...and I also blame it on the delivery change they had him make. I don’t even know where the orders came from, but they didn’t come from me or Mel Stottlemyre.

Um, who then, Frank Cashen? The clubhouse attendent? I love Davey, but I'm rather tempted to call bullshltt on this Family Circus "NOT ME" moment.

Has Gooden ever commented on who told him to change his delivery?

For Rob Neyer's follow-up book...

One time late in his career we went into San Francisco. Henry was 40-something years old. Normally he would take off a day game after a night game. This time the Giants' pitcher, (John) Count Montefusco, said in the paper, "Why am I pitching against the lowly Braves? I want to pitch against a good team." Henry read it. He went to (manager Eddie) Mathews and said, "I'm playing." Now Montefusco had a nasty slider. Just wicked. Ralph Garr got on, Mike Lum got on. Henry got up and Montesfusco threw a slider, down and away, his best pitch, And Henry went boom, and hit it out of the ballpark. He got back to the dugout and said, "Maybe that'll teach this kid a little humility."

The lineup that day (Sept 18, 1974 Attendance: 1,503!!) was...and it was the only time Hank Aaron faced The Count Montefusco (unless there was another Montefusco criminal trespassing and simple assault situation that I missed)

1. R Office
2. M Perez
3. D Evans
4. H Aaron
5. D Baker
6. M Lum
7. V Correll
8. C Robinson
9. C Morton

Ralph Garr was not playing that day nor had he played for two weeks before that, as he was probably in the middle of a two-week DL stretch (no shock there).

Mike Lum batted two spots after Aaron.

Oh, Hank hit a tater that day...but it led off the top of the 2nd for a solo shot.

Ahh...sweet memories.

Nevertheless, it was a wonderful read of an interview. I, for one, miss Davey in MLB.

I asked him what it was, he said mostly Red Bull with some other kickers in there.
In this post-steroid (ahem) era, when managers confront suspicious behavior, they should be required to ask "Is that even legal?".

Um, who then, Frank Cashen? The clubhouse attendent? I love Davey, but I'm rather tempted to call bullshltt on this Family Circus "NOT ME" moment.


it's certainly taken as gospel amongst Mets fans that it was Stottlemyre:

some combination of

1. altering his delivery to lower the leg kick

and/or

2. forcing him to develop a change-up

and/or

3. simple overuse at a young age

I guess it's nice for Davey not to want to throw Mel under the bus and all, but...

Brady would ride a bike to the ballpark from 10 miles away.

Big ####### deal. 10 miles on a bike old ladies can do before breakfast.

10 miles on a bike old ladies can do before breakfast.

That's why old ladies have such impressive leg-press numbers.

DN: He was a good pitcher after that 1985 season, but never the same pitcher.

DJ: Never the same. I blame it on the drugs, and I also blame it on the delivery change they had him make. I don't even know where the orders came from, but they didn't come from me or Mel Stottlemyre. They wanted him to shorten his delivery, lower that big high leg kick and not turn as much. Sure, he could be run on, but they could run on (Greg) Maddux, too; did they change his delivery? To this day I regret even going along with it.

To the extent we can pin the tail on the donkey here, I pin it on Davey Johnson. (And I realize there were likely a number of factors; but I'm talking about the leading candidate for the primary factor.)

Innings/Starts for Dwight Gooden from 1984-1988, ages 19-23:

218/31 = 7.0
276/35 = 7.9
250/33 = 7.6
179/25 = 7.2
248/34 = 7.3

In 1984 Gooden finished the season with an eight start stretch during which he pitched at least 8 innings in each game. He completed 5 of those 8 starts. In one of those games he pitched with a 7-2 lead in the 8th inning. In another of those games, he went the distance despite having a 10-0 lead by the 6th inning (granted he pitched a one-hitter, but he had lost the no-hitter in the 5th).

In 1985 (July 9th), with the Mets up 7-0, Johnson nevertheless sent Gooden out for the bottom of the 8th. On August 10th, Johnson had him pitch the 8th and the 9th with an 8-2 lead. On September 16th, Gooden pitched a complete game shutout with his team up 9-0 by the 5th inning. He then went 8 innings in his next start, in a 12-1 victory, despite his team being up 8-1 after 5. In a July and August stretch, Gooden pitched 5 complete games in 6 starts. He then repeated that feat in September of the same year.

