And you can look it up. As of July 11th, 1968, Buford was in the leadoff spot every day for the rest of the season.

Before Moneyball, before Beane, before Bill James—but not quite before Copernicus—Weaver, a white-haired gnome who never played a day of major league baseball, knew what worked.

And well before Weaver was Branch Rickey and his explorations of these measures.

Awesome piece.

Weaver would be just the type of manager I'd look for. The players don't need to be coddled, but they do need to be utilized correctly. As prickly as Weaver was/is, he'd at least give players a role that they hadn't had before.

What's ironic is that Weaver was CELEBRATED in his time for his attention to detail, the notecards and wanting to seek out an edge.

Now, managers and GMs are derided for seeming too intellectual. The repeated attacks against the "nerds". Case in point is a Tony LaRussa who takes great pains to hide his data fetish and present himself as "old school, tough guy, gut instinct" Tony.

Along with the irony it's disappointing.

Obligatory.

Weaver: And another thing, if you don't make the last out of the game, you never lose! I never made the last out.

[Pitcher Jim Palmer raises his hand.]

Weaver: What?

Palmer: We all know why you never made the last out, Earl.

Weaver: Why?

Palmer: Because they always pinch-hit for you.

Weaver: Aw, you ruined the mood, Palmer!

Has there been a manager since Weaver who'd employ a regular platoon a la Roenicke/Lowenstein? Weaver was known for finding players who could do something well, and then putting them in situations that played to their strengths while trying to hide them from circumstances that'd expose their weaknesses...

Has there been a manager since Weaver who'd employ a regular platoon a la Roenicke/Lowenstein?

Bobby Cox in Toronto - Gance Mullinorg at third base.
For the execrable '92 Dodgers, Lenny Harris and Mike Sharperson (RIP) was a straight-up platoon, also at 3B.

Has there been a manager since Weaver who'd employ a regular platoon a la Roenicke/Lowenstein?

John Gibbons had Reed Johnson and Frank Catalanotto platooning in left for Toronto.

At the start of the season, Cito Gaston was platooning Lyle Overbay and Kevin Millar at first, and Travis Snider and Jose Bautista in left. But in those cases, he wouldn't pinch-hit for the batter if a different pitcher came into the ballgame.

Davey Johnson: Teufel/ Backmann and Mookie/Nails/Foster

the CW is that straight platooning has vanished due to increased bullpen size, right? you think that some enterprising manager would bring it back, along with a 10-man staff...

Has there been a manager since Weaver who'd employ a regular platoon a la Roenicke/Lowenstein?

Bobby Cox in Toronto - Gance Mullinorg at third base.

As well as Ernie Whitt and Buck Martinez at catcher. Bobby Cox loved his platoons back then.

Cito later used a Whitt/Borders platoon, a Myers/Borders platoon, and and a Tabler/Mulliniks platoon at DH.

Let's not forget Davey Johnson's HoJo/Santana platoon at SS, not based on the handedness of the opposing pitcher, but the groundballedness of his own pitcher. When Sid Fernandez was pitching, you could have put Cecil Fielder at SS, given how frequently balls were hit there.

you could have put Cecil Fielder at SS, given how frequently balls were hit there.

they did--they had Kevin Mitchell playing there occasionally

When Sid Fernandez was pitching, you could have put Cecil Fielder at SS, given how frequently balls were hit there.

I went to a baseball game and a sumo match broke out.

Earl Weaver's bio is on of my favorite baseball books, and one of my favorite adages: "Its What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts."

What's ironic is that Weaver was CELEBRATED in his time for his attention to detail, the notecards and wanting to seek out an edge.

Now, managers and GMs are derided for seeming too intellectual.

Two reasons for that: First, he was such a classic redass type manager that the fact that he kept all those notebooks and such made for a good storyline counterpoint to everything else we thought we knew about him. It was a bit like Nixon being allowed to recognize China because he'd already established his anti-Communist credentials.

Second, he wrote it all down in notebooks. Old School sportswriters can more easily identify with that than they can with computer spreadsheets.

#4, Harvey's-- You hit the nail right on the head.
I vividly remember a few years ago Boston Globe columnist/provocateur Dan Shaughnessy interrupting a series of snide remarks about Bill James and statistics in baseball to tell a story about Earl Weaver. Shaughnessy gleefully told of someone running a 3 by 5 card down to Earl in the '79 playoffs and Earl then using the numbers on it to send up John Lowenstein (iirc) to pinch hit against an Angels pitcher named Montague and Lowenstein hitting a bomb.

