2006 Arizona Diamondbacks

Being in a cold climate, I have spent much time hiding in the basement this winter, and so it hasn't been natural for me to look forward to the new baseball season. The Hardball Times's 2006 annual has tons of great stuff, like tables, charts, and graphs, but it's no substitute for real baseball.

The newest entry in the world sports calendar, MLB's World Baseball Classic, had its particulars nailed down at a relatively late date, and so Internet opinion progressed from derision to cautious neutrality to guarded optimism as the first games were played in March 2006. The seriousness on the part of all participants was evident, and as the tourney concluded, there were no known organizational snafus, betting scandals, or steroidal embarrassments to detract from the competition. It was a legitimate event after all.

This means that for the first time in a long time, March baseball reportage is not dominated by spring training updates, and we have all been given a reprieve from the fates and fortunes and breakfast menus and haircut analyses on various East Coast baseball clubs, none of whom need be named. On the downside, that means you, the reader, may not be up to date on the Diamondbacks as they get ready for 2006.

This is a problem, perhaps even bigger than performance-enhancing drugs, lying politicians, NCAA athletes getting phony high school diplomas, or holey socks.

To prepare, I did a session of non-baseball reading over the winter. I tried sampling a few entries from Joel Spolsky's MBA-wannabe reading list, but the most poignant reading had nothing to do with management, baseball, or "Management by Baseball": Ronald Hutton's Charles the Second, King of England, Scotland, and Ireland (Oxford University Press, 1990).

Hutton, a traditional scholarly biographer, looks mostly at the politics of Charles II's reign as the first king of England after the fall of the English Commonwealth. Yes, there are at least three mistresses and assorted illegitimate children who annoyed and inconvenienced His Highness, and Hutton names names, but bedroom antics weren't the be-all and end-all of his investigation.

As I read this long, dry profile of a dead king, I couldn't help but make comparisons of this retrospective of an era (a height of British monarchy) to the plight of many modern baseball teams.

A walk through history

1660-1685

Ignoring the Robert Downey Jr. movie, the fact remains that the English Restoration was an actual era in world history, with real characters living in it.

The beginning

As the first and grandest king of Restoration England, Charles II operated with a mandate of sorts: to avenge the death of his father Charles I, executed by Oliver Cromwell and the English Parliament in the process of creating the Commonwealth (1649-1660); and to rectify the excesses of Cromwell and his humorless, over-Puritanized rule. He succeeded at task one; task two he botched.

Task one was accomplished while Charles II and his retinue were riding the exile road between Den Haag and Paris, trying vainly to raise funds for an invasion. Cromwell died while in office in 1658, and neither his son nor his subordinates, especially his generals, had the stomach to continue on the Commonwealth path and clean up a post-Cromwell succession mess. Thanks to the help of Charles I loyalists and some friendly (albeit self-interested) royalist nobles, in 1660 Charles II wangled his way back to his homeland to re-establish the King / Parliament / nobles / commoners dynamic that had ruled England for four centuries and more. This was no mere constitutional monarchy, but a mostly absolute monarchy.

At home

To actually govern the kingdom, Charles relied on a "Privy Council" consisting of his oldest, closest advisors. Hutton reveals that Charles regularly rotated out advisors who tried to arrogate too much power behind his back, replacing them with younger or more trusted advisors, based on his own hunches. When two or more opposing factions appealed to him on a matter of some decision (e.g. should we exile this traitor to the Orkneys?), he liked to agree with both of them in private, then sit back and watch the squawking in council debates, as each side thought they were backed 100% by the Crown and slowly discovered that they weren't. Charles also wasn't above mocking council members behind their backs. In short, as a politician of elites, he was a true Master of Chaos.

Charles's first tactic after taking power was to reward his noble supporters by granting them back their own lands stolen by the Commonwealth, or what was purported to be their own stolen lands. As you would expect, alleged supporters (today we would call them "lobbyists") mobbed the King's advisors (today we would call them "handlers") asking for land grants (today we would call them "candy"). If enough land wasn't found in England to meet their demands, Charles granted land from Scotland or Ireland. Charles's own courtiers often connived in convincing the King to aggrandize supporters with special grants and royal titles ad nauseam, then taking a kickback.

