Arizona Diamondbacks Preview

The Arizona Diamondbacks, in 7 seasons, have experienced highs and lows that some expansion franchises have yet to experience in 40 seasons. They've had pathetic debut seasons, old player comebacks, old player disasters, young player disasters, an exciting World Series win, great trades, horrible trades, and pathetic follow-up seasons, capped by the explosion of an angry 6-foot-10 god. The annals of the team read almost like the verses of a classical epic poem.

So begins our story of the Phoenicians. The ancient Carthaginians were descended from traveling traders from Phoenicia, who founded the North African settlement Carthage on the edge of the Sahara Desert; the Carthaginian Empire served as the commercial and political rivals of the Roman Republic from across the Mediterranean Sea. Skirmishes evolved into battles, and battles involved into wars. These wars are collectively known today as the Punic Wars.

After a naval defeat in the First Punic War in 241 BC, the Carthaginians came up with another strategy, one of the most legendary in the history of warfare. A young, headstrong Carthaginian general, Hannibal, was tasked with the goal of defeating Rome for good. His tactic was to fight a land war. He would bring a mass of home-grown soldiers, mercenaries, and fierce war elephants all the way around through Africa, through Spain, across the French Pyrenees, and down into Italy. His intent was to overwhelm the various Roman encampments and the Roman citizenry with the magnificence of his frightening (yet indisputably exotic) army.

The problem with this strategy is obvious: long supply lines, troop morale, and fatigued forces against a rested army on their own home field. It is possible he hadn't counted on his African elephants being ill-adapted to harsh Alpine conditions and dying on the crossover into Italy. More likely, he realized the elephants would most likely break down, and so he counted on surprise, luck, and his own improvisational skills to make up for any failure of strategy.

They came close, but no cigar. The attack was repulsed. (When the Roman generals realized what Hannibal was doing, they employed a rope-a-dope of refusing to engage with Hannibal's forces. When the Carthaginians became exhausted rushing from camp to city to camp, the generals struck back, and struck back effectively.)

In one of the later Punic Wars, the sick-of-it-all Roman Republic resolved to dispose of their hated rival. They sent their legions across the Mediterranean to destroy the city of Carthage, extirpate the Carthaginians, and salt its soil so that nothing could grow there ever again. The stage was set for the Roman Empire to dominate the known world, roughly a century after the ex-Phoenicians were crushed.

The seven previous Arizona Diamondbacks teams resemble Hannibal's army more than a little bit. They have just completed the stage of their history where the mighty assault on the National League has fallen apart. The elephants are dead, heads have fallen, and the soldiers are rushing home as fast as they can before their own homes and families are scattered to the four winds. It is time to regroup – yet regrouping may not even matter in the end.

The modern Phoenicians are the ones clad in purple, teal, gray, copper, and black, facing two empires with designs on their territory (Dodgers and Cubs) and one big-E Empire who need not be named. What does their history tell us?

A Walk Through History

1995

Arizona and Tampa Bay were awarded MLB expansion teams, with intentionally enormous expansion fees (specifically earmarked by Bud Selig for paying off the numerous collusion fines incurred by MLB owners in the 1980s!). Besides the fees, the commissioner placed limits on collecting shared national TV money for the first few years. Before an inning was pitched, the team began bathed in blood, just as the city of Rome began in the days of Romulus and Remus.

Jerry Colangelo, owner and general managing partner of the Diamondbacks, had made his name as the high-profile owner of the Phoenix Suns, building his own empire in the desert on the backs of the super-popular NBA. Asked to help lead the local effort to bring MLB to the Valley, Colangelo professed he was truly a baseball fan and would take a Colorado Rockies-style approach to build the team from the ground up. Over 40,000 season tickets for the initial season were sold.