It was too much for myopic, soulless Shaughnessy to see that the difference between using 3 by 5 cards and using computer printouts is insignificant, only one of small degrees and not at all of kind.

Bobby Cox manages almost exactly like Earl Weaver; so much so that I've always just assumed the influence without ever hearing anything about it. Defense up the middle, offense down the lines, strong need for a star third baseman to hold that all together, strong starting rotation, no obsession with closers, willingness to platoon. As best I can tell, what has killed the old Weaver style of platooning is the salaries. If you have Ken Singleton or someone, you have to pay him too much to platoon him. If you don't, he'll go free agent to someone who will play him every day and pay him accordingly. For example, Bobby was never able to get a righty of quality - that he could afford - to platoon with Ryan Klesko, who needed it. I generally regard Klesko as the death of Earl's platooning style. Now, what you have is managers like La Russa, who extend their major league rosters by storing specialty guys in AAA ball and shuttling them in and out to meed short-term needs. Platooning exists in this form, but it's much lesser players than Earl used.

BTW, for the Anti-Weaver, who adopted almost the exact opposite approach, but still successfully, see Whitey Herzog.

- Brock Hanke

The Brewers platooned Geoff Jenkins and Kevin Mench for nearly all of 2007.

Weaver is an interesting case. Weaver would be my favorite manager of all time if I was trying to finish in a surprising second place. Whether it was luck or not, he won only one close pennant race, 1974, while losing in 1972, 1977, 1980, and 1982. He was 0-4 in "do or die" games (1971 7th game WS, 1973 5th Game ALCS, 1979 7th game WS, 1982 Game #162), and that doesn't include the big upset against the Mets in 1969. Three seperate times in the post season his team basically stopped hitting collectively - twice against the Pirates, not exactly known for their Sandy Koufaxes. In the end, he won one World Championship, the same as his predecessor and successor.

Maybe when you have the long range focus like Weaver did the burst of adrenaline that might be needed in certain instances isn't there. I don't know, it's just supposition on my part. His teams certainly had a consistent pattern throughout his career, not counting the comeback, which is true of a lot of good managers.

The early Bobby Cox teams were loaded with platoon regulars or semi-platoon semi-regulars (like Barry Bonnell who always played against lefties and played some against RHP). Barfield started out largely as a platoon player Dave Collins was largely platooned in 1984. Cliff Johnson drifted in and out of platoon roles (by generally out-hitting his intended platoon partner).

Dave Revering, Hosken Powell, Al Woods, Wayne Nordhagen, Jorge Orta, Willie Aikens, Al Oliver, Len Matuszek, Jeff Burroughs and Rick Leach were all straight platoon players.

The Indians attempted to platoon David Dellucci and Jason Michaels in 2007, but Dellucci got hurt and both players were awful. By July, the platoon was over and the team traded for Kenny Lofton to play left field.

The Brewers platooned Geoff Jenkins and Kevin Mench for nearly all of 2007.
The Phillies brought in Jenkins for 2008 with the express purpose of platooning him with Werth. It lasted about a half season when the Phils realized that the crispy brown covering on Jenkins was the symptom of toast and that Jayson was 1) plenty good enough to be an everyday player 2) no longer broke down if he played 3 consecutive days.

For all the snarkiness, I'll always appreciate that Jenkins had a big and historic hit in WS Game 5.2.

What's interesting about the Gary Roenicke element is that Gary wasn't some guy hanging around or who had washed out elsewhere looking for a last chance. Roenicke was a young guy who didn't have some extreme split to his game that Earl put in a semi-platoon because OTHER guys had that problem or they needed a rest every so often. Gary wasn't very good defensively but he wasn't an embarrassment.

Gary was a productive player hitting .220. He's a guy who must definitey wonder "what if".

since the demeez of the original yankee dynasty, the best of all the mini-dynasties to me were the 69 thru 71 O's--I thought they were MUCH better than the A's who followed them

and yet,and yet--only one WS title

(they WERE 9-0 in the ALCS's, so their overall postseason record looks good, but...)

As best I can tell, what has killed the old Weaver style of platooning is the salaries.

I'm sticking with the expanded bullpens as the explanation. With 12 man pitching staffs, you only have a 4-man bench (5 in the NL); once you factor out the backup catcher and utility infielder, you just can't justify a platoon.

With 12 man pitching staffs, you only have a 4-man bench (5 in the NL); once you factor out the backup catcher and utility infielder, you just can't justify a platoon.

:: nods ::

it wasn't so long ago that a manager would pinch-hit for a pinch hitter to force the platoon advantage... that one move would empty some present-day benches.

