Baseball Prospectus:  Introducing SIERA

Matt Swartz and Eric Seidman introduce another way of measuring pitcher effectiveness:

[W]e have invented a new statistic, Skill-Interactive Earned Run Average (SIERA), which corrects the problems with old estimators while adding a few more realistic assumptions. This was done first by un-foiling all of the individual components in QERA while making an adjustment for the issue with the ground-ball denominator issue, and testing to see which interactions and squared terms were relevant by using multiple linear regression analysis. Essentially, we changed the GB/BIP to (GB-FB-PU)/PA and evaluated all of the terms in the exponential regression, removing those with insignificant p-values; while the QERA formula only shows three variables, un-foiling the formula reveals several more. We identified two terms that were not useful: the squared term of walks, and the interaction between walk and strikeout rate. The squared terms on strikeout and ground-ball rates were both significant, and we also found important interactions between walks and grounders and between whiffs and grounders that have strong effects on run scoring.

As a result, SIERA accomplishes the following:

1.  Allows for the fact that a high ground-ball rate is more useful to pitchers who walk more batters, due to the potential that double plays wipe away runners.
2.  Allows for the fact that a low fly-ball rate (and therefore, a low HR rate) is less useful to pitchers who strike out a lot of batters (e.g. Johan Santana’s FIP tends to be higher than his ERA because the former treats all HR the same, even though Santana’s skill set portends this bombs allowed will usually be solo shots).
3.  Allows for the fact that adding strikeouts is more useful when you don’t strike out many guys to begin with, since more runners get stranded.
4.  Allows for the fact that adding ground balls is more useful when you already allow a lot of ground balls because there are frequently runners on first.
5.  Corrects for the fact that QERA used GB/BIP instead of GB/PA (e.g. Joel Pineiro is all contact, so increasing his ground-ball rate means more ground balls than if Oliver Perez had done it, given he’s not a high contact guy).
6.  Corrects for the fact that FIP and xFIP use IP as a denominator which means that luck on balls in play changes one’s FIP.

Part 2 of the introduction can be found here.

P A A P F L Y: Dear Mr. Neukom, SOS.

“We may not be perfect, but heaven knows we try
Let’s drop the big one and see what happens”

What we can clearly see from this is that the Giants still appear to lack the ability to get on base at a league average rate and are by far the worst in the division. Exasperating that problem is the fact that when they do manage to sneak their way on base, they are going to have to go station to station to score runs.  While my method for examining their relative speed and OBP for 2010 isn’t exactly bullet proof, it does provide some pretty significant evidence that the Giants won’t be terribly swift.  After all, Bill James’ ( a pretty smart guy) projections are based on past performance. The Dodgers have the second worst average speed factor in the division and still have greater than a 20% advantage in that category. The back breaker of course is the fact that the Giants also have a serious power outage since the departure of Barry Bonds. A team that can’t get on base, runs like a team full of catchers and can’t play for the three run dinger probably isn’t going to score many runs. So if the Giants pitching staff felt they were carrying the load last year, they will probably feel more of the same this year and the defense behind them projects to do them a lot less good, too.

Sabean is out of money for the upcoming season and he’s running out of time. He may have fooled the business man Neukom thus far, but it appears his days are numbered. Frankly, he was very lucky with the timing of Peter McGowan’s departure. Neukom probably didn’t want to make such a big splash, especially coming off of a very successful season with the huge turnaround from ’08 to ’09, but if Sabean’s rosters continue to be less than impressive despite the young infusion of talent provided to him by John Barr and Dick Tidrow, Neukom will show him the door and find a new CEO. If a man who once ran the very successful Microsoft can’t understand the benefit that is the wealth of statistical information currently available to evaluate players and which Sabean ignores, who can?

FanGraphs: Carruth: Fastball Losses

As Mrs. Delaviour (French for dicknose) said to me in high school..."You’re the most negative person I’ve ever met.” So...to answer that here’s the Fastball Gains.

Looking at the list from the other end, however – that is, from the pitchers that lost the most speed on average on their fastballs – produces more starters. Whether because starters will get more innings even when injured, a usual byproduct of diminished fastball speed, or some other cause is open for speculation, but the results are definitely interesting.

As promised, a list of the biggest drops in fastball speed from 2009 to 2008. A minimum of 50 innings pitched in each season was needed to qualify.

Joba Chamberlain, -2.5
Ervin Santana, -2.1
Ross Ohlendorf, -2
Jared Burton, -1.7
Tim Lincecum, -1.7
Daniel Cabrera, -1.7
Manny Delcarmen, -1.6
Chan Ho Park, -1.6
Brian Fuentes, -1.6
Jeremy Sowers, -1.5
Lance Cormier, -1.4
Chris Young, -1.4
Grant Balfour, -1.3
Mariano Rivera, -1.3
Tim Redding, -1.3
Oliver Perez, -1.2
Aaron Cook, -1.2
Kevin Gregg, -1.2
Kyle McClellan, -1.1
Aaron Heilman, -1

freep: Johnny Damon likes Yzerman, Tigers

Yes...but will he like Rybarczyk’s line change?

“Johnny came to me about Detroit,” Boras said in a telephone interview. “He told me, ‘If I can’t play for the Yankees, I want you to let the Tigers know I want to play for them. I can make that team a winner.’ “

Although Damon, 36, has been a free agent since November, Boras said the market for him really didn’t develop until it became clear the Yankees wouldn’t re-sign him. Then, said Boras, “We got four or five offers right away.”

