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It sure looks like he's swinging at pitches he can't drive (almost doubling his singles rate), and still walking an inordinate amount of the time.
It sure does. If it still works with 1B/PA, that's a very legitimate point.
I didn't RTFA. If the guy's comparing McGwire to Dave Kingman, that's ridiculous.
That was me. The number was 4 times (out of 56 walks) leading to 5 runs. Also in those 56 walks, he scored 10 times, was removed for a PR 5 times, and the other 37 times, in which he neither scored nor advanced a runner who later scored, the batters after him made outs. Every single one. No one, not Vince Coleman, Rickey Henderson, etc, would hace scored, unless you assume steals of both second and third.
Now, you may conclude that the vast majority of his 2001 walks had little value, other than a little more wear and tean on the pitcher, and you would be right. But that would apply, that year anyway, to anyone.
Walks to fast runners are more valuable than to slow ones (no kidding). But it is an overstatement in the extreme to claim that they are worth far more. The fact is, most of baseball is station to station. Few players steal bases, and there isn't a whole lot of difference in rates in which they take extra bases.
In the McGwire era, correct. Not so in earlier eras. The game has become more station to station because of the dramatic alteration in play style.
I looked at 1980 vs. 1998 and there's been a dramatic drop in the number of times the ball is put in play without going over the fence, i.e., walks are up around 10%, strikeouts are up something like 40%, and homeruns are up something like 30%. Stolen base attempts are down something like 10%. I'd have to dig out the exact numbers, but these are close approximations.
I'd have to think the compression of the "take extra base" rate has something to do with this.
In fact, the FA says that McGwire's HR-hitting was "much worse than" Kingman's, because McGwire had a higher home-run percentage. I'm not sure what "much worse than" can mean in such an argument (it's kind of like dissing Wayne Gretzky because all the guy ever did was score goals), but the sense of the paragraph is that he's comparing Kingman to McGwire, and to McGwire's detriment.
But OBP accounts for sacs, and McGwire's OBP also goes through the roof.
Let's compare him to some other HOFers in H/PA, since you don't want to skew things with SHs and those worthless walks (with runners on 2nd & 3rd):
McCovey: .119
Schmidt: .121
Mays: .140
Killebrew: .156
Stargell: .166
Aaron: .167
McGwire: .191
Singles move baserunners. A McGwire walk with no one on is of equal value to a McGwire single with no one on.
That's not just wrong; it's incoherent. If no one behind him was good enough to knock him in, then he should have hit more home runs, not do something "other than... hit a homer." Singling would have put him just as far from scoring as walking would have.
The point wasn't addressed to him getting himself in position to go around the bases slowly, it was addressed to him developing skills that would have made his case stronger (and him a better player) without relying so much on HRs and walks -- in his case, overvalued walks.
Try reading again, slowly, this time with less of a curmudgeonly approach.
The Cardinals paid McGwire to walk?
Again going back to 2001, Mac had 56 walks. 27 of them were with no one on base. Surely you'd agree that those were better than swinging at bad pitches in order to try for a HR, no?
Of the other 29, 15 came with a man on first. Those were almost as valuable as a single. The value being close enough that one wouldn't want the trade of a much lower batting average by swinging at bad pitches. That leaves 14 times he walked with a man on second, or second and third, or third only. 3 of those were intentional. That leaves 11 in which he had a choice. Maybe. 11 out of 56, less than 1 in 5 of his walks, and only 3% of his PA's. It is beyond absurd to hold that against him.
I know you weren't. The claims weren't "about speed," to the extent they were "about" anything, it was about the relative value of a single and a walk.
Nobody would discount a guy's singles because he couldn't steal a base, etc. ... because that would be stupid. Why? Because his singles move baserunners. The singler is as far away from scoring as the walker, yes, but his single contributes more to other guys scoring than his walk.
Is it me?
Why not? A single has two values - it puts a runner on first and it advances runners. The <u>difference</u> between a walk and a single is entirely because of the latter of these. You're saying that McGwire's walks are less valuable <u>than an average walk</u> not because they do less to advance runners - all walks advance runners the same - but because he's harder to score. So why <u>wouldn't</u> you discount McGwire's singles the same way? And if you'd discount McGwire's singles the same way, then why wouldn't you similarly discount the singles of other slug-footed runners?
