I dont want to really defend MaClellan but it's easy to down play his weaknesses w/o realizing he had some strengths. Most people are rather complex, and Mac certainly was.

One of the best discussion boards about civil war stuff can be found at Consimworld which covers all military conflicts but the ACW is pretty intense. Here's a recent snippet (which in fact contains a reference to CSA numbers in the Penninsula campaign if you look closely)


http://talk.consimworld.com/WebX?7@@.ee6c7d6/19521

There's some really knowleageable people there including one: Dave Powell who has done a good job convincing us on the numbers Mac faced at the 7 days. He was likely outnumbered by the CSA forces which to me is about the only way of making sense out of that whole campaign. A lot of issues including the casualty rates, the tactics employed by Lee, MacLellans maneuvers etc. only make sense if both sides were operating with at least a suspicion that Lee outnumbered Mac.

In fact if you go to that link I posted above, Mr. Slivers of Maranville sounds a bit like Dave Powell. (see post no 18928 in the above)

[note you can join up and post on Consimworld w/o paying money, although there is a solicitation for contribution, it is not needed to participate. It's a very nice place]

ANyhow I will say this about the Penninsula campaign. Mac did a rare strategic maneuver to re position his base of operations in the face of the confederate advance. I think this was no small feat but his detractors always down play this. The other pt. is that he managed to plant the army of the Potomac at the gates of Richmond as early as the spring of 1862 with very little loss. It would take Grant another two more years and heavy casuaties before this same thing could be again achieved.

Henry Steele Commanger went out of his way to try to pt. out the differences in '62 and '64 but I think the similarities are striking.

That Mac failed is no surprise he was really not suited as a battlefield general. Neither in terms of facing death or changing his plans under pressure. His prickly personality probably made him unsuited for any sort of commander in chief rule.

One need only think of Eisenhower and how he held Allied powers together having to deal with the likes of DeGaulle, Churchill, Field Marshall Montgomery, the RUssians, etc. He constantly had to bite his lip and listen to BS from these guys in order to hold it together.

The contrast with MaClellan is stark. Here MaClellan is dealing with Lincoln who was usually quite patient w/ such people and he's tearing him a new arsehole...

It would be funny to think of MaClellan having to deal with DeGaulle before entering Paris; or Montgomery at Caen; or the Russians at Warsaw, or admiral Darlan in No. Africa, or Marshall Badoglio before Salerno..

More from Mr. Powell on the numbers in the 7 Days; courtesy of the consimworld site:

For historians, however, these calculations can be used to offset some common historical biases that have crept into the 'common wisdom' of the war. For the Seven days, it has been widely assumed for decades that Lee had 80,000 men, while MAc had about 110,000; meaning that when Lee took 60,000 of them north of the Chickahominy he to fight Porter, he was leaving barely 20,000 troops to defend Richmond against at least 85,000 Federals.

IN fact, however, with better numbers, we know that Lee left more than 40,000 men to face Mac's 75,000 - not nearly as long odds as Generations of ACW Historians have assumed. Less than 2-1 and with the defenders dug in? pretty good odds, actually.

But we only get to those numbers by meticulously building up the picture unit by unit. There simply aren't good army level returns for both sides for all phases of the campaign, let alone the whole war. So while knowing that the 7th Georgia had 611 men in ten companies might not tell us much individually, taken together, that's how we know what force the Confederates mustered in June, 1862.

WTH someone else reads consimworld and BBTF? What is your handle there?

On the plus side, McClellan (also Burnside and to an extent, Hooker) lured Lee into a false sense of security when he was facing Meade at Gettysburg.

I am also a consimworlder.

#104 Could be. On the other hand, the decisions made at Malvern Hill and the third day at Gettysburg were very similar. I think it's clear evidence that Lee didn't really fully understand the power of the relatively new weapons in a prepared defense.

Of course he was on the other side of the equation at Fredericksburg. To my mind that makes the decision to attack the Union center even less defensible.

Well, if you want to look me up I use my real name "Ben Hitz". