flip

and I assume all our discussion of rankings is for spot #2 behind our great Lord Petraeus?

197, so then my idea won't fly for having Henry Louis Gates sit down with the descendents and track down whether Sherman's army destroyed the family farm or not?

If it calls for George Tsoukalos accompanying him down there I'm sure the History channel execs would be intrigued

Just among Americans, I'd have him clearly behind Patton, and Washington. Don't know how you count Eisenhower (never actually commanded troops in battle) but he has to get some consideration. I'd also take Lee and MacArthur over Grant.

And Winfield Scott.

That's Giorgio, Johnny S-LF.

I have a lot of issues with Patton as a general. It wasn't just the slapping incident, though that was bad enough. I prefer Bradley over Patton. Patton was only good when he could be on the offensive, actively attacking, or planning to attack. When he couldn't, he became difficult and unpredictable.

BTW, Bradley's memoir, A Soldier's Story, is excellent. A.J. Liebling ghost wrote it and it is very well written.

I am kind of curious about why MacArthur would rate so highly. I do not know that much about him but have seen a piece or two over the years rating him very poorly. As to Patton, I seem to recall that Eisenhower pointed out that the general that commanded the army next to Patton's captured as much ground, took as may prisinors etc.. but without the headlines. Of course this could have been said long after Patton was dead.

MacArthur had relatively few casualties compared to what the navy suffered in the Pacific, or what the army suffered in western Europe. And MacArthur had very good propagandists. William Manchester praises him in a couple of his books. I haven't read American Caesar but I did read Goodbye Darkness and he praises MacArthur profusely in that (curiously, since Manchester was a marine). OTOH, Nimitz got most of the difficult assignments: Guadalcanal, Guam, Saipan, Pelileu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa (mostly a navy operation).

Publ,

I've greatly enjoyed your commentary in this thread, but...

Are you going to respond to the apparently accurate accusation levied in #193 that you committed a serious miscarriage of justice towards Shelby Foote in #122 by attributing a quote to him that was made by an entirely different person? That's a pretty significant #### up, methinks.

Manchester praises MacArthur highly, and he strenuously claimed that he didn't expect to when he began work on the book. (American Caesar is very very good biography, as are Manchester's first two volumes of the Churchill biography).

MacArthur's reputation is unfortunately (but in a way certainly understandably and deservedly) tarnished by his insubordination under Truman.

(Just as an aside, though: MacArthur was insubordinate all his career, beginning with West Point as a cadet when he refused to take a final and could have been expelled, then to the occupation of Vera Cruz when he engaged in some derring-do worthy of Indiana Jones involving going into enemy territory and stealing some locomotives. Then, again in WWI, when he was the most highly decorated American officer probably and the youngest general of the Allied forces, and receiving a promotion in the war’s closing days making him the youngest divisional commander. He was the youngest Army Chief of Staff at the time (having kept up with the ages of his recent successors), and committed acts of insubordination probably at least three times (the Bonus Army thing, his dressing down of a Congressional committee, and in his cursing out President Roosevelt). He was much more independent, and even high-handed, in his theater of operations than the other supreme commanders were in theirs, and he continued to act pretty independently of his military and civil superiors in his absolute brilliant overseeing of the transformation of Japan, an achievement that nowadays he doesn't get nearly the credit he should.)

He was highly praised by historians and military professionals, even by people like George Marshall who couldn't stand him (when MacArthur was chief of staff, Marshall was a colonel playing warden and Leavenworth). I am surprised, though, that however much he may have rubbed people the wrong way, so many of these same people nevertheless thought very highly of him as a soldier and commander. Their criticism is of his character, not of his military abilities. We all know about Eisenhower's criticisms (he was furious with MacArthur’s actions during the Bonus Army’s Last Stand, and having served as MacArthur's chief of staff for a long time, he did say he had studied dramatics under MacArthur), so they as a whole should weigh heavily. And Eisenhower knew how to judge horse flesh, but those negative comments rest on specific events associated with DM's arrogance and vain glory. Ike was critical of his character, but he also said that the man was brilliant, a genius.