In 1986, on April 25th, Johnson sent Gooden out for the bottom of the 8th with his team up 7-0; Johnson then had Gooden pitch the 9th with his team up 9-0. He still went 8 innings in his next start, despite the Mets being up 8-1 after 5.5 innings. On June 2nd, Gooden pitched a complete game despite his team being up 7-0 after 6 innings. On August 11th, Johnson sends Gooden out for the bottom of the 8th with an 8-2 lead, and for the bottom of the 9th with the same 8-2 lead. On September 7th, Gooden pitched the 8th inning up 6-1, and then pitched the 9th inning up 7-1. On October 2nd, in a meaningless game -- the Mets were up 21 games in the division -- Johnson sent Gooden out for the bottom of the 8th with his team leading 8-2.

And so on and so on. I think Davey Johnson is one of the best managers the game has seen. But Johnson worked Gooden into the ground, and did so at an extremely young age. I know managers generally worked their starters harder back then. I know they weren't concerned with pitch count (just as I believe they are in many ways overly concerned with that now). But I'm not talking about working Gooden hard in games that were close or in games that the Mets needed to have. I'm talking about Johnson working him hard in games in which the Mets were up big. I'm talking about Johnson working him hard down the stretch in 1986 when the Mets had a huge lead in the division. (Gooden pitched at least 8 innings in 5 of 6 starts in September 1986, when the Mets were up 21 games in the standings.)

We can talk about a change in delivery, or immaturity, or substance abuse problems all we want -- and I don't deny that those may have some relevance. But the fact is that Johnson was reckless in his handling of a 19 year old pitcher, and then the pitcher broke. No, we don't know that Johnson was the primary cause; and, of course, Gooden may have broken anyway. But we _do_ know that Johnson was reckless. That's something I wish we could go back in time and change.

That's why old ladies have such impressive leg-press numbers.

True. They also know how to drive a car.

To the extent we can pin the tail on the donkey here, I pin it on Davey Johnson.

Ray, I don't doubt that Gooden's innings were a contributing factor, and I don't necessarily disagree that they may have even been the most important factor in his decline. But this is an important observation, and should be highlighted even more than you did:

I know managers generally worked their starters harder back then. I know they weren't concerned with pitch count. . . .

Gooden's work load just wasn't unusual for an ace pitcher back then. It didn't really matter what the score was -- you kept your ace in for complete games or near-complete games. While Doc lead the league in CGs in 1985 (of course -- pitching like that!), he was only two ahead of Tudor and Fernando Valenzuela, who each had 14. Aces went the distance.

The only thing that was unusual about Gooden was how young he was to be an ace who would be handled like that. Should Davey have been cognizant of that? Maybe, but that's an awful lot of hindsight. Honestly, I don't recall any contemporary observer waving any yellow caution flags at the time wondering WTF Johnson was thinking, and calling he and/or Mel out on their handling of Gooden. They -- we -- were too busy marveling at the wonder that was Doc Gooden.

So I say . . . learn from the lesson, but do it from the standpoing of recognizing that being critical of Johnson is an unfair way to couch it. I don't think there was a manager in baseball at the time who would have handled it 10% differently.

But changing his delivery??? If that suggestion had been made by any numbskull pitching coach (and I don't believe for a second that it came from anybody but Mel, Davey's kindness notwithstanding), Whitey Herzog would have told him to STFU and leave his ace alone. So that one you can blame the pitching coach for, and secondarily Davey for not putting the kibosh on it.

Gooden's work load just wasn't unusual for an ace pitcher back then.

True, but, as you note:

The only thing that was unusual about Gooden was how young he was to be an ace who would be handled like that.

That is my main complaint.

Should Davey have been cognizant of that? Maybe, but that's an awful lot of hindsight. Honestly, I don't recall any contemporary observer waving any yellow caution flags at the time wondering WTF Johnson was thinking, and calling he and/or Mel out on their handling of Gooden.

Well, it's been a few years since I read it, but Craig Wright's "The Diamond Appraised" was published in 1989 -- and he started writing it in 1986, and wrote most of it in 1987. Wright also worked in the Texas Rangers organization in the 80s. In his book he goes on at length about the handling of pitchers, making the point that teams need to be very careful with the workloads of young pitchers.