The Cards paid him to help them win. Whether by hitting HRs (which he did); knocking in those in front of him (which he did when he had the opportunity); getting on base so others could knock him in (which he did; it wasn't his fault those behind him sucked); or with his defense (which was average at best) he was paid to help the Cards win. It would be tough to argue he didn't do more to help them win than every other player on the team while he was healthy.
The Cardinals paid McGwire to make positive contributions to winning baseball games. His walks were definitely among the outcomes that were positive contributions to winning baseball games. They were slightly less so than his singles, dramatically less so than his home runs, and humoungously moreso than his outs.
No, they paid him to hit HR and drive in runners, which he did quite well. You're focusing on less than 5% of his plate appearances.
Let's look at 1998. Mac walked 162 times. 79 came with no one on. 37 came with a man on first (including 6 with the bases loaded). 20 of those with no one on first were IBB. That leaves 26 non intentional walks with men on second and/or third. 26 out of 162, again, less than 1 in 5, and less than 4% of his total PAs. How many walks with RISP and first base open would be acceptable? 0?
Again, stop using what a player does in 5% of his PAs.
No, no one's suggesting a guy should swing at a bad ball with no one on in lieu of a walk. You can get a little more granular and say you wish a slow hitter could hit a close 3-1 pitch out of the yard in lieu of taking it with a tie score, two outs in the bottom of the 9th, but on balance, your statement is plainly correct.
Of the other 29, 15 came with a man on first. Those were almost as valuable as a single. The value being close enough that one wouldn't want the trade of a much lower batting average by swinging at bad pitches. That leaves 14 times he walked with a man on second, or second and third, or third only. 3 of those were intentional. That leaves 11 in which he had a choice. Maybe. 11 out of 56, less than 1 in 5 of his walks, and only 3% of his PA's. It is beyond absurd to hold that against him.
With a fast man on first, a single has a much better chance of moving the baserunner two bases rather than one (and more if the fielders screw it up). At some point you'd prefer the walk to the single if the expected value of going for the single is negative. That is hitter-dependent and much too granular to be captured by OPS.
We've covered the first-base open situations.
I certainly don't mean to hold walks "against" McGwire; I'd say the same thing about any player of his type.
OK, sure. As an example, McGwire has very near the same career OPS as Joe DiMaggio, with fairly similar ratio of OBP to SLG. DiMaggio hit sixty points in BA higher than McGwire. At face value, even if they were both slow-footed first basemen, you would rather have DiMaggio (all else being equal, for the moment). But again, this only means that McGwire isn't as great a player as Joe DiMaggio. I'm cool with that.
Just so it's clear, it wouldn't break my heart if McGwire was voted into the HOF. I merely think there's a fair point to be made that we should dig a little deeper than OPS when the "O" comes from so many walks and the player is both (i) slow; and (ii) the product of the beer league era, in which walks were encouraged, both directly and indirectly through promotion of the concept of waiting for a pitch you could hit out of the yard, even if it means you strike out.
Earth to SugarBear: McGwire was slow, not immobile. You act as if he ran around the bases while balancing a book on his head.
And your other arguments are beyond silly also. He was "paid" to help his team win. Which he did, at a great level.
Nieporent was the one who said he was paid to walk, not me.
Contradict much? You claim 1317 walks didn't materially contribute to McGwires value? Then you claim they weren't valueless. Which is it?
So how much extra value would McGwire have if he had Sosa's speed? Well Sosa stole 234 bases in many more plate appearances, but got caught 107 times. So the extra 234 bases cost 107 bases directly, plus 107 outs (roughly 107 less plate appearances for other players during the year). Let's assume a base is equal to an out. Sosa created an extra 24 bases over McGwire (Big Mac was a minus -4 by the same measure) in 9900 total plate appearances. Even if you cut off the last two thousand plate appearances because Sosa's speed was gone, that's an extra base every 300 plate appearances.
How many times did Sosa have to got first to third or second to home on plays where Big Mac could only go one base to get Sosa close to Big Mac? They both have about 5,000 total bases + walks, but sosa has an extra 2200 or so plate appearances. If you cut off Sammy's last 4 years, you give him better rate stats and a similar number of PAs, but he'd be over 1,000 bases shy of Big Mac total bases + walks.
Do you really think Sammy created a net 1,000 extra bases in 7800 PAs from great baserunning? Well, Sammy was only on base around 1800 times in those 7800 PAs, so he took extra bases well over half the time he was on base? The guys hitting behind him must have been fantastic!
In reality, you over-rate the importance of faster baserunners dramatically in any era. Faster baserunning creates more runs, just not many compared to home-runs, doubles, and high OBP.
