— BTF's Preseason Previews
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
Boston Red Sox
RELATIVIZING THE AURA
If one could fashion a scheme to quantify the amount of "aura" a baseball franchise possesses, the Boston Red Sox would be at or near the top of the list. As the 2004 season gets underway, that "aura" might well be at its apex. Fueled by a long-standing literary love affair with what used to be quaintly termed "Eastern intellectuals," the Red Sox have catered to this aura by becoming the most prominent franchise in the small but growing list of "sabermetric dabblers."
Fans of the team, their executives, and their current brain trust (led by the legendary Bill James) will probably be taken aback by the tone they sense in that term "dabblers." After all, who knows more about sabermetrics than James? Certainly not yours truly, nor any of those who might think so in their secret heart of hearts.
So why "dabbling?" Because that's really where we're at with all this effort, no matter what else we'd like to claim. There are claims that the brain trust revolutionized the Red Sox offense in 2003; such claims are often supported by the increase in run scoring that the team made over the previous season, or by the record SLG the Sox produced. Clearly, then, Epstein, James et al are offensive geniuses, and like their counterparts in Oakland, have a Midas touch in identifying undervalued players who thrive once they are given a chance to play.
Now that's what I call a great "aura." This notion contains the unspoken (but not necessarily defensible) assumption that such a result--an uptick of 98 runs in 2003--is a genuine reflection of the team's offensive value, and is thus reproducible. Such a result was, in fact, not consistently reproduced in Oakland, and over the past three years neo-sabe pundits have jumped through hoops to divert attention from this fact (without simply admitting that the Oakland model of success looks more like the 1990s Braves than, say, the 1990s Indians).
To get past the aura, we have to look at the numbers in a somewhat different way. To do that, we'll break out the Red Sox run scoring by home and road over the past 34 years (1970 to present) and evaluate what we find.
What we want to look at is the league-relative performance of the Red Sox offense both at home and on the road. A basic tenet of sabermetrics, one long espoused by Bill James, is that one tailors one's offense to its ballpark. The 2002 Red Sox were not a potent offensive force at home, scoring at around the league average. By contrast, the 2003 team scored 34% more runs than the average team scored at home (22% above league average when we adjust for the ballpark).
However, before we roll out that "offensive genius" banner, let's remember that we need to adjust for park effects and examine the offensive performance on the road as well. It turns out that the 2002 Red Sox scored more runs on the road than they did last year; their performance away from Fenway in '02 was almost as impressive as the team's park-adjusted peformance in Fenway last year:
Year H/A RRL/a HA RRL/a HA RRL/A 2002 A 1.21 H 1.03 Tot 1.12 2003 A 1.10 H 1.22 Tot 1.16So while James et al improved the adjusted team offensive performance at Fenway by 19% in 2003, the Red Sox road performance actually declined by 11%.
And Boston needed all of that net gain from Fenway, because the team's pitching/defense gave up 42 more runs at home and 102 more runs on the road last year.
As a result, the net gain in wins over the 2002 season: two in the regular season. Thanks in large part to a second-half swoon from Seattle (sorry, Dan Werr), the Sox did add six more post-season victories.
Relative to the run scoring levels in the 2003 AL, the Sox' +16% is the 67th-highest such value since 1970 (out of a total of 904 team-seasons). It's an impressive performance, but not an historic one. Their league-relative performance wasn't the best in the big leagues in '03: two NL teams, the Braves and Cardinals, playing in parks favoring pitchers, had better league-relative offenses (26% and 22% above league respectively).
(A more detailed historical examination of this data, focusing on much more than the Red Sox, will be found in a series running during April at the mostly dormantBig Bad Baseball blog. This time, folks, I actually had a good excuse.)
THE OFF SEASON
For the most part, that's exactly what it was for the Red Sox. Most of their roster moves in 2003-04 were ones addressing the runs allowed hemorrhage. Thus the Sox spent big bucks to acquire Curt Schilling and Keith Foulke.
They also continued to tinker with bargain additions to the offensive squad, the area that had produced the most return on investment in 2003. This years additions, however, pale noticeably in comparison to what was achieved over the previous off-season. The trendy thought is that Pokey Reese will anchor an improved defense and will not prove to be a serious offensive liability in such an otherwise rich offensive context. The not-trendy counterargument is that the Red Sox brain trust appears too willing to believe that the offensive levels obtained by last year's bargain buys (Millar, Mueller, Ortiz) are genuine reflections of their talent.