Note also that Wright was very vocal within the Rangers organization about the need to protect pitchers. Quoting now from the above link:

Within the Rangers organization [pitching coach Tom] House and I represented two very different views on this subject. House firmly believed that with the special conditioning program that he had for the Ranger pitchers that they could be worked unusually hard without it affecting their short or long-term future. I disagreed. While I valued an emphasis on conditioning as a way of promoting better health in pitchers, I felt the evidence just wasn’t there to say it was much more than a minor factor. I felt the key was to search for ways to reduce the most dangerous workloads. Our ideas on the appropriate workloads for various types of pitchers at certain points in their careers were light years apart, and I’m sorry we didn’t get a chance to more clearly delineate our opposing views on this.

The idea that nobody was talking about this in the 1980s is not supportable. It was being talked about even within MLB organizations. In Wright's book he goes back and looks at the workloads of pitchers like Scott McGregor and looks at Earl Weaver's handling of his young pitchers and such. I understand that the culture in baseball was much different two decades ago, but I don't see how that lets Davey Johnson off the hook, much as I like and respect him as a manager. The issue was being talked about back then, and smart people like Wright were paying attention.

At the very least Johnson has to understand it now, and could have commented (for example in the above interview) that in hindsight he wouldn't have worked Gooden so hard. But he doesn't even mention it, and goes on to talk about other causes instead.

Gooden's work load just wasn't unusual for an ace pitcher back then.

Actually, it was.

There were 47 pitchers in 1985 who made 33 or more starts. Of that group, eleven - Oil Can Boyd, Ron Guidry, Tom Seaver, Doyle Alexander, Gooden (30/35), Charlie Leibrandt, Bert Blyleven, Dave Stieb, John Tudor, Fernando Valenzuela, and Mike Witt - went into the seventh or later in 80% of their starts. The median was 71%, and guys like Nolan Ryan (23/35), Orel Hershiser (24/34), Frank Tanana (23/33), Phil Niekro (23/33) and Mike Scott (17/35) were below the median (although Scott wasn't really at ace level yet; that came a year later).

-- MWE

And what's even more interesting:

Of those eleven pitchers who went to the seventh in 80% or more of their starts in 1985, every one except Witt had a worse season in 1986, and only a couple even approached the level of 1985 in *any* season in the rest of their careers. 1985 was Guidry's last good full season. Seaver retired a year later. Alexander had the 9-0 stretch run for the Tigers in 1987, but was basically ordinary otherwise. Blyleven had one good year left (1989).

-- MWE

Mike, while I'm generally with you here, I'm not sure what conclusions we can draw about the information you present in #13 because it stands to reason that pitchers will naturally pitch more innings in seasons in which they are more effective. If they're getting knocked out in the 6th routinely, they're not going to approach 250 innings.

I'm not sure what conclusions we can draw about the information you present in #13 because it stands to reason that pitchers will naturally pitch more innings in seasons in which they are more effective.

I just found it interesting that, in a group of 11 pitchers whose main identifying characteristic was that they were working quite hard relative to their peers, (a) all but one declined the following season and (b) most of them failed to regain their former effectiveness in *any* season thereafter. I don't know that there's a cause/effect type thing here; no one really dropped off a cliff or anything.

By 1985, the trend toward limiting starter innings was well under way. The break point appears to be around 1977. Before 1977, starters took games into the seventh inning or later around 60% of the time, and the rate was fairly constant. In 1977, the rate dropped to 57.4%, and while it rebounded above 60% in 1978, it went back below 60% in 1979 and hasn't been near that level since. By 1985, the rate was down to 55.6%. It went below 50% in 1995, and except for one season (1998) it's been below 50% every year since, dropping below 40% for the first time in 2007.

-- MWE

By 1985, the trend toward limiting starter innings was well under way. The break point appears to be around 1977. Before 1977, starters took games into the seventh inning or later around 60% of the time, and the rate was fairly constant. In 1977, the rate dropped to 57.4%, and while it rebounded above 60% in 1978, it went back below 60% in 1979 and hasn't been near that level since. By 1985, the rate was down to 55.6%. It went below 50% in 1995, and except for one season (1998) it's been below 50% every year since, dropping below 40% for the first time in 2007.

Was it also true that starters became less and less likely to get a very quick hook and be taken out in the second or third inning? I seem to remember you saying something like that as well.

how many seasons could it be said that the best X number of pitchers all performed worse the next year? I bet most seasons. I'm not convinced that proves much. (and wording it as "pitchers who went into the 7th in 80% of their starts" is essentially the same as saying "the best pitchers that year" as post #14 says).

