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Baseball Primer Newsblog— The Best News Links from the Baseball Newsstand
Wednesday, April 05, 2006
Maury Brown sits down with Rob Neyer to discuss his latest book…Rob Neyer’s Big Book of Baseball Blunders : A Complete Guide to the Worst Decisions and Stupidest Moments in Baseball History...and much like his career, I hope Rich McKinney’s name pops up!
On the “criteria for a blunder”.....Neyer: I had fairly rigid criteria in my head when I started. The “perfect” blunder would satisfy three conditions. One: it was premeditated. Two: it could have been avoided with a bit of intelligent analysis. Three: it resulted in some serious negative consequence.
In the event, though, I didn’t stick to those with any great consistency. Every blunder in the book was premeditated, which is why there’s not a chapter about Merkle’s Boner or any of the many lousy pitches that have been thrown over the years. But there are a few “blunders” that really were perfectly reasonable at the time (selling Babe Ruth), and there are a few that weren’t reasonable, but wound up not hurting anybody all that much (letting Carl Hubbell get away). If a particular blunder didn’t meet all three criteria but seemed interesting enough to write about anyway, then I wrote about it. If you want to send the Blunders Police after me, go ahead…
Repoz
Posted: April 05, 2006 at 11:20 AM | 133 comment(s)
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hmmm..what might these be?
well, he traded Norm Cash & Johnny Romano for an aging Minoso ('course, the Indians did worser by then trading Cash for Steve Demeter)
20 year old Johnny Callison for Gene Freese
Earl Battey and Don Mincher for a washed-up Roy Sievers
Well, Merkle's Boner was premeditated, by Tinker, if not by Merkle.
Or maybe that goes in Rob Neyer's Big Book of Clever Stratagems?
Listing Mike Hampton as the Astro's #1 All Time Pitcher in the lineups book.
Sorry Rob ; )
Yup.
I don't know about this book. It's a great idea, don't get me wrong. But, oh, how painful. Every fan will pick it up in the bookstore and have one of two reactions. Either:
What an idiot! How could he have left out my team's decisions to trade Blastocyte Rookiestar when he was a prospect, and not to start Lefty McStuff in the World Series opener in '37, and . . . . Those were the REAL all-time blunders!!!
And he'll put the book down and walk off in a huff, thinking Rob doesn't know a blunder from a blender. Or:
Oh, my God! There they are, right there in all their ugly agony. All the dumb, moronic things my team has done through the ages, the stuff grandpa talked about on his deathbed and that dad still can't get over and that drove me away from the game for five years once . . . I'm supposed to relive this stuff? Oh, no . . . Myrtle might get me this for Christmas . . . . it'll kill me!
Sigh. I'm sure I'll get it. I'm Jewish, I'm supposed to like suffering.
Considering their relationship, Tinker was probably thinking to himself at that moment,"Evers, you stupid ba$tard. The game's over. Stop stomping on the bag,"
1. (tie) Starting Colon in game 4 of the 1999 ALDS, and starting Hudson in game 4 of the 2003 ALDS. Totally premeditated, and totally insane. Old-school managing at its worst. No excuse.
2. Leaving Pedro in---only consolation was it finally got rid of Little.
3. Not pinchhitting Baylor for Buckner, and then not replacing him with Stapleton.
4. Cooper (1 for 17) for Willoughby, in the 8th with nobody on and two out.
5. the Bagwell trade
The collective stupidity exhibited in those six moves was enough to have started three Vietnam wars, two Iraq wars, and one Birmingham fire hose.
1 - Oy, the trades. I know most people say Nolan Ryan and Amos Otis. But I say Tom Seaver, still. Ripped the heart out for the fans, sent a message about whether they were prepared to play the game in the new free agency era that had just dawned, and just as the Yankees were awakening and preparing to steal the city. Made the owners and the management look like they didn't care about winning or the fans, nor that they had a clue what they were doing. And the bottom completely dropped out for years afterward.