There was a thread awhile back (possibly on HOM) where someone DID make that argument- about Wade Boggs...
Oh, I think it's a plausible argument. It just isn't anywhere near enough of one to knock McGwire (or Boggs) out of the Hall of Fame. They both still scored plenty of runs.
(Singling out the Cardinals shows how spectacularly silly your argument is. McGwire didn't suddenly start walking after the Cardinals acquired him; he had always been a TTO player. So if the Cardinals acquired him (and then chose to re-sign him), it's reasonable to think they did so precisely because they wanted what he was giving them -- including walks.)
No. if you think about it for a second, the tradeoff is hugely negative. First, assume mac would hit at his career .263 BA by trying to get a hit on a ball out of the strike zone (an absurd assumpition, but I'll leave it for now). Second, assume a ny runner on first advances to third on a Mac single. So, you have a choice of a 100% chance of first and second, vs a 26% chance of first and third, and a 74% chance of the runner staying at first with one more out (or no one on base and 2 more outs.
No one with more than 2 brain cells firing make that choice.
Furthermore, you're making an unproven assumption that Mac never tried to expand his strike zone with RISP and first base open. how do you know this? In 1998, when he was clearly the most dangerous hitter in the league, he drew 26 unintentional walks in 91 PAs. Surely in those other 65 PAs he was pitch carefully, no?
And lastly, what about BA with RISP? If he should try for any marginally hittable pitch in those situations, his RISP would drop dramatically, and I have no doubts many of his same critics would be hammering him for that instead.
Yet I bet the Cardinals would still prefer that he single than walk with men on 2nd and 3rd.
And I bet they also wished he was faster, such that his walks would be more valuable.
Yes, I have no doubt they wished that he was a great defensive CF too, basically Joe DiMaggio,
but??????
He had flaws, he wasn't the perfect ballplayer, the perfect ballplayer does not exist.
I wrote that McGwire was paid to drive in runs, not to contribute a small part to scoring himself.
You called that "laughably silly."
26 times, in nearly 700 PA!!! And in all but a select few situations, I have no doubt they would prefer a 100% of a walk than a 20% chance at a hit and 80% chance of an out. You're making the incredibly absurd assumption that if he just swung at ball 4 he would have a 1.000 batting average.
The first and second chance isn't 100%, unless you assume perfect judgment of pitches and no strikeouts.
Would they prefer the out that may result from McGwire trying to expand his hitting zone also?
And I bet they also wished he hit 100 home runs a year instead of 50.
Your over-emphasis on his lack of speed is laughable. If you can show that McGwire was getting thrown out at second base when the hitters behind him singled to right, then I'll agree that OPS should be radically changed. Until then, not so much.
I mean, are we even sure he was able to make it around the bases after a home run?
Again, I have no idea why you'd assume a 100% chance of a walk. Even if he never swung at a single pitch, he'd strike out a bunch of times.
Yes, walks are less valuable than singles. Nobody disputes that. Every single calculation out there using any metric in existence agrees with that. But that difference in value is already factored into the analysis. You want to add an extra discount for some reason on top of that.
What the hell are you talking about? I thought you objected to him walking in those situations. Thus, trading a walk for an expanded strike zone AB.
This is the "fallacy of the out" discussed above. Someone is going to make that out.
The answer is, it depends on how likely the next guy is to make McGwire's failure to use the out valuable.
Second and third, McGwire up, me on deck. Two outs. Do you want McGwire sitting there taking hittable pitches and walking? Of course not.
Substitute major league hitter for "me" in the example above and the question is still, whose at bat do you want determining whether the runs score, the ever-dangerous McGwire, or some lesser hitter? (And, yes, I understand that the lesser hitter will have one more duck on the pond.)
Because that's your complaint; you're arguing that he should have traded the walks -- which we know he already had -- for the chance at a single.
In that situation, you look at Mac's batting average swinging at balls out of the strike zone, vs the batter's OBP. I think the latter wins most of the time.
Even if you'd prefer Mac every time, that's such an absurdly small % of his total PA (less than 4% as per above), that it's absurd (I keep using that word, but there you are), to attach any great meaning to it.
So, you want to dock his OBP 4% and recalculate his OPS+? Fine. It's 158 vs 162. Happy now?
Huh? On base percentage treats a walk and a single the same.
But the walks aren't free; it's not like he can choose to take a walk and be successful 100% of the time.