Of that group, eleven - Oil Can Boyd, Ron Guidry, Tom Seaver, Doyle Alexander, Gooden (30/35), Charlie Leibrandt, Bert Blyleven, Dave Stieb, John Tudor, Fernando Valenzuela, and Mike Witt - went into the seventh or later in 80% of their starts.

And you think that shows that it was "unusual," Mike? I think it shows that it was the norm: of the pitchers who got 33 starts or more, between 1/4 and 1/5 got "ace-quality" treatment when it came to innings-per-start. Isn't that about what you'd expect, if the norm at the time is to ride your ace hard in his starts? How many aces do you think there are in the game, after all? And then some of those are going to fall short of 33 starts due to injuries, so I wouldn't think all that many are going to reach the combo of 33 starts and high I/start. Just the guys who both pitch well that year and stay healthy.

Yes, this is also true:

By 1985, the trend toward limiting starter innings was well under way.

Relative to what it had been 30, 20, and even 10 years earlier. But not, as Ray was suggesting, by the standards of today. I was merely suggesting that Davey's usage of Gooden was fairly typical for an ace starter by the standards of 1985. No, it wasn't as prescient as Tom House, and it didn't appreciate the need to see Gooden as like his ace peers in one way, but like his young peers in an equally (and perhaps more) significant way, too.

As for the effect of that workload on the future, I think it's a little bit of a cheat (but only a little) to put too much of that on 1985 alone. A lot of those guys were at the stage of their career where you shouldn't be surprised to see a "last hurrah" kind of year, whether they went 7+ innings per start or not. And to say they never had another year as good again -- there haven't been five pitchers in baseball history who had a year as good as Gooden's 1985, so that's kind of unfair in his case. And Tudor's 1985 wasn't far behind, either.

But that's a quibble, really. I agree with you to 90% of your point that we can anecdotally see quite a picture if we look at the workloads of those guys -- young and old -- and what then became of them. It's a great data point.

Whitey Herzog would have told him to STFU and leave his ace alone.

someone here doesn't know Whitey Herzog too well, Whitey would have allowed the pitching coach to make the change, if it failed he would blame the coach, if it succeeded he would have taken credit or claimed that the pitching coach was just stating something that was alreayd obvious to Whitey.

How many aces do you think there are in the game, after all?

Normally, around one per team. Some teams have two, some teams don't have any; it usually evens out to pretty close to one per team.

11 was an unusually high number, by 1985; the norm was about 7 or 8, and there hadn't been a season in double-digits since 1978, when there were 12; there haven't been as many as 10 since. By 1990, the number was down to 2 (Eric Hansen and Dave Stewart), and although it bounced back up to 8 in 1992, it's been in the low single digits most of the time since. No pitcher with 33 or more starts has taken 80% of his starts into the 7th since 2005, when both Mark Buehrle and Livan Hernandez did it. Roger Clemens and Darryl Kile, in 1997, were the last pitchers to take 90% of their starts into the 7th.

Bob Gibson was 34/34 in 1968, and Greg Maddux was 25/25 in 1994 (I used 22 starts as the qualifying number in 1981, 23 in 1994, and 28 in 1995, so that I could include those seasons in the overall analysis I'm doing). They're the only two pitchers to reach 100%. Catfish Hunter missed by one start (38/39) in 1975.

-- MWE

There were those three games late in the season in 1985 in which both starters pitched 9 or more innings and neither starter allowed a run. And this involved just three teams and four pitchers: Tudor, Gooden, Darling, and Valenzuela. Valenzuela went 11 innings of a game that lasted 13.

And Valenzuela was never really the same after that year. Tudor wasn't young, and he was having his career year, a spike on top of his career, so I don't know what to say about him.

And about Whitey ... that was the year Whitey didn't have a closer and operated a bullpen by committee. The two most trusted relievers were Lahti and Dayley (a R/L pair). But if you look at the stats for the year, you'll see that neither Lahti nor Dayley were particularly heavily used. A little bit of that is that there was eventually a late-season callup rookie closer (Worrell) but mostly there just wasn't much load on the bullpen because all of Whitey's starters lasted deep into games.

With a strong defense and a HR-suppressing ballpark, Whitey may have believed that pitchers were fungible, even Tudor and Andujar. That anyone could win if they'd only go out there and throw strikes. He wasn't protecting the pitchers he did have; it's not clear what he'd have done with a Gooden-level talent.

That anyone could win if they'd only go out there and throw strikes. He wasn't protecting the pitchers he did have; it's not clear what he'd have done with a Gooden-level talent.

Honestly, I don't know. In the cauldron the 1985 pennant race, I suspect Whitey would have ridden his horse trying to win the damn division, and let the future take care of itself. Usage patterns were changing, as Mike has noted, but the very best pitchers having the very best years still went long into games and often completed them.

But I'm positive he wouldn't have let anyone screw around after 1985 with Gooden's delivery. I doubt that was the biggest factor in Gooden's decline, but it still shouldn't have happened, and I'm sure it didn't help. My philosophy in these things is pretty simple: if a guy is the best in the game, especially by as much as Doc Gooden was, you don't mess around with him. Go help Ron Darling or Roger McDowell. When and if he starts to struggle, stick your nose in. Otherwise, leave him alone and let him pitch.

By 1985, the trend toward limiting starter innings was well under way.

Relative to what it had been 30, 20, and even 10 years earlier. But not, as Ray was suggesting, by the standards of today.

I wasn't suggesting at all that the standards of today were in place back then. I was suggesting simply that Johnson should have known not to overwork such a young pitcher to the extent that he did. And he should have. I'm not even talking about tracking pitch counts or even batters faced; I'm simply talking about pulling Gooden once the game is well in hand (especially in a meaningless game). But Johnson didn't do that. Instead, time and again he made Gooden pitch into the 8th and 9th innings with huge leads. That was foolish, particularly with an ace pitcher so young, and Johnson should have known it. Craig Wright knew it. The concept of "hey, pitchers need rest!" is not rocket science, and wasn't in 1985.

Brady would ride a bike to the ballpark from 10 miles away.

Not to take anything away from Brady's status as a workout warrior, but he lived in a condo at 10 E. Lee St., right on the harbor, maybe five blocks from the stadium (and four floors below my parents' place.)

That was an odd statement.

That was foolish, particularly with an ace pitcher so young, and Johnson should have known it. Craig Wright knew it. The concept of "hey, pitchers need rest" is not rocket science, and wasn't in 1985.

But, Ray. You're quoting a book that came out in 1989, that even if we credit for having reflected insights Wright had as early as 1985 when Davey and Mel were overworking Gooden was NOT the consensus position within the game, by any stretch of the imagination. Again: I don't think you would be able to find more than a sliver (if that) of commentary at the time discussing whether Gooden was being overworked in 1984 and 1985, much less actual criticisms of the Mets and Johnson.

Memory is tricky, but I watched almost every game Gooden pitched. Mets' announcers didn't talk about lifting him in those blow-outs. National announcers didn't, either, when their games were televised nationally. Articles weren't written about it in The Sporting News, or SI. Gammons didn't write about it, at least not that I can recall. There wasn't anything percolating about it, no hand-wringing from anyone within the game (certainly not within the Mets' organization) sufficient that the beat-writers were picking up on it.

I guess what I'm saying is that if there were the Craig Wrights in the game who were thinking this way -- rightly, of course -- their voice was very muted in most circles, and it certainly wasn't a position that most managers would have acted on, even to the limited extent you are stating. It doesn't mean you're wrong; my defense of Johnson here is only that he acted the way almost any manager in the game would have, circa 1985. Craig Wright, after all, wasn't any team's manager.

But, Ray. You're quoting a book that came out in 1989, that even if we credit for having reflected insights Wright had as early as 1985 when Davey and Mel were overworking Gooden was NOT the consensus position within the game, by any stretch of the imagination.

But I don't think that Johnson is immune from criticism simply because it wasn't the consensus position within the game. He should have known to give his starter some rest when the team was up 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 runs in the late innings. That's a very low standard, and it's all I'm holding Johnson to.

And it's not just Wright. As I recall (I'll have to re-read that chapter) Wright showed using batters faced that Weaver did not overwork his young starters in this way.

Mets' announcers didn't talk about lifting him in those blow-outs. National announcers didn't, either, when their games were televised nationally. Articles weren't written about it in The Sporting News, or SI.

None of which would absolve Johnson from blame. It was Johnson's job to keep his pitcher fresh and protect his arm.