But the most notorious aspect of the off-season was the Alex Rodriguez affair, in which the Boston brain trust overreached its abilities to transform the team both contractually and philosophically, wound up with highly-publicized egg on its face, and suffered the additional humiliation of seeing Rodriguez traded to their arch-enemies, the New York Yankees.
The result of all this produces more solid fodder for devotees of the Red Sox "aura." In fact, the Sox will still field a solid offense with the less-than-wanted Manny Ramirez and Nomar Garciaparra. The proposed roster changes, which purportedly involved Magglio Ordonez as well as Rodriguez, do not make a critical difference to the 2004 offense, though it can be argued that the 2005-06 teams would have been increasingly better off. For the near term, though, the key moves that the Sox made in their winter of discontent have to do with their pitching, and it is primarily this aspect of the team that will determine its fortunes in 2004.
THE ROTATION: A PROGNOSIS AND A PROPOSAL
Red Sox fans have built their hopes for 2004 around a Big Three of Pedro Martinez. Schilling, and Derek Lowe, a trio whose peak performances possess the requisite "formidability" to challenge the Yankees.
However, it appears that many observers are projecting those peak performances as the most likely outcome for the Boston Big Three's output in '04. Assume, for the moment, that the Red Sox lose 90 runs off their offense this year; in order to improve their won-loss record, it will necessary to reduce their runs allowed by a good bit more than 90 run--somewhere between 110-120 runs, in fact, to reach a projected win percentage of over .600.
Let's examine the Big Three. There is precious little chance that Pedro is going to save the Red Sox runs in '04 over his career value; the bar is simply too high for his performance level already. QMAX trending, which has evolved a bit in the past 2-3 years, suggests that he might be on the cusp of losing a sizable amount of his dominance, as he is increasingly dependent on avoiding the long ball to support his ERA performance than in previous years. If anything, he's likely to give back 10-30 runs.
Schilling will improve over what the Sox had in their #3 slot last year, presuming he doesn't miss 20-30% of his starts, as he has done with some regularity during his career. So Curt can probably save 30-50 runs over last year.
The most problematic of the starters is Lowe, who is looking a lot like the second coming of Jose Lima. A lot of run support kept Lowe's won-loss record looking rosy in '03, but his peripheral stats don't inspire confidence. A collapse from Lowe, which is a good bit more likely than a return to his '02 form, would all but bury Boston's chances for the post-season. Lowe making a mild recovery or holding his own will not bury them, but it will make things more than a little bit dicey.
Behind the Big Three are two pitchers with quirky pitches/pitching motions: knuckleballer Tim Wakefield and sub-side man Byung-Hyun Kim. At present, the Red Sox apparently plan to make them the #4 and #5 starters. Both are pretty high risks in that they have not been consistent performers in a starting role. The most likely outcome of ~60 starts from these two is a break-even result from last season, but if Kim proves to be durable and effective this could improve a bit.
A more risk-averse scenario with a potentially greater upside to the team does exist, however--though it rests on the proposition that ex-Yankee swing man Ramiro Mendoza is healthy after last year's knee injuries. While the Red Sox brain trust (most notably James) has waxed eloquent about implementing unorthodox bullpen usages, they don't seem to have considered that a Big Three-Small Three starting arrangement might have considerably more impact on their ability to stretch their pitching staff.
A Big Three-Small Three arrangement, with Martinez-Schilling-Lowe getting 33 starts each, and Wakefield-Kim-Mendoza getting 21 apiece, would maximize the value of their best starters and allow flexible usage of the Little Three in a variety of relief situations.
In addition, it's possible that such an arrangement could permit additional improvisation should injury (Martinez, Schilling) or ineffectiveness (Lowe) strike in the Big Three. In the latter case, Lowe could move out of the Big Three group into a similar type of mixed usage.
How creative the Red Sox get in terms of deploying their starters might well prove to be the most important element in saving a sufficient number of runs allowed. They need to lop off at least 60 and probably 70 runs from their starting rotation in order to be on track for improvement. Their ability to develop credible and sufficient back-of-the-rotation alternatives is what will make this possible in case their Big Three cannot achieve this goal itself.