2 - Starting Seaver in Game 6 of the 1973 World Series. I doubt it made the book, because some still think it was arguable, but not me. With a 3-2 lead, you take the opportunity to have the best pitcher in the game ready to go out and dominate on full rest in Game 7, if needed. Berra should have used Stone in Game 6, leaving the Mets with Seaver as the trump card (and Matlack behind him for an inning or three if needed on short rest, instead of starting on short rest as he ended up doing in Game 7).
See what I mean? Reliving this #### hurts.
3(a). Not sending Calvin Schiraldi to the firing squad before the Series began.
I'm sure that's one of the 3, jmac. And Siever was involved in another interesting FO blunder that maybe Rob included in the book.
Apparently when Veeck sold the Browns, the Baltimore execs went through Siever's medical file, which included some doc's opinion that Siever's shoulder injury was chronic and he'd be useless in the field. So they traded him for this guy, no doubt chortling that they'd pulled one over on ole Cal Griffith.
Anyway, the book sounds more like fun than picking at scabs, Sam, given that it's mostly ancient history; I'll prolly pick it up, too.
If they were on a 5-day rotation, of course, then your choice shares the top billing with Hargrove and Macha as dumbest managerial move ever.
And it gave us the Tampa Bay Devil Rays! Oy!
A five-day rotation? No. In the NLCS, the Mets' rotation looked like this:
Oct. 6: Seaver
Oct. 7: Matlack
Oct. 8: Koosman
Oct. 9: Stone
Oct. 10: Seaver
With no day off, Seaver went on three-days rest with a four-man rotation. But of course, that was what I'm saying they should have done in the WS: just used Stone when they had the chance. Berra HAD to use Seaver in the NLCS Game 5 on three days rest -- it was an elimination game.
In the Series, though, the Mets were stuck, because Seaver couldn't go in either Games 1 or 2:
Oct. 13: Matlack
Oct. 14: Koosman
Oct. 16: Seaver
Oct. 17: Matlack
Oct. 18: Koosman
Oct. 20: ???????
The fact they were ahead 3-2 going back to Oakland gave Berra the chance to get out of that trap -- he didn't HAVE to use Seaver on the 20th on three days rest, because they weren't facing elimination. Instead, he could have used Stone, who'd been great for them down the stretch, and had both Seaver (on full rest) and Matlack (on short rest, but not needing to start) on the 21st.
Cubs blunder? Trading Lee Smith for two sacks of inferior snot. Cost them some problems in the 'pen which they solved (for a year at least) by trading away Rafeal Palmerio for Mitch Williams.
The whole Greg Maddux as a free agent thing could've gone better, too.
Of course if I were a Mets fan I might put Berra at the top of the list.
I'll see about getting that fixed here in a bit. Of course, I Googled on the quote and that's who came up (I certainly can't claim that I knew it off the top of my head).
Compare and Contrast: the criticism of John McNamara for taking Roger Clemens out of Game 6 in 1986 too early v. the criticism of Grady Little for leaving Pedro Martinez in too long.
Can losing managers in tragic games just not avoid getting roasted like a pig on a spit? Is it simply their fate?
Now Bill Virdon playing Manny Sanguillen in RF to replace Clemente, that is a blunder!
To be fair, Seaver had demanded a trade. Thank you, Dick Young.
Fun Fact: The Mets traded away Dave Kingman the same day they traded Seaver. But at least they got a certified Mets legend in return for him.
I think this nails it. I've always wondered why leaving Pedro in is considered so insane. He's arguably the best pitcher in the game and he has been getting outs. I mean, it is clear that he is tiring, but we've all seen Pedro look like he looked in the 6th and 7th and then end up dominating in the 8th and 9th. I think I would've pulled him sooner than he got pulled but I'm not at all sure I wouldn't have started him in the 8th.
And, admit it, if Little pulls himi after 7 and the reliever gives it up, you Sox fans go apes--t andway.
See what I mean? We relive these nightmares . . . . Seaver had rescinded his trade demand, until Young's column the morning of the trade -- as Donald Grant's house columnist, it was a plant designed to provoke Seaver and blow the whole thing up -- saying that Nancy Seaver was jealous because of Nolan Ryan's wife because Ryan was making more than Seaver. Seaver blew up when he saw his wife being dragged into it.