All the while, Charles tried to revive the patriotism and adoration of the public by spending inordinately on himself, his court retainers, and public ceremonies and parades. A tax-and-spend regime such as this soon discovered there was precious little tax being collected, and he spent much time in council trying to figure out how to tax the public more efficiently.

Britain's underlying religious strife was another multifaceted domestic battle he had to fight. As the head of the Church of England and Defender of the Faith, Charles II naturally had to protect Anglican privileges in England. And yet while he and his royalist supporters were fighting Cromwell, his most visible allies had been Scottish Protestants, some of whom were part of the Auld Kirk (i.e., the Church of Scotland) and were Presbyterians (those who favored more loosely organized, self-governing religious bodies opposed to the hierarchical Church of England). They had deep hooks in and rivalries with secular Scottish politicians. And part of Charles's "vengeance" mission was to reassert his authority over religion in Scotland, authority that Charles I had fought for.

Oliver Cromwell had fought battles throughout both Scotland and Ireland to assert English superiority over these lands. It was not quite the time of tribes and Mel Gibson in face paint, but Scotland still had lairds, the Kirk, highlanders, and other Scotsmen on horses. Then, as now, they bridled under perceptions (by themselves or others) that they were not in fact ruled by an outside authority.

After Cromwell, the story of any English leader, king or not, is one of trying to effectively extend his power into lands that did not want English rule by avoiding direct rule, and instead co-opting as many local leaders as possible into supporting him. So it was with both Scotland and Ireland in Restoration England. As a point of fact, Charles II worked extremely hard to make Scotland part of his kingdom, by co-opting religious and parliamentary nobles with lavish privileges in London, and allowing them free rein to carry out their own local political rivalries. (He was far more hands-off with Ireland, delegating flunkies to Dublin with conspicuously less success.)

Besides the Anglicans and the vanilla Presbyterians, Roman Catholics still lived in Charles's lands, alongside Quakers, Puritans, and various strict Calvinists. It was a major scandal in 1672 when James (Charles's younger brother, heir apparent to the throne, naval commander, and considered a bit of a flake by the king's closest advisors) announced his conversion to Catholicism. Under public pressure, Parliament turned extremely anti-royalist, warning Charles II not to even think about letting James become king and threatening to enact laws that would put anti-Catholic office restrictions into common law.

Charles had accepted the throne under the condition that religious minorities would continue to be tolerated; this condition was soon forgotten, and a battery of new persecutory religious restrictions was enacted. His repressive policies (some of which he supported because he legitimately felt these groups threatened public order, some of which a virulently anti-Papist Parliament forced upon him, and some of which he concocted to protect brother James from his headhunters) provided the impetus for many of these minorities to relocate to the American colonies.

Abroad

But Restoration England, like a modern baseball club, was not solely operating in an internally focused vacuum of domestic policy and politics. There were rivals and more rivals, and alliances were forged and broken at a dizzying rate. England regularly corresponded with foreign kingdoms: France in the time of the Sun King, Louis XIV (Charles was his cousin); Spain and King Philip; the independent Netherlands kingdom and their youthful duke William; the various fiefdoms of Germany; and the seafaring Portuguese kingdom, with whom Charles II eventually negotiated a marriage of alliance to one of the royal princesses.

As every schoolchild knows, one of the oldest, most reliable methods of conducting foreign policy is by fighting. For his part, Charles II took the lead in instigating what became known as the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Nominally about protecting English shipping interests and settling a three-way territorial dispute over the Spanish Netherlands (what was to become Belgium), it is better understood as a way for Charles and England to grab a seat at the table of great nations, and to demonstrate that Britain was back and better than ever.

His actual war preparations left much to be desired, resembling those of the Royals of Kansas City. Underfinanced, underfed navies regularly got trapped in the River Thames by warships, or sailed impotently off the Dutch coast in the dead of winter, unable to enter well-guarded harbors. Army brigades composed mostly of Scots and Irishmen were sent off to the Continent to be fed (or not) by the armies that hosted them. The King's delegates made arrogant demands for Dutch harbors, demands which were politely ignored by both the Dutch and the French who were invading Dutch territory.

