I found USS Mariner today and was pretty impressed. What do you know about these guys?

Would Robby Cano have a .270/.300/.400 upside, TOPS, as a first baseman, under the new CBA? Just checking.

He makes a very good point about the draft pick issue around signings. This has to be seen as good by Selig (i.e. allowing them to not give into bonuses), but definately has some potential for abuse.

He makes a very good point about the draft pick issue around signings. This has to be seen as good by Selig (i.e. allowing them to not give into bonuses), but definately has some potential for abuse.

I forget where a good point was made, but I'm pretty sure it was made around BBTF -- teams just can't afford to do that. The first team that did that would drawn scorn from other teams and other columnists, ridicule from the same people and their own hometown fans, and would be at an overall disadvantage: what respectable agents (that deal with the big-time draft picks) would deal with a team that just screwed over a young kid for personal gain?

The only time I can really see not being called out for abuse is if the team just couldn't sign a big-time prospect, and even then, they wouldn't lose much P.R. As in, the Royals would perhaps have drafted Andrew Miller this last year if they weren't afraid of not being able to sign them. Because, if push came to shove, they'd be okay with not signing him.

Technically, it would be easy to abuse, but realistically, I think it really helps small market teams sign draft picks without too much risk of abusive teams.

Garth - Really? Scorn? Maybe a little complaining from other teams, but that's about it. Columnists barely write about the baseball draft, except here, BA, etc. Fans won't care either....barely 10% of fans even know that a baseball draft exists. Sure, agents would beef a bit, but probably not much. In any draft situations agents are only capable of dealing with the team that selects them.

I forget where a good point was made, but I'm pretty sure it was made around BBTF -- teams just can't afford to do that. The first team that did that would drawn scorn from other teams and other columnists, ridicule from the same people and their own hometown fans, and would be at an overall disadvantage: what respectable agents (that deal with the big-time draft picks) would deal with a team that just screwed over a young kid for personal gain?

The first team has already done this, and they didn't receive scorn, ridicule, and they're not at an overall disadvantage. In 2001, the Reds drafted Jeremy Sowers with the 20th pick in the first round, despite the fact that Sowers had made it well known that he was going to Vanderbilt and was going to be ridiculously hard to sign. The Reds offered him less money than a typical #20 pick would receive, much less a hard-sign player, and when he turned it down, they broke off negotations and let him go to college.

They essentially were told that their player acquisition budget for the year had been exhausted, and they didn't have the cash to sign a first round pick. So, rather than reach a pre-draft deal with a lesser prospect for well below slot, they decided to essentially punt the pick on Sowers and take the compensatory sandwich pick in 2002. They used that selection, #40 overall, on Mark Schramek, who they also failed to sign.

It's going to happen. Teams are going to abuse this rule, and they don't have to "screw over a kid" to do it. Every year, several top ranked prospects announce that they're going to be very hard to sign, and fall into the late rounds of the draft as a result. I think we'll start seeing these kids go much earlier now. I'd imagine the days of projected top 15-20 talents falling past the second round are mostly over.

Sure, agents would beef a bit, but probably not much.

So the Royals have pick #1 in Theoretical Year 2000. The consensus top pick is a senior pitcher out of Theoretical University. Scott Boras (I got tired of typing Theoretical) has been signed to be his agent. The Royals draft him, with no intention of signing him -- they know that in Theoretical Year 2001, two even better prospects will be available to draft and willing to sign. The Royals lowball the consensus top pick, he rightfully rejects the deal, but now he's forced to pitch in a semi-pro league and, a year older, has lost signing value. Both he and Scott Boras lose money, probably a lot of it.

I would say that from now on, the Royals only get Boras agents if they're offering absolutely insane money (which will never happen). Other than that, they're on very icy terms with Boras and, therefore, his clients.

It's just not a good idea for teams to abuse the system like this.

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In 2001, the Reds drafted Jeremy Sowers with the 20th pick in the first round, despite the fact that Sowers had made it well known that he was going to Vanderbilt and was going to be ridiculously hard to sign. The Reds offered him less money than a typical #20 pick would receive, much less a hard-sign player, and when he turned it down, they broke off negotations and let him go to college.

