Dayton Moore is trying to avoid being McClellan. He’s got the farm system built up, the army trained and organized. He’s good at that. Now he’s taking the field of battle and deploying those forces. That’s admirable.Of course, what’s the next part of the story? Is Moore going to turn into an aggressive, brilliant field commander like Ulysses S. Grant or William Tecumseh Sherman? Will he be cautious but effective like George Gordon Meade? Mercurial and erratic like Joe Hooker? Or will he be the well-meaning but dangerously inept Ambrose Burnside? The suicidally aggressive John Bell Hood?
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< 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 > Last ›Wow I figured the translation would be a little better.
I don't think so. A good part of the reason that MacArthur was able to succeed was that the Japanese air arm had been more or less decimated by the Navy's push through the Central Pacific, especially in the Marianas. I think *both* paths to the home islands were needed to keep Japan off-balance.
Completely disagree.
By mid-1943, the US superiority in naval forces was so great, they could go anywhere they wanted to.
Give MacArthur Nimitz's carriers, and he destroys the Japanese navy in the SW Pacific. US material superiority was so great, that landing on defended islands just gave the Japanes the chance to inflict casualties they couldn't otherwise inflict.
Except that airborne infantry basically proved to be an expensive failure throughout the war. Throwing away elite infantrymen by putting them behind enemy lines, lightly equipped, makes no sense.
The U.S. Army would have been far stronger if those 20,000 elite infantrymen were dispersed as platoon and squad leaders among the leg infantry divisions.
The did perform a very important role in the D-Day landings. And it would have been a vital role if the Germans had attempted an immediate serious counterattack. Tedder predicted 70+% casualties and one of the few times he ever admitted he was wrong was in this case. (He was overjoyed to have been wrong)
And he's not the only one so targeted. A visit to the Confederate Memorial Hall Museum in New Orleans reveals a surprising amount of over-the-top misinformation utterly demonizing Benjamin Butler. There were good reasons why he had to initiate drastic measures against NOLA residents while serving as military governor. When your soldiers are being shot at and having toilet waste dumped on them, the local newspapers are attempting to stir up trouble, and locals are trying to tear down the flag of their occupiers, it's not surprising he cracked down hard.
Some things were odd about the Civil War- women were literally off limits as far as both sides were concerned - in a way that had never really been observed before and certainly not since- hell even Quantrill's raiders (more terrorists than soldiers) left the women folk alone while they slaughtered 150 or so men and boys in Lawrence
In New Orleans the "upper class" women (who were really really off limits) had basically begun a campaign of harassment against the Union Army, slapping, spitting, dumping buckets of urine out of windows (now is that any way for a lady to act?) - and it may seem incredible to us today- but the soldiers subjected to that were doing NOTHING in retaliation.
Declaring that women engaging in such conduct were officially "not ladies," was a way of telling solders that if someone did something to you- you CAN do something yourself - and instantly much of the behavior vanished.
Basically it's the start of the South's attempts to systematically re-write history but they haven't settled on a final version yet.
No doubt they were excellent light infantry. The issue is that light infantry isn't that useful. They would have been much more useful if they were the 82nd and 101st Infantry Divisions (Motorized).
According to Alexander Haig (who personally saw some of those Chinese) they were dismissed as ill equipped volunteers of no military consequence.
Basically if the battles were fought the way the Southern revisionists said they were, if the Southern Generals were as good and Northern Generals as bad, if Southern esprit de corp/patriotism as high, Northern as low, if blacks really didn't mind being slaves and did not begin abandoning their masters en masse as soon as physically able to do so...
If things were the way these scholars and writers insisted, the South would have won the war.
But, the South didn't win, they lost, and it may have taken 4 years, but they were crushed pretty badly by the end.
I once saw a talk given by Kenneth Pollack, he mentioned how at one lecture he gave a "Middle Eastern gentleman" disputed literally every single point Pollack had to say, finally he said at the end, he asked the man if he disputed the fact that Israel had won in 1948 and 1967 and 1973, the man said no, so he asked him how did he explain such losses, the man was silent, he had no answers.
For much of the South, pre-ACW, losing to the North was literally inconceivable, there world view simply could not grasp such outcome as possible- let alone likely-
then they lost, and in trying to analyse, come to grips with such fact, you still see that world view leaking out, they were better, braver more "nobler" they should have won- just about the only "pro-north" factors they are/were willing to concede was that the North had more men and factories
It's easier to move a light infantry division quickly than it is to move a mechanized one.