When the war was resolved by treaty, England was not considered notably better or worse off than before the war began. The eventual Dutch trade of their New Amsterdam colony for British Suriname was considered a minor win at best. "New York" was predicted to become yet another underperforming colony with little potential compared to Philadelphia and Boston.

The end

As the typical king did in those days, Charles II died on the throne, leaving his wayward brother James to pick up the scepter in 1685, ruling a radicalized British kingdom as a Catholic king.

But that really isn't important right now. Baseball is.

1995-2004

It's best to review the Diamondbacks' early existence by reviewing my looking-forward article written in 2005, only because it's considered bad form to repeat oneself.

2005

What went right

The Diamondbacks didn't lose 111 games again. Old men Troy Glaus, Luis Gonzalez, and Shawn Green stayed in the lineup and performed reliably. Brandon Webb stayed healthy and performed well. The team did great in one-run games (28-18). And they finished in second place in the NL West, ahead of three other teams. My pre-season prediction of 65 wins was on target, at least in the Pythagorean sense.

What went wrong

Outfield defense collapsed, becoming the weakest point on the team, which undermined the pitching staff. Blowouts on the wrong side became common, with both starting and relieving pitchers knocking their own team out of the game far too often. Relievers' roles weren't solidified, and the good relievers were thrown out there to the point of overuse. No one other than old man Tony Clark had a truly breakout hitting performance. The team still wasn't that good despite finishing in second. The only thing they did better than the average NL team, batting-wise, was hitting for power.

The 2006 season

Whether through economics or the inclination of new management, the Diamondbacks are better off than many downtrodden franchises entering 2006. By the moves made to date, Arizona is acknowledging that the team is probably not as close to contending as a cursory look at the 2005 standings indicates, and is likely doing the right thing in continuing to tread the line between reliance on youth and reliance on veterans from the last good Snakes team. The timing of the arrival of their group of highly regarded young prospects means they should be right in line to take over from the vets.

Catchers

In a crime of opportunity, Arizona acquired Johnny Estrada for two relievers after their 2005 catching strategy of two kids, a broken-down veteran, and a duffel bag full of oranges proved to be misguided.  Estrada had gotten past his reputation as That Guy in the Kevin Millwood trade to become a useful, improved catcher for the Braves. A mid-season 2005 injury torpedoed his hitting, but at a modest $2 million in salary, Estrada should help the Diamondbacks in 2006, and help himself for 2006 and beyond.

Chris Snyder, one of the kids whose hitting problems became a major problem for the team, returns as Estrada's backup. Koyie Hill, the other kid whose hitting problems became a major problem for the team and who has no minor league options left, is still getting spring at-bats of the stray-puppy variety.

Infielders

This year's infield plan has radically changed from past years, with all four positions being shuffled from the previous season. Uncertainty abounds.

First Base

First is the home of a perplexing positional battle, on a franchise plagued with first base troubles throughout their history. Arizona is swearing up and down that they are comfortable with their long-ready prospect Conor Jackson becoming the everyday first baseman, providing some power with exceptional patience. Reasonable, except that last year's end-of-season 1B Tony Clark is coming off a terrific season and was re-signed for 2006 and 2007. If Jackson struggles at all, it will be tough for manager Bob Melvin to keep Clark out of a part- or full-time role again.

Unlike last year's first baseman edged off to make room for Clark (Chad Tracy), Jackson has no positional flexibility. Barring an unexpected trade, expect first base to be a straight positional share with some potential for press drama between the Tony Party and the Conor Party.

Shortstop

After Royce Clayton proved unready to play shortstop at a high level and refused Arizona's generous offer of a one-year contract, the Snakes turned to last year's second baseman, Craig Counsell, and have pushed him to play SS for this season. Steady but slight, Counsell was very good at 2B and (at least for the first couple months of 2005) got on-base at a good clip. His D and O combined to produce 21 Win Shares, very close to the team lead of 23 (Troy Glaus).