You're far off the reservation here. "Someone" is going to be the next traffic fatality, but that doesn't mean I should drive 100 miles an hour.
That's an argument about how good McGwire's teammates are -- not how good he is.
Well, now we're getting somewhere (and I was joking about you saying that since I was getting a lot of flack about it).
If hitting is situational -- more precisely, if the value of an outcome is situation-specific, why would we use mere OBP or OPS, or even other metrics derived from raw stats rather than digging deeper into situational performance. If a guy is systematically walking when he should be driving in runners or is not getting on base in the situation you rightly said we want him to get on base or, to be more positive, is great at doing the right thing at the right time, isn't that something we'd want to know? And at that point, not that I'm advocating it and knowing full well how heretical the idea is ... don't the counting stats, at least R and RBI offer us at least something of value?
I agree wholeheartedly with the way you phrase this, which is why I objected to your original statement (and I wasn't speaking in terms of speed at all). A walk in front of Gehrig is more valuable than a walk in front of Steinbach. I don't think that Bonds or McGwire be penalized (or Ruth rewarded) for such happenstance of teammates, or that their walks are valueless, just that walks themselves have more value when you've got Gehrig coming up next instead of Pedro Feliz.
No one uses OBP ALONE
Just using raw OPS a single counts nearly 2X as much as a walk-
do you think that's enough?
Most more advanced run estimators have a single as being roughly 50% more valuable than a walk.
This assumes there are lots of hittable pitches outside of the strike zone. That's a dangerous assumption for a hitter to make.
I'm not defending the article, but I don't think it's that ridiculous to claim that McGwire would be a marginal HOFer even if you ignore the steroids question.
McGwire had 109 WARP3 according to Baseball Prospectus. By comparison:
McGriff 100
E Martinez 106
Thome 108
Olerud 118
F Thomas 128
Bagwell 137
Palmeiro 138
plus guys like Delgado (84) and Helton (86) who will likely retire not too far behind him.
That's his contemporary 1B/DH types, and some of those guys are definitely not getting into the Hall. Then you have outfielders like Manny (106), Sheffield (117) and Sosa (110) who are in the same ballpark and will be viewed by HOF voters as similar players to McGwire.
I know the limits of BPro's stats, especially on the defensive side, and I wish I had access to better numbers here at the office, but my point isn't that McGwire is undeserving based on his career value. I'm just saying that he does not tower over the competition the way that his offensive rate stats imply, because his career was relatively short and injury-plagued, and he added little defensive value (although he did win a Gold Glove in 1990).
He was one of the better first basemen of an era which had a lot of great 1B/DH/OF types, and by the existing standards of the Hall he'd deserve to be in, but I don't think that makes him a slam-dunk.
I think that makes him a guy who likely deserves enshrinement, but you need to make a positive case for him that focuses on more than rate stats. Do other systems show him standing out among the players listed above? Or do all of those guys deserve to be in? The article and all this discussion about the value of a walk are, I think, beside the point.
So I don't really have a problem with voters who think that he's a borderline HOFer, and that the likely steroid use keeps him on the wrong side of the border.
The problem with your hypothetical is that you're missing the reality: McGwire, by every traditional or advanced metric, hit better in those situations than overall. Even though his walk rate went up, his batting average also went up.
You keep arguing "Wouldn't you want someone better than a .263/.394/.588 hitter at the plate when there are runners on?" when McGwire wasn't that guy - he hit .275/.414/.614 with runners on, and .286/.444/.615 with RISP.
Well, yes, but let's keep in mind that his OBP was that high in those situations because he drew more intentional walks in those situations. And mind you I'm not arguing that McGwire doesn't deserve credit for the intentional walks, I'm just pointing out that SugarBear (to the extent he is at all coherent) is more talking about how McGwire should have approached those plate appearances. I think even SugarBear would agree that McGwire has no control over whether he is intentionally walked. (*)
If we remove the intentional walks from the situations you quote above, we get:
Runners on: .275/.404/.614
RISP: .286/.391/.615
(*) Although it wouldn't surprise me at this point if SugarBear next tried to argue that McGwire should have chased those pitches instead of simply accepting the intentional walks.
The problem is that his rates stats blow away everyone on that list. I mean Palmerio? He had 12,000 plate appearances, McGwire had 7,660. Big Mac created 9.3 WARP for every 162 games, while Palmerio created 7.9, that's a pretty significant difference. You have to dock Big Mac heavily for his injuries and shorter career (or steroids) to keep him out on his on field performance.