Boras declined to identify which clubs made offers or how much interest they have subsequently shown.

Boras addressed one aspect of Damon’s performance last season. According to Baseball-Reference.com, Damon hit 15 of his 24 homers to a place where the ball carried notoriously well, rightfield in the new Yankee Stadium.

“It’s no secret that Johnny Damon purposely hooks the ball in Yankee Stadium and changes his swing on the road,” Boras said. He added that Damon, a left-handed hitter, is a “strong guy” whose Yankee Stadium homers would have cleared the rightfield fence at Comerica Park.

MLB Network: Understanding plate discipline (Video)

Fangraphs goes mainstream…

The Hot Stove crew takes a look at the 2009 swing percentage leaders in the Major Leagues.

ATH: Should Albert Belle be in the MLB Hall of Fame?

Bill from The Daily Something figures no…

I don’t think anybody really puts much stock in these anymore, but just for the sake of completeness, Bill James created two Hall-related statistics many years ago; one, the Hall of Fame Monitor, was intended to measure a player’s likelihood of getting into the Hall, while the other, Hall of Fame Standards, attempted to measure a player’s worthiness for the Hall.

Belle’s Hall of Fame Monitor score is 134; a “likely” Hall of Famer hits about 100. So, finally, we have something in Belle’s favor; remember, though, that that just tracks whether we should expect the writers to vote him in, not whether he actually deserves to be in. The Monitor doesn’t know that Belle was a jerk who never talked to the media; for that matter, it doesn’t know that Belle played in the most hitting-friendly era in history.

Belle’s Hall of Fame Standards score is 36; an average Hall of Famer scores 50. That’s a lot more in line with what we’ve been seeing so far.

James also created “Similarity Scores,” which are just what they sound like—a very rough way to gauge how similar two players are. Belle’s five most similar batters are Juan Gonzalez, Lance Berkman, Carlos Lee, Dick Allen, and Jim Edmonds. His four most similar will never make the Hall, while the fifth might, but was also a Gold Glove centerfielder. After that comes Albert Pujols, but that just shows you the weakness inherent in the system; Pujols scores as very similar because he’s got about the same HR, R, and RBI numbers as Belle had, but he’s gotten there in 600 fewer plate appearances, has about 40 points of batting average and 60 points each of OBP and SLG on him, and plays a stellar first base. The Hall of Famers on Belle’s similarity list are easily distinguishable; the Juan Gonzalezes and Lance Berkmans, not so much.

wezen-ball: The Red Sox and All-Glove, No-Bat Players

Plus...anytime you get a chance to say Hughie Critz. You use it.

The biggest observation here is just hard it was to find good examples of all-glove-no-hit players at the most offensive-minded positions, LF, RF and 1B. I guess it just goes to show how highly clubs value offense at those positions. Conversely, it was incredibly easy to find examples at SS, 2B, and CF. I should also note just how crazy those numbers for Mazeroski and Belanger look. There have never been two players in the history of baseball whose value was so heavily skewed towards their defense as Maz and Belanger. Ozzie Smith, for example, has more defensive value than Belanger (266 defensive runs vs. 256), but his offensive value was much closer to average (-47 offensive runs vs. -213). It really is amazing what those two did with the glove in their day.

I’ll leave it up to the theory and simulation experts to tell me just what a team like this would do in a 162-game season (to make things interesting, vary the pitching staffs for the squad, from 2009 Brewers to 2009 Giants, to see how they’d change). It should be pretty clear, though, that the 2010 Red Sox lineup is nothing like the one I’ve shown here. There are plenty of bats in the lineup, whether they’re balanced out by defense or not. The “defense first” mantra that Theo Epstein is supposedly following this winter might be a real thing, but it’s far from the drastic change that some are making it out to be. It might be fun to see a team so extraordinary, defensively, that it looks like they’re playing with a 10th player on the field, but even Theo knows that that won’t work today. Instead, I just hope that Red Sox writers and fans can take a deep breath and trust the moves of a GM who has given them two World Series victories this decade.

TYU: Robinson Cano and false perceptions of speed

Bad running? Mike de la Hoziery looks on.

While Keith Law is discussing Orlando Hudson here – the “Slow-Dawg” – he might as well be referring to Robinson Cano. Though Cano is not viwed as a “low-power middle infielder,” he is often mistakenly perceived as having “good speed,” although, as Law says, such a characterization just does not “bear out in reality.” I remember Joe Buck referencing Cano in this way throughout the World Series and wondered how, exactly, Buck came to that conclusion given Cano’s poor stolen base numbers – 17 steals in 38 attempts – and decidedly low speed score (3.6). To be fair to Buck, even I admit that I was surprised at how sluggish Cano was on the bases when he first arrived on the scene in 2005.

Perhaps stereotypes regarding infielders as well as stereotypes pertaining to appearance are to blame. While Cano is a powerful middle infielder, he is, still, a middle infielder. Thus, we assume that he is faster, for whatever reason, because middle infielders just are that way inherently. Plus, Cano is slim and “looks” athletic, so perhaps that visual is what makes many people think he is faster than he really is (conversely, when we look at Prince Fielder, we do not consider him to be fast, so, assuming the opposite – thin equals fast – is often the case). In addition, though I am hesitant to say this in fear of a backlash, there are longstanding ethnic and racial stereotypes which distinguish minorities as “fast runners,” so I wonder if this is also implicitly at play with guys like Robinson Cano and Orlando Hudson. This is a difficult issue to discuss, but, as many academics have noted, it is a characterization that exists.

It is a mixture of these things – sometimes one or the other, sometimes all three – that likely influence our perceptions of speed in baseball. Orlando Hudson and Robinson Cano are just two examples of players that are “surprisingly slow” because of these preconceived thoughts. It is an interesting issue to consider the next time we watch a game.

NYBD: Silva: Bill James Accused Elias of Being “About Money”

Ah, yes...but the acreage wasn’t as green when Alf and Ralph Munro Elias owned The Elias Sports Bureau.

There is no doubt in my mind that stats and advanced metrics are about to become a big business. It really always was, despite what some of the sabermetricans claim, even Bill James showed frustration in “Moneyball” with the Elias Sports Bureau, the big fish in the stats game at the time, accusing them of “being out to make money, steal his ideas, and make disparaging comments about him.” It sounds like James had a legitimate claim, after all, he was the same type of startup that most new media types are today. Big companies are always trying to cut off the air supply of the entrepreneur types because they know their arrogance and bureaucracy can’t compete, but their money can.

This brings me to my point. I love the Bloomberg Software and applaud the work of the company. Incorporating someone like Jonah Keri only will give them more credibility within the blogosphere. Not many large companies embrace the thoughts of independent media, which they clearly did last Sunday. With that, the burning question that went unanswered is the engine behind their “B-Rank” system for players. Bloomberg, obviously, will not reveal the formula behind it. This would be equivalent to a consumer goods company telling its competitors what exactly is in the “special sauce” their customers enjoy so much. All we know, according to the companies latest press communication, is that it’s a “mathematical algorithm where they weigh a player’s performance in the key categories – homers, saves, etc. – over the past four years, with greater weight accorded to the most recent season, and so on down the line.” This ranking is used more for fantasy purposes, but isn’t the true value the profit behind it? To credit Bloomberg they have stood their ground, but embraced the demands by giving out enough information. They didn’t slander the critic who asked the question. They didn’t even behave like an arrogant Fortune 500 company. Wow what a concept!

...Did Bill James receive scorn for accusing Elias about being about money? Remember, they, not James, were the mainstream at the time. Probably not, but since the beginning of time, way before sabermetrics existed, people wanted to profit from their ideas. That is why I will continue to challenge everyone, big and small, when they claim absolute knowledge on a particular front because, to quote Bill James, “it’s about the money.”

MLB: Gammons: A’s faced with obstacles

When the chair hit the rappelling wall it didn’t bang and clang, it exploded!

Yet, whether it’s Baseball Prospectus’ PECOTA or the numerology used by different teams, the A’s are considered serious contenders in the AL West. These prognostications for the upcoming season show the A’s win totals ranging anywhere from 80-82 and six games out of the AL West, to one team’s formula, which has them winning 89 games, more than any AL team not based in New York, Boston or St. Petersburg.

...OK, the offense didn’t work, finishing ninth in the AL in runs, last in homers and 12th in OPS. But between the ninth, first and second holes, manager Bob Geren can play around with Crisp, Ryan Sweeney and last year’s revelation, Rajai Davis. Kurt Suzuki can hit second or third, Kevin Kouzmanoff, DH Eric Chavez, Jack Cust and Daric Barton can all bat somewhere in the middle. The pitching, theoretically, will cushion the pressure as they bring their young position players up from Sacramento during the season. Some of the prospects who could see time in Oakland this season are outfielder Michael Taylor (acquired from Philadelphia through Toronto in the Roy Halladay trade this offseason), first baseman Chris Carter (92 home runs over his last three Minor League seasons), infielder Adrian Cardenas, first baseman-outfielder Sean Doolittle and second baseman Jemile Weeks, a former first-round Draft pick.

“By the late part of the season, we should have a pretty good young team,” Beane said. “We just have to have some patience.”

The Baseball Analysts: Allen: Thoughts on a New Box Score

This might be the coolest thing I’ve seen since the boot/bathtub/seesaw sequence in Mouse Trap!

I have fond memories of, as a child, reading box scores in the newspaper. In the pre-internet, or at least pre-internet in my house, days box scores in newspapers was the medium by which I, and I assume, most people consumed baseball data. The data were all there, tightly yet efficiently packed in a format that allowed you to pull out any or all you wanted without feeling overwhelmed. Each was small enough for box scores for all the day’s games to fit on one page.

I still read box scores, the medium has changed to the internet, but the box score itself is largely the same. I guess the format has stayed largely the same since the mid-1800s. Some of the stats are different but the layot is very similar. Over 150 years with little change shows that the format is remarkably successful, but that does not mean there cannot be innovations. FanGraphs’s WPA charts are not box scores per se, but are a very effective way of presenting what happened in a game.

I thought it would be an interesting exercise to attempt to create a new box score. I wanted it to retain the original box score’s quality of presenting a relatively large amount of information in a relatively small space, but making that data accessible and not overwhelming. Beyond that I hoped my new method gave a more immediate feeling for the pace and tenor of the game, like the WPA chart does.