However, another year later and moved to a tougher defensive position, chances are ideal to revert to an awful 2004-level Counsell. This spring he is fighting a torn labrum in his non-throwing shoulder. The Diamondbacks are not really worrying, for they (a) trust in Counsell's ability to play through injury, (b) feel they have two blue-chip SS prospects in the minors to replace him, (c) feel they enough backup shortstops in their system to cover any contingencies, or (d) all of the above.

Third Base

Last year's annual big Arizona free-agent splash, Troy Glaus, hit with the expected power and stayed in the lineup; however, his well-known physical ailments curtailed his defensive range. As an economy measure, he was traded to Toronto, and last year's first baseman/right fielder Chad Tracy is getting flopped back to his minor league position to replace Glaus. Tracy was quoted as saying he was scared out of his wits playing RF, but fortunately he didn't take it to the plate, showing a solid, improving power bat. In either 2006 or 2007, he will contend for an All-Star berth if he's left alone at third base and stays healthy. With this team, that's probably not guaranteed.

Second Base

Last year's second baseman Counsell's move to SS and the Glaus trade has resulted in this year's surest thing in the infield, Orlando Hudson. Hudson, previously best known for calling his former general manager a helluva pimp back in the day, or something like that, has matured into a reasonably powerful, slick-fielding second baseman. He won't play 150 games a season, but when he does play he will be a fine, bargain-priced upgrade for 2006 and beyond. Bob Melvin loves his style of play and intends to bat him second, even against left-handed pitching, which is his weak-hitting side as a switch-hitter.

Outfielders

Generally speaking, the heart of the Diamondbacks batting philosophy has been a heavily veteran, heavily offensive-minded outfield. This blew up on them in 2005, but they plan to take a similar approach this year.

Left Field

Luis Gonzalez enters his eighth season as the Diamondbacks' incumbent left fielder. Due $11.5 million in his final year, he would be traded except for (a) the team's desire not to alienate their old-time fan base who remember the good old days and consider him a favorite, and (b) other teams' desire not to pay out $11.5 million or a percentage thereof.

Luis's offense no longer supports his salary, and his range and arm are weak even for a left fielder. He still could probably out-field Barry Bonds, though.

Center Field

This is a curious black hole in the Snakes' lineup. Attempting to be conservative by patching in Jose Cruz Jr. there in 2005, Cruz cratered, forcing the Diamondbacks to trade him and performing a weird platoon maneuver out there for the remainder of the season. This year's solution, cheap free agent Eric Byrnes, is well known to fans of the Oakland A's for his surfer locks and mentality, his free-swinging ways, and his ability to field three OF positions inadequately. Arizona hopes being given a full-time slot in center will stabilize his hitting and fielding, possibly back to the glory days of Steve Finley.

Right Field

Shawn Green is back as the everyday right fielder, after helping cover center field for a couple of months. He is due $19.5 million minimum over the next two seasons, and he won't earn it.

Bench

It's unclear how this will operate, but the bench will be thin yet again, after Tony Clark and the backup catcher are accounted for. Luis Terrero was the nominal fourth outfielder in 2005, but Bob Melvin preferred the proven veteranness of Quinton McCracken over Luis, both as a PH and as a defensive replacement. McCracken is retired and Terrero is out of options. The more likely fourth OF candidate is Jeff DaVanon, a ripened free agent from the Angels with a low BA, high OBP, and a Byrnesian willingness to handle all three positions.

In a pre-season shuffle, Alberto Callaspo and Damion Easley get a chance to fill the departed Alex Cintron's role as a backup infielder. Cintron was a good-bat infielder with problematic glove; it remains to see whether Callaspo will be similar, or be a more typical good-glove problematic-bat bench infielder. Easley is more of a known quantity, having returned from the dead with two OK years with the Marlins, providing some high SLG for a utility infielder. Hence he would probably be the man while Callaspo works in AAA. Like Clark, Easley lives in Arizona during the off-season, and he may be hoping to drink from the same fountain of youth as Clark.

Longshots to make the bench include Triple-A stalwarts Andy Green and Scott Hairston.

Pitching

Starters

This year's revamped rotation includes Brandon Webb, Orlando Hernandez, Miguel Batista, Russ Ortiz, and a fifth starter du jour. It's a relatively settled situation, compared to others on the club.