In the end, he won one World Championship, the same as his predecessor and successor.

So you're saying his #### didn't work in the playoffs?

I finally read the actual article. It starts with an extended scene in which Earl Weaver is moaning in frustration at an Orioles pitcher during a spring training game. That pitcher? Adam Eaton.

With 12 man pitching staffs, you only have a 4-man bench (5 in the NL); once you factor out the backup catcher and utility infielder, you just can't justify a platoon.

I agree. Nowadays with a platoon, you would have to have two players who bring something else to the table...e.g. platooning one guy who is good enough to be your top pinch-hitter with another guy who is good enough to be your top utility infielder. And if those guys are good enough to actually be platooned, it's probably expensive to have both of them.

it wasn't so long ago that a manager would pinch-hit for a pinch hitter to force the platoon advantage... that one move would empty some present-day benches.

Yes, and a Weaver wouldn't hesitate to pinch-hit for a Belanger or a Dempsey with a LHB in a key situation (say, bases loaded and one out) early in the game, not a platoon situation per se, but gaining the platoon advantage as well as leveraging the opportunity provided. Today's short benches effectively prohibit this tactic as well.

The platoon advantage has definitely moved to the bullpen L/R matchups. Someone (LaRussa?) figured out that having a bullpen specialist cancels out the other guy's platoon after 2 plate appearances. Add in pitch counts for starters and you have the modern bullpen. Maybe LaRussa outsmarted Weaver.

I read Weaver on Strategy years and years ago -

And Earl's right - he was valuing the same things and had the same ideas years ago.

My hatred for the sac bunt still comes from Weaver's comment about it "having its place, namely at the bottom of a forgotten closet" - outs are precious, don't waste them.

Throw strikes on the mound, swing at strikes at the plate.

Personalities aside, Earl would have fit perfectly with Beane.

He's still my pick to manage an all-time all-star team... I realize there are plenty of guys with more success - and sure, maybe its blasphemy not to say McGraw - and yes, Earl most certainly wasn't a "player's manager"... but I think Earl's approach to running a baseball game tactically and what to value is spot-on perfect.

My hatred for the sac bunt still comes from Weaver's comment about it "having its place, namely at the bottom of a forgotten closet"

actually, I believe he said "why don't you take the sacrifice bunt and shove it up someone's ass and leave it there"

actually, I believe he said "why don't you take the sacrifice bunt and shove it up someone's ass and leave it there"

Knowing Earl's vocabulary, no doubt he did -- but he cleaned up in his book.

The platoon advantage has definitely moved to the bullpen L/R matchups. Someone (LaRussa?) figured out that having a bullpen specialist cancels out the other guy's platoon after 2 plate appearances. Add in pitch counts for starters and you have the modern bullpen. Maybe LaRussa outsmarted Weaver.

Well, but having an extra bat on the bench cancels out the other guy's relief specialist. It works both ways.

The one thing we know for certain is that all of MLB has gone with the preference of gaining the platoon advantage on the defensive side (and late in the game) and surrendering it on the offensive side (and all game long). Whether that represents a step forward is far less clear.

It's the pitch counts that helped cause the switch. If neither starter is going past the 6th inning then your platoon isn't going to work as well (you can only substitute once) and you're going to need relievers to pitch the 7-9th so your bench is shorter. Instead of leveraging the pinch hitter we've leveraged the pitchers. Earl had a 4-man rotation and starters that threw complete games.

Maybe determining which side of the coin to leverage is dependent on the run-scoring environment. What is more valuable, run production or run avoidance?

It's the pitch counts that helped cause the switch. If neither starter is going past the 6th inning then your platoon isn't going to work as well (you can only substitute once) and you're going to need relievers to pitch the 7-9th so your bench is shorter. Instead of leveraging the pinch hitter we've leveraged the pitchers. Earl had a 4-man rotation and starters that threw complete games.

Oh, no doubt. But limiting the innings load of starters, and shortening the stints of relievers, have been choices, not mandates. Very likely on balance they've improved the performance of pitching staffs, but the point is that the improvement hasn't come without a cost: the cost of adding inferior pitchers to the staff, and the cost of removing hitters/fielders/runners from the bench.

Perhaps the genius in the bullpen platoon is that a strict batting platoon requires both players to play the same position. A pitching platoon doesn't have that limitation. With a 25 man roster it is impossible to platoon at every position unless you only have 9 pitchers. The move to the 5 man rotation and the DH (requiring 18 platoon players) might have been the tipping point.

This is why guys like Mark DeRosa or Chone Figgins who can platoon with _anyone_ on the field are so valuable in today's game.