Sabermetric Research: Birnbaum: Does it matter that the Yankees keep buying pennants?

Last week, at the Sports Economist blog, Brian Goff agreed and disagreed with Posnanski’s analysis. His agreement was that Posnanski got it right in terms of understanding why MLB did what it did with the expanded playoffs. His disagreement was that, while Posnanski thinks it’s a bad thing for the fans, Goff thinks it’s a *good* thing.

Why? Because Yankee-haters get a lot of satisfaction out of seeing the Yankees lose. And so MLB’s strategy is win-win. Yankee fans get to see their team in contention every year, which creates a lot more revenue for the league and utility for fans (since the Yankees have the largest fan base in MLB). And then, Yankee-haters get to see their least-favorite team defeated two years out of three, which makes *them* feel good and open their wallets. MLB deliberately designed the system this way to squeeze more money out of its fans.

That may be true, but I’m not so sure the strategy is still in baseball’s long-term interest. The sports economists I’ve read note that fans spend more money when their team is successful, and, from that, they conclude that it maximizes profit for the league to ensure the cities with the most fans win the most often.

I’m not convinced. That may work in the short run, when the fans still have memories of when payrolls were more even, and playoff berths were earned more by other means than money. But what happens longer term, when the Yankees make the playoffs for 28 of the next 30 years, and it becomes more and more obvious that the Pirates and Royals will seldom (if ever) be able to compete? And what happens when even Yankees fans start to get uncomfortable noticing that there’s a lot less to be proud of when your management is just buying all the best players, and a playoff berth is just being purchased every year?

Thanks to Marsh.

The Baseball Analysts: Greenhouse: Hitters by Zones

Jonah, points out the latest work from Jeremy Greenhouse.

Few in MLB can beat a well-located pitch down and away. I wanted to look up those who could, so I broke the plate area down into nine zones, scaling the vertical component of the pitch for the batter’s height. For this analysis, I decided to restrict my sample to only 2009 pitches at which the batter swung.

Batters have the advantage when the pitch is middle-middle, and for the other eight zones, the run value is negative. 

Middle-Middle

Name 	Runs 	Swings
Prince Fielder 	30.7 	249
Mark Teixeira 	29.9 	294
Ryan Braun 	29.6 	281
Adam Dunn 	25.3 	294
Andre Ethier 	25.2 	323
Augie Ojeda    -10.9 	128
Nick Punto     -11.3 	191
Luis Rodriguez -11.8 	129
Ty Wigginton   -12.0 	219
Dioner Navarro -13.1 	174

This is clearly the most telling list in terms of quality of hitter. To be successful swinging the bat, you have to be able to hit the ball pitched down the middle.

Kannengieser: Jason Bay = Kevin McReynolds? We Should Be So Lucky

Or as my old bar buddy “Liverspot” Lattimore used to call McReynolds..."The Pulled a Rock from Little Rock”

I wasn’t self aware during most of McReynolds’s time with the Mets but have read enough about him to understand his storyline—talented player who didn’t have much passion for the game. Evidence suggests this might be true, but it’s the first part of the storyline that is most important. Pearlman might be right that Bay is not an “oomph” player, but who cares? You don’t pay for “oomph”; you pay for talent. And despite his defensive shortcomings and the fact that the Mets overpaid a bit, Bay has plenty of talent. Enough to post a .397 wOBA in the powerhouse AL East last season.

For purposes of the following comparison, let’s assume Bay’s option vests and he plays five years with the Mets, just as McReynolds did. Listed are McReynolds’s Mets season-by-season WAR per Baseball Projection and Bay’s projected WAR, starting with the CHONE projected 4.0 for 2010 and knocking 0.5 off each year:

...That 4.0 starting point might be a bit generous, but even so McReynolds outperforms the hypothetical Bay performance. WAR isn’t infallible but it’s not as if McReynolds’s totals were inflated by fluky defensive stats—he posted wRC+’s of 149, 128, 122, 120 and 106 with the Mets and played nearly every game. Give me a durable power hitting corner outfielder over a spark-filled dynamo who is only on the leaderboards for dirtiest uniform and most buffet tables flipped. Bay is the next McReynolds? Awesome!

WEEI: Speier: Checking in at the V-Mart: A look at Victor Martinez’ value

V-Mart is a free-crouching unit that will carry a wide assortment of general tools.

If Martinez is solid behind the plate in 2010 while maintaining his offensive production, then he would likely be in line for the Varitek/Rodriguez/Posada contract. But, if teams conclude – as some executives already have – that he should be evaluated purely in the context of the market for first basemen and designated hitters, then Martinez becomes a completely different animal.

He has the bat to justify being an everyday first baseman and DH. Even so, when removed from behind the plate, his offense translates from elite (as a catcher) to merely good, with an expectation that his corresponding contract would likewise change.

The other “top” catchers who will be on the open market following the coming season include A.J. Pierzynski, Bengie Molina, Ramon Hernandez, Jason Varitek . . .  a group of players who are beyond their primes and are reaching (or well beyond) the age when the production of catchers falls off a cliff. Against that group, Martinez is like a superhero whose smile glints blindingly in the sun.