The Philippines debacle is a real black mark against MacArthur, even looking at it in a light most favorable to him. If he gave orders that his Air Force be evacuated, he should have followed-up. His retreat to Bataan and Corregidor was in the view of almost everyone simply masterful and was, and may still be, studied at West Point. But a rep for being a great commander doesn't rest on brilliant double retrograde maneuvers. He should have been better prepared. He should have acted more decisively, and as has been noted by some, had it been any other officer, that officer would have been cashiered.

But it wasn’t any other officer. It was a man, the only military man, who was a legend before WWII. And he did go on to oversee some 80-85 operations after the Philippines defeat, every one of them successful. Even that he was highly successful is held against him. Somehow it is made to seem as if he got the softer, cushier assignment. When he got to Australia, the Aussies were in complete defense mode. Their plans contemplated even ceding territory to the “Brisbane Line” to the Japanese.

He changed that right away and instilled an invigorating attack mode spirit into operations. Because Iwo and Okinawa incurred greater casualties, they are assumed to have been harder victories to win. Few seem to consider that maybe his operations incurred fewer casualties because he was a better commander, more of a finesse commander (a la Lee), than his Navy/Marine counterparts. He had superb intelligence and made superb use of it. His field commanders, the Aussie Blamey and Eichelberger and Krueger should be better known. No one has ever addressed MacArthur’s sotto voce (for him) criticism of Okinawa: why not just take the air field, establish a perimeter, and wait the Japanese out. What's with incurring all the needless casualities. Eichelberger and Krueger were first-rate field commanders, as was his air commander Kenney, and they all thought highly of MacArthur, even if he didn’t let them have much press write-up. (Eichelberger in his wonderful letters to his wife, published as Dear Miss Em, referred to many of his cohorts in code—MacArthur was Madame Sarah, I think. I doubt that the book is still in print.)

And Inchon is a masterpiece. Few operations turn a conflict 180 degrees instantaneously, but Inchon did, and it was all his baby. No one wanted any responsibility for Inchon. No one when it was first proposed wanted to do it. Not his staff, not his military superiors, not the president and his state department. Truman and Acheson sent both chiefs of the Army and the Navy, as well as the field commanders of the Marines and Air Force part, all to personally talk MacArthur out of doing Inchon. He forcefully stood his ground, and put all his considerable influence and prestige behind doing the thing or else. He ended up talking them into backing it, not least of all because he flatly told them if they didn't, they could find themselves another commander in the Far East. MacArthur was not afraid to take chances, and he always assumed his command mandate in the broadest possible terms. But he also took responsibility. He was no frigging Mark Clark. This paid off very often, but when it backfired, like with the Philippines and with the Yalu, it was a dozy. And of course he paid the ultimate price, which he deserved, but there is no need to denigrate him in other ways. A man’s fate is his character, the Greeks said. But however much we may reprove that part of his character, we should acknowledge and commend his very real achievements. When Manuel Quezon visited Truman, Truman showed him around. There was a huge portrait of MacArthur, and Truman sarcastically said (I paraphrase), and of course this is Jesus who walked on water. Quezon didn’t play up to the attempt at humor. He replied very seriously, yes, that is how our Philippine people see him, Mr. President.

Ignore the last few sentences. It couldn't have been Quezon, although Manchester does recount such a story. Too late for me to correct.

Sherman ..... was a very moral man.

Sherman to his wife: "There is a class of people, men women, and children, who must be killed..."

Sherman to General Grant: We are not fighting against enemy armies but against an enemy people; both young and old, rich and poor must feel the iron hand of war..."

Sherman possessed by the same pah-wraith that later inhabited Joseph Goebbels: "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to the extermination, men, women and children..."

Let's say you're right that Sherman didn't directly mass murder civilians in the South, an assertion I take leave to doubt. WTF makes you think a policy of destroying all food and means of basic production doesn't reflect an intention of mass murder? By this logic, Stalin was completely blameless for the Holodomor.

What is wrong with you? Just because the aggregate enemy was wrong or even evil doesn't mean you have to canonize individual monsters on the "good" team.

That's a pretty significant #### up, methinks.

It was. I lifted the quote from a blog, not using the original source because it was from the WJS, a subscriber site. I should have found some way of double-checking the source, rather than just assuming the blogger lifted the material correctly. My bad. Nevertheless, the other stuff was true, drawn from the original sources, so my point stands.

What about Pershing?

I don'y see anything special about him. He was a competent WWI geberal, but that war didn't exactly provide much room for great generalship, especially on the Western front.

The best generals of WWI tend to come from either the Eastern front (Hindenburg/Ludendorf), or secondary theatres (von Lettow Vorbeck, Allenby).

I have a lot of issues with Patton as a general. It wasn't just the slapping incident, though that was bad enough. I prefer Bradley over Patton. Patton was only good when he could be on the offensive, actively attacking, or planning to attack. When he couldn't, he became difficult and unpredictable.

BTW, Bradley's memoir, A Soldier's Story, is excellent. A.J. Liebling ghost wrote it and it is very well written.

Disgree. Patton was the only Allied general in Europe that had any flair for the attack, or daring approaches, and an actual sense of urgency (Slim and MacArthur had it in Asia). From his end run at Sicily, to the breakout at Normandy, to the offensive that relieved Bastogne, he showed he could get an army moving and take ground quickly. All the other Allied generals in Europe were basically plodders. If Montgomery had been tasked with the relief of Bastogne, he would have arrived in March of '45 with 400,000 men 2500 tanks, and 5000 guns.

The slapping incident is absolutely ridiculous. A General can order men to charge machine gun nests in suicidal assaults, but we're going to get weepy with a little slap?

Even though he acted out of anger, subsequent medical experience has shown that Patton's approach to combat fatigue was closer to being effective than the hospitlization apporach. Combat fatigue cases who are treated like they are wounded basically never recover. The military has found that the best approach is to keep the soldiers who are suffering close to the front (but not in combat) doing military activities for a few days, while they recover. If they feel like they're just getting a rest, and haven't let their comrades down (they know they're not wounded), they are much more likely to recover.

#206 Inchon is a masterpiece -- and the landing was conducted in spite of basically unanimous disapproval. MacArthur basically said fire me or the landings go forward. Similarly, the New Guinea campaign. Far more rapid and at lower cost than anybody else was likely to have achieved.

The one sour note was Biak. That was a failure of intelligence -- there were far more Japanese there than he'd been led to believe -- and a failure of command. Fuller wasn't up to the job. McA remedied both failures quickly. On Eichelberger's advice Fuller was replaced, and adequate number of troops were assigned to the job.

The Phillipines (outside of the air force disaster at Clark Field which simply can't be explained away) had everything to do with McA's belief in the pre-war plans that called for a rapid relief of the Phillipines. I wouldn't hold it against him. The pre-war plans weren't grounded in the reality of total Japanese air superiority (as well as almost toal command of the sea)

MacArthur had relatively few casualties compared to what the navy suffered in the Pacific, or what the army suffered in western Europe. And MacArthur had very good propagandists. William Manchester praises him in a couple of his books. I haven't read American Caesar but I did read Goodbye Darkness and he praises MacArthur profusely in that (curiously, since Manchester was a marine). OTOH, Nimitz got most of the difficult assignments: Guadalcanal, Guam, Saipan, Pelileu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa (mostly a navy operation).

You omit the fact that Nimitz's assignments were completely unecessary, and driven only by the desire of the USN to have a theater that was not subordinate to the Army. MacArthur was too smart to directly assault a small heavily fortified island when he could just cut it off.

MacArthur's approach through the Philippine and then Formosa would have defeated Japan without any of Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Pelileu, Iwo Jima or Okinawa being captured.

Edit: Concur with pretty much everything Morty says.

#211 Catton draws the distinction between Sherman -- who waged a tough campaign which resulted in civilian suffering -- and Sheridan in the valley. Sheridan burned pretty much everything as a matter of spite. He behaved basically the way people accused Sherman of behaving. Sherman on the other hand went precisely as far as he deemed necessary to deny resources to the rebels.

It's a fine line. I guess you could say that Sherman accepted that civilians would suffer and Sheridan intended it. One of the things worth understanding is that the worst incidents under Sheridan happened either with his orders or his acceptance, while the worst incidents in Sherman's march to the sea were by the "bummers" (the deserters and other hangers on operating in the general vicinity of the army)

#205 Bradley was a better administrator. He'd never have been able to manage the rapid relief of Bastonge etc. that Patton pulled off in the Bulge. And I'm not sure he'd have been able to exploit the breakout from Normandy as well as Patton did.

