Grant forcing Lee to surrender in 11 months is in my opinion a quick defeat. Grant did maneuver Lee into an untenable position, though much of the maneuvering was sanguinous.

I love Grant's biography. I think it is the best thing any president ever wrote besides the non-biographical writings of Jefferson and Lincoln. His turns of phrase are terse yet descriptive. For instance, when a battle occurred where the Union forces were severely beaten, he would say that the unit had been "roughly handled".

Grant forcing Lee to surrender in 11 months is in my opinion a quick defeat. Grant did maneuver Lee into an untenable position, though much of the maneuvering was sanguinous.

Did any opponent last 11 months when outnumbered 2:1 against any of the truly great Captains? It's hard to imagine Napoleon, or Frederick the Great, or von Moltke having a 2:1 (and growing) manpower edge, and taking 11 months to finish off their opponent.

Not that Grant was bad, he was good, but Lee was very good. Neither was great.

Alexander the Great was almost always outnumbered in his battles and yet won every time and executed a few complete routs.

Grant was indeed great, the greatest general of that or perhaps any other war. I don't know any serious expert of military history, foreign or domestic, that does not think so, save a handful of southerners with an axe to grind. He proved it over and over, at Ft. Donelson, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and finally, Appomattox. Grant is the greatest general this country has ever produced. He was outnumbered at Ft. Donelson, and practically speaking the initial parts of the sieges of Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Everyone talks about Vicksburg but what he accomplished at Chattanooga was equally astonishing, given the natural terrain and initiative advantages the enemy had.

Grant better then any other US general? I don't know if I can agree with that, but in absence of concrete evidence I cannot argue otherwise.
Off the top of my head though, I would put Patton up there, and can we count Admirals? Nimitz was pretty solid as well

Alexander the Great was almost always outnumbered in his battles and yet won every time and executed a few complete routs.

If the pt. is to show that Lee wasnt great, you probably could not have picked a worse analogy. It is way off in terms of the era; the amount of political power that they respectively had; the types of armies they were facing; the logistical and political resources at the disposal of Alexander, etc. It is way off as an analogy. You would make a better argument by finding commanders at least within a few hundred years...

Grant was indeed great, the greatest general of that or perhaps any other war. I don't know any serious expert of military history, foreign or domestic, that does not think so, save a handful of southerners with an axe to grind

I dont believe that is true. I think among west point educated officers, Lee is thought to be the best commander in US history. You could also offer up Winfield Scott and Geo. S Patton.

Grant was just a master of attrition tactics, and that's not strategy.

Among the Civil War and military experts I have known the consensus best general of the war was Nathan Bedford Forrest.

If the pt. is to show that Lee wasn't great, you probably could not have picked a worse analogy.

Snapper asked for an example so I gave him one. There was no intention to make a comparison to Lee.

Grant was just a master of attrition tactics, and that's not strategy.

Then how do you explain Ft. Donelson, where he forced a larger force in an entrenched position inside a fort to surrender without having to fight? Or Vicksburg, were he maneuvered between 2 separate armies while crossing a large river cut off from his supply lines and forced the surrender of the more strategically important of those armies with modest losses, inflicting defeats in 5 separate battles? Or Chattanooga, when he dislodged an entire army from a far superior position while attacking uphill? Upmountain might be a better description.

And those were just campaigns we are talking about. Grant had it right in his overall strategy, which was to keep constant pressure on the enemy so that he could not use his superior interior lines to reinforce one front or the other as the need arose, like happened previously at Chickmauga, for example, where Longstreet's corp was rushed by rail to counterattack when Bragg appeared in danger of being routed. Once Grant was given the top job, the Confederacy was utterly defeated in a year. All the strategic started to fall like dominoes in rapid succession: Atlanta, Mobile, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Raleigh and Richmond. Grant was the one general in the whole affair who saw most clearly what had to be done, and then he went out and did it.

I dont believe that is true.

It's true. Review what disinterested British historians like John Keegan or JFC Fuller have to say about Grant.

Review what disinterested British historians like John Keegan or JFC Fuller have to say about Grant.

Well, if they're not interested, why should we care what their opinion is? <ducks>

Alexander the Great was almost always outnumbered in his battles and yet won every time and executed a few complete routs.

But no one is claiming that his Persian opponents were great commanders? How does a great captain winning while outnumber refute that Grant wasn't a great captain b/c he took a long time to win with a huge material advantage?

Grant was indeed great, the greatest general of that or perhaps any other war. I don't know any serious expert of military history, foreign or domestic, that does not think so, save a handful of southerners with an axe to grind. He proved it over and over, at Ft. Donelson, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and finally, Appomattox. Grant is the greatest general this country has ever produced. He was outnumbered at Ft. Donelson, and practically speaking the initial parts of the sieges of Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Everyone talks about Vicksburg but what he accomplished at Chattanooga was equally astonishing, given the natural terrain and initiative advantages the enemy had.

That's crazy talk. He was quite good, but no one ranks him as an all-time "Great Captain".

Just among Americans, I'd have him clearly behind Patton, and Washington. Don't know how you count Eisenhower (never actually commanded troops in battle) but he has to get some consideration. I'd also take Lee and MacArthur over Grant.

To me, no great commander ever thinks a frontal assault, without diversion or flanking, is a good idea. Whenever you think attrition is the answer, you should think again. The fact that Grant resorted to this shows he wasn't great. With a 2:1 advantage, a great commander should have been able to manuever Lee into an untenable position in short order.

Not to mention that Grant didn't even need to defeat Lee. With the Western Campaign won, and Sherman moving east, the CSA was finished. All he needed to do was pin Lee down, and wait for his army to collapse when cut off from resupply/recruitment.

But what he was being asked to do wasn't decisive.

I think you can argue that his raids were so effective that they ended the first Vicksburg campaign -- or at least played a major role.

For a commander of relatively small forces he carried out-sized weight in the Union plans. Grant wasn't much given to fretting what the other guy would do, but according to his biographer he worried a lot about Forrest.

So, did we ever figure out who Geroge McClellan was? Jack Morris? Both neither great nor terrible. Both needed lots of run support for their wins. Both had great mustaches and were on a ballot during an election competing with actual great candidates. Both were incessant defenders of their records in the media.

#135 As I mentioned before Brice's Crossroads is still taught as Sandhurst. It's a masterpiece of small unit tactics (Forrest was outnumbered about than 2-1, and the Union forces were better equipped) The Union lost about 2,600 (1,500 prisoners and 16 guns) of a force of 8,500 and Forrest lost 492 of about 3,200. (as usual it's a guess as to how many effectives either side had entering the battle. The 3,200 to 8,500 is the consensus as best I can tell)

In contrast to most battles of the ACW there was an effective pursuit (basically all the way back to Memphis.

Forrest got beat up pretty good by Wilson near the end.

True enough. Wilson had a huge advantage in men and material and made effective use of it. Same for Smith at Tupelo. Don't recall who broke the attack at Franklin, but not a heck of a lot went right at that battle.

He wasn't a god of war, just a very effective commander at both the tactical and strategic level.

Alexander the Great was almost always outnumbered in his battles and yet won every time and executed a few complete routs.

One of the problems with wars/battle from long ago is that the victor generally writes the history, and almost always tends to say that they won despite being outnumbered, etc etc etc., so much so you'd almost get the impression that the side with the superior numbers loses...

What Alexander had was a professional, highly trained and well equipped (for the era) Army, with a well developed and implemented tactical doctrine, and when he was outnumbered - he was outnumbered by large conscript armies that on a man for man basis were far less trained and far less well equipped- a 600 man Marine Combat battalion could make absolute mincemeat out of some random 3rd world country's 6000 man infantry division- even if the Marine commander spent the whole battle drunk and unconscious -
Alexander's main genius was strategic in continuing and building on what his father had done, in organizing, equipping and training his men, tactically he and his officer's main role was in leveraging their man to man advantage and not otherwise screwing up- the idea that he only won due to his sublime battlefield tactical genius was basically propaganda.

#152 I think you're underestimating the technological factors art play in the ACW. Huge edge for the defense. Not just the muskets, the artillery of the day was an awesome defensive weapon -- the smoothbores being essentially huge shotguns, and the rifled cannons were generally good enough to put the other side's guns out of action.

That said, Grant did produce a potential war winner with the James River campaign. I know Catton argues that it was thrown away by Smith's caution (and Butler's overall incompetence). Beaurgard was very heavily out-numbered.