This effort was borne out in the 1997 expansion draft. The Diamondbacks went for a combination of minor league or extremely-limited-experience prospects, symbolized by Jeff Suppan, Tony Batista, Karim Garcia, and Omar Daal, and proven players, symbolized by Brian Anderson (fresh off a key role in the 1997 postseason) and Jorge Fabregas. They also immediately made some trades and acquisitions by which they brought in veterans Andy Benes, Jay Bell, and Matt Williams, which a brand-new team watching their payroll normally doesn't do. To fill first base, they signed heralded young player Travis Lee as an accidental free agent; this signing included a $10 million bonus. As an extra, none of the high-profile free agents were considered troublemakers or bad seeds.

1998

Arizona and Tampa Bay began play. Arizona opened against the Colorado Rockies at home, with great optimism in the new Bank One Ballpark. The Snakes got skunked, 10-0. The team went on to a terrible 65-97 campaign.

Typical for an expansion team (the Devil Rays weren't much better), but nevertheless Colangelo changed course. He vowed to do his utmost to make the Diamondbacks respectable as soon as possible, not falling back on a "small market" excuse or using the Rockies slow-build formula. Garcia was shipped to Detroit for middling outfielder Luis Gonzalez and cash. When aged Randy Johnson (The Big Unit) went on the open market, Colangelo snapped him up. Same for aged Padres CF Steve Finley. All in all, he committed $118 million to upgrade with more veterans in a win-now approach.

It paid off with a quick NL West championship in 1999 and a respectable season in 2000, after which their field manager Buck Showalter was fired for apparently being too much of a martinet for the veterans' tastes. The team's approach had changed from needing a Showalter to needing someone quite different, and Showalter was probably the last to realize this.

2001

This was the big year. Lee had turned out to be a big disappointment, so in 2000 the team dealt him and other supernumeraries to the Phillies for Curt Schilling, who you may have heard of. Randy Johnson posted his third consecutive Cy Young award. Schilling, in his first full season with the club, pitched nearly as well. Scrap-heap pitcher Miguel Batista and Brian Anderson filled in the starting staff. While they had traded for a high-profile closer in Matt Mantei, farm-system product Byung-Hyun Kim became the de facto closer. Gonzalez crafted a completely unexpected 57-HR season.

After three 2001 postseason series, despite the frightful managing of their rookie skipper Bob Brenly, they were World Series champions.

2004

After winning a further NL West championship in 2002, the team had subsided into a mediocrity by 2003. Bell and Williams were retired, and changes had to be made. They oddly pulled in two different directions in 2004: trading for Richie Sexson to be an everyday slugging 1B, yet trading away Schilling for younger pitchers.

It did not work. Sexson, with a well-earned durability rep before the season, went on the disabled list twice, produced one memorable home run, and did little else to help the team win games. Pitchers and middle infielders crumbled like moth-eaten fortification walls, and Shea Hillenbrand (who came from the Red Sox for Kim) ended up being the most dependable offensive force on the club. 51-111 says it all, and the 54-108 Pythagorean record says anything left after "all."

The 2005 season

What's in store for the upcoming campaign? Let's look at the probable 2005 team in the light of ghosts from the past – those who wore the Diamondbacks uniform before.

Catchers

In 1998, three expansion draftees made the opening day roster as catchers: Jorge Fabregas from the Angels, Damian Miller from the Twins, and Kelly Stinnett from the Brewers. Fabregas, the highest-drafted of the three, turned out to be the lamest of the bunch and was traded that season.

Miller and Stinnett hung on, carved out productive roles on the team, and are still catching in the big leagues today. In fact, Stinnett has come back to Arizona as a free agent and has locked down the backup catcher role.

For the starting catcher role, Arizona plans to spend the spring deciding between two rookies, Koyie Hill and Chris Snyder. Koyie was one of the returnees from the Dodgers for Steve Finley, but his bat is considered weak. Snyder is a little weaker defensively, but much more promising at the plate. In the past, the organization has been reluctant to give the job to a non-hitting Mike-Matheny-type glove wizard, so odds are Snyder will win the starting job (barring a trade for some veteran!).

