this earnest, hard-working diamond star—or if it did, he remained true to his promise and signed contract. His buddy, Judy Gans [Lincoln Giants’ manager], attempted to persuade him to go East, but his reply, typical of him, was to the effect that he had signed up with the Grays, and intended to come here."
Pittsburgh Courier 3-29-24
From the Courier, 4-12-24:
“Colorful to the extreme, Beckwith is the kind of player who will make a decided impression with fans throughout the tri-state district, and his name in a lineup will be an immense drawing power. He will do the receiving for the Grays. Realizing this fact and also realizing that tempting offers from various Eastern magnates were being flaunted almost daily in the face of the former Foster star, Posey went to Chicago two weeks ago, and upon his return brought back the bats which are Beckwith’s greatest hobby. Wherever those bats go, there goes Beckwith also, and when he appeared Saturday, one of Posey’s biggest causes for worry had been removed.”
“Beckwith was unable to fit into our organization," Posey said, "and we felt that we had to either let him go or ruin the morale of our club.” The Courier blamed the team's recent poor play on "internal strife": "Several of the players told of arguments which had ensured since the team began its regular playing season, which had proven injurious to the playing of some of the players.”
"'The climax of the entire affair occurred Saturday,' said one of the players, talking for himself. 'It was in the crucial eighth inning. Bellevue at the time was leading 3-1. Posey, on the first base coaching line, sent a pinch-hitter up. Beckwith waved him back. Eventually our club lost, 3-2. That started the fireworks. Posey is as reasonable as anyone, if you get the results. But when you go against his better judgment, and lose games, that is a different thing.'"
Calling Beckwith “one of the most valuable players in organized baseball,” the Courier wrote of him: "Still a young man, he will give the Black Sox just that punch without which they cannot hope to rise above third place. His acquisition has made Baltimore one of the strongest clubs in the East, and the league race from now on promises to take on all the glitter of real fireworks.” (Courier 6-28-24)
Beckwith moved to short for the Black Sox and batted third while the team climbed from third to second place (where it finished the season). In early August, Cum Posey spent an entire week in Baltimore trying to persuade Beckwith to return to the Homestead Grays. Perhaps not so coincidentally, that very week Beckwith was named captain of the Black Sox.
By season's end, it was rumored that Beckwith would replace Pete Hill as manager in 1925. On the other hand, Beckwith was apparently telling friends he intended to retire after the season in order to devote his time to business (of what sort, I wasn't able to find out).
From W. Rollo Wilson's column in the 7-19-24 Pittsburgh Courier:
“An Eastern League manager rises to remark that there is another star keystone combination at work now. He obtrudes his opinion that Beckwith and Day are as good on the defense as Lundy and Lloyd.”
From the Baltimore Afro-American, 7-4-24:
“in the acquisition of Beckwith, formerly of the Homestead Grays, Pittsburg, the Sox have one of the greatest performers at [shortstop] in the Eastern League. Manager Posey himself admits that Beckwith is a star but due to personal reasons the two agreed to disagree and parted. The fans with one accord always give Beckwith the glad hand, and he is proving beyond a doubt his worth to the Sox.”
A key factor in the Grays' release of Beckwith was the team's independent status; Posey wasn't maintaining very good relations with either league around this time, and wouldn't have had many real options to trade or sell Beckwith to another team. He effectively pirated Beckwith away from Foster to begin with, and his first reaction on getting rid of him was to talk publicly about signing players away from ECL teams.
Posey's talk about signing Mackey and Winters to replace Beckwith, however unrealistic he was being, indicates how big a star Beckwith was at the time. Also, his leaving the NNL for the Grays was considered at least as important as Oscar Charleston going to Harrisburg that same off-season.
It also seems to have been generally understood that losing Beckwith weakened the Grays considerably; when they were swept in a three-game series by the American Giants in late August, Wilson attributed the defeats to the departures of Beckwith and pitcher Ed Rile.
Many thanks for providing all this wonderful contemporary commentary on Beckwith!
Yes, I appreciate the responses from both of you. It looks like Riley was factually correct, but he may have slanted the story somewhat to fit his biases about Beckwith. That's a problem in all history from secondary sources, and why it's great to have someone like Gary pulling out information from primary sources.
I guess I'm still inclined to apply a modest penalty to Beckwith's record because I believe some of his actions did hurt his teams - certainly, having a star player contradict his manager in running the game, which is what seems to have happened in the event in question, isn't good for a team. But clearly everyone involved, including Posey, still recognized Beckwith as a great player who was worth having, which is a more positive impression than I obtained from reading Riley.
And Chris, I'm glad to hear the details about the park adjustment. It sounds like your work is very careful and sophisticated, but many of us didn't know because the methods you've used hadn't been fully written up.
John M - Would it make sense to add a thread on methods for calculating major league equivalents?
The only other Negro League team in the 1920s that regularly used a major league home field was the Homestead Grays, who played in Forbes Field quite a bit. The only problem is that the Grays didn't join a league until 1929--they played league teams, but only around 10-15 times a year.
A couple of other big league parks were used for occasional games in the 1920s, notably Ebbetts Field. The Monarchs of course used the KC Blues' home parks, and I believe a few other teams used minor league parks. Though we don't have minor league park factors either, we could check out team stats like we did on the Buzz Arlett thread to get some idea.
By the way, Beckwith hit a home run at Redland on May 22, 1921, that was said by several papers to be the first ball ever hit over the left field wall. The Chicago Defender said that the "enormous clout" "cleared the left field wall by three feet and just several feet east of the large clock."
Honus Wagner disputed this claim, telling Rollo Wilson in 1924 that he'd hit a ball over the left field wall in 1901. Wilson, however, noted that renovations had been made since then, so Beckwith was the first to homer over the new wall. Wagner, by the way, also said at that time that he'd never seen Beckwith play.
"Beckwith was given a great ovation by the fans, who literally went frantic and showered money upon the 19-year-old youth who was able to perform the feat that veterans of the big show have been unable to do. When he had counted his donations from the fans Beckwith found himself about $25 richer. In recognition of the honor bestowed upon him he attempted to loop one into the right field bleachers and missed doing so by only a few feet."
Remember that Beckwith was playing for the visiting Chicago Giants. When the home run came, the Giants were trailing 3-0; it was a solo shot. A few innings later the Cubans opened up on Frank Wickware, drove him from the mound, and ended up winning 14-2. Beckwith hit 1 for 3 with a walk.
Thank you for your response. I did not read your post closely enough. At least leaving him off my ballot did not make the difference. With better understanding, Beckwith may have made my ballot around Moore - about 14th. My ballot is just extremely tight right now from about 7th down to 35th so any little doubt can cause a severe jump.
Yes, the 15-20 homers would be quite a powerful hitter for the 1920s.
Thank you for the continuing education.
Gary A,
Thank you for the contemporary accounts. They really help to complete a picture.
Kelly
"Cooper" is Andy Cooper.
Indianapolis (Washington Park)- 107 (22,42)
Chi American Gts (Schorling Park)- 66 (50,19)
Cleveland (Tate Field) - 121 (25,8)
Detroit (Mack Park) - 122 (40,16)
Kansas City (Association Park) - 109 (44,28)
Pittsburgh (Central Park) - 118 (7,18)
St. Louis (Stars' Park) - 103 (17,18)
The Bacharachs and Hilldales both toured the west, but I have only 2 and 3 home games for them, respectively. The Cuban Stars were again a road team, and the Chicago Giants left the league, though they remained associate members. I haven't found any games they played with NNL teams.
1920 4.49
1921 5.05 (.263/.324/.361)
1922 5.12
1923 5.48
Schorling Park PFs:
1920: 85
1921: 54
1922: 66
1923: 81
1928: 57
Stars Park:
1922: 103
1923: 155
1928: 124
Washington Park (Indy):
1920: 102
1921: 106
1922: 107
1923: 85
Association Park (KC):
1920: 110
1921: 115
1922: 109
1923: 113
Muehlebach Field (KC):
1923: 104
1928: 99
Mack Park (Detroit):
1920: 121
1921: 107
1922: 122
1923: 79
1928: 93
(There might be some minor discrepancies in the 1921 data from what I've previously posted; I'm continually adding new games to that season.)
1920 4.49
1921 5.05 (.263/.324/.361; fielding pct. .949)
1922 5.12
1923 5.48
1928 5.07 (.278/.333/.384; fpct. .955)
A couple of points:
1) John Beckwith did not play "half a season" in an extreme hitters park (Prtotectory Oval) in 1929. Beckwith played with the Homestead Grays until early September of that year and his home field was Forbes Field, a pitcher's park.
Beckwith, not Chino Smith, was the greatest hitter operating in the 1929 American Negro League.
2) The contention that Beckwith would have hit 15 to 20 HRs a year in his prime is obviously false.
Beckwith was the greatest Black power hitter of the 1920s. Does it make any sense that he would not hit as many HRs as the white league leaders?
Although the McMillon Statistics are somewhat unreliable, they show Beckwith in his prime, 1924 to 1931 at ages 24-31, hitting 39.6 HRs per 154 Games.
McMillion (Beckwith 24-31, then pro-rated)
272 G, 1028 AB, 388 H, 60 2B, 9 3B, 70 HR, .377 BA
154 G, 588 AB, 220 H, 34 2B, 5 3B, 40 HR
If he is averaging 40 for eight years, would he not hit 50 or so at his peak?
3) I did not mean to present a "rosy" biography of Beckwith. I simply think that James Riley's characterization of Beckwith as a criminal was way off. Beckwith was a very difficult man, something like Albert Belle (and Albert Belle is an extraordinarily good comp for Beckwith as a hitter).
Several years ago, I spoke with Al Fennar who was a personal friend of Beckwith. He greatly liked and admired Beckwith so you may discount his testimony as biased. He basically told me that Beckwith was a good man, but would not allow anyone to disrespect him or anyone or anything else that he cared about.
Mr. Fennar strongly disagreed with Riley's bio of Beckwith, calling it a "bunch of crap." Fennar, by the way, knew Beckwith for 25 years and visited him in Harlem Hospital shortly before he passed away. Mr. Fennar did admit that Beckwith had a temper.
Mr. Fennar discribed him as "touchy" in the old style of that word, i.e. easy to piss off if you got out of line. He also said that, as a manager, Beckwith was a strict disciplinarian who would help you if you showed you cared and be all over you if you slacked off.
4) I completely agree with Chris Cobb's observation that Josh Gibson was the greatest hitter in Negro League history and that Beckwith (with Stearnes, Suttles, and Charleston) is in the running for Number 2. Though I would maybe add Buck Leonard, Grant Johnson, John Lloyd, and Bill Pettus to the list.
My personal opinion is that he is a close number 3 behind Gibson and Charleston.
On your conversion rates (.87 Batting/.82 Slugging):
In my opinion, your conversion rates are too low and suffer from sample size and quality problems.
For SA, you use the following five men:
Robinson .762
Irvin .816
Doby .833
Jethroe .874
Campanella .961
The problem with Robinson is that you are using his 1945 Negro League stats. These statistics have to be adjusted for 1) a severe war-related decline in the quality of Negro League play and 2) war time dead ball emphasis of speed over slugging.
By the second point, I mean that, if you reduce pure slugging, a player's speed (ability to produce doubles, triples, and inside the park homers because of speed) begins to show up in their SA. Robinson was lightning fast.
Robinson's SA conversion rate has to be adjusted up, way up.
The problem with both Irvin and Doby is the same: Both men went from what was the best hitter's park in the Negro Leagues in the 1940s (Ruppert Stadium: 305 down the lines, short power alleys, 400 to center) to pitcher's parks in the Major Leagues.
Somewhere around here, I have Irvin's 1951 Home/Road Splits. Overall, he hit 24 HRs total with a .312 BA. But on the road he hit 16 HRs with a BA in the .330s. During his Major league career Irvin's home/road home run split was 43/56.
Doby's career home/road home run split is 121/132. In 1948 and 1949, his first two full seasons, Doby hit 13 homers at home and 25 on the road.
Both Irvin's and Doby's SA conversion rate has to be adjusted up quite a bit.
The problem with both Jethroe and Campanella is simply age. Jethroe, born in 1917, was on the down side of 30 with eye and physical problems when he played in the Majors from 1950 to 1952.
On the other hand, Campanella was too young when he played in the Negro Leagues and had not fully developed his power. Another problem with Campy is that Ebbetts Field was a bandbox.
The SA conversion of Jethroe has to be adjusted up and Campanella, taking both his age and the Ebbetts Field factor which offsets it, probably should be adjusted down.
There are similar problems with your BA conversions, biased against the Negro Leaguers, but they are not as severe as these.
Rather than using the Major Leagues, You might want to try comparing the Negro Leagues of the 1940s to the contemporary Triple-A Leagues.
At one point, you state that you think the Negro Leagues are between AA and AAA in quality; but, if you run Negro League and Triple-A comparisons (which have a much larger sample base) and do the appropriate adjustments, you will quickly see that the Negro Leagues of the 1940s are almost exactly the same quality as the contemporary Triple-A Leagues.
By the way, the Mexican League of the 1940s was also of Triple-A caliber. For example, check out Ray Dandridge's statistics some day. He skipped thru the Negro Leagues, the Mexican League, and Triple-A during the 1940s. Also compare Monte Irvin's 1942 Mexican stats with his 1948-49 Triple-A stats combined.
(I was going to say "Final" but it was too Springer-like.)
A couple of years ago, there was a study done that compared the Triple-A Leagues of the 1940s to their Major League counterparts.
The conversion factor that the study revealed was .92. (Interestingly, the modern Triple-A conversion rates that I have seen are pretty much the same. I guess that the more things change, the more they stay the same.)
My own personal conversion rates that I use are:
Negro Leagues
1920-1924 .85-.89
1925-1930 .90
1931-1936 .95
1937-1950 .90
And I think these are very slightly conservative.
(Note: From 1931 to 1936, the Depression concentrated the Negro League talent by killing off the weak teams.)
After 1950, the Negro League talent level fell off the cliff. For example, Henry Aaron hit almost exactly the same in the Negro Leagues in 1952 as he did in A ball in 1953.
Someone in this thread said that: "By studying the Negro Leagues, you are obviously biased in the favor of the Negro Leagues." This is most probably true. However, if you simply look at the evidence with open eyes, the unbiased conclusions are fairly obvious.
I've been researching 1916, and in early July of that year the Montgomery Gray Sox played three games with the Indianapolis ABCs. "Beckwith" was Montgomery's catcher for the series. Both Riley and The Negro Leagues Book identify this guy as John Beckwith; but since John would only have been 16, I was wondering if this could be his brother, Stanley. I don't think I'd ever heard of Stanley before your earlier posts on Beckwith...
Thanks for your comments on conversions.
Obviously, they suffer from sample-size problems, but that problem is imposed by the data: I have used what I have available. Do you have more information on the AAA-to ML conversion study in the 1940s?
Differences in competition quality in the Negro Leagues over time is not something my conversions take into account, although I agree that levels of competition were not uniform and were almost certainly higher between 1925 and 1940 than from 1940-1948. I would like to do so, but I would need some data to go on.
I hope the electorate is aware of this issue and considers it, despite its not being directly represented in my conversions.
Slugging percentage needs to receive more of a reduction than batting average. If my ba conversions are about 3% low, I expect my slugging conversions are about 3% low also. If one converts ba and slugging at equal rates, one gets ba/slg ratios that do not match the ratios achieved by major-leaguers: nobody with a batting average that matches the negro-leaguer's average has a slugging percentage as high. My conversions may be accurate or inaccurate, but I am convinced that my use of a lower ratio for slugging than for ba is correct, and is (I think) corroborated by conversions of minor league stats to MLEs. I would be happy to be corrected on this point by anyone with better information, but as far as I can tell, the lower rate for slugging is justified not just by my limited data set but by other conversion studies.
I have accounted for a number of the factors you mention:
1) I have park-adjusted Doby and Irvin's slugging averages, using their major-league park factors and estimating the Newark park as an extreme hitter's park. I may well have underestimated the park factor for Newark, as I was simply guessing.
2) I did not use Campanella in the slugging average study because of age issues; I don't remember off the top of my head if I excluded Jethro or not, but I think his data was consistent with the others.
3) I did include a WWII competition adjustment in the translations for Robinson's slugging. I agree that speed does become a factor in slugging under some conditions. As Irvin, Robinson, and Doby were all speedy, perhaps there should be a slightly different conversion rate for players who were not speedy.
The quick answer to your question is that I think the Beckwith who caught for Montgomery in 1916 is neither John nor Stanley. But, in all honesty, I could be wrong.
Stanley Beckwith was born in July of 1895 in Louisville, Kentucky. John Beckwith was born in January of 1900, same place. Their parent's names were Jacob and Daisy (Smith) Beckwith.
Jacob Beckwith, who was born in Louisville about 1877, simply disappears from every Census. I assume he died, but Daisy Beckwith is listed as married, not widowed, in the 1920 Census.
In the 1910 Census, Stanley Beckwith is living with an uncle in Chicago; but, as of now, I haven't been able to locate Daisy or John Beckwith.
In the 1920 Census, the 24 year old and married Stanley is the head of household and both his 19 year old brother John and Daisy are living with him. Stanley was working as a clerk in the Chicago Post Office and had apparently given up baseball.
John Beckwith died in January of 1956 and Stanley, still living in Chicago, is mentioned as his surviving relative. John Beckwith's obituary states that he played baseball from 1918 to 1942.
Stanley Beckwith died in Cleveland, Ohio, in October of 1984.
I first heard of Stanley from Al Fennar who told me that John Beckwith had a brother Stanley who also played and got John Beckwith to give up his boxing dreams and play baseball for the Chicago Giants.
Of course, there is a Beckwith playing shortstop for the Chicago Giants in 1917 and 1918. While going through the Chicago Defender, I came across a box score that had two Beckwiths. One was S. Beckwith and the other J. Beckwith.
Just recently, I was looking through the Baseball Magazine Database that SABR has posted access to. Incredibly, there is an article in there about the Chicago All Nations team of 1918. The shortstop for that team is Stanley Beckwith. There is even a team picture.
My conclusions are that Stanley Beckwith played shortstop for the Chicago Giants in 1917 and 1918 and got his brother to join the team.
As far as the Beckwith who caught for Montgomery in Indianapolis in 1916, I would assume that this is another Beckwith. Stanley was a shortstop and John was too young. But you never know.
I do agree with you that, from what I've seen, you have to give a greater discount to slugging average over batting average when doing Minor League to Major League conversions. And it is also very clear that the Negro Leagues were of lesser quality than the contemporary Major Leagues.
I've often wondered about that. I assume that, with the increase in the quality of competition, it is more difficult to made hard contact. This would lower the slugging but, with some of the hard contact now going for singles, moderate the loss of batting average.
But that is simply a guess.
I will try to find reference to the study I saw that did 1940s Major-Minor Translations for you and post some Negro League Triple-A comparisons when I have time. It was my understanding that the .92 conversion was overall. In other words, BA would be reduced by say .95 and slugging by .89. But I could be wrong.
But I still stand by my opinion of Beckwith. Over 8 years in his prime, he averaged .377 and 39.6 Homers in the Negro Leagues. Discount the BA by .90 and the homers by .80 and you still have a man hitting 32 homers and batting .340 a year through the 1920s.
And I think those estimates are dead wrong on the conservative side. I stand by my evaluation of Beckwith as Rogers Hornsby with more power and less speed.
Part of the difference between our estimations of Beckwith may have to do with the numbers we're using. It appears that Holway's numbers are lower than the numbers in MacMillan (which I have not looked at). I've operated on the assumption that the numbers in Holway's book are the most reliable available, despite the limitations imposed by their frequent incompleteness.
Your lower-bound estimate is about where my upper-bound estimate would be.
I note that Rogers Hornsby himself averaged 25 home runs a year from 1920 to 1929,
In any case, I think John Beckwith is a definite HoMer. He hasn't been elected yet, and given the procession of great stars who will be reaching the ballot during the rest of the 1940s and early 1950s, he may not be elected soon, though further analysis may continue to raise his ranking relative to others. But I think it very likely that he will be elected.
The problem with both Irvin and Doby is the same: Both men went from what was the best hitter's park in the Negro Leagues in the 1940s (Ruppert Stadium: 305 down the lines, short power alleys, 400 to center) to pitcher's parks in the Major Leagues....
The problem with both Jethroe and Campanella is simply age. Jethroe, born in 1917, was on the down side of 30 with eye and physical problems when he played in the Majors from 1950 to 1952.
These are the same type of problems that flaw McNeil's "Baseball's Other All-stars" conversions.
Slugging percentage needs to receive more of a reduction than batting average. If my ba conversions are about 3% low, I expect my slugging conversions are about 3% low also. If one converts ba and slugging at equal rates, one gets ba/slg ratios that do not match the ratios achieved by major-leaguers: nobody with a batting average that matches the negro-leaguer's average has a slugging percentage as high. My conversions may be accurate or inaccurate, but I am convinced that my use of a lower ratio for slugging than for ba is correct, and is (I think) corroborated by conversions of minor league stats to MLEs. I would be happy to be corrected on this point by anyone with better information, but as far as I can tell, the lower rate for slugging is justified not just by my limited data set but by other conversion studies.
I agree, SLG% moves up/down at a faster rate than BA. I think my limited studies plus some things others have done show that the relationship is roughly BA gets reduced by the square root of whatever SLG is getting reduced by (so if .92 is the factor for BA, then .85 should be the factor for SLG, if .82 is the factor for BA, then .68 would be the factor for SLG, etc.).
Part of the difference between our estimations of Beckwith may have to do with the numbers we're using. It appears that Holway's numbers are lower than the numbers in MacMillan (which I have not looked at). I've operated on the assumption that the numbers in Holway's book are the most reliable available, despite the limitations imposed by their frequent incompleteness.
I would probably guess the opposite, although maybe Gary could comment. What's funny, to me, is that I believe Holway was heavily involved in the development of the MacMillan numbers...
Year--G--AB--H--D--T-HR-SB-AVE-SLG
1920-15-046-10-01-01-00-01-217-283
1921-34-113-45-05-04-04-00-398-619
1922-48-159-48-11-02-03-03-302-453
1923-60-232-75-19-09-13-05-323-651
1924-33-119-48-08-01-07-07-403-664
1925-47-174-70-14-01-14-02-402-736
1926-34-119-43-07-01-09-01-361-664
1927-46-188-63-13-02-07-01-335-537
1928-(no data)
1929-40-163-62-10-02-11-06-380-669
1930-50-200-96-10-03-19-00-480-845
1931-51-190-66-03-00-16-00-316-616
1932-03-012-04-01-00-01-00-333-667
1933-02-009-04-00-00-00-00-444-444
1934-12-011-03-01-00-00-00-273-364
1935-01-004-00-00-00-00-00-000-000
tot-476-1739-637-103-26-104-26-366-635
Hope this is at least somewhat readable. Sorry, the totals line isn't aligned.
Year-Teams-Pos
1920-Chi Gts-ss,c,p
1921-Chi Gts-ss
1922-Chi Am Gts-ut
1923-Chi Am Gts-3b,1b
1924-Hom Grays, Balt-ss
1925-Balt-ss
1926-Balt, Harrisburg-ss,ut
1927-Harrisburg-3b,ut
1928-(no data)
1929-Hom Grays, Linc Gts-3b,1b,ss,of
1930-Linc Gts, Balt-3b
1931-Balt, Nwk Browns-3b
1932-Nwk Browns-3b
1933-Black Yankees-3b
1934-Black Yankees, Nwk Browns-ph
1935-Hom Grays-c
1923: doubles
1930: games, at bats, hits, home runs, batting average
1931: home runs
The SLG I figured myself, so I don't know the leaders. I'd wager his 1930 SLG is the best in the east.
Source -- AB -- hits -- hr -- ba -- hr/550
Macmil -- 1739 -- 637 -- 104 -- .366 -- 33
Holway -- 2176 -- 767 -- 80-- .352 -- 20
Gadfly's MLEs, if I have understood correctly, are based on a conversion factor of .90 - .95 off of the MacMillan stats.
My assessment is based off of a conversion factor of .87/.82 (ba/slg) off of the Holway stats.
While the differences in the conversion factors are not meaningless, I think the larger discrepancy derives from the base statistics.
It would be useful to get more expert commentary on the reliability of the two sources.
Data that Gary A. has provided from his own box-score tabulation can provide one cross-check of the two larger sources for selected seasons.
Year-Mac-Holway
1923--13-14
1924---7--5
1925--14-24
1926---9-(7 or fewer)
1927---7--9
1928--------
1929--11-15
1930--19--6
1931--16-16
If you see any errors on any Negro Leaguer plaques, please let me know so I can correct them. Holway and Riley don't always agree, plus both of them don't always have the right stats. Thanks!
Thanks for all the great information on Beckwith! For now, the Gray Sox Beckwith will just have to do without a first name, until we can find out more.
The MacMillon Statistics were compiled by the Negro League Committee and, of course, John Holway was a large part of this. John Holway's Statistics from his "Complete Book of the Negro Leagues" are his own continuation of that work.
However, John Holway is a writer, some whould say propagandist, about the Negro Leagues; not a statistician. To say the least, his statistical work is usually quite sloppy. In one book, he listed Josh Gibson hitting 16 HRs in 27 Games. The 27 games was how many box scores he had for Gibson, the 16 HRs were Gibson's published League leading total from a 50 game season.
Of course, I mean no disrespect to John Holway. The world would be a much poorer place without him. But stats are not his forte and any statistics from him need to be examined closely.
One other note: MacMillon (Tenth Edition) lists Beckwith with 6 HRs in 1930, the same as Holway. Not sure where your total of 19 came from. John Beckwith missed most of the 1930 season with a leg injury.
Interestingly, other than that, Holway and MacMillon are pretty much in agreement except that Holway has Beckwith hitting 24(?) rather than 14 HRs in 1925.
More interestingly, I think KJOK is absolutely correct. Looking over some studies I have, SA increases and decreases as the square or square root of BA as you go up and down the talent ladder.
During his prime (1921 to 1929), Rogers Hornsby hit 28.9 HR per 154 Games in the Majors. During his prime (1924 to 1931), Beckwith hit 39.6 HRs per 154 Games in the Negro Leagues.
If your .87 BA reduction is correct that makes the SA reduction .75. In other words, Beckwith, without League or Park adjustments, would have hit 29.7 HRs per 154 Games in the Majors.
And I'll bet dimes to dollars that the League adjustment is in Beckwith's favor in a big way(i.e. there were much less homers hit per game in the Negro Leagues than in the Majors).
you run Negro League and Triple-A comparisons (which have a much larger sample base)
I think it's likely that the Major League sample is critically small and AAA data therefore critically important.
Gadfly #122
there is a Beckwith playing shortstop for the Chicago Giants in 1917 and 1918. . . . My conclusions are that Stanley Beckwith played shortstop for the Chicago Giants in 1917 and 1918 and got his brother to join the team.
Gary A
For now, the Gray Sox Beckwith will just have to do without a first name, until we can find out more.
Are there many open questions about player identities in the major Negro Leagues?
Gadfly #123
I will try to find reference to the study I saw that did 1940s Major-Minor Translations for you and post some Negro League Triple-A comparisons when I have time. It was my understanding that the .92 conversion was overall. In other words, BA would be reduced by say .95 and slugging by .89. But I could be wrong.
Clay Davenport's minor league translation factors have some currency; indeed, I know of them only indirectly, by reference in remarks on major leagues. He uses the summary measure EqA and his factors should have this property (between batting and slugging factors), if I understand correctly.
The Macmillan I have is the Eighth Edition, which I think is where the NeL section first appeared. I know that there were corrections and changes made in later editions, and as I understand it, these were basically done by Holway and disavowed by Dick Clark. Of course, I don't really know the details--those who are interested should check out the SABR-L archives, which is where I read about this.
Btw, when Bill James says in the NBJHBA that Beckwith hit 46 home runs in 141 games between 1929 and 1931, he's citing the same stats I have, but says they're from the 1993 edition (which I believe is the Ninth). So the change in Beckwith's record came between the ninth and tenth editions.
In any case, Holway's account of the 1930 season is a real mess. In the standings, he lists Beckwith's Lincoln Giants as going 19-4, hardly enough games in which to hit 19 home runs. But the pitchers' W-L records add up to 26-3, plus the Lincolns played a ten-game series with the Grays that Holways counts as post-season, and apparently didn't include in the regular season stats. But Beckwith was injured and hit only 1 for 8 in that series, according to Holway.
The explanation may be this: in Macmillan 8, Beckwith is listed as playing for the Lincolns AND the Baltimore Black Sox, and as leading the east in games played and at bats--fairly unusual for Beckwith, who missed his share of games. I'm thinking that in the original tabulation a number of 1931 box scores were accidentally included in the 1930 season, and that at some point Holway noticed and corrected this.
There are lots of issues surrounding Cuban players, because their names tend to get mangled in box scores. Players with the same surnames on the same teams can easily be confused for each other, and sometimes it's not even clear how many there are (as in the Martinez/Martini case on the '28 western Cubans, or the various Joneses, all outfielders, playing for the '34 Cleveland and Birmingham teams).
In general, I would take Holway's later statistics over the earlier ones, as they are based on a larger number of sources--BUT, when there are major inconsistencies, as in Beckwith's 1930 HRs or Lundy's 1924 HRs, they should be checked out. In such cases, Holway might have corrected an earlier mistake (as I think he did in 1930)--OR he may have introduced a whole new mistake.
Beckwith was apparently telling friends he intended to retire after the season in order to devote his time to business (of what sort, I wasn't able to find out).
That was a common negotiating tactic for the preceding generation of white players. They didn't have many alternatives, often no good ones, within baseball under the reserve rule. I don't recall a case where the alternative (eg, the business) was not reported. Offhand, I guess that a viable alternative would be known to or easily discovered by the press.
Brent #[10]7
It looks like Riley was factually correct, but he may have slanted the story somewhat to fit his biases about Beckwith. That's a problem in all history from secondary sources, and why it's great to have someone like Gary pulling out information from primary sources.
Note that contemporary newspapers are commonly secondary sources, even granting that quotation of a participant is a primary source.
In the off-seasons in the 1920s, John Beckwith ran a pool hall in Chicago.
I looked over some of the Davenport translation stuff in old Baseball Prospectus annuals, and you are correct. The .92 is an overall reduction based on the EQA rating. I would assume that this would give you about a .95 reduction of BA and a .89 reduction on isolated SA if the square root theory is correct.
Gary A:
Juan Padron and Luis Padron are, as you assert, two distinct players (and I've never understood the various contentions that they are not).
Luis Padron, was born in Cuba probably before 1880, and played in the Cuban Winter Leagues from 1900 to 1919. In general, the Padron on the Long Branch Cubans and Linares' Cuban Star team is Luis.
He returned to Cuban and there is a picture of him as an old man in the 1948 Raul Diez Cuban League History book.
Juan Padron was an American Cuban born in Key West, Florida, in 1896. In general, the Padron on Pompez' (another Key West native) Cuban Stars and then various Negro League teams thru the 1920s, including the American Giants, is Juan.
Juan Padron died in 1981 in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Each man's name was spelled Padron, Padrone is a misspelling.
Both were very good pitchers and Luis was probably a Major League Caliber hitter too.
I've started working up a Monte Irvin analysis and will post it within a week.
I will pose you a theoretical question though. After integration, the superstars of Major League Baseball were pretty much evenly divided between black and white players (For proof, check out the Hall of Fame demographics of players active from 1950 to Present).
If anything, the greatest stars were actually black (Mays, Aaron, Frank Robinson, etc. and now Bonds). Of course, many people make a demographic argument (i.e. only 10-12 percent of the population is Black); but I have always thought that the more proper demographic argument would be: "What are the percentages of poor people."
Historically, the percentage of white and non-whites below the poverty line is more like 50-50.
So, if the distribution of superstars is roughly equal between white and black, why do none of your translations for the Negro League Superstars from the 1920s and 1930s end up with a lifetime BA of .330 to .350 like their white counterparts?
I saw a translation for Oscar Charleston (I think by KJOK) that posited his lifetime BA as about .310. If Oscar Charleston wouldn't have finished his Major League career with a lifetime BA over .330 and probably closer to .350, I'd eat my hat.
I think that, all by itself, is proof that the .87 BA/.75 SA translation is too low, way too low.
Thanks! I figured somebody had disentangled those guys more thoroughly by now. What you say accords completely with what I know--Luis pitched in the 1900s, but played infield and outfield more and more, whereas the Padron of the early 20s was pretty much a pitcher (though a good hitter, as you point out).
Do you happen to know if they were both lefthanded pitchers? The American Giants' Padron was usually referred to as a lefty; Luis definitely was. Figueredo's book, however, has J. Padron as a righty.
One interesting thing about Luis is that, throwing lefthanded, he apparently played a good deal of third base (and I think 2B--don't have the books here to check) in Cuba in the 1900s.
I would ask you about some other Cuban guys but we're kind of getting far from Beckwith here (not that that's anything new).
MLB was the first major lucrative sport to integrate (not much money in basketball back then.) Hence it got more than its share of great African-American athletes in 1950-1970. Since then, the big expansion has been non-US Hispanics, who can get into the US via a MLB career.
As you mention, both Padrons seem to have been left-handed. However, I have a note under Luis Padron remarking that, in Figueredo's "Cuban Baseball: A Statistical History" (Page 41), there is a small picture of Luis Padron apparently winding up to throw a pitch right-handed.
He may have batted Left and thrown Right, but obviously more info is needed.
By the way, I meant that Luis (1900-1919) was probably a Major League caliber hitter, not Juan (1915-1934).
Way back in 1906, New Britain signed Almeida and Marsans, the two Cubans that broke into the Majors in 1911. What isn't commonly known is that they also signed Luis Padron (and also Alfredo Cabrera).
Padron way outhit both Almeida and Marsans and was considered the best prospect of the 4. However, I will note that Padron was surely older than either future Cincinnati Red.
In any case, Padron's career went no further becuase he was considered not white enough.
Karl Magnus-
You misconstrue my argument completely. I never stated that 'only' those under the poverty line play MLB. My point was that economic incentive coupled with cultural bias are more important in the demographics of MLB than just straight-line demographic percentages.
How do you explain all these Dominicans currently in MLB, by the way? It surely isn't demographics, but it certainly is economic and cultural.
Do you really assert that the economic and also cultural incentives that drove the percentage of African-American Baseball Players so high from 1950 to 1980 were not there before integration?
I would theorize that those economic incentives were even greater before integration (a good example is the endless careers of some of the great Negro League players themselves).
It is also true that those economic incentives are currently receding and the population of Black Players in MLB is falling. Which, if you ask me, simply proves my point.
I also note that you completely ignore the fact that Hall of Fame players since integration are evenly distributed between white and non-white.
Of course, I do note that you admit that the standard deviation from the 10-12% demographic could be quite high. I submit that it is so high to make the 10-12% figure essentially meaningless.
One final Note: Your example of Lou Gehrig is silly. Gerhig was the only child of very poor immigrant parents. He got into Columbia because of his athletic talent and the fact that his parents, having only one child, could manage to just barely get the money together.
Most Major League Superstars come from economically impoverished backgrounds (Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, and Ted Williams all being good examples).
A few rare Major League Superstars come from backgrounds that are impoverished in other ways (Ty Cobb and Barry Bonds being the two great examples). But they are very obviously the exceptions to the rule.
My humble apologies. On rereading my posts, I note that I directed a theoretical question to you that should have gone to Chris Cobb.
I think that, all by itself, is proof that the .87 BA/.75 SA translation is too low, way too low.
Just to avoid confusion AND mischaracterization of my MLE's, my MLE for Charleston was .315 average, not .310, and more importantly, was converted TO National Leage 1955-2003, NOT to Charleston's contemporary Major Leagues. The conversion to contemporary leagues would give him a MLE BA quite a bit higher than .315 I believe!
I would theorize that those economic incentives were even greater before integration (a good example is the endless careers of some of the great Negro League players themselves).
This point has been discussed here before.