As an aside, I was in the 101st during Desert Storm and one of our FOBs was named Bastogne. We had our
It's easier to move a light infantry division quickly than it is to move a mechanized one.
As an aside, I was in the 101st during Desert Storm and one of our FOBs was named Bastogne.
BTW, thank you for your service.
Snapper, I don't think the slapping incident was a joke. A commander who sends his troops into battle, risking their lives, must never appear to be insensitive or uncaring. For historical accuracy, Patton slapped not one but two soldiers (within a few days of one another), and the one in question had both dysentery and malaria. Regardless of how he felt internally, he should have controlled himself. It wasn't the first time, nor the last, that Patton displayed a lack of self-control. In one book I read of him, his annual review once said something like "This officer will prove to be a menace in peacetime and invaluable in wartime."
While we're on the subject of reviews, back when they actually meant something, when George Marshall was a young officer, one of the questions on the review form said "Would you be honored to have this officer serve under you?" and the reviewing officer wrote "It would be an honor if I could serve under him.".
Sorry, I think it's a complete joke. It never hurt Patton's reputation with his troops; I've heard these stories first hand as my uncle served under Patton (he was also Mark Clark's driver for a while; hated Clark, loved Patton). This was excatly the Patton touch; do you duty and he loves you and will safeguard your lives, disappoint him, and watch out.
I have never read a single account that an actual combat soldier under Patton was upset by the slapping incidents. His soldiers knew he cared about them b/c he disciplined them into elite soldiers, and fought in a way not to squander their lives.
I sure as hell rather fight under a general who'll curse me, and slap me and fight smart and get my ass home alive, than have a rah-rah session and a cup of tea with old Monty, before he sends us into another meatgrinder attack.
This is anecdotal of course and should be regarded as such. So you think it's OK for a general to abuse a soldier with malaria and dysentery then, I guess. I don't.
I think it was a mistake, if he was actually really sick. But, a trivial mistake in the grand scheme of fighting a war.
Every officer who ordered a stupid attack, after failure was obvious, did something 1000X worse.
That particular soldier was interviewed about it in the 60s- he mentioned that Patton actually apologized twice, once publicly and once privately- FWIW he believed that Patton's 2nd apology was sincere- the second one was prompted by Patton learning that the soldier had in fact been "physically" sick...
Patton was, among other things, someone for whom the non-physical was not real, there are still people like that- they refuse to accept any form of mental illness as a disability- To Patton a soldier who appeared uninjured, but was nonetheless at a hospital while his comrades were fighting and dying was a malingerer/coward... So he sees a soldier with no visible wounds, and asks him what he's doing there, and the guy (suffering from malaria and dysentery) says, "I don't know I can't take it any more"- Patton's mind simply shuts down and he becomes enraged. Had the soldier said, "I don't know, they say I have malaria..." Patton would likely have moved on without incident... that time.
I have never read a single account that an actual combat soldier under Patton was upset by the slapping incidents. His soldiers knew he cared about them b/c he disciplined them into elite soldiers, and fought in a way not to squander their lives.
I sure as hell rather fight under a general who'll curse me, and slap me and fight smart and get my ass home alive, than have a rah-rah session and a cup of tea with old Monty, before he sends us into another meatgrinder attack.
And what would have happened if Patton's impulses and behavior went unchecked? As some authors have speculated Patton was either experiencing exhaustion, battle fatigue, and or a nervous breakdown when the slapping incidents took place. Eisenhower reigned Patton in and made it clear that Patton's behavior was not tolerated. It appears, at least publicly, that Patton got the message and snapped too.
I don't think anything would have happened. If what you say is true (I've never seen evidence of that) he would have had plenty of time to rest between Sicily and the Normandy Landings.
Are you talking to me? I've been finalizing well before the deadline. I finalized this turn the same day it started. Somebody else is the delay source.
Well, I'm talking to all but not talking about you.
Eisenhower and Patton's higher ups found out about it rather quickly and came down on Patton. What would have happened if instead of coming down on him they did nothing or they swept it under the rug? History is full of anecdotes of what happens when superiors do nothing. The outcome generally isn't pretty.
I can certainly understand that Patton's men looked up to him and thought the slapping incidents were trivial but they think that in part because he got caught, had to pay the price for it, and got attacked for doing so. If that doesn't happen and Patton keeps on belittling his men in that way things could have and probably would change.
And I’m sure there were many soldiers who criticized, even abhorred, what Patton did. See Andy Rooney, for example. He spoke of it often. Sure, Rooney was a curmudgeon and something of a crank, but he served, received commendations, and I’m sure he represents a larger contingent than one.