Hell, even 20 year old Dwight Gooden himself knew it. Quoting now from a 1985 SI column

Such was the fans' hunger for strikeouts that they actually booed Mets first baseman Keith Hernandez and leftfielder George Foster for catching two-strike foul pops in the seventh and eighth innings. But the levelheaded Gooden doesn't want to strain his K-pabilities. "A lot of strikeout pitchers develop arm trouble," he said after the game. "I'll take a ground ball over a K any day. That's less pitches."

"A lot of strikeout pitchers develop arm trouble," he said after the game. "I'll take a ground ball over a K any day. That's less pitches."

Yes, and you know what Bill James said about that in the Abstract after that season (or perhaps after 1986, when similar quotes percolated around Gooden)? He called BS on it, that's what -- and rightly so, at least when put in the context of the strikeout v. ground ball pitcher debate. That's what started the whole "Mel's trying to change Doc" debate; Stottlemyre got that nonsense into Doc's head about not trying for strikeouts, that he should change his approach because strikeouts are so much more taxing and ground ball pitchers last longer.

To which James called BS, showing that in fact pitchers with high K rates are FAR more durable and have longer careers than pitchers with similar success in the short term but who record more GB outs. His advice was to tell Mel to leave Gooden alone and let him keep roaring back and dominating.

Now, that doesn't change what you're saying about how many innings Gooden should have thrown, and when he should have been lifted. But those quotes from Gooden in 1985 were evidence that Mel Stottlemyre (who was saying basically the same crap) was filling his head with garbage about how strikeouts were bad. Mel kept trying to turn Doc Gooden into a latter day Mel Stottlemyre. Ugh.

Yes, and you know what Bill James said about that in the Abstract after that season (or perhaps after 1986, when similar quotes percolated around Gooden)? He called BS on it, that's what -- and rightly so, at least when put in the context of the strikeout v. ground ball pitcher debate.

Well, if Bill James called BS, then it must have been BS.

Not.

You're putting the quote in the context of strikeouts vs. ground balls, but what you cannot deny is that Gooden is saying that less pitches is better because it may avoid injury.

A Rat Done Bit rLr's Sister Nell

and Whitey's not even on the moon, is he?


Of those eleven pitchers who went to the seventh in 80% or more of their starts in 1985, every one except Witt had a worse season in 1986

Regression to the mean? Methinks if we look at the pitchers who got into, say, the 6th inning most often in the past few years, they subsequently fell off too. Are these guys still being overworked?


I don't think you would be able to find more than a sliver (if that) of commentary at the time discussing whether Gooden was being overworked in 1984 and 1985

The only comment along these lines that I remember from that era is by my dad, who wondered why Gooden had been allowed to throw 150 pitches on a cold April day. But I don't think that was until a few years later; maybe this game or this one?

Anyway, if Gooden had been treated like young pitchers now, no one would be talking about him today.

You're putting the quote in the context of strikeouts vs. ground balls, but what you cannot deny is that Gooden is saying that less pitches is better because it may avoid injury.

And yet, neither Gooden nor anyone else talking about or looking at the Mets said word one about taking him out of games sooner to achieve the goal of fewer pitches. The sage pitching coach, whose goal it evidently was, didn't go to the skipper and say, "Hey, Davey -- let's maybe start taking Doc out of these blowouts. Whaddya say?" Instead, he went to Gooden and tried to change his style of pitching. Your way was a good idea, if not the conventional wisdom at the time. Mel's way was idiotic, and so yes -- I'm calling BS on it, and Bill James was right to do so, too.

What I do recall is that Gooden's age was a constant topic of conversation. It got to the point that the story was "He's so good so young" which I realized at the time was backwards in terms of the emphasis. It should have been "He's so good so young." I'll swear I saw stories comparing him to various all-time greats at age 20. Of course most all-time greats weren't in the majors at age 20.

The conversation was about his potential, his future. That people's ideas on how to ensure that future were not exactly well-founded is another part of the story. Lost from sight in all of this: Gooden's 1985 is a serious candidate for the greatest single pitcher's season since the prime of Walter Johnson. (Personally, I'll take Gibson 1968 in that category, but I recognize Gooden as a serious challenger.) Who was saying that in 1985?

The conversation was about his potential, his future.