Or, put another way, McGwire's not a career candidate for the Hall of Fame - he's a peak candidate and when your peak is good enough that it gets you to 8th-place alltime in HRs (5th when he retired) that's a Hall of Fame peak.
Which still gives him a higher BA and SLG with men on (or ISP), and an equal or greater OBP (depending on which measure you use). Plus, the entire difference in OBP with runners on is due to an increase in BA, while his BA rises significantly with RISP as his OBP actually drops slightly - both pointing towards him changing his approach in those situations.
Edited for clarity.
OK, but (understanding the limitations of WARP), Raffy had a better WARP peak than Mac in addition to a better career.
Raffy top 6:
11.3
10.3
10.2
10.1
9.3
9.0
Mac top 6
11.0
10.5
9.8
9.4
8.8
8.3
They're pretty much even for the top 2, then Raffy had a .5-.7 advantage the rest of the way.
You are basically starting from the premise that he's a HOFer based on his rate stats and then placing the burden of proof on people who don't think he belongs (or who think he's borderline, which is where I sit). I'm not docking him for his injuries and short career, I'm simply not giving him credit for games he didn't play, which I think is perfectly reasonable.
Making a rate stat out of WARP doesn't make a lot of sense because it completely ignores injuries and it penalizes guys who played additional seasons with significant positive value that were simply below their peak. McGwire didn't have as many of those seasons which hurts his value.
For example, if you compare Palmeiro's and McGwire's X best seasons using WARP3, Palmeiro is better for every X. If you rank their seasons by WARP3, Palmeiro comes out ahead in every year but their second-best, where Mac has an 0.2 advantage.
In other words, their peaks were pretty close, but then Palmeiro has a number of 4-6 win seasons at a point when Mac was injured or retired. Those non-peak, yet good, seasons have value but Palmeiro is penalized for them in your WARP/162 stat.
Now, being worse than Palmeiro doesn't mean you're not a HOFer. I think Palmeiro would obviously be voted in if it weren't for the steroid issue. I'm just pointing out, again, the flaw in using rate stats without looking at anything else.
Totally. And it'd be a tough arguement to keep Raffy out of the Hall if not for getting popped for steroids.
Your comments are far more logical than what SugarBear is throwing out there, but as for change in approach, doesn't the league overall hit better with runners on (or RISP) than with the bases empty?
I think many would agree there could be a 'tipping point' - not sure there's any way to find it, though.
And if McGwire couldn't hit HRs off sub-optimal pitches, or Williams' mind-boggling hitting skills didn't extend to 'bad ball hitting?'
If so, maybe they did just the right thing.
But if Williams could have hit .280 in those spots (crappy for him, but..) and McGwire could have HR'd in every 25 ABs in those spots....
Well, somebody can take these musings to the next level I hope.
Not necessarily.
Going back to my list above, his peak is better than Thome or McGriff, marginally better than Matinez, about equal to Palmeiro and worse than Bagwell, Thomas and Olerud. I didn't include Will Clark in my original list but he's another guy with about equal career value to Mac and a better peak. Maybe other metrics give different results, but even by peak he doesn't stand out among his peers.
He played at the time when it was the easiest ever to hit HRs, and he didn't provide much value besides the HRs and the walks, which I agree do have value. I think that was enough for him to make the HOF, but based on the crude metrics I have at my fingertips, it's close. There will likely be equal or better players at his position from his era who are excluded from the HOF.
I'm sure it's highly dependent on who is batting behind them.
Which would give him 1 more HR in 1998, his biggest walk season. Would 71 HR and 149 RBI in 1998 make or break his HOF prospects?
The reason I've taken up the gauntlet is not because I'm so in love with walks, or I think that not making an out trumps everything. It's than the number of events is so small as to be virtually meaningless. In 1998, Mac had a total of 26 PAs (out of over 680) in which it could be argued he should have expanded his strike zone. Is that really enough to be concerned about? Turn every man on 2nd and/or 3rd walk in his career into an out, re-calculate his OPS+ and tell me his numbers still aren't HOF caliber.
I think you and Ray have hit on the meat of SugarBear's argument. It's not that McGwire is a bad hitter in MOB situations, it's that McGwire and others like him should be more agressive under these conditions. That philosophy doesn't have to necessarily include chasing pitches out of the strike zone, but perhaps being less selective on pitches within the strike zone (in other words, not take as many 2-0 and 3-1 strikes).