The economic incentives can be debated. They would have been much greater after 1947 when compared to before, based on the assumption that MLB paid much better than the NeL's.
The cultural incentives can also be debated. Certainly the example of Jackie Robinson was much more powerful than that of Frank Grant or Rube Foster, and there is a time lag between the icon's effect on young boys and their later arrival on the baseball scene.
The ethnic mix of MLB baseball has varied over time and it's not clear that the 1950's/1960's are any more relevant to the 1920's/1930's than the 1890's are.
I've noted elsewhere(see post #71, down the bottom) that the geographic origins of the white players of the 1920's/1930's would indicate that the 10% estimate for blacks should be revised upwards to 15%. Quantifying and incorporating the factors you note would push that up further. But to 50%, as in the 60's? probably not, as I see that as the peak, and not typical.
So, if the distribution of superstars is roughly equal between white and black, why do none of your translations for the Negro League Superstars from the 1920s and 1930s end up with a lifetime BA of .330 to .350 like their white counterparts?
I don't have a firm response to this, but here are my thoughts about the situation. I have never attempted to justify my translations in demographic terms. I don't think it's possible to derive from demographic/economic arguments the percentage of stars by race with any certainty. For the purposes of Hall of Merit elections, I believe that a quota approach to electing black player would create an inappropriate double standard. One of my goals in trying to develop accurate and reliable MLEs has been to make quota arguments unncessary. So I have not attempted to measure the results of my translations against any demographic standard.
That said, I'm not at all sure my MLEs are correct. My gut, which is sensitive to players' reputations of greatness and to expert opinions, says that they are a bit low. However, my standard for calculating them is to base no step in the process on my sense of what the numbers _ought_ to show, but to construct a system that creates statistics that are (1) derived from the best available data and (2) based on conversion methods that have been discussed by the interested membrs of the electorate and that have been generally (if not universally) accepted as sound.
If the results seem lower than they ought to be, we have the commentary of experts to challenge the results and to help us find ways to do better. I think that you are probably right that my MLEs are a little low, and I hope the electorate here will consider the serious likelihood of that based on your comments and other evidence of expert opinion.
But I can't change the system based on opinion, or it ceases to be a system that aims at an objective numerical statement of value. If we find evidence that I have erred in a calculation or gain access to evidence that leads to different conclusions about the conversions, I can make changes to improve the system accordingly. I hope to do so. I believe improvements in my handling of regression based on recent conversations will improve the system and give a fairer representation of peak value.
I can see a number of points where the evidentiary basis for the conversion factor could be improved:
1) NeL park factors from 1938-1948. A lot of the data for the conversion comes from Doby and Irvin in Newark. We know that was a hitter's park, but how extreme was it, exactly, and what percentage of their games did they play there? If I have used too low a park factor, that would depress the conversion factor incorrectly.
2) Data on the overall level of offense in the NeL from 1938-1948 in comparison to the major leagues, especially in the Negro National League. Evidence from the 1920s provided by Gary A. indicates that, although NeL levels of offenses tracked with ML levels, these diverged at times by up to 10% (I think that the difference was even greater in the late teens), with the ML levels being higher. I have taken this into account for 1920s conversions, which raises the MLEs of Negro-League players. Eyeballing the numbers for the late 1930s and early 1940s, it looks like offensive levels were high in the Negro Leagues at that time, quite possibly higher than in the majors. If this is the case, that again, if not properly accounted for, would depress the conversion factor incorrectly.
3) Use of AAA conversion studies could help to better model the process of arriving at a conversion, provide a point of comparison for the Negro Leagues' competition level, and add statistics from NeL stars playing in the high minors to the pool of data available for the calculation of a conversion factor. Studies on the level of competition in the Mexican League would be similarly useful (and will be important for the assessment of players like Cool Papa Bell, Ray Dandridge, Martin Dihigo, and Will Bill Wright in any case).
4) Striking the right balance between conversion rates for batting and conversion rates for slugging. The discussion of the square-root relation between the two numbers has been helpful and should help to improve the accuracy of individual conversions and provide a standard by which the conversion factors can be judged. Obviously, the .87/.82 split I am using now isn't right. It appears to be a compromise between two different conversion levels. Figuring out why my calcuation of conversion factors from the data produced this discrepancy could lead to a more reliably derived factor.
I am hopeful that I/we can do better on all of these fronts.
A most reasoned, objective, and flexible answer. Without evidence, all of this is simply argument and opinion. I'll see what I can do to back up my claims with some scientific evidence.
KJOK-
Now I must give my humble apologies to you too. I was just speaking off the cuff and did not realize that your Oscar Charleston translation was to modern times.
"The East Orange Baseball club is set for a double diamond attraction this week end, beginning July 4 with the Brooklyn Royal Giants invading the East Orange Oval against the locals at 3 p.m.
John Beckwith, Giants manager, is now playing his strongest team of recent years, with Chick Anderson and the two Spearman brothers, Chollie and Clyde, who are clouting the ball at a .400 clip."
Of course, according to Riley the Unreliable, John Beckwith was deep into his criminal career by this time. According to Al Fennar, Beckwith stayed involved with baseball. I guess you can make up your own mind who is right.
But first two things (one on point and one off point):
1) In Post 118, I stated that Monte Irvin hit over .330 on the road in 1951. Unfortunately, that is just wrong. Over a decade ago, I went through the NY Times, of all things, and broke Irvin's seasons down. But, it was a long time ago. I am pretty sure that what I misremembered was this: In 1951, Monte Irvin hit over .330 in the second half of the season. So Mea Culpa.
2) I have been about the Padrons. I think it entirely possible that there are 3 of them: Jose, Juan, and Luis. The Jose Padron in Figueredo's book is a short-timer, playing one season in the Cuban League just at the intersection of the career of Luis and Juan.
I have always been under the impression that Juan Padron never played in Cuba. The interesting question is, if Jose is a third player, did he play in America?
“Will Monte Irvin’s Statistics support a .87 Batting Average (BA) reduction and a .82 Slugging Average (SA) reduction to translate Negro League statistics into Major League equivalents?”
To answer this question, the first thing that must be done is to compare Monte Irvin’s statistics within the context of the Leagues themselves [Off the point observations in brackets].
1) LEAGUE STATISTICS
Since Irvin went from the Negro National League to the National League, I’ll concentrate on comparing the two National Leagues with info on the Negro American League thrown in for perspective; but pretty much ignoring the Caucasian American League. Of course, the NAL absorbed four teams from the defunct NNL to make a ten-team league for the 1949 season; so, for that year, it is really the combined NAL-NNL anyways.
National League 1944-1953
[R/G = Runs per Game]
YEAR, R/G, BA, SA, ISA, (2B-3B-HR/500AB), SB/500AB
1944: 4.25, .261, .363, .102, (21.93-4.60-6.70), 4.43
1945: 4.46, .265, .364, .099, (21.29-3.92-6.74), 6.13
1946: 3.96, .256, .355, .100, (20.81-4.54-6.68), 5.68
1947: 4.57, .265, .390, .125, (21.92-4.62-10.44), 4.25
1948: 4.43, .261, .383, .122, (21.77-4.54-10.00), 5.31
1949: 4.54, .262, .389, .127, (21.83-4.33-10.95), 4.26
1950: 4.66, .261, .401, .140, (22.22-4.36-12.97), 4.39
1951: 4.46, .260, .390, .130, (20.44-4.30-11.99), 5.30
1952: 4.17, .253, .374, .121, (19.96-4.04-10.83), 4.73
1953: 4.75, .266, .411, .145, (20.84-4.85-14.04), 4.01
Negro National League 1944-1948
1944: 4.89, .274, .383, .109, (22.55-8.88-4.78), 9.01
1945: 4.79, .276, .381, .104, (19.67-7.77-5.68), 8.52
1946: 4.96, .255
1947: 4.94, .270, .388, .118, (22.69-7.32-7.20), 11.42
1948: 4.71, .263
Combined NAL/NNL League 1949
1949: 4.90, .268, .374, .106, (22.40-6.80-5.64), 9.41
Note 1: 1944, 1945, 1947, and 1949 Negro League stats are from complete Final Statistics
Note 2: 1946 and 1948 Stats are all but complete, excluding the season’s final week.
Note 3: 1946 NNL home run rate equals 5.69 HR per 500 AB.
Other Negro American League Statistics
YEAR, R/G, BA, SA, ISA, (2B-3B-HR/500 AB), SB/500 AB
1944: 4.29, .255, .329, .074, (16.40-6.85-2.30), 16.12
1945: 4.52, .258, .340, .082, (18.62-7.03-2.85), 13.64
1946: 4.49, .245 (Small sample: 3866 AB)
1947: 5.74, .283 (Final Statistics: 13919 AB)
1948: 5.59, .278 (One week left out: 15147 AB)
RAW STATISTICS
1944 Negro National League
250 G, 8160 AB, 1223 R, 2233 H, 368 2B, 145 3B, 78 HR, .274 BA, 147 SB
1945 Negro National League
226 G, 7398 AB, 1083 R, 2043 H, 291 2B, 115 3B, 84 HR, .276 BA, 126 SB
1946 Negro National League
263 G, 8784 AB, 1304 R, 2242 H, .255 BA and 100 HR
1947 Negro National League
402 G, 12430 AB, 1985 R, 3357 H, 564 2B, 182 2B, 179 HR, .270 BA, 284 SB
1948 Negro National League
318 G, 10517 AB, 1498 R, 2761 H, .263 BA
1949 Combined NNL/NAL League
820 G, 27410 AB, 4022 R, 7349 H, 1228 2B, 373 3B, 309 HR, .268, 516 SB
SOURCES:
National League: All-Time Baseball Sourcebook
Negro National League: New Jersey African American, various other newspapers & the 1945 and 1946 Negro League All-Star Programs.