Over the past 10 years, Martinez ranks fourth among catchers with an .837 career OPS (behind Mauer (.892), Posada (.878) and Mike Piazza (.872)). During the same decade-long stretch, however, he would rank 24th in the majors in OPS among first basemen/designated hitters, behind Nick Johnson (.849) and just ahead of Adam LaRoche (.834) – both of whom, it should be noted, will be free agents following the 2010 season.

Remington: Can Granderson solve his lefty pitcher problems?

Future Waldling: “100 Granderson Bar now has 48 HR’s this season at Yankee Stadium! Isn’t that amazing, Suzyn!?”

Granderson will be 29 in a month, and is in his physical prime. The odds are good that he’ll have a field day with that short right field wall. He wasn’t overly lucky last year, according to Hit Tracker Online, which means that he’s not due for the kind of rude awakening Jimmy Rollins received after he hit 30 homers. He has legitimate 25-30 homer power in his bat and he’s moving to a park that will make it easier for him to hit them.

The Forecast for 2010: Last year, Granderson showed two things: he could murder right-handers and hit a ton of homers off them, and he couldn’t hit lefties if you gave him a bat the size of John Kruk. The new Yankee Stadium likely won’t help him hit lefties — the short porch in right field will only help him if he can pull the ball, and he can’t get around on lefties. What’s more, the Yankees have a homegrown solution to the problem: Brett Gardner is defensively similar to Granderson, and has an OPS over .700 against southpaws in the majors and in the minors. Any time a lefty’s on the mound, they can rest Granderson and let him lurk as a potent pinch-hitting weapon any time a right-handed reliever comes in. Granderson doesn’t seem like a platoon player, but the more often the Yankees realize it, the better.

The Baseball Analysts: Sullivan: Josh Beckett: To Extend or Not?

The first lesson here is that it’s critical to understand that there is a premium to be paid on the unrestricted free agent market, and that you have to recalibrate performance expectations. You might not get the late-aughts Beckett for his next contract, and it might feel like you’ve overpaid at times, but when you consider how much value Boston got in this last contract, it could all even out. Let’s take the John Lackey deal as an example and given Lackey’s similarities to Beckett, it’s not a bad proxy at all. If you believe Fangraphs free agent dollar values assigned to each win, all the Red Sox need from Lackey to make the deal worthwhile is output like Scott Baker or Carl Pavano produced in 2009, or Andy Sonnanstine in 2008. Can Beckett do that in his 31 to 35 seasons? Maybe.

The second lesson is that, given the odds of a 30-plus pitcher living up to his end of the deal, there are probably better areas to allocate your free agent spend. In Boston’s case, this is especially true given the commitment they have made to John Lackey this off-season. As a Red Sox fan, I am not ready to state explicitly that they should let Beckett walk but $35-$40 million committed to Lackey and Beckett annually from 2011-2014 has the potential to hamper Boston’s flexibility. As with anything else, this decision will come down to Boston’s ability to meld medical, scouting and performance analysis insight to generate an accurate projection of Beckett’s future output.

Now don’t mess it up!

Thanks to Wims.

Klapisch: How long can Lincecum shoulder load?

Or as Mrs."The Schemestress” Drucci once said..."We sure gave the Verducci Effect a swell sendoff!”.

Lincecum’s mechanics are so far acting as a buffer against injury; to say the Giants’ right-hander uses his entire body to deliver the ball is like saying Bill Gates has a checking account. Lincecum’s pitching stride reaches 7.5 feet, or roughly 129 percent of his height. The average stride length for a pitcher is 77 to 87 percent of his height.

That may explain why Lincecum was able to dodge the dreaded “Verducci Effect” in 2009. The theory, devised by Sports Illustrated’s Tom Verducci, suggested that a pitcher under 25 risks injury by increasing his workload by more than 30 innings from one year to the next.

Lincecum added 81.1 innings between 2007 and 2008, which means the Verducci Effect should’ve nailed him in ’09. But it didn’t. Lincecum leads the majors in ERA, batting average against (.214), winning percentage (.733) and strikeouts over the past two seasons.

But that’s not to say Lincecum can forever rely on pure velocity, as he’s already weaning off his fastball. In 2007, two out of every three pitches Lincecum threw were four-seam heat; the percentage declined to 55.8 percent last year. Conversely, his dependence on change-ups increased from 13.4 percent in ’07 to 21.4 percent in ’09.

AZ Snakepit: The 2010 Interview with Josh Byrnes, Part One

AZ: It’s interesting you talking about younger players. There was an article at Fangraohs.com where David Cameron said older players might be the new market inefficiency, because “everyone” is trending young. Any thoughts as to whether that might be the case?

JB: Maybe - I think there’s always a pendulum in the game. There was probably an exaggerated taste for college players in the draft a few years ago, and when that happens, it makes high-school players more valuable. The fifth high-school player drafted or tenth high-school player drafted, maybe “should” go in the twenties, and now he was getting pushed to the second-round. That’s really the story of this whole decade. People chasing defensive metrics now, or young players. Is there a point at which the pendulum swings too far? It’s why, as information-savvy as we think we are, we’re generally not the organization espousing the newest philosophy and going, “Dammit, we’ll show you how smart we are.” We’ll probably take a longer view, and understand where our opportunities are in the marketplace to get the right players.

AZ: Both LaRoche and Johnson mentioned that one of the things attracting them to Arizona was its reputation as a good hitting park. Is this something you pitch to free agent hitters?