It should be pointed out the Mets scored 1 run in Game 6 and 2 runs in Game 7 of the 1973 World Series. Perhaps a fully rested Stone and Seaver would have done better but you will not win too many games scoring 1 and 2 runs.
If we were only going to score two runs in Game 7, I'd have sure liked to have had TOM SEAVER at his best trying to make that stand up, instead of Matlack on short rest.
I always wondered why Pedro Martinez told Grady Little that he felt fine when he clearly wasn't. Or why Varitek didn't say something. Sometimes the players on the field have a better idea as to what's going on than the old guy on the bench does, and I don't necessarily agree with the "top-down" structure a lot of teams have gone with.
But I'm not a Red Sox fan, and I really don't want to get into this old argument.
Anyhoo, it could be that I don't know as much about baseball as some of you, but I started keeping a mental note every time I second-guessed a manager's decision, and realised that I was wrong more often than I was right. But when I'm wrong, my bad decisions aren't broadcast over the nightly news.
After the trade, the Mets had 1)No center fielder, 2) No leadoff man, and 3) no right handed closer, which ended up helping cost the Mets the pennant in 89 and 90. They did it to get a guy who was an overrated hitter and bad second baseman, so that he could play center field, a position he had never played before. I don't think you can make a dumber trade. It was worse than the recent Soriano fiasco.
Wow...I forgot that the Mets played Samuel in CF. Maybe Bowden's strategy wasn't to improve the Nationals, but to ensure that Samuel's and Soriano's careers are even more similar.
I'd agree with you if we weren't talking about game 7 of a league championship series against the Yankees. And its not just that he let Pedro start the inning - its that he left him in for several batters after that when it was obvious he had nothing left.
Lets remember 1973 was not too far removed from the era when times used pitchers on 2 days rest :Stottlemyre and Gibson in 1964, Lonborg in 1967, McLain and Lolich in 1968.
2) When Pedro entered the game in the 8th, it was obvious he was done. He was missing location with the fastball and clearly unable to throw an effective off-speed or breaking pitch. It had nothing to do with pitch counts or statistics, and everything to do with watching the game. By observation, Pedro was no longer effective, and Little left him in to face batter after batter.Why should I admit that? It didn't happen, so it's not really evidence or an argument. There's always a possibility that a good move will backfire, but it's hard for me to believe that Sox fans would have been annoyed at the pitching change. The "Pedro pitch count" meme had been fully drilled into the head of every Sox fan since 2002.
so anything that happened after that is found money
Why should I admit that?
The reason you shouldn't admit it is that it is flat wrong. If Grady brings in Timlin and Williamson, who had been lights out during the post season, and they happened to have a bad game, we would have been upset, but nobody would have blamed Grady, just like nobody blamed Grady or Wakefield for what happened in extra innings. The reason everybody blamed Grady was that he was acting like a total moron.
Can losing managers in tragic games just not avoid getting roasted like a pig on a spit? Is it simply their fate?
Its their fate when they make incredibly stupid decisions that are in large part the reason for the games being tragic in the first place.
Sorry guys, I know most people don't want to rehash Grady. I couldn't resist.
A few points, schuey.
First, I agree that Matlack was great. But note that the first two games you point out were on full rest. Only the Game 4 start was on short rest, and he went 8 innings in that one. To follow that effort up with another outing on short rest in Game 7 was a heck of a thing to ask.
Second, how much better might he have been if he'd been able to take whatever he had left and just use it for 2-3 innings, instead of trying to make it work for 5-6, or as long as he could go?
And third, whatever you might think about the bet on Matlack to win in the 7th, I kind of prefer the Seaver/Matlack exacta myself. My Racing Form shows Seaver as "Well Rested" and "In Good Form" for that race.
1. Glenn Davis. Also Glenn Davis and Glenn Davis, just for emphasis.
2. Firing Jon Miller. (Yeah, I know Angelos's version of events is that Miller wanted to leave. Let's just say I believe Miller.) Miller was the voice of the Orioles. He had been with the team in the darkest days of the mid-late 80s. And he made even those teams bearable. The new guys, not so much. This sent a message to Orioles fans that the entire team was just a big ego trip for Angelos.