OK. Just wanted to be clear.
I can certainly understand that Patton's men looked up to him and thought the slapping incidents were trivial but they think that in part because he got caught, had to pay the price for it, and got attacked for doing so. If that doesn't happen and Patton keeps on belittling his men in that way things could have and probably would change.
They could have just reprimanded him privately, without sidelining him from command.
An officer slapping an enlisted man, for me, is like the no throwing games in baseball rule. That's a basic prohibition that cannot be questioned if you want to have an ordered organized endeavor. It goes to the heart of the integrity of the profession. Without the baseball rule you can’t have a game that gains respect and thus a wide interest. Without the no physical abuse...same thing. This wasn’t a new prohibition sprung on Patton after the fact; it goes back a long way, both in tradition and as expressed law. It's not only a nicety, and it isn’t about not being able to discipline soldiers or not being able to help soldiers. There are ways of doing both those things. It's about maintaining the illusion of a boundary between officers and soldiers based on mutual respect.
And I’m sure there were many soldiers who criticized, even abhorred, what Patton did. See Andy Rooney, for example. He spoke of it often. Sure, Rooney was a curmudgeon and something of a crank, but he served, received commendations, and I’m sure he represents a larger contingent than one.
Officers, and NCOs historically struck soldiers, especially if the were displaying what the officer felt was cowardice. Hell, in most European armies, an officer would shoot a soldier he thought was abandoning the front.
Rooney was a military journalist, not a combat soldier, and didn't serve under Patton. Lot's of people outside of Patton's command criticized him for all kinds of things, including his strict uniform regulations. His soldier loved him, either because or in spite of all his quirks. Mostly, other units resented Patton b/c his troops were simply better. Better led, better disciplined, and more effective.
Which command should he have been given? Between Sicily and D-Day what was he supposed to do and who was he supposed to command?
And by WWI the "European model" was shown to clearly not work.
Which command should he have been given? Between Sicily and D-Day what was he supposed to do and who was he supposed to command?
He should have commanded the landing forces on D-Day. Troops under Patton get off those beaches and take Caen on the first day.
Montgomery was the absolute worst commander for an operation that required speed and urgency. Since Gallipoli, the British showed a horrible propensity to focus on beachhead security to the exclusion of getting off the beaches.
I'm not saying it's the best way, or the morally correct way, I'm just saying having officers strike troops doesn't preclude combat effectiveness. Hell, the Germans executed something like 50,000 soldiers for cowardice in WW2. Even that didn't stop their troops from being the most effective (man-for-man) of the war.
I'd rather have an abusive S.O.B., who wins battles and minimizes casualties, running my army, than a sweetheart, friend of man who's a tactical butcher.
MacArthur and Patton was S.O.B.s, and quite possibly crazy, but they won, and without a huge casualty list. Nimitz was, by all accounts level-headed, smart, and a really nice person, but he let his generals throw tens of thousands of Marines and soldiers into island meat-grinders to no real purpose.
And then run out of supplies and get entrapped.
Patton was an attacker who largely did not appreciate the realities of waging a war on limited supplies.
At some point you have to take the ground the enemy is holding. That is true in all wars ever fought.
I would also concede that it isn't as if Patton made a habit, before or after that incident, of doing physical abuse--although I think he did do something like that on another occasion. Anecotally, my father served with Patton during WWII and loved him, and the Scott movie was his favorite movie. As I remember, he just shrugged off that incident in question.
Both you and I and everyone knows that Patton's action was not by any interpretation universally condoned, much less admired, and it wasn't just journalists and politicians and those who disliked him in the military who condemned what he did, although, you know, journalist can ask questions and interview soldiers to find out things, and often do. I wouldn't entirely write off their opionions in favor of someone who was immediately and severely reprimanded by his superiors--and just as many of his peers thought MacArthur insubordinate in Korea (including Ike and MArshall), many thought Patton had definitely crossed the line here. It was not arguable. Andrew Jackson would probably have hung that soldier, but that is totally immaterial to what the standard was in the American military at the time and what it had been for quite a while. I could, I sure, find soldiers who went on record as not liking what he did, but I think it would be a snipe hunt, so I'm not going to waste my time.
But some commanders are much better about deciding what's small stuff that will fall into place if you take care of what reallyh matters. MacArthur was particularly savvy about his. He had served in the trenches in WWI, had led from the front, as they say, and he abhored that sort of static confrontation.