The catching crew may be slightly underpowered at the plate, but they are the least of this team's worries, as we shall see.

Infielders

First Base

Travis Lee, Erubiel Durazo, Mark Grace, Lyle Overbay, Richie Sexson. (And Shea Hillenbrand.) The ghosts of unfulfilled potential, overestimated potential, and short-sightedness hang heavy over this position.

This year's stab at first-base respectability is second-year man Chad Tracy, moving over from third. After playing third base, first, and even a little outfield in 2004, he showed the hitting ability advertised by his minor league stats, but also showed an unsteady arm at his natural position of 3B.

To make room for Troy Glaus, Tracy has been penciled in at 1B. Look for that pencil's eraser to be used, as his lack of power makes it hard for any team to station him there at first base, and tempting for such a team to shift him to other positions as needed. Who knows what this will do to his production?

Second Base

This position has a little less of a haunted history; Jay Bell is the granddaddy of all Diamondbacks at this position, and he's returned to the organization as a coach. Craig Counsell at 2B combined with Tony Womack at SS formed one of the odder middle infields to win a World Series.

Despite a light-hitting 2004 in Milwaukee, the Diamondbacks decided to bring back Counsell and his boyish face to recapture the glory of that championship season. Not enough power to get excited about, and an injury risk at his age. Bad gamble, and he certainly will be substituted by various bench options.

Shortstop

Free agent Royce Clayton comes from Colorado to take over the job from last year's incumbent Alex Cintron. This is a ridiculously bad gamble, and he will probably lose playing time to Cintron regardless.

The team justifies the free agent signing by saying his glove will stabilize the infield and help out the pitching. Well, I know this is bad sample size and totally unfair to Royce, but I watched a Colorado game on August 17 of last year, where the Rockies had a three-run lead, runners on first and second with no one out. The batter hit a grounder to the first baseman Todd Helton, who tossed to second. Clayton alligator-armed the ball, letting it trickle off his glove into LF and letting the man on second score. How does that help the pitching? Shouldn't teams considering acquiring a SS whose only asset is his defense and veteran leadership get their heads out of the cliché hymnal and do a little scouting?

A youngster named Jerry Gil got some late season games in, but he can't hit and is injured. All in all, this middle infield is going to have less power than a water-saving toilet.

Third Base

In 1998, the elderly Matt Williams was a third baseman who had the essential, fundamentally sound good-soldier qualities Colangelo cherished. Matt put together one (objectively) good season on his huge Diamondbacks contract until injuries, age, and an aborted trade to the Rockies forced him to hang it up in 2003. This opened up the spot for forgettable turns from Hillenbrand and Tracy.

Free agent Troy Glaus is this year's Richie Sexson, and probably the one Diamondback the team expects to draw fans to the BOB or whatever it's called this year (Chase has bought Bank One and allegedly wants to rename the stadium). His advantage over Sexson is better power and a higher batting average. His disadvantage is lack of health; his problems are not of the banged-up-day-to-day quality, but the oh-my-god he-may-never-play-again quality.

Outfielders

Left Field

Luis Gonzalez will have his career defined by his Diamondback years. He went down miserably to an elbow injury last season, and is still owed big money through 2007. If healthy, he will play well at an advanced age, similarly to how Finley played, and the Diamondbacks just may try to deal him to a team in the playoff hunt this midseason.

Center Field

Steve Finley has another strong claim to be remembered as a Snake, and the team has nothing to apologize for given his 5.5 years of service.

Jose Cruz, Jr. gets a chance to fill in this season. He has had the All-Star promises of his early career beaten out of him in Toronto, San Francisco and Tampa Bay, and unfortunately he has settled into the life and hitting stats of a journeyman. Unlike the gambles elsewhere on this team, he should be reliable enough for this season.