3. Firing Davey Johnson. (Again, I know Angelos tries to spin this as Johnson quitting.)
4. Tie: Ray Miller and Phil Regan. That's Miller as manager, not as pitching coach. Regan was totally out of his depth, and Miller's favorite pastime was to run to the media to talk down his players, telling the media that they were overpaid losers.
5. DeCinces for Ford. 1982 alone should be enough to cinch that.
6. EBW deciding to plunge heavily into the free agent market to rebuild the team... right when the owners decided to collude. Thus ensuring that the Orioles would get a bunch of worthless veterans, often forfeiting draft picks for them, digging the farm system into an even bigger hole.
6. Hell, pretty much every decision that has been made with this team since the 1997 season ended. (It's tempting to simply say, "Selling the team to Eli Jacobs," since that pretty much led inevitably to everything that has happened since. Jacobs was bankrupt and was using the team as his personal piggy bank; he was forced to sell the team to pay creditors, which allowed Angelos to buy it. Which led to the Angelos era. But I can't say that, because we did get 1996-1997 out of that era.)
Can't remember where I read it, but somewhere along the line it was reported that Dave Wallace told Pedro he was done, and then wrote Embree's name onto the dugout lineup card in the pitcher's spot. Little then came over and told Pedro "I need one more inning from you."
With Little back in the majors managing and with several of his former players on his team, I'm not surprised to have seen recent historical revisionism coming out of LA regarding Grady's blunder. Rob's book will be a welcome buttress against such thinking. As Maury pointed out, at the time it was happening, I too was screaming at my TV that Pedro was done and needed to be pulled.
BTW, it's worth noting that Little did the very same thing to Pedro earlier that postseason in Game 5 of the 2003 ALDS against Oakland. After 7 innings it was a 4-2 game and Pedro looked done (final play of the 7th was the Damon/Jackson collision play), yet Grady sent him out there for the 8th and he proceeded to give up a double and then a single without recording an out to make it 4-3 before Little removed him. That blunder is forgotten because A) the Red Sox won the game in dramatic fashion thanks to Derek Lowe, and B) it was overshadowed by both the Damon/Jackson collision and the later blunder in the ALCS.
-Tommy LaSorda pitching to Jack Clark in Game 6 of the 1985 NLCS
-Dick Williams pitching to Kirk Gibson in Game 5 of the 1985 World Series
Because they didn't win their division? No, that can't be it. They did, in fact, finish ahead of every other team in the NL East.
Because they didn't win the NLCS? No, that can't be it. The beat the Reds in five. (Poor Pete. He had the Mets in four; got good odds, too. Sucker.)
Were they damned lucky to get there? Obviously. I won't argue that. But the team that played in September and October -- having gotten past the injuries that had them in the hole all season long -- was every bit as good as it looked against the Reds and A's. That is to say, it was a team fully capable of competing heads-up with the teams then recognized as the best in the game, and beating them. They hadn't performed like a championship-caliber club most of 1973. But the team that took the field in the post-season WAS a championship-caliber club.
Glenn Davis seems really dumb in retrospect, but at the time, I thought it was a pretty good move. Davis was a very good hitter, who hit lots of homeruns in what was the toughest park in the majors. I remember thinking that he was going to be a monster once he got to a reasonable park.
That wasn't a blunder at all. Statistically, Van Slyke was the better hitter against right handed pitchers - it made no sense to walk Clark to get to Van Slyke unless you had a left hander ready to go. Its just one of those moves that didn't work out.
So no, I disagree that fans would've screamed if the bullpen had blown it.
What, you didn't like the Aase, Lacy, and Lynn era?
I might have to rank John Miller above Glenn Davis. At least the Davis trade was somewhat defensible at the time.