AS FEW WORDS AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE BULLPEN
After the difficulties in this area in '03, Boston has opted for a more traditional approach this year by signing Keith Foulke. As good as Foulke is, he's not likely to be quite as good again in '04. And he is not going to save the Sox more than about 30 runs from last year's closer performance, even at his best. Boston will need more consistent performance from its entire pen to lop off 40-50 total runs here: that means similar quality from Mike Timlin and Alan Embree, improvement from Scott Williamson, and extra value from Mendoza, Wakefield, and Kim in swing roles.
Is that possible? Sure. Is it likely? Not quite. The likeliest scenario is that Timlin will struggle--his eye-popping command of last year isn't a sure thing and without it, he could be hit hard--and that it will be up to Mendoza to stop the bleeding. That would minimize the Sox' chances of gaining relief runs from Wakefield and Kim, as they'd end up starting more games.
ABOUT THOSE NINETY RUNS
So where are the Sox going to lose those runs on offense, anyway? Let's look:
Player Proj 2003 Peak Career Varitek -13 120 124 100 Mirabelli +2 Ortiz -9 144 144 116 Reese -28 41 89 70 Garciaparra -3 121 158 135 Bellhorn +6 Mueller -21 140 140 111 Ramirez -9 160 190 157 Damon +6 94 117 99 Nixon -11 149 149 121 Millar -5 110 141 122These figures come from a blending of several projection sources, including ZiPS, that were converted to extrapolated runs (XR) and compared with the actual player performance in '03. These will no doubt be subject to some dispute, but the added OPS+ reference data provided for most of the projected starters (2003 OPS+, peak OPS+ season, career OPS+) shows how many peak or close-to-peak performances the Red Sox received last year.
That works out to a projected net loss of 85 runs; chances are it will be a little worse, because you need to factor in heightened injury scenarios for Ramirez and/or Garciaparra. The Red Sox lineup is not young: only one projected regular (Ortiz) is under 30.
Looking at the 34-year league-relative offense database for Red Sox teams with similar profiles to the 2003 squad produces one close match: the 1978 team, which also scored 10% more runs than average on the road (40-41 record), and had a very similar home Pythagorean WPct (.628 as opposed to .633 for the '03 team). The 1979 team maintained most of its league-relative offensive advantage at home, but declined on the road and wound up with a 91-69 record.
There was a lot of talent on that 1978 squad, and one is hard-pressed to conclude that the current lineup is actually better, though it's close. The '78 team isn't remembered for having pitchers like Pedro and Schilling, but it did have Dennis Eckersley and Luis Tiant, plus a season from Bob Stanley that kept the team in the pennant race (contributing to its ability to go 59-23 at home, exceeding its PWP projection by almost 15%). The staff ERA of the 1978 team--3.54--ranked fourth in the league that year.
The 1979 team didn't add a pitcher of the caliber of Schilling (it moved Stanley into the rotation and made Dick Drago into the "closer"), but it had much younger hitting talent at its core (Rice was 26, Lynn 27). The 1979 team had a similar PWP at home (.623), but didn't win any extra games in Fenway that year (51-29, .638 WPCT, net gain 2.4%). The team ERA declined by half a run (4.03), but it still ranked fourth in the league.
While such an historical parallel can only carry us so far, it does give us some grounding in terms of expectation vs. reality that can be applied to the 2004 team. It supports the proposition that the Red Sox offense is likely to decline (roster age, career year clustering), and that any gains the team might hope to achieve will need to come from significant improvement from pitching/defense. The difference between 90 wins and 100 wins will rest--simply and inevitably--on how little the hitting declines and how much the pitching/defense improves.
