The Book on the Book
When I am away from home without family, as I have been
since the end of April, I typically have a lot of time to catch up on my
reading. On this trip, I've managed to read a couple of books of interest to
the Baseball Think Factory community, one of which was Bill Felber's version of
the Pete Palmer/John Thorn classic The Hidden Game of Baseball. As
Felber acknowledges, it was Thorn who encouraged him to proceed with the
project, and Palmer (along with Gary Gillette) who advised him throughout the
project. While The Book on the Book: A Landmark Inquiry into Which
Strategies in the Modern Game Actually Work is not exactly a sequel or
update to Hidden Game, it's in the same vein. Felber's intent up front
is quite clear, as stated in the Preface to Part I:
...today we often do have the tools to determine which
strategies work and which don't. We can tell through computer analyses
precisely how frequently a stolen base must be successful in order to help to
offense. We can develop statistical models to determine exactly how much money
is too much to pay Alex Rodriguez. We can determine exactly - if only in
retrospect - how large a budget any team must have in order to be competitive
in the pennant race. In other words, we can gauge what works and what doesn't.
Felber goes on to apply analytical methods to a number of
questions of interest to baseball fans, including many well-known (and
often-discussed) topics. These include:
- How much better is it for a pitcher to be ahead in the
count rather than behind in the count?
- How useful are the stolen base, sacrifice, and intentional
walk?
- When should a tiring starter be pulled?
- Is modern bullpen strategy optimal?
- What is the best approach to team-building? Should teams
focus on hitters or pitchers, or follow a balance approach?
- Are payroll disparities really hindering competitive
balance? How much money does a team really need in order to be
competitive?
- What is the "true worth" of a player, in terms
of his salary? Is A-Rod really overpaid?
- How do you evaluate a GM's performance?
- What do "park effects" really mean, and how
should you account for them?
Felber does a pretty good job of framing the questions to be
addressed and in describing the approaches that he takes to address them. Even
though he is not a "stat geek" - he relied heavily on Palmer,
Gillette, and his sister, an actuary, to help him with the analysis - he
demonstrates an intuitive grasp of the methods that he is using, enough so that
he asks the right questions much of the time. (For example, in discussing Win
Shares, he asks the logical question "Shouldn't we have Loss
Shares?")
The chapters on assessing the relationship between payroll
and team performance and on establishing the worth of a player are the best
part of the book, as Felber goes against the sabermetric grain, to some extent
- but with a well-grounded analytical approach showing that payroll
"does" relate fairly strongly to team performance, that teams with
lower payrolls are operating at a disadvantage, and that in general players
"are" paid commensurate with performance. Felber is not wedded to a
pre-defined answer to a question, but honestly tries to follow the method
wherever it leads him. Felber's chapter on managers is also very good - he
focuses on three commonly used strategies (SH, hit-and-run, straight steals)
and evaluates the managers based on how well they deploy those strategies and
how often those strategies succeed.
Unfortunately - perhaps because Felber is not well-versed in
statistical analysis himself - he doesn't dig very deeply into the questions
that he's trying to answer, and his conclusions are often overstated as a
result. In evaluating team-building strategies, for example, Felber uses
payroll as the basis for his analysis - he looked at what the average team
spent on various areas of the team, for example just under 40% of payroll on
pitching - and then characterized teams based on what they spent in those areas
- a team that spent more than about 49% of its payroll on pitching was a
pitching-oriented team, where a team that spent more than about 34.5% of its
payroll on its five starters but less than about 49% of its payroll on all
pitching was considered to be a rotation-oriented team - and concluded based on
won-lost record that teams that the most successful teams were those that
concentrated their resources into both their rotation and their overall
pitching. The problem with this analysis is that payroll resources and talent
aren’t perfectly related - payroll is also a function of service time as well
as talent - and the fact that the payroll was pitching-heavy doesn't mean that
the team was "emphasizing" pitching, as Felber puts it. I had similar
questions about Felber's analysis of closers (which is not terribly dissimilar
from the discussions we've had on this Web site) and starting pitchers. It's
not so much that the analysis itself is flawed as that it doesn’t go far
enough, and Felber doesn’t realize that it doesn't go far enough.
The Book on the Book does raise a number of
interesting questions, and Felber does strive to answer them as best as he can.
While he clearly doesn't answer them fully, and in some cases inadequately (and
I'm sure many people here can and will point out other areas that Felber could
have addressed more fully), I think on balance The Book is a worthwhile
read, if for no other reason that to get people thinking about some of the
unanswered questions that Felber leaves behind.
Mike Emeigh
Posted: July 15, 2005 at 01:39 PM |
4 comment(s)
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In his chapter on hitting in different pitch counts, he doesn't seem to understand that you have to look at the results of all the at-bats that "pass through" the count you are interested in (say, 0-1 or 1-0). Not just the results of the at-bats that end on that count.
This is obvious in his comments about walks -- he says some things about how his analysis is a little sketchy around the 3-ball counts, because he can't fully adjust for walks, and all walks obviously come on a 3-ball count. But he doesn't seem to extend this thinking to strikeouts. Obviously all strikeouts have to come on 2-strike counts, but he ignores this fact and just concludes that the 2nd strike is the most important pitch.
This seems to me not an area where he didn't dig deep enough, but just missed the point. It's not like I'm that much smarter, I just read this idea (looking at all at-bats that pass through a certain count) by reading someone else.
But what really got me was early in the first chapter, when he says that Sammy Sosa could prevent umpteen runs by catching the ball with two hands because of the time it would save him when throwing runners out. First of all, players catch the ball with just the glove because it's easier -- the other hand would just get in the way and cause more errors. I've basically never seen a ball pop out of someone's glove on a routine fly ball, which is what catching the ball with two hands is supposed to prevent. But moreover, I don't see how catching the ball with two hands will decrease the time it takes to throw the ball into the infield. To properly throw the ball, the outfielder is going to have to bring the ball all the back behind his head & body. The transition from catching the ball to cocking his arm is done in one motion, so having the other hand already near the glove isn't going to save you any time.
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