Part 1:
1986 regular season ERAs for Sox relievers:Schiraldi 1.41
Crawford 3.92
Stanley 4.37
Stewart 3.38
Sambito 4.84
Lollar 6.91
ALCS SERIES STATSPlayer G ERA W-L SV CG IP H ER BB SO
+------------------+-+------+---+--+--+----+--+--+--+---+
Calvin Schiraldi 4 1.50 0-1 1 0 6.0 5 1 3 9
Bob Stanley 3 4.76 0-0 0 0 5.7 7 3 3 1
Steve Crawford 1 0.00 1-0 0 0 1.7 1 0 2 1
Joe Sambito 3 0.00 0-0 0 0 0.7 1 0 1 0
So after being (easily) the best reliever for the Sox in the regular season, Schiraldi was the best reliever for the Sox in the ALCS too.
(Tangentially related: on the flipside of Schiraldi, Stanley had one of his worst regular seasons in 1986, and did not pitch well in the ALCS, but pitched great in the World Series. So it goes).
ALCS SERIES STATSPlayer G ERA W-L SV CG IP H ER BB SO
+---------+-+-----+---+--+--+----+--+--+--+---+
Schiraldi 4 1.50 0-1 1 0 6.0 5 1 3 9
Stanley 3 4.76 0-0 0 0 5.7 7 3 3 1
Crawford 1 0.00 1-0 0 0 1.7 1 0 2 1
Sambito 3 0.00 0-0 0 0 0.7 1 0 1 0
Also, the comparison to Gibson and Lolich is off, since not only were they proven workhorses, the greater point was that their managers had no real alternatives. Gibson was the Cardinal’s only reliable starter in 1964, and McLain, who was the Tigers’ ace in 1968, had pitched in game 6. And at that, Gibson gave up 5 runs and was hanging on for dear life at the end.
3(a). Not sending Calvin Schiraldi to the firing squad before the Series began.
Well, that's just silly.
Part 1:
1986 regular season ERAs for Sox relievers:
Schiraldi 1.41
Crawford 3.92
Stanley 4.37
Stewart 3.38
Sambito 4.84
Lollar 6.91
Were you watching game 4 of the ALCS that year? He wasn’t the first regular season rookie flash who folded like a tent in the World Series. Schiraldi’s World Series ERA wound up at 13.50.
And anyone with two eyes could see that he was scared out of his wits on the mound in those last two games. Why he was ever trotted out there again in game 7 after his performance in game 6 remains one of baseball's all-time mysteries.
First, "admit it" was not an attempt at getting anyone here to actually admit to anything, it was just an expression. Two, I don't actually mean you wise baseball folks here would necessarily get on Little if Timlin starts the 8th and gives it up. I mean the larger baseball and Sox world would get on him. I was trying to agree with Sam's point, that the losing manager in any close series or game is going to be second guessed by history. Very soon folks would have written/said that Little had the greatest pitcher of his era going in a big game and pulled him for a middle reliever and got burned. That it isn't necessarily true wouldn't matter much.
As I said, I can see sending him out to start the 8th but it was a huge blunder not to bring him in after a couple of batters evidence that he was done.
Ok, taking a different tack, let's look at Schiraldi's World Series performance, outing-by-outing...
Game 1: entered to start 9th inning of 1-0 game. Walked Strawberry, got Knight to ground to Buckner (who threw to second to get lead runner), got Backman to fly out, and struck out pinch hitter Heep. A scoreless inning in a pressure situation.
Game 6: entered to start 8th inning of 3-2 game. Mazzilli pinch hit for Orosco and singled. Dykstra sacrifice bunts, but the Red Sox try for and fail to get the lead runner. 2 on, no out. Backman sacrifice bunts the runners to second and third. (So there is now one out, runners on second and third). Hernandez is walked to load the bases. Carter hits a sacrifice fly (two outs, runners on first and third). Strawberry flies out to end the inning.
The Red Sox do nothing in the top of the ninth.
Schiraldi stays in the game. He walks Knight to start the 9th. Wilson bunts, but Gedman makes an error in trying for the lead runner, everyone safe. Schiraldi then fans Johnson and gets Mazzilli and Dykstra to fly out.
The Red Sox get two runs home in the top of the tenth, Schiraldi stays in the game and gets two quick outs... and then all hell breaks loose.