#216 Formosa would have been at least as bad as Okinawa -- probably worse. Very heavily garrisoned.

But then Formosa wouldn't be necessary to cut Japan off from Borneo (etc.)

The problem though is that while Japan was objectively defeated the moment that the landings on Luzon succeeded, they showed no interest in surrender.

Stipulating for the moment that Formosa is captured at an acceptable price, now what?

You're still looking at either an invasion of Japan or an A-bomb. (and yeah, you could base the B-29s in the Phillipines)

#206:

Some recent historians/biographers have stated that Eisenhower rather pushed in the late '40s for Patton to get the five-star rank, rather than Bradley (who seems to have gotten it because we were at war and the commander of the allied forces in Korea, MacArthur, was a five-star general of the army and it didn't look good that combined chief of staff, Bradley, was outranked by a field commander). And of course there is that deal where Eisenhower placed Bradley's command under Montgomery, something that Bradley took as an insult(perhaps rightly so). This, however, didn't budge Eisenhower. "Those are my orders." When Bradley said he wouldn't answer to the American people, Eisenhower coldly told him, a la MacArthur, you don't answer to the American people; I answer to the American people; you answer to me.

Japan still quibbled over surrender terms even after Hiroshima. It took a second bomb for them to capitulate. And then there was an element was vociferously, violently against that. Those who claim Japan was desperately trying to surrender are talking through their collective hats. Even after Nagaska, there was unrest, even riots against surrender. MacArthur, preparatory to going on the mainland for the first time walks in on his entourage and their strapping on 45s, even the generals. Got to say MacArthur handled it masterfully.

The one sour note was Biak. That was a failure of intelligence -- there were far more Japanese there than he'd been led to believe -- and a failure of command.

You can also lay much of the blame for the Yalu debacle to the failure of intelligence--and you can't lay it entirely at MacArthur's feet. He even personally (a five-star seventy-year old general) conducted a reconnaisance flight (eschewing the offer of a parachute). Unfortunately, there had been a blizzard and all traces of troop movement had been obliterated. Contrary to the anti-MacArtur mindset, howver, Truman and the State Department were kept apprised of MacArthur's intentions and said nothing. Moreover, the Chinese had been urgently telling Nehru to tell the State Department that the Yalu better not be crossed, something MacArthur knew nothing of, but the State Department wasn't talking to Nehru at the time. MacArthur had been so successful that it was scary. Within two weeks of Inchon, he had recaptured Seoul, and then here it was, he was chasing the North Koreans entirely out of Korea. His claim that the war would be over by Xmas is made fun of, but if not for the Chinese entry, it would have. It was all over but the crying. Then they took it one step too far.

Sherman to his wife: "There is a class of people, men women, and children, who must be killed..."

Sherman to General Grant: We are not fighting against enemy armies but against an enemy people; both young and old, rich and poor must feel the iron hand of war..."

Sherman possessed by the same pah-wraith that later inhabited Joseph Goebbels: "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to the extermination, men, women and children..."

Let's say you're right that Sherman didn't directly mass murder civilians in the South, an assertion I take leave to doubt. WTF makes you think a policy of destroying all food and means of basic production doesn't reflect an intention of mass murder? By this logic, Stalin was completely blameless for the Holodomor.

What is wrong with you? Just because the aggregate enemy was wrong or even evil doesn't mean you have to canonize individual monsters on the "good" team.

He talked tough, but didn't commit any war crimes. Stripping the land of food and resources was SOP for armies from time immemorial.

I also think you grossly overstate the devastation he caused. He tended not to destroy private property. There is no evidence of starvation deaths in Georgia following his march.

Sherman's march was a hell of a lot more humane, and caused a tiny fraction of the deaths of the slaughter in northern VA.

#205 Bradley was a better administrator. He'd never have been able to manage the rapid relief of Bastonge etc. that Patton pulled off in the Bulge. And I'm not sure he'd have been able to exploit the breakout from Normandy as well as Patton did.