JB: Yes, but not necessarily in that respect. It’s funny, we’re aware of the ballpark, park factors, how it affects the outcomes of OPS+ or ERA+. On the other hand, there’s also watching how it turns out. I think it’s a good offensive ballpark: I don’t think it’s a bandbox, it does help singles, doubles, triples and homers, but it’s not an exaggerated park as some are.

The flip side is, our road environment is very, very difficult on our hitters. We play in a division that’s had great pitching, we play nine series a year in California, at least, so it’s going to create a divide. Playing for the Diamondbacks, yes, home games, perfect weather, good ballpark to hit in. That’s great - but our road schedule is difficult or an offensive player.

Talking to those two guys, we talked much more about our team, our environment, and we felt like our capabilities of winning. Those were the points we were trying to make and I think those factored into their decisions too.

Sherman: Joba’s bullpen call

Less innings for better pitchers...the new market unmentionable?

This is not easy for the Yanks. They truly have believed Chamberlain’s pitch inventory was that of a starter. Plus, they have endured the criticism of the Joba Rules to navigate to this moment when he would have few restrictions as a starter.

But by morphing back into a confident, dart-throwing reliever in the postseason, Chamberlain has pushed the Yanks to more seriously consider that he might not have been suffering rotation growing pains and, instead, simply is more temperamentally built to work out of the pen.

And, really, the bigger question the Yanks might want to ask in spring is not Joba vs. Hughes as much as 2010 vs. the future.

Because aren’t the 2010 Yanks much better if both Joba and Hughes are in the bullpen? Think about it.

As long as they have health with their main veteran starters—Sabathia, Burnett, Pettitte and Javier Vazquez—the importance of a No. 5 man dims.

The Common Man: The Manly Awesomeness of Frank Howard

This really blew my purkinjerkin’ cells to pieces...no, not the delightful article...the fact that Neyer never saw Hondo play!

Despite a reputation as a low-average slugger in a terrible era for hitters, Howard managed to put together at .273/.352/.499 line across 16 seasons. His 142 OPS+ is tied for 61st all time, ahead of former teammate Duke Snider, and other Hall of Fame sluggers including Reggie Jackson, Chuck Klein, Al Simmons, Dave Winfield, Eddie Murray, Billy Williams, Carl Yastrezemski, and (of course) Jim Rice.

In fact, it might be helpful to think of Frank Howard as the player everyone thinks Jim Rice was. Like Rice, Howard was a defensively challenged corner outfielder. Both lasted 16 seasons, each playing from age 21 to 36, and both hit, believe it or not, 382 homers. Howard’s career OPS was .851, and Rice’s was .854. Rice had a higher batting average, more hits, and more doubles, but also had 1700 more plate appearances. While superficially similar, however, Howard’s performance actually towers over Rice when we account for the era and stadiums in which he played. While Rice spent his whole career taking aim at the Green Monster, Howard was mired hitters’ hells in Dodger Stadium and RFK Stadium for almost all his career. Howard had two full seasons in LA’s Memorial Coliseum in 1960 and 1961, and one full year at Tiger Stadium in his last season, but otherwise played in a scoring wasteland.

Their careers also differ in another essential way. While some writers have twisted themselves into knots to demonstrate that Jim Rice was The Most Feared Hitter In the American League, it’s Howard who was really frightening.

Langweber: Todd Helton = Sandy Koufax

I wonder if Payton Manning would wave this one off…

First, when Koufax was dominating the National League we were not nearly as cognizant of park and league effects as we are today during Helton’s time.  As we came to understand park and league effects better as time went by, Koufax’s legacy nevertheless remained intact.  Second, Koufax was a pitcher, and fans and writers have a tendency, I think, to romanticize pitchers more than hitters, particularly when it comes to “short but dominating career” type guys (consider that Ralph Kiner, similar to Koufax in that he had a brilliant peak but short career as a hitter, took 20 years after his retirement to make the Hall while Koufax sailed in after only his second year of eligibility).

Third is dominance compared to their contemporaries.  Despite the fact that Helton’s peak is equal to that of Koufax’s, Koufax really was the best pitcher of his era.  Helton was not the best hitter of his.  That honor would have to go to Barry Bonds, and it’s far from clear that Helton was even the second best hitter of his era: in addition to Helton, Vladimir Guerrero, Manny Ramirez, Carlos Delgado, Albert Pujols, and Alex Rodriguez can all lay a legitimate claim to “best non-Bonds hitter of the first half of this decade” title, not to mention Frank Thomas, Ken Griffey Jr., and Jeff Bagwell immediately prior, as well as David Ortiz and Travis Hafner immediately after.

None of which fully explains why Koufax is perceived as one of the greatest pitchers of all time while Helton is viewed as something less than one of the best hitters ever, to say the least.  The facts do not lie: Helton and Koufax had great peaks of almost identical value, save for the fact that Helton’s was slightly stronger.  Both put up otherworldly numbers because they were great players playing in parks and eras particularly suited for them.  Yet Koufax is viewed as one of the greatest pitchers of all time while the perception of Helton is something less than that.  Todd Helton is Sandy Koufax.

Play a Hard Nine: Who Was the Greatest St. Louis Brown?

Relax Rivington Bisland Fan Club members...passed over again.