Many commanders get into a mindset that battles are to proceed according to a ceremony. It takes a special officer to break that mindset, to realize he doesn't have to dance with his opposition. Patton was of the best of that first type, MacArthur of the second. Comparing it to a boxing match, Patton (and his type is much more prevalent) would have gloried in fighting according to the rules of Maquis de Queensbury and beating you fair and square. He loved that. MacArthur grew to essentially hate war. He did love winning, however. MacArthur would have said to the opposing fighter (if he could have gotten away with it), oh, look, your boots unlaced, and when the guy looks down he would have broke a beer mug over his head or shot him with a concealed derringer and walked away unscathed. He didn't see a batttle or was as this glorious ritual that was set in stone as to how you behaved. (It's just an analogy.)
It would be unusual for a subordinate to openly criticize a superior officer, even after he left the unit. Especially someone famous like Patton. A few do though, usually after a particularly egregious incident. Hackworth was very critical of one of his CO's while he was in Vietnam.
I don't agree with this either. The islands Nimitz was tasked with taking (and let's not forget that all of Nimitz' operational plans had to be approved from above) all had specific strategic objectives. Because of the nature of the area of operation, Nimitz had less tactical flexibility than MacArthur because the land masses that constituted his objectives were both smaller and more dispersed. When you're attacking a place like Iwo Jima, there is no place you can unload your landing force without being in range of enemy guns. They bombed the #### out of the place for weeks prior and made little impression.
Additionally, Nimitz island hopped too. He bypassed Wake, for instance, because it had little strategic value.
Finally, the islands Nimitz took all had strategic value. Iwo, for instance, had to be taken because there were too many bombers that were dropping into the ocean after runs at Japan and the distance between Japan and Saipan stretched the range of the bombers. The crews of those bombers would vigorously disagree with you that it served no strategic purpose.
Nope. Lots of times you can go around, cut them off and wait for them to surrender. MacArthur bypassed hundreds of thousands of dug-in Japanese troops.
Both you and I and everyone knows that Patton's action was not by any interpretation universally condoned, much less admired, and it wasn't just journalists and politicians and those who disliked him in the military who condemned what he did, although, you know, journalist can ask questions and interview soldiers to find out things, and often do. I wouldn't entirely write off their opionions in favor of someone who was immediately and severely reprimanded by his superiors--and just as many of his peers thought MacArthur insubordinate in Korea (including Ike and MArshall), many thought Patton had definitely crossed the line here. It was not arguable. Andrew Jackson would probably have hung that soldier, but that is totally immaterial to what the standard was in the American military at the time and what it had been for quite a while. I could, I sure, find soldiers who went on record as not liking what he did, but I think it would be a snipe hunt, so I'm not going to waste my time.
He clearly crossed the line, I'm not saying he didn't. But, in the context of fighting WW2, it was so minor, it should have been treated as irrelevent. Reprimand him privately, tell him not to do it again, and move on.
Additionally, Nimitz island hopped too. He let Wake alone, for instance, because it had little strategic value.
Finally, the islands Nimitz took all had strategic value. Iwo, for instance, had to be taken because there were too many bombers that were dropping into the ocean after runs at Japan and the distance between Japan and Saipan stretched the range of the bombers. The crews of those bombers would vigorously disagree with you that it served no strategic purpose.
I repeat, those island were completely unecessary to the U.S. offensive. Everything they achieved could have been achieved by the SW Pacific offensive through New Guinea and the Philippines. The Japanese were beaten by cutting them off from the East Indies, and destroying their merchant marine via the sub campaign. Even the mass bombings achieved very little, until the shock of the second A-bomb.
In any case, more men died taking Iwo than total bomber crews that landed. Most of that same life saving could have been achieve with a picket line of submarines in a known location where crews could ditch.
Quite frankly, the U.S. would have been MUCH better off in both Europe and Pacific if all the strategic bombers had been used for tactical purposes under Army and Navy operational control.
Strategic bombing was a largely ineffective waste of resources and men, and perilously close to a war crime.
Nimitz of course had great input into how the navy and marines fought their part of the war, and he was the operational commander of the greatest naval war in history, but let's not forget the chief of naval operations, King. Now that was a hard ass. FDR once said that King probably shaved with a blow torch, and King's own daughter once commented that her father had a perfectly even temper--he was always in a rage. For Guadalcanal King had gone to Marshall and explained what they intended to do. Marshall started to object, saying that he didn't think it would work, and King interpreted him: I'm not asking your permission. We're doing this, you want in or don't you? When King and Marshall had gone to the British with the idea of doing D-Day at the end of 1942, the British ####. Their experience and quick thinking got it postponed, first until the end of '43, but King let them know in no uncertain terms that if they didn't want to fight, he was taking all of "his" navy to the Pacific. Churchill would never have put up with anyone in the British military talking to him the way King did (Marshall was more diplomatic), but he had to stuff it. King hated the English. I don't think anyone really knows why.