You can argue that having Butler in command was on Grant, but Grant knew there was nothing to be done at the time and tried to get something by giving him the most capable subordinates he could. He regarded Smith very highly (so yeah, that part is on Grant)

Then how do you explain Ft. Donelson, where he forced a larger force in an entrenched position inside a fort to surrender without having to fight? Or Vicksburg, were he maneuvered between 2 separate armies while crossing a large river cut off from his supply lines and forced the surrender of the more strategically important of those armies with modest losses, inflicting defeats in 5 separate battles? Or Chattanooga, when he dislodged an entire army from a far superior position while attacking uphill? Upmountain might be a better description.

Not to downplay Grant's strategic excellence, but there certainly are mitigating factors to be considered here. The victory at Vicksburg belongs solely to him, and is in my estimation a brilliant piece of planning as well as improvisational tactics. However he was certainly favored by the fortuitous choice of opponents in Joe Johnston, who throughout the course of the entire war never seemed to miss an opportunity to fail to engage the Union army. And his two failed frontal assaults on the Vicksburg fortifications after maneuvering his army into place certainly were needless slaughters.

Furthermore, when it comes to Chattanooga, the shattering of Bragg's center at Missionary Ridge had little to do with Grant's plans or Thomas' command on the scene, and everything to do with the spontaneous initiative of the soldiers themselves, under fire from above, taking it upon themselves to scale the heights and rout the enemy. It's one of the most dramatic moments of the entire Civil War in part because it combined seeming impossibility (steep uphill assault) with the shock of unanticipated spontaneity. Nobody really should get credit for Missionary Ridge except the Union soldiers who climbed the heights (and perhaps Bragg for arraying his defensive artillery so poorly).

Also, lest we forget, Shiloh was a near apocalyptic-level blunder on Grant's part. He was caught asleep at the switch, his army nearly backed up against the Tennessee river, and had affirmatively neglected to dig any sort of defensive fortifications. He had literally no idea that Albert Sidney Johnston was moving to attack him in force until he was hit head-on -- he was ten miles downriver at the outset of the battle! His entire army was arguably saved by the hard fighting (and sacrifice to encirclement and capture) of Benjamin Prentiss' division at the Hornet's Nest, as well as Sherman's absorption of the initial blow. Grant recovered well as the battle went onward, but let's not pretend that there wasn't serious irresponsibility at the outset.

#152 I think you're underestimating the technological factors art play in the ACW. Huge edge for the defense. Not just the muskets, the artillery of the day was an awesome defensive weapon -- the smoothbores being essentially huge shotguns, and the rifled cannons were generally good enough to put the other side's guns out of action.

Which is why frontal assaults were so stupid. Given the inherent advantages of the defense (mostly the minie-rifle), you had to maneuver to achieve decision. Given the relative lack of density of force, and his large advantage in numbers, if Grant was a great captain, he would have maneuvered his way to victory.

The Prussians did it several times, with equally defense-favoring weaponry. The French/Piedmontese did it to the Austrians in Italy as well. There was no technilogical reason barring decisive victory in this era.

Snapper, given your (well-argued) disdain for Civil War-era frontal assaults, how much of a demerit do you think is appropriate to apply to generals who applied them? Grant is definitely guilty of more than a few (Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, etc.), but then again doesn't Pickett's Charge weigh even more heavily against Lee, given he had to have known he was working with vastly smaller manpower resources? And -- not to return to a favorite stalking horse of mine -- how the heck does one classify Missionary Ridge? A theoretically suicidal frontal assault against the center of an entrenched defensive army...that somehow, in contravention of practically every precedent in recorded military history, turned into a overwhelming victory for the attackers.

Snapper, given your (well-argued) disdain for Civil War-era frontal assaults, how much of a demerit do you think is appropriate to apply to generals who applied them? Grant is definitely guilty of more than a few (Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, etc.), but then again doesn't Pickett's Charge weigh even more heavily against Lee, given he had to have known he was working with vastly smaller manpower resources? And -- not to return to a favorite stalking horse of mine -- how the heck does one classify Missionary Ridge? A theoretically suicidal frontal assault against the center of an entrenched defensive army...that somehow, in contravention of practically every precedent in recorded military history, turned into a overwhelming victory for the attackers.