I dunno. I see a pitcher who'd pitched extremely well for the Sox in the regular season, who'd pitched well for the Sox in the ALCS, who'd pitched well in his one other appearance (to that point) in the World Series, who'd had to get "four outs" in two pressure-packed previous innings in front of a hostile crowd against a tough offense, and who was asked to give a third inning (and face many of the same batters a second time). Tough to rip on Schiraldi there, it seems to me. It may not be completely Brenley/Kim-tastic, but it's still a tough spot to put the kid.
Not that McNamera had any reason to have a lot of faith in any of his other relievers -- none but Schiraldi had been all that good in the regular season and only Stanley was ultimately any good in the World Series.
I dunno. I don't tend to play the "he looks scared" game because I could care less how brave/scared a pitcher looks when he's on the mound so long as he's throwing strikes (and getting them by the hitters). Schilling never looked scared all last year, but he should have been (given the slop he was throwing).
No they wouldn't. I doubt there's a single Red Sox fan, here or anywhere else, who would have blamed Grady for bringing in Timlin to start the eigth, no matter what ended up happening. Every Red Sox fan who watch a game in 2003 knew that Pedro tended to get tired and wasn't any good after that. It was a constant topic of conversation on sports radio around here before the game. - it's not like something only statheads knew.
Alright, which one of you doesn't drink?
Right. It's kind of like the Lasorda/Jack Clark thing. Someone, I forget who, famously quipped "If I have a chice between pitching to a guy making $1 Million and one making $75,000, I chose the latter." The fact that pitching to Clark was the correct percentage move is lost in the rhetoric.
World Series ERAs:Stanley 0.00
Hurst 1.96
Clemens 3.18
Crawford 6.23
Nipper 7.11
Boyd 7.71
Schiraldi 13.50
Sambito 27.00
Perhaps Schiraldi was the worst choice to throw in there, but I'm not sure the Sox had a good choice (other than Stanley, in hindsight, who ended up pitching in 5 of the 7 games). And Schiraldi had at least had a good regular season, unlike any of the other relief pitchers.
The situation: 1993 ALCS, game 2. The White Sox have already lost game 1 at home and are behind 3-1 in the bottom of the ninth. Two out, runner on first base, Duane Ward pitching for Toronto. The batter is Joey Cora; the next two batters in the order after him are Frank Thomas and Robin Ventura. Warren Newson has already been used earlier in the game, but Bo Jackson is available to pinch hit.
Gene Lamont stayed put, leaving Cora in to bat. Cora popped out to end the game. The criticism I heard of Lamont: why didn't he send up Jackson to pinch hit for Cora? His public defense of leaving Cora in: "I was just trying to get to Frank."
I've lost the file in which I worked up the probabilities on this one - they're unusually easy to analyze becuase any out ends the game. The two things to note: Bo Jackson represented a significant home run threat and Joey Cora did not, but Cora had an OBP of .351 that season to Jackson's .289. Essentially, pinch hitting Jackson for Cora is playing for the immediate 2-run home run to tie the game; keeping Cora in is playing for the 3-run inning to win the game.
If I remember correctly, if I assigned a 50/50 chance to any game going extra innings, and if I used season-average batting statistics for the players involved, there was a very slight advantage (in terms of probability of winning the game) to having Cora bat. You'd get a slight enhancement on this by assuming that you're better off in extra innings with Cora still in the lineup.
The problem with that line of analysis: Duane Ward. He wasn't a league average pitcher - he was a good, high-strikeout closer having a good season. Presumably, he would severely depress all offensive elements for Jackson, Cora, Thomas, and Ventura. In that setting, things that take only one step (Jackson hypothetically hitting a HR) wouldn't be depressed as much as things that take two or more steps (Cora reaching base followed by Thomas hitting an extra base hit, or Cora and Thomas both reaching base followed by Ventura doing something positive.) And that swings the analysis back: Lamont would actually have been better off pinch hitting with Jackson. But I wouldn't have criticized him for what he did, and "just wanted to get to Frank" does make sense.
See, it's easy to look at those and say they were bad moves. But it seems to me that there are plenty of examples where they were good moves (Beckett in 2003, Schilling in 2001). I think the manager needs to know his personnel and how they would be able to handle it. It's hard to say that starting Seaver was a horrible decision, considering that he went 7 strong and only gave up 2 runs.
Of course, the fun thing is that before 2004, I would have had a lot of trouble looking back at 1986. Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit. It ain't so bad looking back now.
9/25: Short (2 days rest)
9/26: Mahaffey (5 days rest)
9/27: Bunning (2 days rest)
9/28: Short (2 days rest)
9/29: Bennett (6 days rest)
9/30: Bunning (2 days rest)
9/25: Short (2 days rest)
9/26: Mahaffey (5 days rest)
9/27: Bunning (2 days rest)
9/28: Short (2 days rest)
9/29: Bennett (6 days rest)
9/30: Bunning (2 days rest)
That was a rather egregious panic attack on Mauch's part.
Going into the game on the 25th, the Phillies had lost 6 of 7 -- but they still had a 3-game lead, with 8 to play. Playing .500 ball over the final eight games would nearly guarantee them the pennant. They didn't need to win that game on the 25th, what they needed to do was not blow up and do something truly disastrous, like losing 6 of the final 8.
Once he started the sequence, you can see the logic in riding it out, as each succeeding game did become more of a do-or-die. But just keeping Short and Bunning on their 3-days-rest schedule would have given each of them 2 starts over the final 8 games. Instead, Mauch's premature panic helped to ensure the eventuality of the unlikely worst-case scenario.
ROB NEYER'S GREATEST BLUNDER???!!!
GETTING RID OF THE FLANNEL!!!!!!!
Two managerial blunders that have always stuck with me occurred in World Series games. Game Two of the 2000 World Series, the Mets trail 6-0 going into the ninth. They rally for five runs, capped by a two-out Jay Payton home run; everyone in the park and watching on TV is going nuts. Then, with Matt Franco and Bubba Trammell both still on the bench, Bobby Valentine lets Kurt Abbott bat -- I remember thinking that Valentine was just so thrilled by the Payton home run that he forgot he could pinch-hit for Abbott. Of course, if Valentine simply forgot, it was not a blunder in the Neyer sense. Abbott strikes out and the game is over.
The other curious blunder, the manager got away with; so it gets hidden. Game Five of the 1996 Series, the Yankees lead 1-0 and are batting in the top of the ninth; the Series is tied 2-all. With runners on first & third and two outs, with Joe Girardi, Tim Raines, and Wade Boggs of all people on the bench, Joe Torre lets Andy Pettitte bat. Pettitte is promptly out and the rally folds. Of course, Torre wants Pettitte to pitch the ninth. But he will eventually bring in John Wetteland anyway (after Pettitte gives up a leadoff double to Chipper Jones). I am still shaking my head, because this did require premeditation. And Torre not only got away with it but thereby took command of the World Series.
Classic Tolaxor.
Good to know. Can't trust a baseball fan that doesn't drink beer!
The debate about Pedro in Boston from 02-04 was pretty simple: is Pedro a great pitcher because of his great ERA, or is he a big pansy because he can't go deep into ballgames? The debate was predicated directly and consciously on a belief that Pedro should not pitch deep into his pitch count. Everyone knew all about pitch counts and late-inning fatigue, those topics were in constant discussion on talk radio.
To suggest that this is some after-the-fact concern simply does not fit with the situation, the context in Boston at the time of the ALCS and before the ALCS.
I believe that Pedro, generally, will be less effective deep into his pitch count, but I suggest that the way baseball is played does not provide us with a sample that would allow us to make the case statistically.
The problem in the 2003 ALCS was observational, scouty. It was that Pedro couldn't locate his fastball or get the right movement on his curve or change.
Against a then still immortal-in-the-playoffs Rivera. Agreed, huge blunder. As was letting Leiter throw 600 pitches in game 5.
I just don't see how you can say that. Long before Gedman did anything wrong, long before Stanley did anything wrong, long before McNamara's decision to leave Buckner in the game tempted fate, these things happened:
Carter singled to left.
Mitchell singled to center.
Knight singled to center.