The Bastogne relief was a pretty nifty piece of administration. Patton's staff was planning a response to a German breakthrough before it even happened.

I also think you grossly overstate the devastation he caused. He tended not to destroy private property. There is no evidence of starvation deaths in Georgia following his march.

I think Sherman's March is more or less one of the truly great military acts of American history (in that it truly broke the back of Southern popular resistance and will to fight, which was crucial), but let's not forget that while the Georgia leg of the March was, as you said, rather humane given its stated objectives (and I include Atlanta in this), the swing up through South Carolina was a good deal more brutal. Not necessarily as a matter of explicit policy, but definitely in terms of damage to private property and incidental casualties. The burning of Columbia is still a matter of controversy, though it's not like I'm shedding any tears personally.

It's also fascinating to note that, as much as Sherman's army ravaged South Carolina, they then dialed back down significantly upon crossing into North Carolina due to its popular perception as a "reluctant" Confederate state (last to secede, measurable pre-war pro-Union sentiment in the mountain west of the state).

The burning of Columbia

How could they tell?

Thanks for the responses on MacArthur.

#222 Everything I've read tells me that McA was adequately warned about crossing the Yalu. He and his staff simply discounted the threat -- and vastly underestimated the capacity of the Red Chinese.

I know the warnings he got from the troops in the line who were encountering more and more Chinese were simply discounted.

I don't doubt that there was plenty of contradictory and/or incomplete information. It's the nature of warfare. He is the guy who authorized the step too far and the consequences have to be on him.

Sherman was pretty clear that he unleashed the men on South Carolina on purpose since he blamed the coastal planters for the war. He denied the blame for Columbia, though.

The comparison of Sherman to Stalin or Goebbels falls apart pretty quickly, no? First you have to ask whether you're interested in actions or words. Sherman liked flat statements which were generally the accepted viewpoint of both sides (looks what the Confederates did when they reached Pennsylvania) but weren't supposed to be said aloud. He thought stating flatly that war is cruelty would help white Southerners think through its continuance. But his actions were pretty much banal. Taking food for armies could not be more standard. Additionally I think there's good reason that people put the rulers who deliberately kill their own defenseless citizens on a different level than people whose prosecution of a war puts hardship on the enemy's civilians.

In the West, Sherman liked wild statements but of course presided over the West in the period of a long liberal (and eventually doomed) reform effort to soften the federal government's treatment of Indians. He didn't lead or support that reform, but he didn't undermine it either. We can dislike the paternalism of that reform, but also recognize that the era was one where massacres of Indians got increased press exactly because they became more rare.

Unless you put your entire moral weight on words over acts or have a slippery slope so slipper that everything but a joust leads inevitably to total war, then there's really no way that Sherman even registers on the list of moral monsters.

The demonization of Sherman by the South is one of the great propaganda campaigns of all time, and a very peculiar one since Sherman--as he had promised at Atlanta--lobbied hard for soft treatment of the South from the moment Johnston offered to surrender through the end of Reconstruction.

I can understand why Confederates hated Sheridan or Sickles--though I personally think that once you add freedpeople's treatment to the account, they look far better than most--but the vilification of Sherman is just absurd even on Lost Cause terms.

#222 Everything I've read tells me that McA was adequately warned about crossing the Yalu. He and his staff simply discounted the threat -- and vastly underestimated the capacity of the Red Chinese.

I know the warnings he got from the troops in the line who were encountering more and more Chinese were simply discounted.

I don't doubt that there was plenty of contradictory and/or incomplete information. It's the nature of warfare. He is the guy who authorized the step too far and the consequences have to be on him.

And if they would have bombed the Yalu bridges like he wanted to, the Chinese capabilities would have been greatly reduced,

My history book reading is pretty limited, but in the The Coldest Winter, Halberstam does not have a favorable view of McArthur.

#231 Started reading that one. It's not surprising that Halberstam (and his sources) would not think kindly of McA since you're talking about events shaped by the decision to cross the Yulu (which basically threw away everything gained by Inchon)

I think it's worth considering how the various Generals might have done in other command roles.

Could MacA have succeeded in Eisenhower's job? Color me skeptical. So much of Ike's job was political. I don't see how Montgomery and MacA could have functioned together.