Brandon Webb recovered from a horrible 2004 to take a step forward as the unquestioned #1 starter. With better infield work to snag his groundballs and better catching to protect him from wild pitches as a result of his sinker, he should be fine.

Orlando Hernandez was the 72-year-old poor alternative available from the White Sox when Javier Vazquez, the poor alternative acquired from the Yankees for Randy Johnson, exercised his own right to demand a trade. Hernandez is due $4.5 million in 2006. One theory is that the Snakes will perform standard maintenance on Hernandez through July, and then trade him to a playoff contender. If he starts, he will be up and down, though no more noticeably than 2005 rotation member Shawn Estes.

Miguel Batista is a short term solution to 2006's starting woes, and hopes to make his Les Straker Memorial Tomb of the Unknown Third Starter on a World Series Winner badge glisten in the sun once more. He should be fine, as an alumnus of the 2001 team who knows how to pitch and is not expected to be any kind of Closer or Stopper. And he's not hurt.

Russ Ortiz undershot the expectations of even his worst critics, putting up a 64 ERA+ in 22 starts over only 115 innings. Bob Melvin is optimistic that 2006 will be better, and he is still owed $23 million through 2008, so expect the fun to continue throughout 2006.

The best guess for a fifth starter, Claudio Vargas, was claimed off waivers in mid-season 2005 and failed to go Ortiz (19 starts, 91 ERA+), so that's a good sign. Other candidates are last year's fifth starter Brad Halsey (26 starts, 95 ERA+) and rookie Dustin Nippert.

Relievers

Another year, another newly anointed closer: Jose Valverde. Jose is a repeat closer from 2004, disappeared into middleman work early in 2005, and returned later that year to collect double-digit saves.

Middle relief was a zoo in 2005. Lance Cormier and Oscar Villarreal were lost in the Estrada trade, and Tim Worrell left after half a good season. Brandon Lyon (another double-digit save collector) and Brandon Medders are the nominal candidates to set up Valverde, but Lyon's shaky health and Medders's unavailability to pitch in 2006 spring camp indicate the Brandons will probably not be the ones getting the lead to Jose by season's end. Brian Bruney and Mike Koplove are shaky returnees, with Koplove in camp but not even on the roster. Internet favorite Jeff Bajenaru (acquired in trade) and perpetual injury candidate Greg Aquino are also getting long looks.

After 2005's inability to find a LOOGY until Buddy Groom fell into their laps, management is preparing to look at two veteran lefty stoppers, Terry Mulholland and Felix Heredia. Mulholland will certainly make the team as a fortysomething LOOGY-Plus, whereas "The Run Fairy" really ought to make the team as comic relief (the March 16 Arizona Republic gave the following at-a-glance of TRF's spring performance to date: "5 IP, 9 hits, six runs").

Field Management

Bob Melvin, entering his second year as Diamondbacks manager, could be nicknamed Mr. B Positive. On offense, he displayed patience with underperforming players to a point, after which he switched and tried to realign and/or experiment. His biggest move was in the second half of the season, attempting to get Tony Clark's bat into the lineup by a complicated set of position shifts (designate Cruz Jr. for assignment, shift 1B Chad Tracy to RF, shift RF Shawn Green to CF, defensively substitute as necessary). What was considerably less creative was to fall in love with a LOOGY (Colorado waivee Javier Lopez) for the first half of the season, letting him pitch in 29 games and compile a 9.42 ERA (not counting inherited runners) before deciding he really wasn't the best use of a roster spot. Also not cool: burning out 3 or 4 relievers a year in an attempt to nail down saves and a fixed setup-man 1 / setup-man-2 / LOOGY / closer role assignment.

This corresponds with last year's personal perception of Melvin as OK with batters, not so OK with pitchers.

Mark Davis, in his first assignment as a pitching coach in 2005, proved unworthy and was deposed. Arizona is attempting to replace him with proven veteran Bryan Price (not to be confused with ex-NBAers Brent or Mark Price), whom Melvin knew from his time as Seattle's manager. Price made his reputation in Seattle by turning the Mariners' Piniella-dysfunctional pitching staff into something that was functional. Basically this involved protecting young starting pitchers before they got too deep into trouble, hammering good mechanics onto everyone on the staff, not letting ineffective relievers get burned out over and over, preferring veteran middle relievers and closers to finish up games, and preferring hard throwers to finesse pitchers.

Price hung on through Melvin's stay and the first year of Mike Hargrove's stay, after which the decline of the veteran pitchers and a failure-to-thrive crisis among the youngsters (Price's defenders say their arms were damaged in the minors before they ever got to Seattle) encouraged him to leave for a new job elsewhere. Like Melvin, he's a very positive guy.

Upper Management

The biggest change for 2006 is the offseason addition of Josh Byrnes as the club's new general manager.

Unlike his former boss Theo Epstein, who cultivates a public image as a combination of moody numbers whiz, old-line Bostonian intellectual, and brooding rock-and-roll vamp worthy of trashy E! TV sabermetric celebrity specials, Byrnes comes off as a golly-gee-whiz Opie of the GM world, reminiscent of the family sitcoms on TVLand and a guy who can't wait to enter the wonderful, colorful world of GM'ing. Like Melvin and Price, he's a positive guy.

The tradeoff of Jason Bulger (fungible reliever) and Cintron for Callaspo and Bajenaru is an example of his minor deal-making abilities. Getting something other than a can of dog food for Vazquez and Glaus in trade is a good smoke test for verifying that he has a sense of ballplayer valuation.

Ken Kendrick, the team's managing general partner, and Jeff Moorad, the team CEO, allowed (or encouraged) the club's founding GM Joe Garagiola Jr. to depart in order to install their own man, and have said they will attempt to control costs in an attempt to survive as a small market team. This likely means Byrnes will have autonomy to make deals below a certain level, but that he won't have complete authority to make budget-busting reshapes: he'll have to "call his manager," as they say in the wheeler-dealer business.

Mike Rizzo, the team's vice president of scouting operations, deserves special credit for being promoted in the midst of the organizational flux, and shepherding what is certain to be a mass of talent into the big leagues. Justin Upton, Stephen Drew, Carlos Quentin, Chris B. Young, and an assortment of lower minor-league players offer a chance for elite-level performances on a team that no longer wishes to spend elite dollars on free agents.

Conclusions

2005 produced a 65-97 Pythagorean record for the Diamondbacks, but a 77-85 actual record. I can make no grand conclusions this year. Let the War of the White Sox Succession begin. Don't expect the 2006 Diamondbacks to fight it, but they may supply the arms and guns to the combatants.

