I'd also say that since virtually no one joined the coup and the military leadership went along with the surrender that that is rock hard proof that the military leadership by mid 1945 was ready to surrender.

If by mid-1945 you mean August 14th, then I agree. If you mean any time prior to the notification by the emperor that the war had to end, then I disagree.

Ienaga was astonished at the arrogance and duplicity of the war cabinet, who were planning to attack the Soviets if the opportunity arose, only to turn around and ask them for help when Japan was on the brink of total defeat. This is another instance where the Japanese war leadership was clearly not operating within the realm of the possible. The Soviets knew, because enough intelligence had been gathered to inform them, what Japan's true intentions were.

From what I can gather from your posts, you seem to be suggesting the dropping of the bomb was both unnecessary and inhuman. I think, as do many others here, that there is ample evidence to suggest it was necessary and that Truman acted out of necessity more than post-war political considerations. That view, again as others have pointed out, is a revisionist POV that grew during the cold war and during the period where Japan sufficiently regained its confidence.

The only book I read of Keegan's that I felt was well done was the Face of Battle or whatever it was. And let's face it, that book was one of his first, done many years ago and its point of view is very well tailored to focus on simply how it felt to be in the ranks. It works on that level. It is of course, not a complete primer on weapons, or tactics or generalship, but rather simply what it's like to hold a metal pike in your hands on a cold winter day etc.

His other works, where he tries to hit all aspects like political, tactical etc. are a far cry from classics. At least the ones I skimmed. It would be folly to accept anything Keegan says as the last word on generalship. I think you will find that in the long haul he is going to be remember more for a clear writing style and some interesting points of view, but not hardly on scholarship.

Truly Keegan is fluff. Relying on him just detracts from any real argument you could make here.

Completely disagree.

I thought Faces of Battle, The Mask of Command, Six Armies in Normandy, A History of Warfare, The Price of Admiralty, and The Second World War were all excellent books.

He's not a standard academic historian, but who wants to read their stuff? For readable, informative history Keegan is pretty tought to beat.

Not necessarily. The Germans anticipated that two things would happen:

1. Britain under Churchill would refuse to support the Soviet Union actively;
2. Japan would abrogate its treaty with the Soviet Union and jump into the fray.

Had those happened, it's certainly possible that the Germans could have achieved their strategic objectives in the Soviet Union - and neither was a completely unreasonable expectation.

-- MWE

What exactly could the British do for the Russians? Without American involvement the British would have been doing nothing for the Russians and the British weren't going to not allow the Americans to use Britain as a stopover on their way to Russia. Britain's involvement should have played no part in any calculus on whether to attack the Soviet Union or not.

The Japanese part is trickier and was a pretty big gamble on the part of the Germans. The Japanese had already had their noses bloodied by the Russians in the 1930's and had shifted their forces to head south and west instead of north against the Russians well before Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Plus the treaty that formed the Axis explicitly stated that the parties weren't bound to existing conflicts nor were they bound to conflicts started by one of the parties. So Hitler had no real reason to expect the Japanese to declare war on the Soviets nor pull the tiger's tail to help the Nazis. Not only that but Germany kept Japan in the dark about the attack on the Soviet Union and encouraged Japan's attacks on British held territory believing that it would draw away British resources and keep the United States focused on the Pacific. Hardly steps one would take if you want the other side to help you attack a common enemy.

The Japanese wanted and needed a neutral Soviet Union and gained very little by attacking Russia. Hitler had nothing to offer the Japanese to induce them to do so and thus gambling that Japan would attack the Soviets was a rather foolish gamble and doubling down by declaring war on the USA was even more foolish.

Now then had it somehow happened that the Japanese attacked the Russians it is possible that it helps greatly the Germans but it is also possible that the Russian armor steamrolls through the rather weak Japanese army and then turns west and attacks German armed forces.

Not necessarily. The Germans anticipated that two things would happen:

1. Britain under Churchill would refuse to support the Soviet Union actively;
2. Japan would abrogate its treaty with the Soviet Union and jump into the fray.

If that's what they thought, then they were being delusional. Neither of those things was ever going to happen. Japan was very careful not to make any promises. They never even bothered to inform the Germans they intended to attack Pearl Harbor (great allies, huh?). And if they were expecting Churchill to do anything than what he actually did do, then they thought the entire body of statements Churchill made about bringing Russia in on the side of the allies was pure propaganda. That was an absurd assumption.

Of course, Hitler was as delusional a political figure as one could have so it's not that surprising they acted as though things might come to pass.

From what I can gather from your posts, you seem to be suggesting the dropping of the bomb was both unnecessary and inhuman.

I'm not sure where you are getting that from. It appears you are reading what you want to read when it comes to my posts.

My view has been that Japan had known for a long time that they had lost the war, hell, their pre-war strategy contained the fact that they could not win the war, and much of the hang up for ending the war came from the sticking point of the Americans wanting an unconditional surrender even though they really didn't want an unconditional surrender. Furthermore the Japanese were holding out hope that the Russians would stay neutral thus giving the Japanese the tiniest bit of leverage so that they could keep the Emperor around. Thus if American had held off on dropping the bombs so that the Russians could declare war and attack Manchuria and possibly through back channels let the Japanese know what our intentions were for the Emperor we might never have needed to drops the bombs.

There is no real reason why the bombs had to be dropped at the beginning of August. If a declaration of war and the invasion of Manchuria doesn't force the Japanese to surrender you can always drop the bombs then.

What exactly could the British do for the Russians?

I think by that Mike means that the British would bail on the Soviets and cut a separate deal with Hitler so they could hang onto their colonies. Hitler was actually willing to do that and was puzzled when Churchill didn't seem interested. Hitler regarded all British politicians as "little worms" who would throw anybody under the bus if it suited them. I suppose he had reason to think that after what transpired in Munich.

I think by that Mike means that the British would bail on Russian cut a separate deal with Hitler so they could hang onto their colonies. Hitler was actually willing to do that and was puzzled when Churchill didn't seem interested. Hitler regarded the British politicians he dealt with as "little worms" who would throw anybody under the bus if it suited them.

Oh, okay. Well, that part is true. Hitler badly under-estimated what the British were going to do when faced with an aggressive Germany which agains leads to the view that Germany was doomed the moment they decided to be an aggressor of that level of magnitude.

I've said it before but the German armed forces were simply not ready to fight the war they ended up fighting in 1940 and on. German military leaders were constantly telling Hitler that the armed forces weren't ready to get into a real war during the prewar years and that it wouldn't be until I think the mid to late 40's that they would be. The problem is that the German economy would never have been able to handle a war buildup for that long nor were the Russians going to sit around and wait for the Germans to get ready. Stalin was either going to invade the west in 1942 or 1943 regardless of what Hitler's intentions were so Hitler had to walk a very tightrope. Sometimes I think Poland was a misstep and sometimes I think it was a brilliant gamble.

Not enough Battle of Oriskany.

All this WWII talk and I forgot to mention that I am currently listening to the audio version of Operation Mincemeat. I read The Man Who Wasn't There as a kid and this is a new retelling of that story about a Brit deception operation prior to Operation Husky. Good stuff so far, but it has a narrow focus.

This entire thread should be dipped in gold and encased in carbonite.

It seems war threads alternate between people bashing them or praising them. I guess it depends no who is suspended or on vacation at the time.

This entire thread should be dipped in gold and encased in carbonite.

Surely Grand Moff Tarkin is the worst Grand Moff ever. Overconfidence isn't even the word for it... if you're facing any kind of organized assault against your key military asset, can't you bestir yourself to dispatch more than eight of your 8,000 TIE fighters to deal with it?

Also, the Empire needlessly destroying Mon Calamari cities is somewhat analogous to the Japanese "awakening the sleeping giant" in '41.

Hyperdrives on a single seat fighter? Why? Hell, why have fighters in the first place?