How about Eisenhower in the Pacific? As noted above, MacA had some pretty capable guys working for him. Eichelberger was first rate. Kruger not quite at that level in my opinion but still quite competent (Not one of MacA's favorites. Considered him slow). Barbey probably wasn't as good as Turner but still was very good. Carpender followed by Kincaid did a good job with the 7th fleet.

All that to say that I think Eisenhower could have got the job done. Maybe not as fast (since he'd have probably deferred to Krueger and Krueger was more cautious than MacA)

There is absolutely no chance that Eisenhower would have chanced Inchon. SUue he signed off on Market Garden but that more than likely made him very wary of high risk/high reward strategies. Paradoxically perhaps this might have worked out for the better. A long slog north rather than a furious pursuit makes it less likely that they'd have pushed all the way across the Yalu.

If Montgomery had been tasked with the relief of Bastogne, he would have arrived in March of '45 with 400,000 men 2500 tanks, and 5000 guns.

This reminds me of my last visit to the Imperial War Museum in London (which is... awesome). They had a special exhibit dedicated to the Paragon of Martial Virtue that was Bernard Montgomery. I found it quite hilarious.

Inchon was surely brilliant, but SOMEONE didn't believe the ground reports that there were Chinese divisions in the area (or didn't think boots on the ground could tell the difference between NKA and ChiComs)... and in the end that failure rests with high command.

MacArthur was at his best when his authority wasn't immediately and specificallyin question and his pride wasn't at stake. Keep on a lease, but a long lease--FDR understood this. Who would have thought he could have played puppeteer with such discreetness and finesse during the Japanese occupation? Yet, he most certainly did, often being content to pull the strings behind the scenes without public fanfare whatsoever.

I admit that, confronted by equals, this wouldn't have been possible in the European theater. I agree that Eisenhower was much more adaptable, personality-wise, generally. Still, things like the recessive role he played wrt Japan. He provided the scaffolding that made the new Japanese political structure possible. Once the scaffolding is gone, we are left only to wonder in awe at the structure, but it needs to be remembered that that skyscraper just didn't happen on its own.

Same thing happened on a lesser scale at other times when he acted with (perhaps) surprising finesse. The Philippines, the delivering of the city of Seoul to Rhee, the reformation and revitalizing of West Point after WWI. The Aussies in his theater had nothing like the pop the British had in the European theater, but still he had to display negotiating and diplomatic skills. He also knew how to appeal to third-world peoples, I guess one could call them. He wasn't as one-dimensional as his most partisan critics would have it. Study how FDR, Nimitz, Kenney, and Krueger (he was a much better than mediocre--and stayed in touch with MacArthur, attending his birthday every year, for instance) handled a relationship him, compared say to Truman, who was either at his feet or at his throat. He got along surprisingly well with the admirals of "his navy", especially Kinkaid and Halsey--whose fighting spirit he relished. When some were pushing for him to reprimand, even court-marshal, Halsey after Leyte Gulf, MacArhthur lased out: leave Bull along; he likes to fight and I like that.

MacArthur's approach through the Philippine and then Formosa would have defeated Japan without any of Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Pelileu, Iwo Jima or Okinawa being captured.

I don't think so. A good part of the reason that MacArthur was able to succeed was that the Japanese air arm had been more or less decimated by the Navy's push through the Central Pacific, especially in the Marianas. I think *both* paths to the home islands were needed to keep Japan off-balance.

To a similar extent, this was the Confederacy's problem in the Civil War, also - they simply had too large a defensive perimeter and not enough available manpower to guard all of the flanks, and while it took a while the Union was eventually able to take advantage of the multiple attack routes open to it.

-- MWE

This reminds me of my last visit to the Imperial War Museum in London (which is... awesome). They had a special exhibit dedicated to the Paragon of Martial Virtue that was Bernard Montgomery. I found it quite hilarious.

I was at the Household Cavalry Museum awhile back, one of the items displayed was a model of the building, with a clock permanently stuck at 4pm. It seems that back in the 19th century the Queen paid an impromptu visit to the Household Cavalry (In theory to get to Buckingham Palace you are supposed to pass through there- the Household Cavalry was essentially the UK's imperial guard)- and was SHOCKED that the fine young gentlemen were lounging around, drinking and playing cards- she decreed that henceforth they would all have to dress up in parade formation for inspection at 4pm every day for... 100 years

I'm sure that did wonders for esprit de corps...