Right Field

World Series hero Danny Bautista (he did hit a homer in Game 7, just like Aaron Boone) ran out of steam and was let go after 3.5 years of service. This year's attempt to fill RF is a curious acquisition, ex-Dodger Shawn Green. He's old, no longer hits like he used to, doesn't thrill at right field or first base and has no particular affinity to Arizona. Like Cruz, he should be predictable yet unspectacular.

Bench

Luis Terrero, a farm-system product who got a look-see in the terrible latter part of 2004, was going to play CF all this off-season, up until stat heads and old-time scouts alike raised question marks about his skills and personality. Out of options, he will be the fourth outfielder, but don't be surprised if he pouts or flounces his way off the team to become someone else's headache, à la Alex Sanchez. The fifth outfielder will likely be retread Quinton McCracken.

Scott Hairston and Alex Cintron will back up middle infield, as will last year's second baseman Matt Kata. Hairston and Kata (who got injured early on) basically shared the 2B job in 2004, but a sub-.300 OBP sunk them into their current roles. Hairston is also being groomed as a backup OF, should he not get traded before opening day.

Tony Clark gets to play the lumbering pinch-hitter role in his last hometown hurrah (lives in Glendale, went to school at University of Arizona). He's the most likely Diamondback to get "involuntarily retired" in April or May for ineffectiveness and then begin the rest of his post-career life.

Pitching

Starters

After the coups of Johnson and Schilling, and the lesser coups of Batista and Anderson, the team developed a bit of unwarranted confidence in being able to find and identify pitching. Besides those guys, they tried out Rick Helling, Shane Reynolds, Elmer Dessens, and Steve Sparks for extended periods before throwing in the towel and admitting these guys couldn't pitch anymore.

For 2005, they have 4 starters (of whom 3 are imports) and a closer locked in before exhibition play even starts, and the mentality seems to be that the rest of the staff will magically sort itself out.

The three imports are free agents Russ Ortiz from Atlanta, Shawn Estes from Colorado, and recent trade acquisition Javier Vazquez (acquired finally from the Yankees in the Big Unit trade). The other guy is third-year man Brandon Webb, a young pitcher who had a superficially terrible 2004 when asked to step up to replace Schilling as the #2 man in the rotation.

The unifying theme in all these pitchers is lack of control. 2004 BB/9IP for the four amigos: 4.9, 4.7, 2.7 (not including Javier's 11 wild pitches – tied for 3rd in the AL), 5.1. Webb and Vazquez have shown they can pitch better than they did in 2004; Ortiz and Estes have not, and the Cinderella-Pumpkin Club of stat analysts is waiting for them to implode.

Webb managed to compile a good ERA (3.59) despite all the walks, the unfriendly home park, and the 6-15 record. He must prove that his groundball tendencies combined with weak Arizona infield defense caused his problems. If the defense truly stabilizes behind him, he should easily be the class of this staff, with Vazquez shaping up to be a good #2.

As for dealability, Ortiz and Webb are committed to this crew. Estes is on a one-year deal, and Vazquez can demand a trade after 2005.

The fifth starter battle is uninspiring and probably not worth obsessing over. Farm system product Mike Gosling dukes it out with Brad Halsey (Vazquez's from the Yankees), hot-wived holdover Casey Daigle, and possibly Oscar Villarreal, a farm system prospect who had a bullpen career until overworked under Brenly's regime, may be tried out as a starter. Villarreal probably has the most talent of the bunch, but for him 2005 should be a year of healing.

Relievers

Gregg Olson, Kim, Matt Mantei, and Mike Fetters constitute the Arizona ace reliever tradition. Mm-hmm.

Greg Aquino, not a high-profile arm, came out of nowhere to pick up a bunch of saves in late 2004, and is being promoted as a bona-fide stopper this season. He could be that, or he could be that Oriole pitcher who lucked into a bunch of saves one year, and then cratered. Ryan Kohlmeier, that's the guy. The Baseball-Reference similarity scores for these players are unavailable, but Aquino must take a step forward to not be considered a fluke of that sort.