I just found out I am going to Vicksburg next year- Any recommendations on books about that campaign?

Grant's and/or Sherman's memoirs are a good place to start.

I just found out I am going to Vicksburg next year- Any recommendations on books about that campaign?

For sheer readability you could do far worse than Shelby Foote's The Beleaguered City: The Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863. It's quite simply an extraction/reorganization of his chapters on Vicksburg from the Civil War Trilogy. You read Foote for the pleasure of his prose, and his account of Vicksburg is among the best in the entire series, IMO. A great place to start before delving into more detailed accounts.

Vicksburg-1863 Winston Groom
Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippi Michael Ballard
Campaigns for Vicksburg, 1862-63 Kevin Dougherty
Vicksburg 1863: Grant clears the Mississippi Alan Hankinson
The Siege Of Vicksburg Richard Wheeler
Vicksburg Is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River William Shea

I haven't read any of them but they'll all do. I have read Groom before in another context and he's an excellent writer who will capture the essence of the struggle, if that's any help.

Happy New Year to my favorite recent OT thread!

Mike Emeigh wrote
Well, the fact that the British, despite superior resources, wound up mostly bottled up in New York City for the bulk of the Revolution has to be laid at Washington's feet. That and holding the army together despite a government that was unwilling or unable to provide the level of support needed (both men and supplies).

-- MWE

And snapper replied

In addition, the occupation of Dorchester heights, leading to the recapture of Boston was a masterpiece. He extricated his army from numerous dangerous spots, and led a brilliant campaign at Yorktown, relocating his army across half the country w/o the British in NY stirring.

Mike understates the odds Washington faced. Britain was the most powerful nation in the world, with a highly professional military. Washington had to create an army on the fly, and he did it, and won.

I recently started listening to audiobooks on my commute. Among other things (like the book on Operation Mincemeat,) I've been listening to some Joseph Ellis. He reminded me that Washington almost led the Continental Army to its destruction in late 1776. Fortunately, General Howe was too risk averse to finish them off when he had the chance. Also, Yorktown involved a lot of engineering and the French were better at that than the Americans.

What makes a good general anyways? Off the top of my head, I can think of several qualities generals can or should have:

1. Tactical proficiency
2. Strategic proficiency
3. Ability to train troops
4. Political acumen = When you are that high up the chain of command, you have to work with a lot of different people and getting those who are not your underlings to cooperate is a skill.

I'm just spitballing here, but this may be a good restarting point for this thread.

What makes a good general anyways? Off the top of my head, I can think of several qualities generals can or should have:

1. Tactical proficiency
2. Strategic proficiency
3. Ability to train troops
4. Political acumen

Guts/drive/ambition/aggressiveness/audacity? As you note: Fortunately, General Howe was too risk averse to finish them off when he had the chance.

Anyone up for another game of diplomacy? In about 5 days there will be no more BFF active games. Seems a shame to let it die.

What makes a good general anyways? Off the top of my head, I can think of several qualities generals can or should have:

1. Tactical proficiency
2. Strategic proficiency
3. Ability to train troops
4. Political acumen = When you are that high up the chain of command, you have to work with a lot of different people and getting those who are not your underlings to cooperate is a skill.

I'm just spitballing here, but this may be a good restarting point for this thread.


It really does depend on the context. Obviously for a revolutionary leader like Washington, the ability to train/inspire troops was critical, but for the British Generals opposing him it was minor. They were handed trained professional troops by their system. I think you can say a few basic things.

1) Tactical/operational proficiency is table stakes. You can't be great, or even good if you're constantly being out-maneuvered/out-fought. You can win, but you're just a butcher, like a Zhukov, or any of the successful Soviet commanders. They never stopped having 3:1 to 5:1 adverse casualty ratios against the Germans, even in '45 when the German Army was a hollow shell.

2) Charismatic leadership is almost always a prerequisite to greatness. The ability to instill/maintain discipline, and still inspire aggression and have men eager to follow you is found in nearly every great commander.