Among other items was an armored breastplate from the 17th/18th century- with a divot right over the heart- before being issued they'd test the armor by shooting it with a musket- yep it was bullet proof... of course it weighed a ton and was wholly impracticable to maneuver in, but if your job entailed sitting on horse while on guard duty- not moving- while wearing a bright red uniform... it's a hell of a lot better than not having body armor if someone decides to use you for target practice.

I once saw one of Monty's biographers get exasperated when continually questioned about some of Monty's boasts and misstatements- no he claimed Monty did not really claim that he could take town X in Y days, well he did claim it - but he never actually planned to take town X in Y days, he merely told his superiors that in order to obtain the necessary men, supplies and material for the actual operation intended by Monty...

The Bastogne relief was a pretty nifty piece of administration. Patton's staff was planning a response to a German breakthrough before it even happened.

Let us not forget though that Bradley was the architect of the American airborne infantry capability and it was the airborne infantry who were the real heroes of Bastogne.

Interestingly, Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame is highly critical of Maxwell Taylor, and was glad that he wasn't in command when they were ordered to occupy Bastogne. He felt that Taylor was too political and not enough of a soldier, not enough of a fighter. Taylor could have parachuted in after he returned but didn't do so. Post-war, Taylor was instrumental in reorganizing the army and David Hackworth was equally critical, opining that he was trying to transform soldiers from killers to social workers.

My history book reading is pretty limited, but in the The Coldest Winter, Halberstam does not have a favorable view of McArthur.

Yes. That is my reading as well. I started but never finished it though I do remember he is critical of MacArthur and highly praiseworthy of Mathew Ridgeway.

I have a tough time finishing books on the Korean War. I just don't find it that interesting. WWII and Vietnam, yes. But not Korea for some reason.

The demonization of Sherman by the South is one of the great propaganda campaigns of all time, and a very peculiar one since Sherman--as he had promised at Atlanta--lobbied hard for soft treatment of the South from the moment Johnston offered to surrender through the end of Reconstruction.

Peculiar yet often repeated. The South has been weird about their civil war history, like the tearing down of Grant. It was Grant who won the thing so why would they be more content to lose to a lousy general than a good one?

Additionally, Sherman was nearly relieved because his terms of surrender at Durham Station were so generous to Johnston. Grant was ordered there with the intent of replacing him but rescued his friend at the last minute when The terms of surrender were changed to reflect the same terms Grant gave Lee in Virginia. Stanton was furious with Sherman, and Sherman equally furious with Stanton, and it is one of the reasons why Sherman disliked politicians so much, and why he stayed a soldier, refusing to run for any political office after the war despite his huge popularity in his native state.

When some were pushing for him to reprimand, even court-marshal, Halsey after Leyte Gulf, MacArhthur lased out: leave Bull alone; he likes to fight and I like that.

If Kurita hadn't inexplicably abandoned the plan that was actually working* (because Halsey had taken the bait) and shelled McCarthur's beachead with his Battle Group, I really kind of doubt McA would have been so forgiving- Halsey screwed up massively at Leyte- he only got bailed out - because Kurita fumbled the ball right back (to use a football analogy)


*I think the likeliest scenario for why Kurita broke off was two fold- he never actually believed in the plan in the first place- he just never believed that the decoy fleet would succeed in drawing off Halsey's battle line- and he was one of the few experienced men still drinking the pre-war koolaid regarding US fighting spirit- in his mind there was no way in hell that a bunch of USN destroyers were going to throw themselves at a line of capital ships unless they had serious back-up... So when he was charged by destroyers- he assumed they were to drop torpedoes and break up his battle line in preparation for an attack by the US battle line and/or give the US Fleet Carriers time to launch an attack wave - in fact the USN destroyer attack was pure desperation- a frantic effort to keep Kurita out of range of the beachead while they were frantically trying to get Halsey to steam back- to Kurita- a desperate non-Japanese foe doesn't attack, they run away- so while the Destroyers attacked a much larger force out of desperation- Kurita interpreted it as a sign that the decoy had failed and Halsey was right behind the destroyer screen-