You've got two outs in the 10th, nobody on, and a two run lead, and you can't retire any of the next three batters??? I'm sorry, but in that scenario, you've got to get a heck of a lot of the blame! And it's not like Schiraldi takes it all; McNamara gets a bunch, Stanley and Gedman take a slice, and Lord knows the name almost everyone remembers first and foremost is Billy Buck. I'd say Schiraldi gets pretty much exactly the right amount of the blame; if anything, you could say history's let him off a bit easy.
Here's a few:
-Cone for Hearn
-Dye for Perez
-Chuck Knoblauch
-Letting David Howard appear in 143 games and bat over 400 times in 1996
-Letting Bob Hamelin go
-Firing Hal McRae
-Hiring Bob Boone
-Hiring Tony Muser
-Waiting too long to fire Tony Muser
And the funny thing about that is, if the story is to be believed, Davey Johnson called for Mitchell to pinch-hit, and somebody had to go searching for him in the locker room, and found him there, of course, not wearing any pants. (Let's not ask why, shall we?) So Mitchell hastily pulls on his pants, no time to bother with, you know, cup or jock strap or any of that nonsense, and goes up there commando style and laces a base hit, and then still dangling in the breeze as it were, comes around to score.
-Charlie Leibrandt for Gerald Perry
-Danny Jackson for Kurt Stillwell
-Bud Black for Pat Tabler
-Bret Saberhagen for Sleepy Kevin McReynolds, Gregg Jeffries, and Keith Miller
-Protecting David Howard over Jeff Conine in the 1993 expansion draft
-David Cone for Chris Stynes and reck
-Firing Hal McRae, firing John Wathan, hiring Bob Boone, hiring Tony Muser
I'll give them a pass on Cone the first time around because he had pretty bad numbers at AA (114 walks in 178 IP) and AAA (93 walks in 158 IP) before getting traded and the team wasn't exactly hurting for pitching.
He had no chance of retiring Carter. We Canadians think of Carter as something like Chuck Norris or Jack Bauer -- he was not going to make the final out of the World Series.
Maybe not, but he made the last meaningful out of the Mets' dramatic losing pennant race against the Cardinals the year before. After the Mets beat St. Louis two in a row to close within 1 game with four to play, they faced St. Louis one more time with a chance to either tie, or fall 2 back with 3 to go. They lost, 4-3 (even though Hernandez went 5-5) on October 3rd. Carter made the final out on a fly ball to right. The Cardinals clinched the division two days later.
Just sayin'.
Cone getting traded in 1995 was just awful. Completely awful. We didn't get a single worthwhile player for a Cy Young winner!
As for Jefferies, trading him away for Felix Jose was probably also a mistake, although Jefferies was probably due to get traded.
I think the Royals got Chico Lind in a minor deal too
That's a big blunder. I guess you can never have enough third string catchers.
As much as it pains me, I love that story. With Don Baylor on the bench, Buckner never should have been in there against Bobby Ojeda (the Game 6 starter) and most certainly should not have been allowed to face Jesse Orosco with the bases full in the 8th.
Amos Otis and Fred Patek for Joe Foy*
John Mayberry for Jim York and Lance Clemons
Hal McRae for Roger Nelson and Richie Scheinblum
Darrell Porter and Jim Colborn for Jim Wholford, Jamie Quirk, and Bob McClure
Cookie Rojas for Fred Rico
* Bob Johnson came in the Otis trade. The Royals later traded him for Patek.
OK, I realize all of those transactions were 30+ years ago, but the scales had to be balanced sometime, no?
1. Letting Gorman Thomas play centerfield in the '82 WS.
2. Firing Harry Dalton in 1990.
3. Not standing up to Gary Sheffield (see #2).
4. Letting Paul Molitor go.
5. Leaving Pete Vuckovich in for 160 pitches vs. Boston in September '82.
That's it. They've made only 5 blunders in 36 years.
Oh wait:
6. Bringing Nick Neugebauer up for no apparent reason in 2001.
7. Eldred and Valentin for Navarro and Snyder.
8. Antone Williamson.
9. Chad Green.
Jeffrey Hammonds doesn't count. At that point, it made no discernible difference one way or the other.
And their alternative was who? Marshall Edwards? Charlie Moore?
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