The Negro National League (NNL) that Monte Irvin played in from 1945-1948 compares to the National League (NL) that he played in after 1949 in the following ways:
The NNL scored significantly more runs, hitting for a slightly higher overall batting average but with a lower isolated slugging percentage. There was significantly less HR hit in the NNL, but significantly more 3B. The rate of 2B was about the same. The NNL stole many more bases than the NL, about twice as many.
[NAL Note: In general, the NAL was the NNL’s schizophrenic cousin, hitting for either much more or much less BA with way less power (HR) but even more speed (3B, SB). For reasons that I cannot really explain, the NAL had extremely high offensive levels in 1947 and 1948 after playing in almost dead ball conditions from 1944 through 1946. After the NNL and the NAL combined in 1949, the 1949 NAL offensive level was obviously a mix of the typical 1946-1948 NNL offense and the high-octane offense of the 1947-1948 NAL.]
In order to properly evaluate Monte Irvin’s statistics, the next obvious question is:
1) Why did the Negro Leagues score so many more runs per game than the National League with about equivalent offensive levels (based on BA/SA)?
The one obvious answer to this question would simply be speed. The Negro Leaguers hit many more 3Bs and stole many more bases than the Major Leaguers. They were evidently playing a faster and quicker game. Although modern baseball analysis denigrates the value of the stolen base, it is obviously true that speed will help a team manufacture some runs.
However, there are two other factors that surely might be having an even greater effect on the rate of Negro Leagues’ runs scored than simply speed. The First would be errors and the Second would be base on balls or On-Base Percentage (OBP).
This is the extent information on Negro League Error Rates:
1944 NNL: 383 E in 250 G, 1.53 per game
1945 NNL: 371 E in 226 G, 1.64 per game
1947 NNL: 556 E in 402 G, 1.38 per game
1948 NNL: 516 E in 318 G, 1.62 per game
1944 NAL: 779 E in 394 G, 1.98 per game
1947 NAL: 776 E in 422 G, 1.84 per game
1949 NAL: 1311 E in 820 G, 1.60 per game
[The difference between the two Negro Leagues is interesting. The NNL, especially during World War 2, was a much older, more experienced, league than the NAL. Evidently, by 1949, when the leagues combined, the difference had washed out.]
On the Other hand, the Caucasian National League had significantly less errors:
1944 NL: 1361 E in 1246 G, 1.09 per game
1945 NL: 1405 E in 1236 G, 1.14 per game
1946 NL: 1259 E in 1242 G, 1.01 per game
1947 NL: 1154 E in 1240 G, 0.93 per game
1948 NL: 1256 E in 1238 G, 1.01 per game
1949 NL: 1189 E in 1244 G, 0.96 per game
Obviously, some of the runs scored differential is due to error rate.
Now the question becomes: How much is due to the rate of walks (BB/OBP)?
One would assume that the Negro Leagues would have lower BB and SO rates than the Major Leagues simply due to the quality of the umpiring. In other words, if you are not sure whether the Umpire is going to give you a free pass or ring you up on strikes, you are much more likely to try to take the matter out of his hands by swinging away and putting the ball in play.
Unfortunately, there is not much info on BB and SO rates for the 1940s Negro Leagues.
However:
In 1944, the NAL drew 911 BB and had 1523 SO in 12838 AB.
In 1945, the NAL drew 871 BB and had 1578 SO in 11950 AB.
In 1947, NNL pitchers, who recorded 3 or more decisions, had 1168 BB and 1676 SO in 3011 Innings Pitched (IP).
In 1949, NAL-NNL pitchers, who recorded 45 or more innings, had 2215 BB and 3081 SO in 6274 Innings Pitched (IP).
In the 1944 and 1945 NAL seasons, the rate of BB is significantly below the NL rate (by about 25%) and the rate of SO is significantly higher than the NL rate (by about 50%).
In the 1947 NNL season, the rate of BB is slightly lower (by 3%) and the rate of SO is much higher (by 33%) than the rates in the 1947 National League.
In the 1949 Combined NAL/NNL season, the rate of BB is lower (by about 10%) and the rate of SO is higher (by about 20%) than the rates in the 1949 National League.
Obviously, the addition of those pitchers who pitched less than 3 decisions in 1947 and less than 45 innings in 1949 would probably increase the BB rate and decrease the SO rate; but, in each case, there is much less than 10% of the possible IP thrown missing. So, unless these pitchers were almost superhumanly awful, these rates would not change that much.
Interestingly, the observation that, because of the quality of the umpiring, one would assume that the BB and SO rates of the Negro Leagues would be lower than those of the Major Leagues proves to be only half-right. Although the BB rates are slightly lower or much lower, the SO rates are uniformly much higher. In any event, it is obvious that the BB rates (or OBP) are not the cause of the higher runs scored rate of the Negro National League.
[Also, it is once again interesting to note the difference between the older, more experienced, NNL and their generally younger, wilder, NAL cousins. As one would suspect, the league with the older and more experienced players walked more and struck out less.]
In conclusion, we can say that Monte Irvin’s NNL of 1946-1948, when compared to Monte Irvin’s NL of 1949-1953, had the following characteristics:
1) Scored significantly more runs, mostly due to a much higher error rate and perhaps speed.
2) Hit for a slightly higher overall batting average.
3) Slugged for a lower isolated slugging percentage with about the same rate of 2B, significantly more 3B, and significantly less HR.
4) Stole significantly more bases than the NL, about twice as many.
5) Drew about the same amount, or slightly less, of BB.
6) Struck out at a greater rate, somewhere between 20 and 33 percent more
In other words, the Negro Leagues played a faster, looser (or sloppier) game that was less power and walk dependent than the contemporary Major Leagues. Of the two Negro Leagues, the NNL played a version of baseball closer to that of the Major Leagues, and the NAL was much further away from the Major League style. On the basis of the speed, runs scored, and even sloppiness, one might actually claim that the Negro Leagues played a more exciting game.
Next, to properly evaluate Monte Irvin’s career, the man himself must be considered.
Monte Irvin was born February 25, 1919, in Alabama. In 1927, his family moved to New Jersey. Irvin was, to put it mildly, a High School athletic superstar: lettering in Baseball, Basketball, Football, and Track for the Orange (NJ) High School in every year he attended the school.
Irvin grew up to be the perfect baseball prospect: big, strong, and fast with the ability to hit for average, hit for power, control the strike zone, throw, run, and field multiple positions. On top of all this, Irvin had a fantastic disposition: calm, controlled, competitive, and intelligent. If Irvin grew up today, he would almost certainly be the first player picked in the baseball draft.
He began playing professionally for Abe and Effa Manley’s Newark (NJ) Eagles of the Negro National League (NNL) in the summers of 1937 and 1938. In 1939, Irvin dropped out of college to join the Eagles full time; playing shortstop, third base and centerfield depending on the team’s needs. From 1939 to 1941, Irvin was recognized as the coming superstar of the Negro Leagues.
In 1941, Monte Irvin began to hit for great power in the Negro Leagues after copying the batting stance of Joe DiMaggio. In 1942, after an early season dispute with Effa Manley over his salary, Irvin left the United States to play for the Vera Cruz team in Mexico. At the age of 23, Irvin had (by his own evaluation) the greatest baseball year of his life, winning the Mexican League Triple Crown with statistics that are just short of incredible.
[Interestingly, the only player, in the history of the Mexican League, whose statistics can be compared to Irvin’s 1942 season without blushing are those of Josh Gibson in 1940 and 1941. Both men played in the same park. All in all, Gibson’s stats are better. While Gibson’s 1941 rate stats are quite comparable to Irvin’s 1942 stats, Gibson played the whole season. Irvin only played two-thirds of the season. Both men lead the Mexican League in HR, but Gibson hit 33 to Irvin’s 20. Of course, Gibson spent most of the 1941 season indulging in a season long drinking contest with Sammy Bankhead.
In other words, playing hung over, Gibson was as great a hitter as Irvin was at his absolute peak. Gibson’s 1940 Mexican season, when he was evidently sober, was so ungodly that nothing can be compared to it. Playing just the last month, Gibson hit .467 and came within one home run of tying for the league lead. That would be like Barry Bonds sitting out the most of the 2005 season, coming back in September, and then crushing the ball so hard and often that he failed to lead the League in home runs by just a whisker.]
Monte Irvin was inducted into US Army for the Second World War on March 9, 1943, before he could return for his second season in Mexico. He was discharged from the Army on September 1, 1945. Unlike most Major League players and many Negro League players during World War 2, Irvin did not play any type of organized baseball while in the Army.