He could have been drafted as a draft-and-follow, right? (I don't know much about the draft's rules; I could very well be wrong here.)

They essentially were told that their player acquisition budget for the year had been exhausted, and they didn't have the cash to sign a first round pick.

So they had a monetary reason and, as you mentioned, they weren't really screwing any kid over. I'm not surprised they didn't suffer much backlash.

So, rather than reach a pre-draft deal with a lesser prospect for well below slot, they decided to essentially punt the pick on Sowers and take the compensatory sandwich pick in 2002.

But a sandwich pick is a little different from getting equal value, even if all other things in those situations are the same. Because, no matter how you look it, the team that passes up on the draft pick is losing at least some value.

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In the new situation, a team can really screw a prospect like one's never really been screwed before. But, at the same time, no team will do it. It's just not good P.R., not good agents relations, and it's just a wrong thing to do.

He could have been drafted as a draft-and-follow, right? (I don't know much about the draft's rules; I could very well be wrong here.)

You can only be followed if you go to a junior or community college. Since Sowers went to Vandy, the Reds lost his rights as soon as he stepped in a classroom that August or September.

In the new situation, a team can really screw a prospect like one's never really been screwed before. But, at the same time, no team will do it. It's just not good P.R., not good agents relations, and it's just a wrong thing to do.

Right. There is never going to be a policy that states you have to sign your picks. But at the same time I'm sure there is a unwritten understanding that there will be a good faith effort to sign a high draft pick. In Sowers' case, it wasn't a big deal since the chances of him turning pro were relatively low as is.

In the new situation, a team can really screw a prospect like one's never really been screwed before. But, at the same time, no team will do it. It's just not good P.R., not good agents relations, and it's just a wrong thing to do.

My point really had nothing to do with "screwing a kid over". My point is that teams are going to abuse the spirit of the compensation rule to reallocate picks from one season to another. You can argue that's not a big deal to you, if you want. I was just pointing out that it's going to happen.

My point really had nothing to do with "screwing a kid over".

I didn't mean to imply that you had. I was just saying that a team could screw a kid over even more so with this new set-up, doing something even worse than the situation you cited, but that I don't think it'll happen too often if at all, simply because (A) it's the wrong thing to do (B) it's bad business if agents stop dealing with you or give you no leeway in other dealings (C) it makes a team look bad, overall.

I was just pointing out that it's going to happen.

Hmm. This is interesting. Because had these rules been in place, the Royals might have felt a little more freedom to draft a more elite prospect like Andrew Miller, but might not have been able to sign him. This 'screwing' business brings up a difficult question: when is a team screwing a kid and when are they just unable to sign the kid?

Considering this, a team very well might be able to abuse the system, but they'd have to be very good and subtle with the ways they did it. Not to mention that if it ever got leaked what the higher-ups were intentionally doing, it would be P.R. suicide for the club.

Hmm. This is interesting. Because had these rules been in place, the Royals might have felt a little more freedom to draft a more elite prospect like Andrew Miller, but might not have been able to sign him. This 'screwing' business brings up a difficult question: when is a team screwing a kid and when are they just unable to sign the kid?

Considering this, a team very well might be able to abuse the system, but they'd have to be very good and subtle with the ways they did it. Not to mention that if it ever got leaked what the higher-ups were intentionally doing, it would be P.R. suicide for the club.

That's a fair point about Miller. And they probably would have been better off taking the #2 pick this year anyway, since Wieters and Price are probably better prospects than Hochevar or Miller. But I think the injustice is going to come from teams who take a player without any intention of signing him. If a team lowballs a player by a couple hundred K, so be it. A player isn't going to get a lot of sympathy from fans for getting 1.2 million instead of 1.5. But if there is ever an instance where a team refuses to negotiate with a player, you might see some type of reform initiated.

On the topic of the public outrage w/r/t the abuse of the system, I'll believe it when I see it. There have been a lot of injustices in the MLB Amateur Draft for as long as I can remember, without so much as a peep from the MSM. I don't see that changing in the near future.

But if there is ever an instance where a team refuses to negotiate with a player, you might see some type of reform initiated.

I don't think you're ever going to find out about it. I'm sure teams will give the "appearance" of negotiating with a player even when they have no real intention of signing said player.

I have no doubt that some high-profile first-rounder will fail to sign at some point, and I don't doubt that some team will use the system to reallocate picks from one draft to another. I agree with Temple that there's going to be little, if any, public outrage when a highly-drafted player doesn't sign. I suspect that, given the downward pressure on bonuses that the new system is virtually certain to exert, there will be far fewer of these situations as time passes, as players and agent/advisers realize that there's less incentive than before for teams to give in to bonus demands and that staying out for another year or three is likely to weaken their bargaining position even further.

-- MWE

The Royals draft him, with no intention of signing him -- they know that in Theoretical Year 2001, two even better prospects will be available to draft and willing to sign. The Royals lowball the consensus top pick, he rightfully rejects the deal, but now he's forced to pitch in a semi-pro league and, a year older, has lost signing value. Both he and Scott Boras lose money, probably a lot of it.

I would say that from now on, the Royals only get Boras agents if they're offering absolutely insane money (which will never happen). Other than that, they're on very icy terms with Boras and, therefore, his clients.

The problem with this scenario is this: The way that the new system is set up, no team has an incentive to offer "insane" money, because they're guaranteed a pick of close to equal value the following year if the prospect doesn't sign. In the old system, they got a pick that was much lower than the value of the pick they were losing, so they had some incentive to "make up the difference" to sign a guy.

Let's say the third pick in the draft returns $2 million to a team, on average, while pick #35 (a typical sandwich pick) returns $250,000. That difference between #2 and #35 might cause a team to go to $3 million to sign a player in the old system, on the principle that you'd rather lose $1 million than $1.75 million plus whatever the difference is between $250k and what you'd have to pay to sign the #35 pick. But if the typical #4 pick returns $1.85 million, you have less reason to go significantly above $2 million to sign the #3 pick, because you are guaranteed to get something of close to that value a year later (in addition to your own first-round pick a year later).

Teams will know this math - but so will Boras, and he's going to come to the realization that, like it or not, the teams will now have the upper hand in the bargaining process, because they aren't likely to lose as much if a Boras client doesn't sign, and (more importantly, from Boras's POV) the Boras client isn't likely to gain significantly by not signing.

-- MWE

I forget where a good point was made, but I'm pretty sure it was made around BBTF -- teams just can't afford to do that. The first team that did that would drawn scorn from other teams and other columnists, ridicule from the same people and their own hometown fans, and would be at an overall disadvantage: what respectable agents (that deal with the big-time draft picks) would deal with a team that just screwed over a young kid for personal gain?

It's one thing to "screw over a young kid" in bad faith -- such as refusing to offer a bonus or offering an obscenely low one. No team will do that, for the reasons you mention.

OTOH, it's quite possible that a team may decide that that years draft class is awful, that their pick this year couldn't be nearly as good as an equal pick next year, and therefore decide to be particularly tough in negotiations -- perhaps offering $900k where they would otherwise offer $1mm.

That's entirely plausible and I can't see the fans/media getting too upset about it. Agents may see through it, but it's not as if they have a ton of leverage (at least with respect to draftees). Put another way, Harry Hotshot isn't going to hold out against the only team with whom he can negotiate, simply becase the team played hardball with Perry Prospect.

Furthermore, I don't see it affecting MLB FAs either -- does anyone really think that, say, Barry Zito will refuse to accept a teams $15mm offer because it was tough in its negotiations with Perry Prospect?

So the Royals have pick #1 in Theoretical Year 2000. The consensus top pick is a senior pitcher out of Theoretical University. Scott Boras (I got tired of typing Theoretical) has been signed to be his agent. The Royals draft him, with no intention of signing him -- they know that in Theoretical Year 2001, two even better prospects will be available to draft and willing to sign. The Royals lowball the consensus top pick, he rightfully rejects the deal, but now he's forced to pitch in a semi-pro league and, a year older, has lost signing value. Both he and Scott Boras lose money, probably a lot of it.