And yet, you know who had the insight to sound a word of uncommon wisdom at the time? The man we all love to taunt nowadays, Tim McCarver. After 1985, McCarver said (on more than one occasion) that it was very likely -- almost certain, in fact -- that we had just seen the greatest season Dwight Gooden would ever have. Because no matter how talented he was, no matter how brilliant, the game is just not that easy. Staying at your peak for a whole season, maintaining your absolute best like that, doesn't just happen at the snap of your fingers. He wanted everyone to realize that the expectations were massively unrealistic if people thought Gooden was just going to put up 20+ win seasons year after year, with ERAs in the 1.50 range. And he wanted people to appreciate that season, really appreciate it, without focusing on the future. Because 1985, McCarver said, was IT. The season of Gooden's career, even if he backed it up with the rest of a HOF resume (which, as it turned out, he didn't).

Of course, he'd been Gibson's catcher. So he knew whereof he spoke.

But you know what, Sam? I believe McCarver may have influenced the stupid change in Gooden's delivery. He used to harp about his inability to hold runners on (and we'd scream you dumb sumbitch, he ain't letting anybody on!!) along with "they're playin too deep" and his other horseshit. Jeff Wilpon let on that they consulted Timmy about baseball matters (over Davey and especially Harrelson) and they would be just the type to take his advice.

Lost from sight in all of this: Gooden's 1985 is a serious candidate for the greatest single pitcher's season since the prime of Walter Johnson. (Personally, I'll take Gibson 1968 in that category, but I recognize Gooden as a serious challenger.)

I guess you can argue Gooden 1985 over Pedro 2000 because of the innings differential (277-217), but Pedro put up a 1.74 ERA in a 5.07 run environment, vs. 1.53 in a 3.49 for Gooden. I like Pedro's season better for pure dominance, but it depends on what flavor you like your greatness to come in.

Maddux 1994 and 1995 has the same issues, though he's excused a bit on the innings differential because of the strike.

Clemens 1997 is very similar to Gooden 1985 in both innings and quality, with Gooden being a hair ahead on both scores.

Sam, I just took a quick look at Clemens's game logs in 1986, and in fairness to your point, Clemens was left in a few times to pitch complete games with huge leads also.

Just wanted to say thanks to all participants for a really fine debate. From roughly August of '84 through May of '86 Doc Gooden was about as good as any pitcher has ever been. A combination of factors--overuse, change in approach, drug abuse, the ridiculous lowering of the strike zone perpetrated by the umpires--ended Gooden's days of dominance. I wish Davey hadn't overworked him, Mel hadn't messed with him, Doc hadn't gotten high so much, and Dutch Rennert et al had occasionally called a pitch above the waist a strike.

Special citation to Sam M for the McCarver reference (which I also recall), though Benji is right re: the holding runners on crap. I don't know that anybody ever stole home on Doc, and when you allow as few hits as he did at his peak, there's really no percentage in worrying about the occasional guy who does get on if it's going to mess with your delivery to the plate.

Thanks again to all.

Sam's right here, 100%. No one was talking about Gooden's workload in 1985 - at least no one who wrote books or wrote articles or who announced games, etc. The groundball/strikeout issue came up, but not in terms of taking Gooden out of games, but changing his style. I remember it being said that the real issue was that Gooden's arm was going to be hurt by the fact that he threw too hard, and that throwing sinkers or changeups are easier on the arm.

A combination of factors--overuse, change in approach, drug abuse, the ridiculous lowering of the strike zone perpetrated by the umpires--ended Gooden's days of dominance. I wish Davey hadn't overworked him, Mel hadn't messed with him, Doc hadn't gotten high so much, and Dutch Rennert et al had occasionally called a pitch above the waist a strike.

There's another point that needs to be made. No one knows what caused Gooden's decline. Its very possible that aging caused the decline. I don't mean the type of effects felt by a 40 year old pitcher, but that a 20 year old pitcher's body is changing. Sometimes those changes help, and sometimes they don't. Its very possible that even if Gooden was used more sparingly, and never took drugs, and so on, he still would experienced a decline.

From roughly August of '84 through May of '86 Doc Gooden was about as good as any pitcher has ever been.

I love selective endpoints:

from Aug 11 1984 to May 6, 1986

Gooden was 37-5 with a 1.38 ERA and a WHIP of 0.89

a 20 year old pitcher's body is changing

Yup, and in fact I think it was, of course, Bill James who once wrote this about Gooden. The 20-year-old Gooden was tall and very slender, and his arm was the just the end of a long, explosive whip. (someone cue up that SI cover.) As he naturally became a little bulkier, his body became less supple, and his delivery was probably altered.

Sam's right here, 100%. No one was talking about Gooden's workload in 1985 - at least no one who wrote books or wrote articles or who announced games, etc.

But the issue is not whether the mainstream media was talking about it. (The MSM wasn't "talking about" OBP much either; that doesn't mean people in the game shouldn't have understood its importance.) The issue is whether Johnson should have known better. And since people like Wright and Weaver knew better, then Johnson should have. Some people were talking about limiting the workload for young pitchers.

Its very possible that even if Gooden was used more sparingly, and never took drugs, and so on, he still would experienced a decline.

Nobody is arguing otherwise.

But the issue is not whether the mainstream media was talking about it. (The MSM wasn't "talking about" OBP much either; that doesn't mean people in the game shouldn't have understood its importance.)

First of all in 2008, there is the MSM, and there is this huge amount of available research and analysis easily available that is not the MSM. In 1985, the MSM was almost all there was. And while most people weren't talking much about OBP, there were many people who were aware of this issue. Its not at all the same as Gooden's workload. Virtually no one, in the game or out, were talking about Gooden's workload, while lots of people were aware of the importance of On base percentage.

And since people like Wright and Weaver knew better, then Johnson should have. Some people were talking about limiting the workload for young pitchers.

Earl Weaver, and certainly Tom House, were never faced with the situation Johnson faced in 1985. You are assuming that if Tom House or even Weaver were involved, Gooden would have thrown 220 innings in 1985, rather than 276. I don't think you can say that for sure. And when you say that some people were talking about it, you found one guy, in all of baseball and all of the MSM, who mentioned the issue. Finally, the fact that the Mets allowed their young pitchers to throw a good number of innings in 1984 to 1986 is what made them competitive in the first place. If they took the Weaver approach, where young people start out in the bullpen, they never would have been so competitive at all.

I do not blame Johnson one iota about the way he managed from 1984 to 1986. It was a great job of managing, probably the best in Mets history.

And since people like Wright and Weaver knew better, then Johnson should have. Some people were talking about limiting the workload for young pitchers.

The movement was -- at best -- just beginning to be voiced at that time. Wright may have been just thinking about this; he didn't publish it until 1989, and we don't know who he was talking to, if anyone. To expect the manager of a pennant-contending team (and believe me, the 1985 pennant race was as hot as it gets) to not only be totally up on this issue, but be bold enough to act on it in a way that would have limited the innings of the guy who was light-years the best pitcher in baseball? That would have been so frigging beyond the curve, it would have been positively heroic.

Remember, the "big" move had already been made in the eyes of most baseball wise men: the move to the five-man rotation. That alone had cut back the workhorse loads from the fairly common 300+ innings of the 1950s and 1960s (Jenkins; Marichal; Roberts; Drysdale; Koufax) into the high and mid-200s. The managers of the '80s would have said that was already protecting their pitchers. And the CGs were down from a decade earlier, too. Gooden "only" had 16, after all -- that wouldn't have lead the NL a single year in the '60s or the '70s -- there were some years in the '60s when it took 30 to lead the league. But the advent of the closer role changed all that. Protect Gooden? The "new" era was already protecting him! At least Davey would have thought that way.

Now, I know you're saying, just take him out of the blowouts and save an inning here, two there. But still, since nobody was doing that then, my response remains the same: it's fair to observe that the practice at the time was a bad one that didn't utilize a sensible idea, but not fair to especially criticize Davey Johnson for not being ahead of his time.

Remember, the "big" move had already been made in the eyes of most baseball wise men: the move to the five-man rotation.

Interestingly, Whitey was cheating a bit on the notion of the 5-man rotation. Look at the games started on his team that year- each of Tudor, Andujar, and Cox got more than a 1/5 share of the starts, with significantly fewer starts to be traded among the several other starters. And each of Tudor, Andujar, and Cox had 10 or more complete games.

Interestingly, Whitey was cheating a bit on the notion of the 5-man rotation. Look at the games started on his team that year- each of Tudor, Andujar, and Cox got more than a 1/5 share of the starts

I don't think that's unusual. The 5-DAY rotation has only come into vogue in the past decade. Top starters were always getting 35+ starts per year back then.

just curious

has mel stottlemyer ever been asked flat out - DID you change gooden's delivery?

has gooden ever said that mel is the one who changed his delivery?

why is there a question about the delivery change and mel?

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also, you guys are forgetting that 20 year old guys' bodies don't ever change unless they use steroids because that was why barry bonds didn't weigh the same at 40 that he did at 20