2004 ZiPS Projections
Name P AVG OBP SPC G AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB K SB CS Ramirez lf .321 .424 .595 142 526 99 169 37 1 35 114 89 101 2 1 Mueller# 3b .309 .392 .501 128 447 69 138 36 4 14 67 56 61 1 3 Ortiz* 1b .280 .366 .551 123 425 67 119 35 1 26 84 54 82 0 1 Nixon* rf .283 .380 .519 144 501 83 142 32 4 26 88 73 103 4 3 Millar 1b .299 .371 .507 140 495 71 148 38 1 21 84 52 90 2 2 Garciaparra ss .306 .360 .519 151 634 106 194 45 9 24 98 41 59 13 4 McCarty 1b .271 .346 .468 99 340 60 92 23 1 14 54 36 89 2 1 Daubach* 1b .256 .352 .452 120 356 46 91 23 1 15 55 48 98 1 3 Varitek# c .264 .339 .461 127 421 52 111 33 1 16 65 44 94 3 3 Damon* cf .280 .358 .412 150 628 107 176 35 6 12 72 70 71 27 8 Burks dh .261 .325 .463 107 380 56 99 29 0 16 61 33 89 2 2 Bellhorn# 3b .244 .362 .411 122 348 47 85 18 2 12 47 61 106 5 6 Snyder 3b .262 .323 .449 127 465 68 122 31 1 18 71 37 120 0 1 Dominique c .269 .336 .416 108 387 52 104 24 0 11 53 35 68 1 1 Bailey c .259 .343 .403 111 382 55 99 20 1 11 49 46 98 2 2 Crespo# cf .278 .349 .401 121 436 65 121 26 2 8 51 44 93 9 8 Youkilis 3b .253 .374 .350 131 446 77 113 23 1 6 46 75 64 1 2 Shoppach c .255 .334 .396 105 369 44 94 26 1 8 45 40 95 0 0 Mirabelli c .235 .311 .432 62 162 19 38 11 0 7 25 17 40 0 0 Hyzdu cf .235 .319 .423 109 307 43 72 20 1 12 45 34 81 1 2 Hernandez c .272 .349 .362 76 243 31 66 10 0 4 27 27 31 0 2 Lombard* cf .251 .316 .413 114 419 56 105 23 3 13 54 36 136 14 5 Coquillette 2b .259 .326 .396 102 351 50 91 25 1 7 42 31 105 4 6 Medrano 2b .270 .342 .361 105 385 65 104 20 3 3 36 38 80 18 12 Febles 2b .251 .323 .349 109 350 52 88 15 2 5 34 34 58 11 5 Kapler rf .245 .310 .354 119 387 48 95 20 2 6 39 35 54 11 4 Reese 2b .242 .311 .329 108 368 38 89 20 0 4 35 35 71 11 3 Shumpert 2b .207 .284 .340 94 188 20 39 12 2 3 17 17 33 4 2 Name ERA W L G GS INN H ER HR BB K Martinez 2.54 16 3 27 27 177.0 136 50 9 40 210 Schilling 3.21 19 6 32 31 230.0 206 82 25 32 235 Foulke 3.53 7 3 70 0 79.0 73 31 7 20 71 Arroyo 3.66 11 4 28 23 150.0 147 61 12 33 116 Kim 3.71 9 5 65 6 102.0 91 42 9 31 100 Embree* 3.95 5 2 65 0 57.0 52 25 7 18 59 Williamson 4.15 5 3 63 0 65.0 55 30 5 33 71 Lowe 4.16 14 9 37 28 184.0 191 85 13 55 113 Mendoza 4.19 7 4 51 2 86.0 91 40 8 20 53 Malaska* 4.23 5 5 36 5 66.0 63 31 4 26 52 Wakefield 4.35 11 7 40 23 178.0 171 86 18 67 151 Hebson 4.39 7 4 45 2 84.0 84 41 7 31 61 Brown 4.41 8 6 26 15 104.0 119 51 9 25 52 Dinardo* 4.46 8 5 25 20 113.0 114 56 9 44 80 Almonte 4.50 3 4 54 0 62.0 61 31 7 23 48 Timlin 4.56 6 4 70 0 81.0 89 41 12 14 52 Seibel* 4.64 6 9 28 23 130.0 132 67 15 49 94 Mr. Bean 4.64 3 3 49 0 64.0 59 33 6 32 60 Bierbrodt* 4.69 6 7 30 17 117.0 114 61 14 50 104 Shiell 4.76 4 3 47 1 68.0 70 36 6 30 47 Lambert 4.96 3 3 47 0 49.0 44 27 9 21 56 Hamulack* 5.03 3 3 44 1 68.0 72 38 6 34 44 Yarnall* 5.06 2 4 18 13 64.0 64 36 7 33 35 Martinez 5.42 6 8 33 17 108.0 108 65 12 64 86 Jones* 5.78 3 4 45 4 67.0 70 43 10 38 46 Garcia 6.00 3 5 51 6 87.0 95 58 15 45 68ZiPS Projections are not playing time predictors; they project a player's performance given playing time in the majors in their accustomed role. As with all projections, specific knowledge of non-statistical attributes of the player should temper what the computer says.