Pickett's charge is certainly a big black mark against Lee. The only logical explanation would be that he thought his flank attacks had drawn so many troops from the Union center, that the line was very weak. That tactic has certainly worked many times in history, e.g. Blenheim, and many Napoleonic battles. It also fails disasterously, Gettysburg, Waterloo, etc. In reality, I think Lee was just desperate and frustrated at that point, and should rightly be criticized heavily.

Missionary ridge was a fluke. I don't think you can take anything from it except that virtually anything is possible in the chaos of war; sometimes stupid decisions work.

Missionary ridge was a fluke. I don't think you can take anything from it except that virtually anything is possible in the chaos of war; sometimes stupid decisions work.

Again, for me the truly fascinating thing about Missionary Ridge is that it wasn't a "stupid decision," it was nobody's decision. Thomas' army moved forward of its own spontaneous accord! And it worked! Pretty much unique in American military history.

Again, for me the truly fascinating thing about Missionary Ridge is that it wasn't a "stupid decision," it was nobody's decision. Thomas' army moved forward of its own spontaneous accord! And it worked! Pretty much unique in American military history.

Yes. But if Thomas hard ordered it, it would have been stupid.

The battle of King's Mountain in the Revolution is somewhat similar. The Patriot army consisted of ~1000 "over-the-mountain" men, basically without military formation or discipline. The Loyalists positioned themselves on a heavily wooded hill, and the mountain men basically advanced independently up the slopes, and devastated the Loyalists with skirmishing tactics, and highly accurate rifle fire.

Yes. But if Thomas had ordered it, it would have been stupid.

Well, that depends. By most accounts, the real reason the Missionary Ridge assault succeeded is because of Bragg's misdeployment of his artillery and defensive entrenchments. In a world where Thomas knew about such a thing it would be have been a truly brilliant stroke. But yes, in the real world, I agree -- it would have been inconceivable for a general of George Thomas's competence to order such an assault.

Which, of course, is what underpinned Grant's famous exchange with Thomas (as recounted by Maj. Gen. Wilson): Grant quickly turned to Thomas, who stood by his side, and I heard him say angrily, "Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge?" Thomas replied, in his usual slow, quiet manner: "I don't know; I did not."

I love Thomas's laconicism. I just love it.

Given the relative lack of density of force, and his large advantage in numbers, if Grant was a great captain, he would have maneuvered his way to victory.

It's kind of funny you say this as a criticism of Grant when he did exactly what you say he should have done. He maneuvered south of the James and fixed Lee at Petersburg where he could not help the western armies when they got annihilated. The grand plan was Grant's so you have to give him partial credit for what happened out west too. While Sherman should be credited for his tactical successes, it was Grant who put him in charge and gave him his strategic objectives.

I think you don't understand how hard it was to maneuver large numbers of men in those days. Except in the rare instances where water or rail travel was available, it was and exceedingly difficult thing to do to turn the flank of a defensive position with large numbers of men on foot, when the enemy always was monitoring your movements and had shorter distance to travel to counter your new position.

Missionary ridge was a fluke.

The central attack was a fluke. But the assault on Bragg's left on Lookout Mountain had already succeeded and the flank turned when the charge up Missionary Ridge occurred. That's what panicked the Confederates as much as the frontal assault. They knew the flank had been turned because they could see Hooker's men occupying the gun positions adjacent to them and they didn't want to get trapped in a crossfire. The Union suffered less casualties than the Confederates, despite attacking uphill. Grant would have won the battle one way or the other, even if that had not occurred. It was a brilliant piece of generalship by Grant. It was Hooker's best showing of the war. Grant got Hooker's best work out of him.

Speaking of which, Grant says something interesting about Hooker in his memoir. While he admires his courage and willingness to fight, he called Hooker "a dangerous man" because in a battle where he was but one element, he tended to detach himself and operate as a separate unit, sometimes independently of the overall strategic plan.

Speaking of which, Grant says something interesting about Hooker in his memoir. While he admires his courage and willingness to fight, he called Hooker "a dangerous man" because in a battle where he was but one element, he tended to detach himself and operate as a separate unit, sometimes independently of the overall strategic plan.

I've always felt that, of all the commanders of the Army of the Potomac prior to George Meade, the only one who I could make any defense of as a battlefield general was Joe Hooker. (McClellan was a gifted organizer, but no field general.) I often wonder how Chancellorsville would have turned out in a world where Hooker hadn't gotten shellshocked by that artillery round and set back on his heels. Though I suppose that was his fatal flaw, really: Grant, Sherman, and Thomas (heck, even Rosecrans at Murfreesboro) were all far better at adjusting to unexpected hardship and duress, which in my estimation is perhaps the most important quality of a good battlefield commander.

if Grant was a great captain, he would have maneuvered his way to victory.

Assumes that which is not in evidence. Lee was in the picture too. Grant has only so many options (in part constrained by his superiors worry about Washington). The one time he seriously misjudged Grant's intentions Beauregard (and Butler and Smith) saved his bacon.

I think the decision that he doesn't get enough credit for was sending a force big (and well enough led) to crush Early's raid and not simply parry it. After that it was just a matter of time.

Worth noting that while Sherman was able to conduct a campaign primarily based on maneuver to get to Atlanta, he could get no further (and the Army of Tennessee was still a viable force until Hood threw it away). The eastern theater compressed this.

#175 I think it's telling that Sherman wanted no part of Hooker as an army commander. I think there's a strong case for regarding Hooker as a very capable corps commander (the only union commanders who I see as clearly better at that level were Thomas and Hancock. His battlefield record at the corps level is better than Sherman's to my mind, but army or army group command takes a different set of skills) who was best left at that level.

#169 Malvern Hill is an even bigger black mark. No force in the world at that time could have dislodged the union until they ran out of ammo.

The one semi-justification for cold harbor comes from a couple of actions at Spotsylvania Court House. Upton's attack on the 10th succeeded in breaking through. Lee and Ewell were able to reinforce while Upton got no support. Upton's attack was interesting on that he realized that the way units normally attacked (exchange of fire) simply didn't work, so he had his men (only 6 regiments) simply rush the Confederate works.

So Grant tried the same thing the next day with an entire corps (Hancock's). And again it nearly worked. A confederate division was nearly destroyed in the initial attack and only a desperate (the famous "Lee to the rear" attack) counter attack saved the day. Yeah, pure luck in that the artillery for the sector had been taken out of the line (in a preparation for what Lee thought was going to be more maneuvering by Grant) and the union commanders did not understand that this is why it worked so well.

In a very real sense this Confederate tactical disaster paved the way for Cold Harbor.

Just among Americans, I'd have him (Grant) clearly behind Patton, and Washington. Don't know how you count Eisenhower (never actually commanded troops in battle) but he has to get some consideration. I'd also take Lee and MacArthur over Grant.

Washington? I know he's the Father of the Country and all and he improved as the war went on but should he rank this high? He outlasted the British, but how much of that credit should go to the French or Nathaniel Greene?

I know he's the Father of the Country and all and he improved as the war went on but should he rank this high?

Well, the fact that the British, despite superior resources, wound up mostly bottled up in New York City for the bulk of the Revolution has to be laid at Washington's feet. That and holding the army together despite a government that was unwilling or unable to provide the level of support needed (both men and supplies).

-- MWE

It's true. Review what disinterested British historians like John Keegan or JFC Fuller have to say about Grant.

I agree on the judgment of Grant but would not trust Keegan's account of anything in the American Civil War. He was obviously a great historian but totally out of his element on the Civil War and his book is full of howlers. Jim McPherson--no headhunter--wrote perhaps the toughest review of his career about Keegan's book.

Some choice passages:
The analytical value of Keegan’s geostrategic framework is marred by numerous errors that will leave readers confused and misinformed. I note this with regret, for I have learned a great deal from Keegan’s writings. But he is not at top form in this book....
But Keegan’s grasp of river geography and other terrain features is shaky. He confuses the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers, seems to place the Confederate forts Henry and Donelson on the wrong rivers, has the Kanawha River join the Monongahela River at Pittsburgh to form the Ohio River (it is the Allegheny River that joins the Monongahela, while the Kanawha empties into the Ohio 150 miles southwest of Pittsburgh) and shifts the state of Tennessee northward, where he says it “gives on to” Illinois, Indiana and Ohio. The Confederates did not abandon their strong point on Island No. 10 on the Mississippi River; Union forces surrounded and captured it with its 5,000 defenders. Tunnel Hill at Chattanooga is not a feature of Lookout Mountain, and the battle of Cedar Mountain did not take place in the Blue Ridge.

There are many other errors in the text, perhaps foreshadowed by wrong dates for a half-dozen battles on the map at the beginning of the book. North Carolina did not escape Union invasion until almost “the end of the war” (it was first invaded in February 1862); the old canard that some Union soldiers were bayoneted in their blankets at Shiloh is simply not true; at least 10 percent of United States soldiers in 1865 were black, not 3 percent; the British government recognized the Confederacy’s belligerent status under international law in May 1861, not 1863; and so on.

These and similar mistakes can perhaps be attributed to carelessness, but others seem inexplicable. Keegan declares that Lincoln “never learnt the importance of visiting armies in the field, from which he might have discovered a great deal,” apparently unaware that Lincoln visited armies in the field 11 times, spending 42 days in their camps. Describing the role of the United States Navy in the Civil War, Keegan makes the astonishing claim that at the outbreak of the conflict “almost all” of its “antiquated” warships were sailing vessels and that “none had been launched later than 1822.” In fact, 57 of the Navy’s ships had been launched since 1822, and 23 of them were steamships, including six screw frigates launched in the 1850s that were as advanced as any ships of their class in the world. And what is one to make of the statement by Keegan, a native Englishman, that the British prime minister during the American Civil War was Benjamin Disraeli? (It was Viscount Henry Palmerston.)

Keegan’s sympathies lie with the Union cause in the war, and he considers Lincoln a better commander in chief than Jefferson Davis. Like Grant and Sherman, Lincoln “abandoned altogether the conventional thought that the capture of the enemy’s capital would bring victory. Instead he now correctly perceived that it was only the destruction of the South’s main army that would defeat the Confederacy.” But Keegan shares a widespread misconception about Lincoln’s most eloquent expression of the war’s meaning. “The genius” of the Gettysburg Address, he writes, “lies less in his magnificent words than in his refusing to differentiate between the sacrifice of the North and the South.” This assertion could not be more wrong. The soldiers who “gave the last full measure of devotion” at Gettysburg so that the “nation might live” were Union soldiers. No Confederates were buried in the cemetery that Lincoln dedicated; they fought to break up the nation that the “brave men” whom Lincoln honored fought to preserve. Far from refusing to differentiate between the sacrifice of the North and the South, Lincoln made the most profound differentiation.

I agree on the judgment of Grant but would not trust Keegan's account of anything in the American Civil War

While I acknowledge your point, I wouldn't take it that far. I read the same book that McPerson reviews above and I was very disappointed as well. But I think Keegan is highly competent to rate commanders on their battlefield performance asnd leadership styles, especially Grant. In fact, in The Mask of Command, he describes in detail the leadership style of Alexander the Great, Wellington and Grant, using Hitler as a negative counterpoint. That book got very good reviews.

I think Keegan had just gotten too old. It was published when he was 75 years old and perhaps was not up to the task physically. He died 3 years later.

It's funny. I read another book about the comparison of Britain and America from just before the revolution until the present by another British historian (I can't remember the name of it but it was written by a woman with an Irish surname). I swear the British are constitutionally incapable of being complimentary towards the American navy, especially in comparison to their own. This historian suggests that the US did not catch up to the British militarily until WWII.

Washington? I know he's the Father of the Country and all and he improved as the war went on but should he rank this high? He outlasted the British, but how much of that credit should go to the French or Nathaniel Greene?

Well, the fact that the British, despite superior resources, wound up mostly bottled up in New York City for the bulk of the Revolution has to be laid at Washington's feet. That and holding the army together despite a government that was unwilling or unable to provide the level of support needed (both men and supplies).

-- MWE

In addition, the occupation of Dorchester heights, leading to the recapture of Boston was a masterpiece. He extricated his army from numerous dangerous spots, and led a brilliant campaign at Yorktown, relocating his army across half the country w/o the British in NY stirring.

Mike understates the odds Washington faced. Britain was the most powerful nation in the world, with a highly professional military. Washington had to create an army on the fly, and he did it, and won.

Greene should get a lot of credit though. It was his idea to move the cannons over the Berkshires to Boston. Washington was a great leader but an inexperienced tactician. He made a lot of mistakes, lost a lot of battles, but he learned from them too.

Ah, I remember now. The book I reference above is Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning by Kathleen Burk. Here's a review.

I swear the British are constitutionally incapable of being complimentary towards the American navy, especially in comparison to their own. This historian suggests that the US did not catch up to the British militarily until WWII.

I can see that. The Royal Navy owned the sesa and the United States never really did a large military build up until WWII. Though the size of the US Army was formidable immediately after the Civil War it would not be able to go anywhere easily since the RN would stop it from leaving the US and inhibit supply efforts.

I can't recommend most of John Keegan's works enough (particularly The Face Of Battle, The Mask Of Command and especially for anyone who wants to introduce themselves either to John Keegan or military history in general, A History Of Warfare), but I have to admit that McPherson's review there is really disappointing. I hope it was simply a product of age affecting Keegan's writing, because the flaws McPherson points out are all quite obvious and indeed not mere quibbles.

Too bad RETARDO isn't around much these days to chime in on it.

My instinct is to be reticent nowadays, but you asked for it, Gary.

I don't care for military history in general and I'm suspicious of those who make a point to specialize in it. And I hate Civil War discussions because they are an energy-draining vortex of reaction and overinvested identity politics -- the latter already being exhibited in this thread -- in which the historian types are even more parched and dispassionate (as a way to avoid responsibility, IMO) than usual, the conservatives are even more cartoonish dead-enders than usual, while my natural allies (liberals) are absolutely batshit insane.

An evicted Palestinian watches an Israeli government-owned Cat dozer annihilate the olive grove his family has owned and nurtured for generations. This victim of ethnic cleansing, driven to homicidal rage against invaders, a modern American liberal can understand, even sympathize with. An Iraqi peasant whose home has been leveled by American ordnance, perhaps with his family inside it, driven to violence against invaders, a modern American liberal can understand, even sympathize with. But the average, non-slave holding Southerner in the 1860s who shot a Yankee invader? No sympathy, just hatred. Why? Because even though the typical Confederate soldier owned no slaves and probably disliked or even hated the slaveholding aristocracy, he was probably personally racist (nevermind that so was the typical Northerner) and moreover associated with a racist system and government. To the modern American liberal, literally nothing is worse than bigotry. Liberals are squeamish, often even outright disapproving of controversially brutal American actions against such legitimately reprehensible enemies as Nazi Germany (Dresden) and Imperial Japan (Hiroshima, Nagasaki). And post 9/11, genocidal sentiments uttered by the mouth-breathing conservatives in this country were rightly opposed by liberals. But speak of Sherman's total war and march to the sea, which was basically as close to a blanket fire-bombing of Georgia as 1860s technology would allow, and watch liberals become retroactive neocon war-cheerleaders, fapping to the idea of righteous carnage every bit as much Bill Kristol and David Nieporent contemplating the nuking of Mecca. Point out that the correspondence of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan included the explicit language of genocide and watch liberals say, "yay, moar plz!" Make the case that the genocidal actions and policies of Sherman and Sheridan and under an approving President Grant toward the Plains Indians in the postbellum period was a logical and inevitable extension of what was said and done to the South prior and watch liberals' blank stare. And don't get me started on liberals' attitude to Reconstruction, which was never corrupt or punitive enough to suit them, never mind that the inexplicably hated Andrew Johnson correctly attempted to implement Abraham Lincoln's relatively conciliatory plans for reintegration (in their own, subconscious way, liberals hate Lincoln every bit as much as do Lost Cause conservatives). Also note how quickly liberals embrace such traditionally rightwing tropes as "loyalty," adopting a More American Than Thou posture that would make Joe McCarthy and A. Mitchell Palmer proud. It's all worth it because Southerners were racist. If a liberal had a gun with two bullets and was locked in a room with Hitler, bin Laden, and confederate soldier, he'd shoot Shelby Foote twice, sic semper Footenus.

187, If your smart, you shoot hitler wait for the reb to kill bin laden and shoot him last, that way your the only one left. And well an ironic post number to have in this thread considering how it ended!

Nothing is more "classic RETARDO" about #187 as the casual conflation of Bill Kristol with David Nieporent.

[golf claps]

EDIT: Actually, I want to point out that the rest of that post was pretty damn well dead-on.

But speak of Sherman's total war and march to the sea, which was basically as close to a blanket fire-bombing of Georgia as 1860s technology would allow

This is incorrect. Civilians weren't killed in Sherman's March To the Sea. Property was taken or destroyed and the slaves freed but civilians weren't killed except in the few instances where an individual soldier disobeyed orders and committed an atrocity.

This is incorrect. Civilians weren't killed in Sherman's March To the Sea. Property was taken or destroyed and the slaves freed but civilians weren't killed except in the few instances where an individual soldier disobeyed orders and committed an atrocity.

Concur. Sherman was punctillious not to harm civilians. He was a very moral man. I've never read of anything even resembling a war crime perpetrated at Sherman's orders.

Even the New Georgia Encyclopedia admits

Physical attacks on white civilians were few

This historian suggests that the US did not catch up to the British militarily until WWII.

Which is quite possibly accurate- in fact despite passing the UK in population size and industrial might- before WWI, we were never as strong as them militarily until after our entry into WWII, when we completely blew past them and never looked back.

After WWI our frontline Naval strength moved into rough parity with the UK's, but they had far more Naval reserves, they maintained a larger standing army (even though theirs was quite small by European powers), and a larger Air Force.

Among industrially advanced nations our military was miniscule compared to our population and resources

Re: post#122

It appears that you have attributed a quote to Shelby Foote when the New York Times article in question was actually by Shelby Steele.

even if the Marine commander spent the whole battle drunk and unconscious

Which brings us back to the ACW and a major lost opportunity. James Ledlie is widely reported to have been drunk at the Crater. Certainly he was out of contact with his division and the failure to take advantage of the Crater is largely on Ledlie.

And on Burnside for giving Ledlie (by simple drawing of lots, rather than his selecting the guy he felt was most able) such a key role (and not making sure Ledlie was on the job during the battle)

And it's sort of on Grant for giving the job to Burnside (though it would have been awkward not to give Burnside the job. His people came up with the idea. He backed it. He had the troops with the mining expertise)

War is all hell.

Have any of you read John Fabian Witt's Lincoln's Code? It should be called Lieber's Code, but it's a very well-written and intellectually serious grappling with the development of the laws of war in the Civil War and the complex relationship between laws of war and aggressive policies toward civilians.

Concur. Sherman was punctillious not to harm civilians. He was a very moral man. I've never read of anything even resembling a war crime perpetrated at Sherman's orders.

Southerners hated and still hate Sherman for one simple reason- he beat the living snot out of them- I saw a program awhile back where a fellow has been collecting oral histories of the Civil War- and the number of families who claim to have been personally affected by Sherman is astounding, you know they were told by Gramps who was told by his Gramps that Sherman burned down the family farm type of thing... the trouble is that when he was able to track down details, where the family homestead was and when, 99% of the time the family oral "history" is simply false- the family property was no where near where Sherman was. or they didn't move into the area until after the ACW, etc etc., but generation after generation has been telling and retelling and embellishing these tales...

and folks tend to get really hostile if told they may be mistaken...

but anyway, south of Mason-Dixon Sherm has been on the receiving end of a generations long unrelenting defamation campaign- to the extent that in many quarters the mere idea that he might not have been history's worst war criminal is regarded the way Holocaust Denialism is regarded by the descendants of Shoah survivors

197, so then my idea won't fly for having Henry Louis Gates sit down with the descendents and track down whether Sherman's army destroyed the family farm or not?

but anyway, south of Mason-Dixon Sherm has been on the receiving end of a generations long unrelenting defamation campaign- to the extent that in many quarters the mere idea that he might not have been history's worst war criminal is regarded the way Holocaust Denialism is regarded by the descendants of Shoah survivors

You mean my great-granddaddy's cousin's brother's best friend's sister-in-law wasn't turned into a lampshade for Ellen Sherman's parlor?

Just among Americans, I'd have him clearly behind Patton, and Washington. Don't know how you count Eisenhower (never actually commanded troops in battle) but he has to get some consideration. I'd also take Lee and MacArthur over Grant.

What about Pershing?