In September of 1945, Irvin returned to play for the Newark Eagles, hitting .222 in a handful of games. He played in Puerto Rico for the Winter Season of 1945-46 to tune himself up; and was robbed of the BA title after hitting .368. In 1946, he played shortstop for the NNL Champion Eagles, winning the batting title (.389) and finishing tied for third in HR. Irvin hit .462 in the Negro World Series; and the Newark Eagles defeated the Kansas City Monarchs in 7 games.
Returning to Puerto Rico for the 1946-47 Winter Season, Monte Irvin hit .387. In 1947, Irvin continued to play shortstop for the Eagles. The Eagles won the first half of the NNL season; but the team, and Irvin, slumped after the Eagles sold Larry Doby to the Major Leagues. Irvin lead the 1947 NNL in HR and RBI, but Newark finished second.
After playing for Habana in the Cuban Winter League Season of 1947-48, Irvin began the 1948 NNL season with an unknown illness, reportedly under a doctor’s care, and missed the first month of play. After the season ended, the NNL folded up and the Newark Eagle franchise was sold, moved to Houston, and entered into the NAL. Monte Irvin returned to play for Habana in the 1948-49 Winter League Season, and lead the Cuban League in HR.
In January 1949, Branch Rickey and the Brooklyn Dodgers, believing that Irvin was now a free agent, signed Irvin to a Brooklyn contract while he played in Cuba. The Dodgers had originally approached Irvin in 1946, but backed off because the Eagles had a signed contract with Irvin that contained a reserve clause. Rickey, though certainly a hero in the integration saga, pretty much refused on general principles of cheapness to pay Negro League teams for their players.
Rickey also probably realized that Effa Manley, who was still angry for his uncompensated signing of former Eagle Don Newcombe, would want her pound of flesh. When Effa Manley strenuously objected to Irvin’s signing and pointed out that the Eagles had been sold and not dissolved, Rickey voided Irvin’s contract rather than pay Manley for it. Manley sold Irvin’s contract to the New York Giants, who were looking for their own Jackie Robinson.
In 1949, the now 30-year-old Monte Irvin played for the Giants’ Triple-A International League Jersey City Giants farm club and hit .373 with good power. Irvin made his Major League Debut on July 8, 1949; and played sporadically for the rest of the year, hitting just .224 in 76 AB. For some reason, Leo Durocher, the Giant manager, resisted just letting Irvin play so that he could get his feet on the ground.
In 1950, Monte Irvin once again began the year with Jersey City but went absolutely atomic with his bat, hitting 10 HR and 33 RBI, with a .510 BA, in 18 games. He was brought back up to the Giants where Durocher played him some at 1B and some in RF for the rest of the year. Irvin hit 15 HR, 66 RBI, and .299 BA in 110 Games to finally establish himself as a Major League player at the age of 31. However, Durocher still will not simply commit to playing Irvin full time.
In 1951, Irvin, after a great Spring Training season, began the season as the Giants regular 1B and clean-up hitter. However, Irvin started the season slowly (15 G, 1 HR, 8 RBI, .226 BA in April) and Durocher lost faith in him. Durocher batted him eighth a lot, sat him for six various games, put him in at RF, LF, 1B, and even 3B; and generally just screwed Irvin around for the entire first half of the 1951 season. The Giants fell way behind the Dodgers in the pennant race.
But Irvin started to hit. On the 78th game of the season (exactly the beginning of the second half of the season), Irvin went back into the clean-up spot. For the 86th game, Monte Irvin became the starting LF for good and was no longer shifted around at all. Irvin hit 12 HR, 71 RBI, with a .332 BA, in the second half. Irvin was the driving force behind the Giants surge to the 1951 NL pennant. In the 1951 Series, Irvin hit .458 but the Giants lose in six games to the Yankees.
On April 2 of 1952, while playing a Spring Training exhibition game in Denver, Irvin badly broke his ankle. After missing the entire first half of the season, he returned in the second half and, playing with a special heavy high top shoe to protect the ankle, hit .310 but with little power (4 HR) and almost no speed (2 2B, 1 3B, 0 SB) in 126 AB.
In 1953, the now 34-year-old Monte Irvin begins the season as the Giants’ clean-up hitter and left fielder. Although he starts slow again in April (14 Games, .218 BA) while still wearing the heavy protective shoe, Durocher leaves him alone and doesn’t lose faith in him. Irvin removes the protective shoe in May and begins to heat up. By August 8, 1953, Irvin has raised his hitting statistics to 20 HR, 91 RBI, with a .339 BA and .562 SA, in 101 Games. He is white-hot with the bat and on the verge of taking over the NL BA and RBI leads.
On August 9 of 1953, Monte Irvin once again badly re-injures his ankle in a collision at home plate in St. Louis. He missed several weeks, and then returned to play poorly while hobbling around (22 G, 49 AB, 1 HR, .245 BA, .367 SA). Irvin finished the season with a .329 BA. This second ankle injury would effectively end Irvin’s prime years as a baseball player.
In 1954, the now 35-year-old Irvin, handicapped by his wrecked ankle, struggles through a 19 HR, 64 RBI, .262 season. He bats just .222 as a part-time player in the New York Giants World Series victory over the Cleveland Indians. In 1955, Irvin once again starts slow (.253, .333 SA) and the Giants demote him to their Triple-A farm club. At Triple-A, he finally begins to hit again (.352) and is drafted by the Chicago Cubs for the 1956 season.
In 1956, the now 37-year-old Irvin hits 15 HR, 50 RBI, with a .271 BA and .460 SA, as a part-time left fielder for the Cubs. Released after the season, Monte Irvin signs for the 1957 season with the Pacific Coast League Los Angeles Angels. However, he retires after a handful of games due to back problems that have probably been caused or exasperated by his ankle injuries. Irvin will later estimate that his ankle injuries took four to five years off his career.
Irvin goes on to a later career working in the Baseball Commissioner’s Office in the Bowie Kuhn administration. Most notably, Irvin is part of the Special Committee to honor the Negro Leagues and he is one of the nine original Negro League players enshrined in the Baseball Hall of Fame.
MEXICAN STATISTICS 1942 (Vera Cruz)
YEAR-G-AB-R-H-2B-3B-HR-RBI-BA-SA-SB-BB-SO
1942: 63 237 74 94 17 6 20 79 .397 .772 11 50 19
PUBLISHED NEGRO LEAGUE STATISTICS 1945-1948 (Newark Eagles):
1945 NNL
5 G, 18 AB, 5 R, 4 H, 1 2B, 0 3B, 1 HR, .222 BA, 444 SA, 0 SB
1946 NNL
57 G, 213 AB, 59 R, 84 H, 20 2B, 4 3B, 8 HR, 56 RBI, .394 BA, 638 SA
1947 NNL
81 G, 287 AB, 70 R, 91 H, 18 2B, 4 3B, 14 HR, 71 RBI, .317 BA, 554 SA, 19 SB
1948 NNL
42 G, 135 AB, 26 R, 43 H, .319 BA
Notes:
1): The 1945 and 1947 Statistics are final and complete. The 1946 statistics do not include the final 4 games played by the Newark Eagles, during which Irvin played 2 games, went 2 for 8 with 0 HR, and finished at 86 H in 221 AB to win the NNL Batting Title with a .389 BA. The 1948 Statistics do not include the very final Newark Eagle game of the season. The Eagles played 56 Games in 1948 and Irvin missed the first 13 games because of illness. It is unknown if he played in the final game.
2) In 1948, the Negro Press Sportswriters constantly referred to Irvin as the 1947 HR Champion. However, for some reason, they constantly credited him with 16 HR and either 69 or 70 RBI for that 1947 season.
Newark Eagles Team Games 1946-1948 (How many Irvin played):
1946- 63 NNL Games (59 of 63 Games)
1947- 83 NNL Games (81 of 83 Games)
1948- 56 NNL Games (42 or 43 of 56 Games)
TRIPLE-A STATISTICS 1949-1950 (Jersey City Giants)
YEAR-G-AB-R-H-2B-3B-HR-RBI-BA-SA-SB-BB-SO
1949: 63 204 55 76 18 05 09 52 .373 .642-14 59 22
1950: 18 051 28 26 04 01 10 33 .510 1.216-02 29 06
NATIONAL LEAGUE STATISTICS 1949-1953 (New York Giants)
YEAR-G-AB-R-H-2B-3B-HR-RBI-BA-SA-SB-BB-SO
1949: 036 076 07 017 03 02 00 007 .224 .316 00 17 11
1950: 110 374 61 112 19 05 15 066 .299 .497 03 51 41
1951: 151 558 94 174 19 11 24 121 .312 .514 12 89 44
1952: 046 126 10 039 02 01 04 021 .310 .437 00 10 11
1953: 124 444 72 146 21 05 21 097 .329 .541 02 55 34
One of the most interesting things about Monte Irvin’s statistics is the comparison between his Mexican League stats of 1942 (first line) and his combined stats from Triple-A in 1949 and 1950 (second line).