The flip side is that these guys are great hitters in large part because of their selectivity, so I'm not sure that asking them to change their approach in the batter's box is wise, either within those individual at bats or over the long haul as such a change could have a negative impact on their non-MOB at bats.
At the end of the day, if I had a Bonds, Williams or McGwire, I think I'd just trust their approach and live with the occasional extra men LOB.
But isn't this the point? SugarBear has one of the greatest hitters ever on his team and he's going to mess with him? Why on earth?
To answer my question, 1101 of Mac's career 1317 walks came as either:
No one on or a man on first (including 26 with the bases loaded), or IBBs with men on 2nd and/or 3rd.
Leaving 216 "discretionary" walks with RISP and first base open. Giving Mac no value for them, indeed, penalizing him by calling them outs, lowers his career OBP/SLP to .366/.568, an OPS+ of 149.
Putting it in the worst possible light, his career rate stats are still comfortably in HOF range.
It's just too infrequent of an event to be talking about.
But you're talking about less than 3% of his career PAs (216/7660). Why is this significant?
Well, I was just laying out the two sides. There's certainly merit to the argument that there are times that great hitters should be more agressive within the strike zone. But the potential downsides to such a change in hitting philosophy would ultimately dissuade me.
Well I'm not really talking about whether it impacts his HOF credentials. Simply addressing the idea of whether there are times when a hitter like McGwire should alter his approach depending on the circumstances.
But how do you know he didn't?
Which is the more valuable batting season?
1) 154 games of .322/.389/.532 in the AL in 1990 (EQA .318).
or
2) 153 games of .278/.424/.697 in the NL in 1999 (EQA .343).
WARP3 tells you it's #1. It's such a complicated, proprietary, formula that people just accept the output without pointing out that it's sometimes crazy.
Especially when it uses a very questionable FRAA calculation as it's basis for a large part of WARP value. FRAA gives McGwire lower fielding ratings in some years than it does Palmeiro in years was a DH. What's the logic in that? WARP doesn't seem to notice that Palmeiro played 400 more games at DH than McGwire. And it's FRAA where Palmeiro catches up the most.
Much of the rest of the discrepancy is caused by WARP mis-valuing the replacement player and docking McGwire much too much value for missed games.
WARP, SHMORP.
Roberto Clemente, the opposite of Williams, said that the more often you swung, the more chances you had to hit the ball. I wouldn't have messed with his approach either.
Well, first you're quoting WARP#, but EQA unadjusted for time. The EQA's than generated the WARP3's were .333 and .341 respectively.
Second, the .333 EQA came in 714 PA. The .341 in 661.
Third, the defense had little to do with it. Raffy got a -1 FRAA, Mac a -12
Seems about right overall.
McGwire's career worse than Palmeiro's? The difference between the two is 4386 PAs. McGwire would have had to hit .325/.329/.408 (.737 OPS) in those 4386 PAs to bring his rate stats down to the level of Palmeiro's. (Er, unless I did the math wrong.)
Obviously, I don't. Why does it matter?
FWIW, I think you could include two outs, nobody on base in that category. That's certainly a time when a power hitter could choose to be more agressive within the zone.
Not really. I and everyone else who used it on this thread acknowledged its limitations.
WARP doesn't seem to notice that Palmeiro played 400 more games at DH than McGwire. And it's FRAA where Palmeiro catches up the most.
Yeah, that's my point. And you don't seem to notice that Palmeiro also played about 400 more games at 1B and 200 more in the outfield than McGwire. Even if WARP's fielding numbers are flawed, I think it's universally acknowledged that McGwire was fairly one-dimensional and did not add a lot of value in the field (or on the basepaths).
Much of the rest of the discrepancy is caused by WARP mis-valuing the replacement player and docking McGwire much too much value for missed games.
I would like to get away from this notion that players are "docked" for missing games. Nobody gets "docked" by a counting stat like WARP3. They just don't get value for games they didn't play. Maybe Palmeiro gets too much credit for his extra playing time, but that's another question.
If you want advanced metrics, why not Batting Runs?
Because it doesn't include fielding. Even if you use Batting Runs, McGwire falls behind Thomas, Bagwell and Manny, will likely be passed by Sheffield and Thome, and is not that far ahead of Edgar Martinez. That is good company but if a guy provides little defensive value, does that by itself make him a slam-dunk HOFer?
McGwire's career worse than Palmeiro's? The difference between the two is 4386 PAs. McGwire would have had to hit .325/.329/.408 (.737 OPS) in those 4386 PAs to bring his rate stats down to the level of Palmeiro's. (Er, unless I did the math wrong.)
But Palmeiro had more value in the field. Are you even reading the comments in this thread?
Here's what McGwire did in terms of hits, outs-in-play, walks (incl. HBP), and strikeouts with the bases empty vs. with runners in scoring position for his career (excluding intentional walks):
Bases Empty: H, 21.1%; BB, 16.3%; K, 21.5%; Outs-in-Play, 41.1%
RISP: H, 22.2%; BB, 18.2%; K, 21.1%; Outs-in-Play, 38.5%
So, with runners in scoring position, he cut down on his strikeouts and got more hits (interestingly, with the bases empty, he had more strikeouts than hits; with runners in scoring position, he had more hits than strikeouts), made fewer outs, but did draw more walks.
For some context, let's look at what batters in general did in the 2007AL:
Bases Empty: H, 24.1%; BB, 8.5%; K, 17.4%; Outs-in-Play, 49.9%
RISP: H, 23.7%; BB, 10.2%; K, 16.8%; Outs-in-Play, 49.3%
A typical hitter walks about 18.8% more often w/ RISP than w/ the bases empty, whereas McGwire only walked about 11.5% more often. A typical hitter gets about 1.7% fewer hits, while McGwire got 5.2% more; and a typical hitter makes 1.8% fewer outs (K+Outs-in-Play), whereas McGwire made 4.8% fewer outs with runners in scoring position.
So, it looks like McGwire did adjust his approach, or at least adjusted his results in a favorable way, with runners in scoring position.
Yes. I read comments such as #177, in which ValueArb pointed out that FRAA gives McGwire lower fielding ratings than Palmeiro in some years in which Palmeiro was a DH.
Yes, my point was that that fielding metrics are imprecise, to say the least, and that it's very difficult to quantify how much extra value Raffy got from his superior defense (and that FRAR might be the worst way to measure it). It's much easier to quantify McGwires hitting superiority.
Just to clarify a few points--first off, WARP3 uses FRAR, not FRAA. Second, Palmeiro only had 2 years where he was primarily a DH, and in one of those he still played 55 games in the field. Third, Palmeiro played 1000 more games than McGwire, 600 of them in the field, 200 of them in the outfield.
Here's where I am with regards to McGwire and the HOF: He put up HOF numbers, even when you include his defense, injuries and short career. (I'm even inclined to give him some kind of a bonus because I have more confidence in hitting stats than fielding stats, and a greater portion of his value derives from his hitting than most of his peers.)
But still, he's not a Bonds or Clemens--guys who I'd give the benefit of the doubt to, even assuming they used illegal performance enhancing substances, because they were so far above the competition. He simply wasn't that much better than the competition, even though he likely took those substances. And there are equal or better players than him, contemporaries of his, who will likely be shut out of the HOF.
I realize that (see #188), but that doesn't mean we should ignore fielding or playing time. I used WARP not because I think it should end the conversation, but because I think it should begin the conversation. Too many people were trying simply to use batting rate stats to say that McGwire was a no-question HOFer. WARP or even Batting Runs raise the question of whether he really was when compared with his peers, even if you ignore the steroids question.
So, if we agree that fielding is important but that WARP's fielding metrics are imprecise, what other fielding data do we have? Tomorrow I'll take a look at what was said in the HOM discussion about McGwire w/r to fielding and career length.
McGwire played on the tenth best offense in the NL that year, i.e. a lousy one that didn't benefit from a DH. Palmeiro played on the top offense in the AL his year, i.e. a great one that benefited from the DH. Palmerio played one more game and got 53 more plate appearances, hmm do you think that was due to his efforts? Or maybe he had better hitting team-mates than Big Mac did (bingo).
So WARP gives Palmeiro extra credit for being on top offensive teams that gave him extra plate appearances for free, while McGwire played on mediocre offensive teams in tough offensive parks that reduced his plate appearances. WARP is actually docking Big Mac for the huge excess foul ground in Oakland and for playing with Steinbach, Brosius, Bordick, etc getting tons of at bats.
Yes. Your list of such players includes Edgar Martinez and John Olerud, which is pretty silly. For all your talk about downgrading McGwire because of fielding, Edgar Martinez was a bleeping DH, wasn't as good a hitter, and had a career that was just 181 games longer:
McGwire: 1874 games, 162 OPS+, 1791 games in the field.
Martinez: 2055 games, 147 OPS+, 591 games in the field (granted most at 3B).