Anyway, I asked myself the question “who was the greatest Brown?” I know the knee-jerk response is to say “Gorgeous George Sisler, stupid”. He’s the only Brown to get elected by BBWAA, he hit over .400 twice, posted a lifetime .340 batting average and hit over .300 over six seasons in which he had such severe sinusitis that at times he suffered from double vision. While Sisler was a hit machine, he has just a career OPS+ is just 124, tied for 245th career all-time. He gets bashed a bit in the saber crowd for not drawing walks, hitting for power all at the wrong end of the defensive spectrum.

On the flip side, you have Bobby Wallace, one of the finest defensive shortstops of his era. Total Zone has him worth 9.5 runs above average per season (700 PA). While his offensive numbers are less than stellar (career OPS+ of 102), he did post some solid seasons in a less than hitter friendly era.  We’ll take a closer look at both players at some point as I add more players in my revolutionary and sometimes controversial Hall of Excellentitude, but in the meantime I just wanted to throw some numbers out for your consideration before you say with certainty that Sisler was the King of the Browns.

NESN: Francona: Small Ball Still May Not Be the Answer For These Red Sox

With the type of lineup and defensive presence the Red Sox have coming into the 2010 season, is it time to start thinking more small ball?

I think the term “small ball” gets confused—or, at the very least, misused. The idea is, regardless of who is on our team, to put players in the best position to succeed. So often, when we have runners on first and second, we would rather have our good hitters hit rather than sacrifice an out. So many positive things can happen when we allow guys to hit. There are certainly times when a sacrifice bunt is in order, but there are many things to consider when doing it: Is there speed on the bases? Where are we in the lineup? Will they walk the next guy and set up a double play? How good a bunter is he? Basically, does it potentially put us in a better position to win? The one huge risk when allowing guys to swing away is the double play. That’s part of what makes baseball so interesting—everyone has an opinion on what happened or what should have happened.

Last year, there was a lot of big talk around Lars Anderson. How did he do in the minors last season, and how much can we expect from him now that a year has gone by?

Last year at this time, Lars had just completed the rookie development program. He was the talk of the town. Going into spring training, everybody was looking at Lars to make the next big impact. It was probably a little unfair, and I believe he tried to live up to a lot of those expectations and, in the process, put undue pressure on himself. After tearing up Double-A to end the 2008 season, he had to really grind through a year of adjustments. He is slated to be in major league camp as a non-roster player, and we are looking forward to seeing him a year more mature—and, hopefully, all the good things that will come with it.

Thanks to Roebuck.

Washington Nationals: Skipper Jim Riggleman On XM With Rob Dibble

Q: Ivan “Pudge” Rodriguez? What do you expect? Will he mentor catchers or pitchers?

Jim Riggleman: “Well, he’ll do both. I think he’s taken on that a little bit in the last couple years on clubs that he’s been on, whereas in the past that wasn’t part of his game, but I think he will mentor some other players. I think he’ll give us an air of confidence with our pitchers when they look in and see who’s back there, but, you know, he’s still a good player, he’s not just a senior citizen on the club. This guy can block balls, throws the ball very well, he’s an athlete back there and he kind of puts in the mind to the other ballclub that you just can’t get on and go. We’ve got a chance to stop your running game. If our pitcher gives him any chance at all, he can throw people out and he’s a good hitter. I only saw Pudge in games that we played against him, but the last couple years that I saw him, I actually commented to him a couple times through the last couple years that he really was swinging into some bad luck? He was hitting a lot of balls right on the barrel, right at people, and that’s just the way it goes sometimes. All you can do is try to hit the ball hard in our game and his numbers are not bad, offensively he’s still a productive hitter, but he can’t continue to hit into that kind of bad luck, cause this guy hit a lot of “at’em” balls...”

Cappydick wants to know if there is any truth to this…

TFT: Mitchell: Is Strategy Baseball’s New Market Inefficiency

Or why more teams should revisit the Camp Campy Campaneris camp or something.

Another strategic area where teams can begin to exploit market inefficiencies is using and acquiring players who are more versatile.  This should be done in a strategic way.  Simply acquiring players who can play a number of different positions, like the San Francisco Giants seem to be doing, in not the answer.  However, given the degree of specialization needed in baseball today, versatility can help address this issue a market efficient way.  For example, pinch runners and third catchers are valuable, but teams cannot afford to carry a player who can do little more than pinch run or catch.  However, a back end of the bullpen reliever who could pinch run, or a third catcher who could also play the corner infield positions, or hit lefties decently would have great value.  Similarly, a fifth outfielder, particularly in the AL is a luxury that some teams cannot always afford, but if that fifth outfielder could play first base, or even third base, he would be much more valuable.

Players who are more versatile make the roster seem bigger and give the manager more options.  Currently, versatility is neither encouraged nor valued very much.  A team that acquired and cultivated more versatile players would gain a small but meaningful advantage-particularly in the post-season.  Players might first balk at this, but it would also increase their value.  The aforementioned Johnny Damon, for example, would have a lot more value today if he could also play first base.  Any pitcher competing for the spot as the 5th righty out of the bullpen would have an edge on his competitors if he was able to pinch run and if his manager understood the value of using him in that capacity.

Lauber: AMARO: ‘I’M NOT A DUMMY’

Señor Winces?