3) Aggression (to bobm's point), nearly to the point of recklessness. Generals who worry about failing never succeed.

Anyone up for another game of diplomacy? In about 5 days there will be no more BFF active games. Seems a shame to let it die.

I'm in.

And probably located next to me to as well.

And probably located next to me to as well.

You want to be Russia or Turkey?

You should probably email the cast of characters if you want to start soon.

I'll try to get around to it tomorrow. Going on like two hours of sleep in the last two days.

I'll try to get around to it tomorrow. Going on like two hours of sleep in the last two days.

Must have been some New Year's Eve :-)

Nope, it sucked.

Anyone up for another game of diplomacy? In about 5 days there will be no more BFF active games. Seems a shame to let it die.

I'm in as well.

Would I sound dumb if I asked what this game was?

BTW, I've gotten into McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom again. Man, it's been SO long since I last read this...I'm enjoying it much more this time around than I did before.

Would I sound dumb if I asked what this game was?

Check it out.

http://www.playdiplomacy.com/

It's an old board game, converted to online.

Nope, it sucked.

That tends to be true of most NYEs.

You might email joe dimino about a diplomacy game if he isn't in your group already

It really does depend on the context. Obviously for a revolutionary leader like Washington, the ability to train/inspire troops was critical, but for the British Generals opposing him it was minor. They were handed trained professional troops by their system. I think you can say a few basic things.

1) Tactical/operational proficiency is table stakes. You can't be great, or even good if you're constantly being out-maneuvered/out-fought. You can win, but you're just a butcher, like a Zhukov, or any of the successful Soviet commanders. They never stopped having 3:1 to 5:1 adverse casualty ratios against the Germans, even in '45 when the German Army was a hollow shell.

2) Charismatic leadership is almost always a prerequisite to greatness. The ability to instill/maintain discipline, and still inspire aggression and have men eager to follow you is found in nearly every great commander.

3) Aggression (to bobm's point), nearly to the point of recklessness. Generals who worry about failing never succeed.

Thanks, snapper. I'd add bravery, too, if aggressiveness doesn't cover it.

Created a new game at playdiplomacy.

BTF Diplomacy VI
password: baseball

Thanks, snapper. I'd add bravery, too, if aggressiveness doesn't cover it.

Correct. But, it is very, very rare for someone to rise to field grade rank w/o being physically brave.

Created a new game at playdiplomacy.

BTF Diplomacy VI
password: baseball

Joined.

#433 There's more to Zhukov than just a willingness to accept casualties. Compare the pre-war performance of the forces in Finland (not under his command) with those who administered a rather firm butt kicking to the Japanese

There were plenty of other Russian leaders who were willing to acept losses and were relatively easily handled.

The best of the Soviet commanders (I'd include Koniev and Rokossovsky) spent them intelligently. Bagration and the counterattack at Stalingrad are excellent examples of hoarding resources, identifying weak points and allocating enough resources to not only break through but exploit the break through.

And yes, all of these guys were made to pay heavily when top German commanders were allowed to fight an intelligent mobile defense. (Model and Von Manstein in particular)

Talking about the qualities that make for successful generalship, I'd recommend Norman Dixon's "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" for a good look at why generals fail.

Created a new game at playdiplomacy.

BTF Diplomacy VI
password: baseball

I'm in too.

Just two spots left open in the Diplomacy game.

#433 There's more to Zhukov than just a willingness to accept casualties. Compare the pre-war performance of the forces in Finland (not under his command) with those who administered a rather firm butt kicking to the Japanese

There were plenty of other Russian leaders who were willing to acept losses and were relatively easily handled.

The best of the Soviet commanders (I'd include Koniev and Rokossovsky) spent them intelligently. Bagration and the counterattack at Stalingrad are excellent examples of hoarding resources, identifying weak points and allocating enough resources to not only break through but exploit the break through.