Martinez DH'd for 1412 games. McGwire? Just 37.
As for Olerud:
McGwire: 1874 games, 162 OPS+, 1791 games in the field.
Olerud: 2234 games, 128 OPS+, 2053 games in the field.
So 360 extra games played for Olerud. But a gulf separating them offensively.
Mostly. Raffy's 1991 team scored 829 runs. Mac's 1999 team scored 809. Your point? That an extra 20 runs scored over the season led to an extra 53 PA for Raffy? Try again.
That's not the point. The point is FRAR gave McGwire a zero in 1996 while he played 109 games at first. In 1999 Palmeiro got a -2 (almost the same) while DHing 135 games. When Raffi DH's, he forces a lesser bat to play first, yet WARP doesn't dock him at all for this...
For the record, the numbers you cite are Palmeiro's 1991 season, not his 1990 season. In that season, he played 159 games (6 more than McGwire).
And due to the difference in league-wide offense, the 1999 Cards only scored 20 fewer runs than the 1991 Rangers (829-809, despite the Rangers being ranked #1 in the league and the Cards being #10 in a non-DH league).
Hey, Raffy won a Gold Glove in 1999, don't forget. He had to have some defensive value!
Seriously, though, that was two seasons that Palmeiro spent at DH, and he still played significantly more time in the field than McGwire over his career, at a higher level.
Besides, I'm not sure that playing a sub-par first base is really any better than playing DH. Is a replacement level DH really a better hitter than a poor-fielding replacement level 1B? What do you think is the appropriate amount to dock Raffy for games played at DH. Do you think docking him for the 400 games at DH would make up the 29-win difference?
And defensively.
I missed how similar the teams scoring was despite their league contexts. Of course, Raffy got more at bats coming in as a replacement and started 4 more games, so that's a significant part of the raw difference. But we are talking about context adjusted EQA as a basis for context adjusted WARP, and in context of their leagues, Raffy got way more help than Big Mac those years.
In 1991 Texas had a team OPS+ of 113, while Raffy provided an OPS+ of 155. Six other regulars (300 abs) had an OPS+ over 117.
In 1999 St. Louis had a team OPS+ of 98, while McGwire provided an OPS+ of 177. Only two other regulars other than Mark had an OPS+ over 100.
Replace Palmiero with McGwire on that Texas team, it's OBP and SLG increases, his plate appearances increases because of it, and he's also able to play more often as a DH. Because of that, their scoring and his WARP goes up. Replace McGwire with Palmeiro on that St. Louis team and Raffy's WARP declines. Isn't that a flaw in the metric?
An extra seven years or so of playing time was responsible for the 29 extra wins (4 per season isn't terrible but not McGwirean). If Raffy DH's, a lessor player plays first base. Likely a better defender who's a far worse hitter. I don't know how to account for this difference, but it's a negative that isn't incorporated by WARP.
Why do you think this is the case? I could understand the argument if we were comparing a DH and a shortstop or even an outfielder. But is it really that much harder to play a sub-par first base (like McGwire did) than to DH? There's a reason we talk about 1B/DH types, and it's because they're often similar players with similar skill sets. And the stats bear this out--league average production at 1B and DH is pretty similar from year-to-year (some years, the 1B are better, some years the DHs are better).
1999 AL DH: .278/.365/.476/.841
1999 AL 1B: .279/.362/.481/.843
2003 AL DH: .260/.349/.439/.788
2003 AL 1B: .272/.358/.458/.816
Another way to look at it: the seasons Palmeiro primarily DHed for the Rangers, the primary first basemen were Lee Stevens (105 OPS+) and Mark Texeira (102 OPS+) (Raffy got some time at first as well). You can't penalize Palmeiro because these guys were worse hitters than him--the more relevant question is whether they were worse than the replacement-level players available at DH.
The years Palmeiro primarily played first, the DHs were a hodgepodge of guys like David Segui, Ruben Sierra, Frank Catalanotto, Rusty Greer, Chad Curtis, Andres Galarraga, Mike Lamb, and others. Some were good, some were bad, but at first glance they appear to be a little above average offensively when you aggregate their performance as well.
Also, these are basically the same guys who played first when Raffy DHed in those seasons. In other words, the Rangers viewed these guys as basically interchangeable at DH and 1B.
I didn't RTFA, but this sentence pretty much eliminates any need for me to, combined with the arguments referenced in the posts preceding the one I'm quoting.
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