“I was talking to some people the other day,” Amaro recalled, “and I said, ‘I’m not a dummy. I know what Cliff Lee means to our rotation in addition to Halladay and [Cole] Hamels. It’s a no-brainer.’ … Our goal is to be a contender every year — not just to be a competitor, but to be a contender every year. That’s really my job. As an executive of the club, it’s my job to do what I can to try to maintain that level of talent on the club and that hope from the fans. So, yes, I’d like to have a championship, but not at the cost of having our organization not be good for 10 years. Absolutely not. That’s not the goal. The goal is to be a contender every year. And once you get to the World Series or get to the playoffs, it’s really a matter of who’s playing the best baseball, who’s hottest, who has the karma.”

I’ve covered the Phillies for five years, and for five years, I’ve heard team president David Montgomery say the same exact thing. Sure, the Phillies would love to win the World Series every year. But to them, having a chance to win it every year is more within their control than actually winning it.

Last night, Amaro made a point of saying, “We cannot be the New York Yankees. We have to have people that we can bring to the big leagues from our system.” Translation: The Phillies can’t buy championships. They can’t have a $200 million payroll, and with the 2010 payroll nearing a club-record $140 million and $131.25 million already committed to only 15 players for 2011, they need to begin preparing to replace various parts of their championship-winning nucleus.

Henning: Agent: Damon wants to play for Tigers

Yeah...and I want to play for Pill Wonder. So what of it?

Johnny Damon, the free-agent outfielder who helped the Yankees to a world championship in 2009, would be happy to talk with the Tigers.

“Johnny believes the addition of him to Detroit’s lineup would make the Tigers a winner,” Scott Boras, Damon’s agent, said during a Monday phone conversation.

“He’s batted .363 at Comerica Park, he has a .412 on-base percentage at Comerica,” Boras said.

Boras added, quoting Damon before Damon signed earlier contracts with the Yankees and Boston Red Sox: “I told you I could make the Yankees a winner, and I told you before I left Oakland (where he played in 2001) I could make a Boston a winner.”

Boras says Damon has the same disposition toward the Tigers in 2010: “I can make the Detroit Tigers a winner,” Boras said, citing Damon’s words to him in December.

Damon, 36, has a career .288 batting average, 207 home runs, and needs only four more RBIs to reach the 1,000 mark. His career on-base average is a robust .355.

YESNetwork: Goldman: What to do with Robbie Cano

Robbie Cano, Don’t You...OH ####### NO!

hat same description applies to Cano, albeit for different reasons. A career .306/.339/.480 hitter, Cano freezes up with runners on base. This was clearly demonstrated last season, when he batted only .255/.288/.415 with men on and .207/.242/.332 with runners in scoring position. Conversely, leading off an inning he hit an incredible .441/.459/.797. Batting with the bases empty, he hit .376/.407/.609. While Cano hasn’t been this extreme every year, he has been fairly consistent in this regard. He’s a career .256/.291/.398 hitter with runners in scoring position, .280/.312/.425 with men on, and .331/363/.528 with the bases empty.

This doesn’t mean that Cano isn’t a good hitter, but that he simply has limitations. To get the most out of Cano, a manager might keep him out of RBI spots. Now, when you have one of the best offenses in baseball, your whole batting order is an RBI spot. That’s why the second spot in the order is a place he might prosper. Even if the Yankees get another .400 OBP from their leadoff man, Cano would be batting with the bases empty 60 percent of the time, do his best hitting, and be on base for Mark Teixeira, A-Rod, et al. The downside is that you might get a few extra Cano double-play specials when the leadoff man does reach base.

One other advantage to moving Cano up in the order is that it would get him away from Nick Swisher, who also struggles to hit with runners on. The two spent a good part of last season batting back to back, which meant a lot of dead rallies as the Yankees could count on consecutive outs when a runner got on. Add in that the runner in question was quite often Jorge Posada, who couldn’t navigate the bases with alacrity if you strapped an outboard motor on him, and you had a dysfunctional situation in the aft section of the lineup. Cano batted second back in 2005 and did not hit well, but the mature Cano has rarely been listed there.

Cybermetrics: Morong: How Did Mark McGwire Age Compared To Previous Sluggers?

Dunno, but after the Mike Hershberger Assay...we’ll should all know a lot more.

In some ways it looks like he aged significantly better, but I don’t the evidence is completely conclusive. I took all the guys who had 400+ HRs before McGwire and found their SLG relative (RELSLG) to the league average when they were under 31 and from ages of 31-37. The I found the ratio of their old RELSLG (ORATE) to their young RELSLG (YRATE). The data was from the Lee Sinins Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. I ranked them, including McGwire.

...From age 31-37, McGwire had a 0.683 SLG while the league average was 0.435. Since .683/.435 = 1.57, his RELSLG is 157 (everything gets multiplied by 100). Under 31, his SLG was .507 while the league average was .397. Since .507/.397 = 1.28, his RELSLG was 128. Then I divided the older RELSLG by the younger. For McGwire it was 157/128 = 1.23.

He is well ahead of everyone else. If it were not for Stargell, McGwire would really stick out. One thing that occurred to me was that in moving out of Oakland and to St. Louis, he no longer had to play in a tough HR park. So for all of these hitters I then used their neutralized SLGs from Baseball Reference.