And yes, all of these guys were made to pay heavily when top German commanders were allowed to fight an intelligent mobile defense. (Model and Von Manstein in particular)

Well, lot's of the other Soviet commanders were flat out incompetents. That's what happend when you select generals for political loyalty.

Zhukov, Koniev and Rokossovsky were not incompetent, just not very good. Beating the Japanese army in '39 is no great feat. Their army completely lacked modern armor and artillery, and had no mobile combined arms doctrine.

I just can't rate a general very highly when with very good equipment (Russian tanks and planes were always at least equal to the German, and often better), and massive numerical superiority, they always suffered casualty rates of 3 to 5 times those they inflicted.

Even in 1945, when they were drafting a bunch of teenagers and old men, the Germans always gave much better than they got against even the best Soviet commanders.

The Western armies, for all their flaws (especially poor tanks), always inflicted casualties at near parity starting in '42 (maybe 1.3:1 against early on), and moved to an advantage by late in the War.

Anyone up for another game of diplomacy? In about 5 days there will be no more BFF active games. Seems a shame to let it die.

How many players do you need?

The Western armies, for all their flaws (especially poor tanks), always inflicted casualties at near parity starting in '42 (maybe 1.3:1 against early on), and moved to an advantage by late in the War

That was due to the obvious advantage in air superiority enjoyed by the Allies. Especially after 1943 when the P51's and P47's started coming out in greater numbers for escort duty

Where should one start when first reading Bruce Catton?

How many players do you need?

2 I believe.

That was due to the obvious advantage in air superiority enjoyed by the Allies. Especially after 1943 when the P51's and P47's started coming out in greater numbers for escort duty

From mid-1943, the Soviets had air superiority, tank superiority, artillery superiority, infantry superiority, and still took 3-5 casualties for every one they inflicted.

Their army was simply unskilled. No tactical acumen, no coherent doctrine, no training of initiative allowed for field grade and junior officers. Man for man, they were a terrible, terrible fighting force. This in no way undermines the bravery and sacrifice of the individual soldiers (although many of them were guilty of terrible atrocities too); it's an indictment of the disfunctional and corrupt Soviet system.

If the Allies had the stomach to fight the Soviets in 1945, they would have cut through them like a warm knife through butter. Soviet manpower was essentially exhausted, and they were entirely dependent on the west for trucks, boots and rations. Especially if they mobilized the Germans (not to mention the anti-Soviet Russians, and Ukranians) to fight with them. Give a 1945 US armor or infantry division 50 Panthers and Tigers and it would have been a magnificent fighting formation.

Well, if the men and officers were unskilled and inferior it is kind of hard to size up the Russian generals properly.

Well, if the men and officers were unskilled and inferior it is kind of hard to size up the Russian generals properly.

Fair. But, I put the blame for that heavily on the Generals.

Fair. But, I put the blame for that heavily on the Generals.

Why? Zhukov was stuck in Siberia for much of the pre-war period and Stalin purged the officer corps before the start of the war. Once the war started Stalin didn't loosen his grip on the army and handcuffed his generals tremendously.

Why? Zhukov was stuck in Siberia for much of the pre-war period and Stalin purged the officer corps before the start of the war. Once the war started Stalin didn't loosen his grip on the army and handcuffed his generals tremendously.

They should have shot him. At least some of the German generals tried.

They also had the opportunity to train their own armies while they commanded them. I've seen no evidence that Zhukov's Siberian troops were particularly effective, except in Dec-Jan '41-'42 when they were fresh fighting exhausted Germans.

I've seen no evidence that Zhukov's Siberian troops were particularly effective, except when in Dec-Jan '41-'42 when they were fresh fighting exhausted Germans.

But I think that contradicts your earlier view. You think Zhukov's troops were at least somewhat effective when fresh and had been helmed by Zhukov for awhile. Then when the Soviets had its levee en masse they became less effective as they were less well trained. What Zhukov did early on is proof that given proper resources and a political branch that wasn't murderously paranoid he was a pretty good general.