Jose Valverde, the previous incumbent, performed well but got hurt in 2004, just like Villarreal.

In the non-closer category, Mike Koplove is an acceptable pitcher, albeit he himself was overworked. Brandon Lyon, Jose Jimenez, Brian Bruney, the ob-LOOGY-tory Randy Choate, maybe Edgar Gonzalez, maybe Villarreal fill out the rest of the pen out as charity cases. From the 10,000-foot view, this bullpen has the makings of a disaster zone. There's little upside (no K-Rods lurking in the wings), lots of walks, and lots of downside.

Field Management

After Brenly wiped out in mid-2004, interim manager Al Pedrique failed to demonstrate any managerial chops, and Wally Backman entertained the world for a week in the 2004-05 offseason. Diamondbacks management had had it. They chose the complete temperamental managerial opposite to Brenly and Backman in Bob Melvin to manage the team on the field.

What does he bring? Melvin's two years in Seattle don't offer much guidance on how he will do with the Diamondbacks, since his Mariner teams were constructed so differently and had different expectations that the Snakes don't/won't have to meet.

If I had to guess, I would expect Melvin to do well managing the everyday players, and with day-to-day roster management. If there's a young player who shows promise, he puts them in. If a veteran's bat starts sagging or is showing the effects of injury, he doesn't hang with them till the bloody end; he yanks them out of the lineup once results show they don't have it any more. When Bucky Jacobson came up and impressed, Melvin did all he could to protect Bucky from tough right-handers and Bucky's own bad knees. As another line of speculation, seeing Ichiro on offense succeed without either a typical power game or typical little-ball game should give Melvin license to be creative with arranging Diamondback lineups and/or choosing offensive approaches based on his personnel.

However, those possible plusses should be counterweighted with some minuses. Look for Melvin to handle the pitching (starting and relief) much less expertly than the offense. With the M's, he leaned on the respected Brent Price; with this team he'll have the unknown Mark Davis. More worrisome, he took public pride in lasting the entire 2003 M's season with 5 starters in a strict 5-man rotation, saying "our 5th man was as good as our 1st man," as if this was something to be desired.

He failed to mention that in 2004 the staff went puff-bang-boom on him. He had no idea what to expect from one of his starters (Gil Meche), watched two of his reliable vets spiral into the abyss (Jamie Moyer and Shigetoshi Hasegawa), and had his most talented starter (Joel Piñeiro) and reliever (Eddie Guardado) disappear with unexpected season-ending injuries. He went from a 5 to 11 starting staff, and only one new starter (advanced-age Bobby Madritsch) showed any ability to stick.

On the field, Melvin is so even-tempered he was accused for not standing up for his players, in arguments and the like. I'm not sure what this means, except that he won't likely be pulling any silly Ben Davis-style whining as Brenly was apt to do.

Upper Management

Up through 2004, Jerry Colangelo acted unilaterally in what he felt was the best interests of the club. This meant getting winners above all: lots of veterans at retail value, in long contracts with deferred money as needed. This worked for the most part, but caused financial problems for the franchise. In 2004 he gave up financial control of the club to a consortium, yet continued acting unilaterally, obstructing a mid-2004 trade that would have sent the Big Unit to the Yankees, getting some immediate cash relief. The enraged partners finally took away all team control from him.

The current word is that Ken Kendrick and ex-player agent Jeff Moorad will be partners on the baseball operations side, sharing responsibility for in-season roster and payroll management. They're essentially in their rookie seasons; I have no idea if they know what they are doing. Kendrick claims the team is not in trouble financially, pointing to his numerous big-money signings as proof. (This smells like the ownership equivalent of Beatagan, but let's be open-minded for now.)