G-AB-R-H-2B-3B-HR-RBI-BA-SA-SB-BB-SO
63-237-74-094-17-6-20-79-.397-.772-11-50-19
81-255-83-102-22-6-19-85-.400-.757-16-88-28
In fact, these statistics look like the same player put them up in the same league. The only real difference is that the 30-year-old Irvin walked at a greater rate than the 23-year-old Irvin. Of course, this is exactly what you would expect.
But this phenomenon is somewhat unremarkable. In 1948, Luke Easter hit .363 in the NNL. In 1949, he hit .363 in Triple-A. In 1948, Ray Dandridge hit .369 in Mexico. In 1949, he hit .362 in Triple-A. From 1946 to 1948, Minnie Minoso hit .306, .294, and .336 in the NNL. In 1949 and 1950, he hit .297 and .339 in Triple-A. From 1946 to 1948, Sam Jethroe hit .325 in 717 AB in the NAL. In 1948 and 1949, he hit .325 in 927 Triple-A at bats.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the Negro Leagues, Mexican League, and Triple-A Leagues of the 1940s were of equivalent strength if the League statistical rates were identical. When a player goes from one League where he is already experienced to another League where he has no experience and is able to post the same averages while he adjusts, the only conclusion is that the second League must be inferior to the first League.
[Also, despite Jethroe’s statistics, this usually doesn’t work as well for NAL players. In fact, I would have to say that the only reason it does work for Jethroe is that he was injured and sub-par for most of the 1948 season, thus bringing down his cumulative NAL batting average.
As was mentioned before, the NAL had a high-octane, high BA offense in 1947 and 1948. There are a number of players (Bob Boyd, Piper Davis, Hank Thompson, Artie Wilson, etc.) that hit for a much higher BA in these NAL years than they later would in Triple-A. Of course, until now, I had never realized how high the NAL BA was in 1947 and 1948. It will be very interesting to go back and see if these player’s BA are more consistent after an adjustment.
Also, another problem with these players may be the phenomenon of the ‘rising tide.’ In other words, as black players made it into the Majors and particularly Triple-A, they would obviously elevate the talent level of these Leagues by forcing lesser players down the organized baseball totem pole. The Triple-A Leagues in, say 1955, almost surely had to be tougher than the Triple-A Leagues of 1946 to 1950 for this reason.]
Now that there are hopefully adequate League and Player numbers for Monte Irvin’s career, it is possible to compare his Negro National League career to his National League career.
From 1945 to 1948 (Age 26 to 29), Monte Irvin played two full seasons in the NNL, one injured season, and one season where he entered the league late in the season and just played a little.
From 1949 to 1952 (Age 30 to 33), Monte Irvin played two full seasons in the NL, one injured season, and one season where he entered the league late in the season and just played a little.
So it would stand to reason that these four-year periods could and should be compared to each other. Some may say that, comparing Monte Irvin’s prime (26-29) to his post-prime years (30-33), is slightly unfair; but, to forestall any cries of bias in favor of the Negro Leaguers, it seems appropriate to actually try to be as biased against Irvin as possible.
From 1945 to 1948, Monte Irvin hit .339969 (222/653) in the NNL.
The weighted (by Irvin’s at bats) 1945-1948 NNL BA is .263841.
The conversion factor is 1.28854.
From 1949 to 1952, Monte Irvin hit .301597 (342/1134) in the NL.
The weighted (by Irvin’s at bats) 1949-1952 NL BA is .259616.
The conversion factor is 1.16170.
The conversion factor of NNL BA into NL BA (1.16170 divided by 1.28854) by this calculation is .901563.
In other words, a Negro League player going from the Negro Leagues to the Major Leagues, in this time period, would lose 90 percent of his batting average. Obviously, this is slightly higher than the current conversion rate being used of 87 percent.
However, there are very obviously two glaring weaknesses with this conversion equation. The first is that it ignores adjustment effects. The second is that it ignores park effects.
1) Adjustment Effects (i.e. the Matsui effect)
In 1948, Candy Jim Taylor, a long-time Negro league player, manager, and official was asked how the Negro League players would fare in the Major Leagues. Taylor replied that, after they had a year to adjust, they would do just fine.
In 2003, Hideki Matsui, the greatest player in Japan, signed with the Yankees and came to the United States to play in the Major Leagues. Matsui faced pretty much the exact same situation that Monte Irvin faced in late 1949 and 1950. Matsui was in a new League, with no past history or experience of the League or its players. He needed to gain experience and adjust. In 2003, Matsui hit for a BA-OBP-SA line of .287-.353-.435. But, in the year 2004, Matsui had evidently adjusted to his new League and hit .298-.390-.522.
[In fact, whether Matsui continues to adjust and improve will be one of the most fascinating aspects of the 2005 season to me. I assume that he will continue to improve, just not as much as he did between the 2003 and 2004 seasons. If he does improve some more, the Yankees will have, through nothing more than the process of adjustment, one of the best hitters in the Major Leagues and Matsui will justify all the hype.]
Of course, the point of all this is that Matsui, an incredibly durable and consistent player, was not any less talented in 2003; he simply needed to adjust. If Matsui had stayed in Japan, his statistics for 2003 and 2004 would almost surely look remarkably similar if not virtually the same.
By comparing the Monte Irvin of the 1945 to 1948 Negro National League to the Monte Irvin of the 1949 to 1952 National League, his adjustment period for the Major Leagues is being included in the equation. This would unfairly lower the conversion factor. The only fair thing to do is to remove Monte Irvin’s 1949 and 1950 adjustment period (146 G, 450 AB) from the discussion.
Basically, Irvin spent three seasons in the Major Leagues (1951 to 1953) after his adjustment period and before his ankle injuries totally derailed his career. Of these three seasons, Irvin was a full time player in two (1951 and 1953) and lost one season to injury (1952). In the Negro National League from 1946 to 1948, Irvin played two full seasons (1946 and 1947) and was hampered by an unknown illness in the other (1948).
Obviously, the fairest possible comparison that could be made would be between Irvin’s two full seasons in the Negro Leagues (1946 and 1947) and his two full seasons in the Major Leagues (1951 and 1953). Once again, notice that Irvin’s Negro League seasons are in his prime (Age 26 and 27) and Major League seasons are past his prime (Age 32 and 34). Also, his numbers were obviously reduced by injury in 1953. However, to continue the bias against Irvin, both of these factors will be ignored.
Interestingly, by comparing Monte Irvin’s 1946 and 1947 NNL seasons to his 1951 and 1953 NL seasons, it also becomes possible to compare his Slugging Average. The 1947 NNL League SA is known. Although the 1946 NNL SA is not known, the information available makes it clear that it falls between the known SA of the 1945 NNL and the known SA of the 1947 NNL.
Because it will bias the equation against the Negro Leagues, the much lower 1945 NNL isolated SA, rather than the 1947 NNL isolated SA, will be used to evaluate Irvin’s 1946 SA. Also, in addition to that adjustment, the two extra HR that the Negro League sportswriters decided to add to Irvin’s 1947 HR total in 1948 will be included in Irvin’s 1947 statistics to further bias the case against the NNL.
So, now that the problem of adjustment period is considered, that leaves only Park Factors to consider and adjust for.
From the beginning of his career in 1937 until 1948, Monte Irvin learned how to hit in Ruppert Stadium, the Eagles’ home field in Newark, New Jersey. The dimensions of Ruppert Field were 305 feet down both foul lines, 365 feet in both power alleys, and 400 feet to dead center field. In other words, Ruppert Stadium was a symmetrical hitter’s park that would especially reward or favor a modern style power hitter (i.e. to hit for power to both the right and left field alleys).
Perhaps not un-coincidentally, Monte Irvin grew up to be a great, modern style, power hitter.
In 1949 to 1955, Monte Irvin had the New York Giants’ Polo Grounds as his home field. The Polo Grounds was a park that would reward extreme pull hitters and punish all other hitters, and especially a modern style power hitter. Shaped like a bath tub, the left field foul line was just 280 feet away and the right field foul line a mere 259 feet away. However, both power alleys were over 440 feet away; and dead center field was a phenomenal 490 feet away.
Not surprisingly, the Polo Grounds killed Monte Irvin’s statistics.
Monte Irvin 1951 and 1953 Home/Road Splits
1951
Home (top)/Road (bottom):
75 G, 270 AB, 84 H, .311 BA, .474 SA, 8 2B, 6 3B, 8 HR
76 G, 288 AB, 90 H, .313 BA, .552 SA, 11 2B, 5 3B, 16 HR
1953
59 G, 206 AB, 64 H, .311 BA, .476 SA, 7 2B, 3 3B, 7 HR
65 G, 238 AB, 82 H, .345 BA, .597 SA, 14 2B, 2 3B, 14 HR
1951 & 1953 Combined
134 G, 476 AB, 148 H, .311 BA, .475 SA, 15 2B, 9 3B, 15 HR
141 G, 526 AB, 172 H, .327 BA, .572 SA, 25 2B, 7 3B, 30 HR
The question now becomes: How do we adjust for Irvin’s problem with the Polo Grounds?
In 1951 and 1953, the 8 team National League played a 154 game schedule, each team playing 77 games at home and 77 on the road with 11 games at each venue against the other teams (22 games total per season). In other words, if Monte Irvin’s 1951 and 1953 home statistics are divided by 7 and added back into the road totals, the end result i