In either event- whether the decoy failed or not- Kurita's JOB was to plow ahead towards McA's beach head- and he didn't he disengaged and eventually retreated- a stunning blunder

If Kurita hadn't inexplicably abandoned the plan that was actually working* (because Halsey had taken the bait) and shelled McCarthur's beachead with his Battle Group, I really kind of doubt McA would have been so forgiving- Halsey screwed up massively at Leyte- he only got bailed out - because Kurita fumbled the ball right back (to use a football analogy)

Let's not be too harsh of Kurita though. He was operating with a massive intelligence and material deficit. The Japanese navy was so low on fuel by that stage of the war that their ability to maneuver was extremely limited, they couldn't send out scout planes like the US could, and their intelligence network was weak because the local population was so hostile to them.

With that, your point is acknowledged.

Another highly recommended history of that part of WWII is Pacific War 1931-1945 by Saburo Ienaga. He's a Japanese liberal and pacifist academic who was in his twenties and thirties for the duration of hostilities and he gives his own account from that perspective. He talks about the Japanese homefront extensively, which I found very interesting.

MacArthur needed to be shown where the line was drawn. The Truman administration, including the military higher-ups, didn't do this. That was a mistake. They chose to ride the tiger of MacArthur's popularity and prestige, buying into the myth of his invulnerability, and they paid the price.

Ridgway, before going to Korea to take over 8th Army (and ultimately relieving MacArthur), recounts in his memoirs how when he was on the staff of combined Chiefs he plaintively asked them at a meeting why "we just don't tell The General to shut up and toe the line. W are his superiors, aren’t we?" He records, "A frightened silence followed my words." MacArthur most certainly would not have liked being told off in no uncertain terms where he got off, but it should have been seen as necessary, and he would have toed the line (or possibly resigned), I think. It was an obvious problem that could have been headed off at the beginning with the assertion of authority. Those who didn't assert that authority until things got out of hand cannot be given a free pass. They were all too willing to lick MacArthur’s ass as long as he was winning. When he finally got his comeuppance, suddenly everyone was claiming ain't nobody here but us chickens. Or, if you prefer, pretend self-righteously that they never supported MacArthur ever anyway.

The War Museum in London is awesome. The French War Museum is also pretty cool (attached to Napoleon's tomb). I love the explanation of French involvement in WWII.

I love the explanation of French involvement in WWII.

Can you elaborate?

In either event- whether the decoy failed or not- Kurita's JOB was to plow ahead towards McA's beach head- and he didn't he disengaged and eventually retreated- a stunning blunder

One of the most inexplicable battlefield decisions in the history of warfare. Makes Pickett's charge look like pure genius by comparison. Kurita was like a guy folding on the river to save his last chip because he thinks his 2 pair isn't good enough. Yeah, maybe it isn't good enough, and even if you do win the pot you've got a long way to go, but what the hell good is that last chip if you fold? His comrades sacrificed everything to get him precisely where he was. Yes he also took big losses, but what the hell was he saving the remainder of the fleet for? To fight another day? That day was never going to come.

I love the explanation of French involvement in WWII.



Can you elaborate?

Their strategic surrender made Hitler overconfident and paved the way for later Allied victories.

MacArthur most certainly would not have liked being told off in no uncertain terms where he got off

The funny part was that McA had approximately zero respect for Truman- until Truman fired him...

McA tolerated people standing up to him a lot better than the toadies ever seemed to realize

My favorite McA anecdote- during the occupation, a female member of his staff slips a gender equality passage int the draft Japanese Constitution- a delegation of Japanese officials later comes to McA- specifically to complain about that passage... McA reads it, shrugs, it stays in.

Their strategic surrender made Hitler overconfident and paved the way for later Allied victories.

There's a slight kernel of truth to this- the part about their surrender making Hitler overconfident- as far as that surrender being "strategic" or part of some long con... what's the French word for delusional?

I resent this "World War II generals" hijacking of my original "Civil War generals" hijacking of a thread about the Royals' GM decisionmaking style.

[j/k]