Joe Garagiola, Jr., the much-maligned GM who has been with the team from the beginning, returns for another year with the backing of Kendrick, Moorad, and the rest of the money men. He's the type of person who'd agree with Brian Sabean that sabermetrics gives him a headache, and has taken the heat for numerous trades that blew up in his face (most notably the Schilling-to-the-Sox, Dessens-for-Durazo, and Mantei trades). He will never be the object of dreamy Theo-Epsteinesque GM worship, but considering him and farm director Mike Rizzo as a tandem, the team still has the incentives and the resources to be competitive.

These men are responsible for what will happen to the high-quality farm system prospects due to join the team in 2006 and beyond. Carlos Quentin, Conor Jackson, and Sergio Santos are almost ready, and 2004 draftee Stephen Drew would be an asset if he ever managed to sign. Ever since Travis Lee failed to pan out, the team has not gotten close to developing a bunch of high-ceiling prospects to step forward, preferring to swap iffy or undeveloped prospects in the system for proven veterans. 2005-06 will make or break this crew if they decide the years of shelling out high-bidder prices for proven veterans are over.

Conclusions

This year is the team's biggest gamble yet, both on and off the field. The "Baby Backs" of 2003 turned out to be boringly unexceptional in 2004, and got booted to the back of the bus. The club entered 2004 with a winning record predicted, and only the switches of Sexson and Schilling to disturb the waters, yet they collapsed. Veterans in or slightly past their prime are now being ordered to win for this year. With all the high-risk revamps, could a big reward be on the way? Could Hannibal sack Rome against all odds?

In reality, management doesn't really expect to win the division, as they are telling the more gullible sportswriters -- one of the 3 NL West California teams is sure to find their way and have a breakout season. A .500 season is the upper limit of what I think Arizona is hoping for. (Hell, if the Royals can crack .500, anyone can crack .500.)

If the Snakes have a 2004-Tiger-ish improvement to 76-78 wins, that would be cool, but the ZiPS-based simulations I've seen other people run have the Snakes penciled in at an average 65-97 season. This would bring up the NL West rear for a second consecutive year, revisiting the neighborhood of that awful 1998 team of Karim Garcia, Yamil Benitez, and Andy F. Stankiewicz.

Since my intuitive unpublished MLB predictions have proven so inaccurate (.500 season for the 2001 M's! 100-win season for the 2002 M's! 72-win season for the 2004 M's!), I will go with what the sims say, and pick 65-97. Look for a lot of dead elephants on the road out of Phoenix.

2005 ZiPS Projections

Name          ERA   W   L   G  GS     INN    H   ER   BB    K  HR 
Koplove      4.09   4   4  68   0    77.0   75   35   30   56   5 
Vazquez      4.10  11  13  33  33   224.0  227  102   59  192  29 
Valverde     4.14   3   4  61   0    63.0   50   29   32   80   7 
Webb         4.16   9  12  32  31   188.0  173   87   93  163  13 
Villarreal   4.26   6   7  68   2    74.0   68   35   35   66   6 
Medders      4.26   3   3  47   0    57.0   49   27   28   60   6 
Acevedo      4.33   3   3  46   0    52.0   55   25   19   31   4 
Jimenez      4.33   5   6  59   3    81.0   90   39   22   41   7 
Halsey*      4.40   9  12  31  29   180.0  189   88   58  131  20 
Ward         4.41   3   5  45   0    49.0   51   24   15   30   5 
Choate*      4.50   2   4  69   1    66.0   60   33   35   52   4 
Bruney       4.57   4   5  60   0    63.0   52   32   45   65   4 
Lyon         4.62   5   9  38  14   111.0  122   57   32   65  14 
Nippert      4.72   3   5  15  15    80.0   71   42   51   72   6 
Cormier      4.73   7  11  32  29   156.0  167   82   59  101  18 
Aquino       4.76   3   5  34  12    85.0   84   45   46   66   8 
Ortiz        4.92   9  16  34  34   203.0  210  111  107  146  18 
Gonzalez     4.92   7  12  30  26   159.0  178   87   48  102  25 
Nance*       4.94   4   6  59   1    71.0   69   39   33   62  10 
Tolar*       5.10   2   4  49   3    60.0   54   34   42   63   6 
Stockman     5.31   5   9  24  23   122.0  116   72   80  105  13 
Peterson     5.40   3   7  46   0    55.0   56   33   31   50   8 
Estes*       5.61   6  14  31  31   183.0  206  114   97  107  23 
Daigle       5.70   5  11  28  26   158.0  186  100   60   85  29 
Gosling*     5.81   4  10  28  25   141.0  163   91   67   80  23 
Osborne*     6.21   2   3  15   3    29.0   36   20   12   17   6 
Murphy*      6.90   3  13  26  26   133.0  143  102   97  111  29 