If he was drafted #1 simply because it was a poor draft class, doesn't that mean that in any other season, he wouldn't be the #1 pick? If that's the case, why would it be completely unreasonable for the Royals to offer him less than they would otherwise offer a "true" #1 talent? Why would it be "rightful" for him to reject it?

If anything, you could argue that the Royals are "screwed over" by being pressured to offer a kid #1 money when he is clearly not a #1 talent.

And as I said above, if you think that an elite Boras client (say, Carlos Lee) is going to turn down a $15mm offer because that team played hardball with that #1 pick, you're nuts. Heck, I doubt that Neifi Perez would turn down an offer because of this.

From the article:

Perhaps getting the least attention of the important rule changes, amateur draft picks must now sign by August 15th. This will put an end to the long, protracted holdouts we’ve seen by high draftees recently, but more importantly, also puts an end to the draft-and-follow process that teams have used to evaluate a player’s development during a year at a junior college and still be able to sign the player. The DFE process, as it was known, was a boon for JC baseball, and the elimination of the DFE process isn’t a good thing, in my opinion.

As I see it, the new rules clearly put pressure on kids to sign by August 15, but what happens if they don't sign? Do they become FAs at that point?

If a team cannot sign a kid after August 15, do they still somehow retain his rights? Is this through the next years draft (as under the current system)?

I'm not sure it really screws over JC baseball. Yes, it means that some HS kids will be pressured to sign rather than go the JC route. OTOH, there should still be some kids who believe they have (or will have) the talent to go much higher in the draft . . . and will therefore go the college or JC route.

The only other difference, as I see it, is that the kid going the JC route wouldn't be draftable the following year, but would have to wait 3 more years before going back into the draft pool.

If a team cannot sign a kid after August 15, do they still somehow retain his rights? Is this through the next years draft (as under the current system)?
No, the kid has to wait 'til the next draft to go pro.

Otherwise, what Mike and David said.

Thanks, that makes sense. Still, there would be nothing preventing the kid from playing independent ball, I suppose.

Of course, if he was a HS kid, he could go to college, but then he wouldn't be able draft-eligible for 3 more years.

I found USS Mariner today and was pretty impressed. What do you know about these guys?

USS Mariner is one of my half-dozen must reads, especially when David Cameron posts. This Cameron article is easily the best summary of the issues involved in (statistically) evaluating pitcher performance that I've seen anywhere.

-- MWE

The rules on draft eligibility have not been changed; therefore a prospect who chooses not to sign and who got to JC will be draft-eligible the following year.

I think that elimination of the DFE process will hurt the JCs some, but I think it will hurt the players who would normally have been DFE candidates more. Many will get drafted lower than they might otherwise have been; some will sign prematurely, and more will get lost in the JC system and wind up being undrafted down the road.

-- MWE

One thing I haven't seen really commented on (except bare mentions without implications) is that if a team doesn't sign its draft pick one year it gets an equivalent one the following year - but it gets nada if it doesn't sign THAT draft pick. One implication of this is that we are likely to see higher bonuses for players drafted with those picks than for players drafted earlier but with teams having the fallback position. So, if team A can't sign the 5th pick in the draft they get the 6th the following year - but the agent for the 6th pick will know that he's in a better negotiating position, and can play hardball.

I'm thinking Boras clients are less likely to be drafted with those picks.

Thanks for the kind words, Mike.

On balance, I think this might make picking someone in Rule 5 more attractive to major league teams, because the prospect will have had an extra year of development under his belt and might be better able to adjust to a year of relative inactivity a major league roster. The flip side is that it allows teams to control a prospect for an extra year before they have to fish or cut bait on him. It’s probably of minimal impact in the long run, since useful prospects rarely make it to Rule 5 anyway.

Would the new Rule 5 errr rules encourage more minor-league trades? Since teams have an extra year before they need to put them on 40-man rosters, these 3/4-year players would make attractive roster-fillers at AAA and AA levels.