2006 ZiPS Projections - Arizona Diamondbacks

Name               P     G   AB    R    H  2B  3B  HR  RBI   BB    K  SB  CS   AVG   OBP   SLG 
Clark#             1b  115  279   36   75  17   1  20   55   27   75   0   0  .269  .333  .552 
Green*             rf  158  590   89  168  40   2  23   87   70  100   5   3  .285  .364  .476 
Tracy*             3b  148  530   69  156  31   3  17   70   43   64   2   2  .294  .349  .460 
Byrnes             cf  130  474   68  129  32   4  15   65   44   80  10   2  .272  .342  .451 
DaVanon#           cf  119  298   49   82  14   2   7   37   46   53  15   6  .275  .371  .406 
Young              cf  132  456   89  114  29   2  20   67   57  133  25   6  .250  .342  .454 
Quentin            rf  134  432   86  116  22   1  15   58   38   69   7   1  .269  .350  .428 
Jackson            lf  131  426   73  119  29   1  10   55   52   56   4   4  .279  .359  .423 
Green              2b  137  489   86  139  38   4   9   53   43   72   8   7  .284  .348  .434 
Estrada#           c   114  383   42  110  34   0   5   49   29   43   0   0  .287  .346  .415 
Gonzalez*          lf  141  512   69  129  32   2  17   69   66   78   3   2  .252  .342  .422 
Cintron#           ss  143  498   60  142  30   5  10   54   31   42   2   3  .285  .327  .426 
Hill#              c   101  342   44   87  30   1   9   46   33   90   5   3  .254  .328  .427 
Hairston           2b  104  363   56   94  17   5  14   44   26   84   4   2  .259  .313  .449 
Hudson#            2b  137  490   63  131  29   5  10   58   43   73   6   2  .267  .329  .408 
Hammock            c    83  262   32   68  16   2   7   31   22   52   4   3  .260  .326  .416 
Varner             lf  132  452   66  127  22   2   6   47   34   82   8   5  .281  .333  .378 
Carter*            1b  126  449   68  112  19   1  19   64   36   71   0   2  .249  .304  .423 
Easley             2b   85  234   24   52  16   1   9   32   23   34   2   1  .222  .311  .415 
Barden             3b  135  493   69  132  29   3   9   55   25  114   7   4  .268  .311  .394 
Counsell*          ss  137  505   65  125  25   3   6   41   65   64  17   6  .248  .338  .345 
Snyder             c   121  392   52   92  21   0  11   46   43   80   2   1  .235  .318  .372 
Terrero            cf  115  399   58  106  17   4   7   38   29  100  14  12  .266  .327  .381 
Drew*              ss   66  234   36   54  16   1   8   31   22   51   2   3  .231  .303  .410 
Callaspo#          ss  141  542   74  147  25   1   9   57   31   29  14   9  .271  .310  .371 
Ball#              cf  129  415   67   97  17   2   8   37   44  125  22  11  .234  .310  .342 
Gil                ss  111  393   48   98  20   5  11   45    8   47  11   6  .249  .266  .410 
D'Antona           3b  116  384   50   87  19   1   9   40   28   64   1   2  .227  .279  .352 
Brito              c    60  237   30   55   6   0   5   23   13   58   1   1  .232  .276  .321 
Williams           cf  120  428   64   96  13   3   6   33   28  112  29  19  .224  .273  .311 

Name                 W   L    ERA   G  GS     INN    H   ER  HR   BB    K 
Valverde             3   3   3.48  58   0    62.0   48   24   5   27   77 
Medders              4   3   3.84  55   0    61.0   51   26   6   27   69 
Webb                11  12   4.12  33  33   212.0  205   97  17   79  166 
Halsey*              9  12   4.30  31  30   178.0  191   85  17   47  110 
Nippert              4   6   4.42  18  18   108.0  104   53   8   51   82 
Bass                 7   9   4.53  27  27   159.0  169   80  20   45  109 
Batista              8  10   4.64  47  22   163.0  172   84  15   73  103 
Lyon                 2   3   4.68  39   0    50.0   54   26   6   16   38 
Gonzalez             7  11   4.96  28  24   158.0  175   87  28   39  112 
Groom*               1   2   5.06  53   0    48.0   55   27   6   16   27 
The Run Fairy*       2   3   5.07  54   0    55.0   58   31   6   27   32 
Grimsley             4   5   5.16  63   0    61.0   62   35   6   33   40 
Vizcaino             3   6   5.18  69   0    66.0   69   38  10   29   52 
Bruney               2   5   5.19  55   0    59.0   53   34   5   44   63 
Hernandez            5  11   5.21  21  20   114.0  120   66  14   53   86 
Ortiz                7  15   5.34  29  29   172.0  179  102  19   95  112 
Vargas               6  11   5.36  32  22   136.0  144   81  24   56  104 
Chico*               7  12   5.38  28  27   159.0  168   95  29   64  130 
Daigle               5   9   5.45  37  19   137.0  157   83  22   48   75 
Mulholland*          2   5   5.78  44   7    95.0  115   61  15   35   38 
Murphy*              4  10   6.02  24  23   127.0  131   85  22   80  103 
Aquino               1   3   6.13  47   1    47.0   50   32   8   28   41 

Disclaimer:  ZiPS projections are computer-based projections of performance.  
Performances have not been allocated to predicted playing time in the majors - 
many of the players listed above are unlikely to play in the majors at all in 2006.  
ZiPS is projecting equivalent production - a .240 ZiPS projection may end up 
being .280 in AAA or .300 in AA, for example.  Whether or not a player will play 
is one of many non-statistical factors one has to take into account when predicting 
the future.