Name         P    AVG   OBP   SLG   G  AB   H 2B 3B HR   R RBI  BB   K SB CS 
Green*       rf  .291  .378  .509 158 595 173 41  1 29  89  91  79 111  5  3 
Cruz#        rf  .251  .356  .452 151 538 135 28  4 24  73  69  90 116  7  7 
Gonzalez*    lf  .263  .379  .463 131 467 123 31  4 18  70  69  86  60  4  3 
Tracy*       3b  .313  .367  .434 145 530 166 30  2 10  71  63  45  59  2  3 
Cintron#     ss  .298  .340  .426 147 547 163 33  5  9  69  44  34  51  3  4 
Glaus        3b  .258  .369  .476 106 391 101 20  1 21  68  65  66  92  6  3 
Varner       lf  .297  .354  .399 134 464 138 17  3  8  71  50  38  83  5  4 
Quentin      rf  .286  .333  .442 128 423 121 24  0 14  85  56  27  54  8  1 
Snyder       c   .259  .333  .431 127 425 110 28  0 15  68  62  45  76  2  1 
Green        2b  .283  .337  .419 126 442 125 35  2  7  44  36  34  58 10  7 
Jackson      lf  .272  .349  .422 115 408 111 24  2 11  71  50  46  67  7  3 
Hairston     2b  .271  .319  .454 118 421 114 20  6 15  43  39  29  98  4  3 
Hill#        c   .281  .340  .410 112 417 117 24  0 10  61  54  35  79  2  1 
Kata#        2b  .274  .321  .414 112 449 123 26  5  9  65  45  30  73  5  4 
Clayton      ss  .246  .313  .360 140 508 125 25  3  9  66  47  46 105  7  4 
Kroeger*     rf  .294  .347  .423 109 385 113 23  3  7  56  45  30  77  5  5 
DeVore*      rf  .257  .310  .426 117 397 102 21  2 14  51  51  29  98  5  4 
Terrero      cf  .269  .311  .369 112 431 116 17  7  4  70  37  24  99 13 17 
Counsell*    ss  .245  .331  .311 122 421 103 16  3  2  53  31  53  66 12  5 
Ansman       c   .252  .321  .480  91 294  74 17  1 16  51  47  28  99  1  1 
Gil          ss  .244  .275  .370 133 459 112 22  6  8  35  34  16  94 14  7 
Abercrombie  cf  .251  .276  .399 112 431 108 18  5 12  60  47  12 145 17 10 
Williams     cf  .234  .281  .312 118 458 107 15  3  5  74  32  27 111 37 25 
Clark#       1b  .209  .277  .407 108 258  54 12  0 13  30  41  24  77  0  0 
McCracken#   rf  .266  .324  .378  99 233  62 14  3  2  30  21  20  41  3  4 
Brito        c   .253  .295  .357  79 269  68 11  1  5  35  29  16  55  1  1 
Stinnett     c   .228  .297  .349  52 149  34  9  0  3  13  16  13  41  0  0