Weren't there a lot more instances 30 or 40 years ago of starters being taken out after, say, 1 inning, than there are now? One of the few sabermetric studies I actually remember was by Mike Emeigh recently on that topic. Where now Ian Snell gives up ive runs in the first two innings and is left in to "get settled" and more than likely pitches into the fourth or fifth inning, Billy Martin or Danny Ozark would just tell a guy to get out of there if it wasn't his day, and put in some other pitcher to go the next four or five innings.

I think in terms of the specialization of pitching roles, the bigger culprit is having starters who need to get four days' rest, and if possible exactly four or five days' rest, between starts. Nowadays the guy you put in to throw four innings of relief is probably the least skilled pitcher on the staff (Chad Durbin?), because there's no way you can disrupt your rotation by using a starter in relief, unless it's the World Series.

Well, but having an extra bat on the bench cancels out the other guy's relief specialist. It works both ways.

Not as well, though. Relievers all play the same position, while batters have to cover a variety of defensive roles in addition to their PH roles. Two guys left in the pen vs two on the bench do not give the manager the same flexibility if there's no catcher or SS to put out there at the end of an inning.

The one thing we know for certain is that all of MLB has gone with the preference of gaining the platoon advantage on the defensive side (and late in the game) and surrendering it on the offensive side (and all game long). Whether that represents a step forward is far less clear.

Which seems odd, given that Earl Weaver's team could guarantee itself the platoon advantage against Tony LaRussa's team by pinch hitting for a pinch hitter. (At least the first couple times that platoon advantage became a sticking point in a high leverage situation in the game.) After a couple tradeoffs, Tony would then have more pitchers left than Earl would have hitters, but up until that point, Earl's squad got the platoon advantage against the starting pitcher, then made Tony's first two relief specialists obsolete.

Davey Johnson was (I guess not surprisingly) probably the closest thing to Earl since Earl. Left/right platoons, no obsession with naming a closer (although I think he finally caved to convention in his later years), I still remember the wacky extra inning game when he had McDowell and Orosco switching back and forth between pitching and the outfield, getting the platoon advantage all the while. I'd love to see that gambit come back to some degree with today's overly specialized bullpens, even when there isn't desperation like Davey had. (I know some rules have been put in place, particularly in the AL, to prevent its abuse, but I think you can still pull it off once an inning.) Davey also loved the defense/offense platoons, like using HoJo and Mitchell at short ... he would say why play your no-hit guy, fall behind, then have to pinch hit for him, when you can play your no-glove guy, get a lead, and then put in the defensive replacement. The other bit I remember is that liked to use McDowell to relieve El Sid, thinking that throwing a RH sinkerballer after a LH sidearm fly ball pitcher would really screw the hitters up. I don't suppose McDowell has splits "By Pitcher Relieved" to prove that, does he?

Nowadays the guy you put in to throw four innings of relief is probably the least skilled pitcher on the staff (Chad Durbin?), because there's no way you can disrupt your rotation by using a starter in relief, unless it's the World Series.

Four innings of relief? Really? Your team can be down 10-2 in the third, and you're still likely to see three pitchers pitch the last 6 innings of the game. It's amazing to me how what used to be known as middle relief now passes for long relief.

Weren't there a lot more instances 30 or 40 years ago of starters being taken out after, say, 1 inning, than there are now? One of the few sabermetric studies I actually remember was by Mike Emeigh recently on that topic.

Mike may well have had that data, but I think it came up most recently in a link to a Tango post on his Book blog, where Tango drew that conclusion after looking at Dodgers pitch count data from the Koufax years.

Bobby Cox loved his platoons back then.


Garret Anderson/Matt Diaz

Cox has not abandoned his platoonishness.

Mike may well have had that data, but I think it came up most recently in a link to a Tango post on his Book blog, where Tango drew that conclusion after looking at Dodgers pitch count data from the Koufax years.

Tango's data confirms it, but one doesn't need that data to make it clear. All you need to do is look at the IP/GS of pitchers from distant decades compared to today, and then also compare the complete games. Unless the non-complete games of modern pitchers are routinely 8+ innings (and we know they aren't), then it becomes obvious that old-time starters had many more low-IP outings than modern starters do.

Not as well, though. Relievers all play the same position, while batters have to cover a variety of defensive roles in addition to their PH roles. Two guys left in the pen vs two on the bench do not give the manager the same flexibility if there's no catcher or SS to put out there at the end of an inning.

Not as well at the end of the game, but much better for the first seven or eight innings. A platoon at a single position provides far more platoon-advantaged PAs than a LOOGY faces all season.