Many commanders get into a mindset that battles are to proceed according to a ceremony. It takes a special officer to break that mindset, to realize he doesn't have to dance with his opposition. Patton was of the best of that first type, MacArthur of the second. Comparing it to a boxing match, Patton (and his type is much more prevalent) would have gloried in fighting according to the rules of Maquis de Queensbury and beating you fair and square. He loved that. MacArthur grew to essentially hate war. He did love winning, however. MacArthur would have said to the opposing fighter (if he could have gotten away with it), oh, look, your boots unlaced, and when the guy looks down he would have broke a beer mug over his head or shot him with a concealed derringer and walked away unscathed. He didn't see a batttle or was as this glorious ritual that was set in stone as to how you behaved. (It's just an analogy.)
I don't see Patton as bound by any set of rules either. In Sicily he completely disregarded the plan to execute his end run.
I think it is important that both Patton and MacArthur saw heavy combat in WWI. Their methods showed a disdain for frontal attacks and slogging.
Also, both were conspiculously physically brave. Both exposed themselves to fire when vsisiting front line troops.
Go around to where? Again, at some point you have to take the enemy's ground. You in fact are advocating taking the enemy's ground. Why would the Japanese surrender? That wasn't something the Japanese did often. Cutting them off and simply waiting for them to do something they very rarely did has its costs and dangers. There aren't too many commanders in this world that would leave that many enemy soldiers and combat vehicles in there rear and in their supply lines. Your strategy would not only leave them there, force the US and its allies to spend resources making sure those enemies stay on the island and are neutralized, but also force the US and its allies to extend their supply lines to attack even more formidable defenses. I don't see that as viable.
Many commanders get into a mindset that battles are to proceed according to a ceremony. It takes a special officer to break that mindset, to realize he doesn't have to dance with his opposition. Patton was of the best of that first type, MacArthur of the second. Comparing it to a boxing match, Patton (and his type is much more prevalent) would have gloried in fighting according to the rules of Maquis de Queensbury and beating you fair and square. He loved that. MacArthur grew to essentially hate war. He did love winning, however. MacArthur would have said to the opposing fighter (if he could have gotten away with it), oh, look, your boots unlaced, and when the guy looks down he would have broke a beer mug over his head or shot him with a concealed derringer and walked away unscathed. He didn't see a batttle or was as this glorious ritual that was set in stone as to how you behaved. (It's just an analogy.)
MacArthur for the most part was a Napoleon/Civil War general. He liked to fight positional battles and that for the most part wouldn't really work on the Western Front. You can't outflank your enemy on the Western Front but when dealing with the Pacific Ocean and SE Asia that option was always available.
True. King and the whole navy hierarchy probably deserve more blame than Nimitz.
But, it should not be over-stated how much the Central Pacific campaign was a result of inter-service politics. The Navy simply would not stand for being subordinate to MacArthur in the Pacific theatre, which led to the very odd split command.
Which they probably would have done if Patton had the good sense not to do this in front of journalists but he did do it in front of journalists so it could not stay hushed up.
Tell that to the men who in Lorraine.
Well, in the Pacific MacArthur left hundreds of thousands of Japanese cut off on islands. He did exactly what you say he couldn't, at Rabaul, Truk, and dozens of other places. They all surrendered after the war ended, with approx. zero loss of Allied life.
MacArthur for the most part was a Napoleon/Civil War general. He liked to fight positional battles and that for the most part wouldn't really work on the Western Front. You can't outflank your enemy on the Western Front but when dealing with the Pacific Ocean and SE Asia that option was always available.
This doesn't describe MacArthur's Pacific campaign at all. His whole plan was to end-run around heavly defended islands, and cut off and isolate the garrisons. He rarely launched an attack against prepared enemy positions.
On the Western Front in WWI the only sane strategy was to stay on the defensive until you had tanks, or Storm Trooper tactics developed.
He shouldn't have launched that offensive, just like Bradley should never have attacked in the Huertgen Forest.
I'm not saying he was perfect, just the best the Allies had in Europe. MacArthur and Slim were equally good in Asia.
Journalists reported only what the military allowed in WW2.
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