Another umpire, Ron Luciano, once said he didn't care who won the AL East, so long as it wasn't Weaver and the Orioles. The league kept Luciano off Baltimore games for a year because of that comment. When the ban expired, Luciano threw Weaver out the first chance he got, ejecting him before Weaver even cleared the top step of the dugout to argue a strike call.

An additional advantage of platooning relievers is to reduce the effectivnes of some of the better hitters in baseball in key moments. Some of the best hitters in baseball are the big sluggardly firstbase/DH types. The David Oriz/Ryan Howard/Jason Giambi/Carlos Delgado types* just aren't going to be pinch hit for when they come to the plate even against a RHP who is dealing, you can argue the merit's but not even Weaver would pinch hit for his Sluggardly LHH in Boog Powell (109/74 tOPS+). However, as the opposing manager you can really take advantage of this.

*career tOPS+
108/78
122/59
107/84
111/74

However, as the opposing manager you can really take advantage of this.

Of course you can -- late in the game. But if you have a deeper offensive bench, you can be gaining multiple platoon-advantaged PAs against the starter, earlier in the game.

And, a deeper bench provides not just more bats, but more gloves and more legs. Teams with deeper benches could make late-inning defensive replacements more than modern teams do, and pinch-run in late-inning situations more than modern teams do.

Treder vs Rauseo at DMB in DC. I want to see this.

and pinch-run in late-inning situations more than modern teams do.

Teams pinch run with their pitchers.

Teams with deeper benches could make late-inning defensive replacements more than modern teams do

You don't need a defensive replacement for your DH.

The one thing we know for certain is that all of MLB has gone with the preference of gaining the platoon advantage on the defensive side (and late in the game) and surrendering it on the offensive side (and all game long).

True. And either way it's for 3 or 4 PA per game. "All game long" platoon is only until the starter leaves and once per lineup cycle. "Late in the game" platoon will also get you 3 or 4 PA of platoon advantage, per your number of pitching changes minus the number of opposite-handed opposing PHs.

And I think the explanations are pretty straightforward. The modern media and viewer attention span focuses disproportionately towards the later parts of games. And changing pitchers is Doing Something for the manager to remain visible and appear to be doing his job.

Another current platoon is Kosuke Fukudome/Reed Johnson in CF for the Cubs this season. Now that Soriano is out of the leadoff spot, Lou says he's going to hit the CF starter in the leadoff spot. We'll see how long that lasts.

The Mariners have been platooning much of the year at DH with Sweeney and Griffey. That's really an unusual use of position players in today's game - two bench players whose use in the field is extremely limited. Back in 1985, the Royals carried two full-time DHs - Hal McRae (112 games) and Jorge Orta (110 games), neither of whom played an inning in the field all year. And they won the Series...

Bobby Cox manages almost exactly like Earl Weaver

And he has one WS win to show for it, exactly like Earl Weaver

From the article:

The subject of cheating brings the conversation to another subject. The Steroid Era, I ask him, does it embarrass you?

"Oh, I don't know." The man who would do just about anything to win a ball game pauses for a moment, letting honesty bubble to the surface. "Not really," he says quietly. "You're always looking for an edge. And guys, that's their living. And if a growth hormone helps you be better physically and able to do more things physically ... but it just shatters the records."

Mike Schmidt and Earl Weaver: Truth Tellers.

Mike Schmidt and Earl Weaver: Truth Tellers.

Is that the religion that has Gary Busey as a member.

As for Weaver, he has slagged enough pitching talent to where he should love something that risks injury over performance.

I don't know if there would have been an Earl Weaver without Harry Dalton. Earl figured out where to fit everybody, but Harry's the one who developed the system, drafted or obtained many of those players, and is responsible for the whole "Orioles Way to Play Baseball." Whereas Earl was the stats side of the equation, Harry was more scouty, and a great one at that. Unfairly unheralded guy.

I don't know if there would have been an Earl Weaver without Harry Dalton. Earl figured out where to fit everybody, but Harry's the one who developed the system, drafted or obtained many of those players, and is responsible for the whole "Orioles Way to Play Baseball." Whereas Earl was the stats side of the equation, Harry was more scouty, and a great one at that. Unfairly unheralded guy.

Certainly, Dalton was a tremendous GM, and generally overlooked. But, in the spirit of granting credit where it's due, Dalton inherited an extremely sound top-to-bottom organization from Lee MacPhail, who'd inherited it from the guy who conceived of it and built it utterly from scratch in just a matter of a few years: Paul Richards.

And it was Richards, of course, who hired Weaver into his first managerial job.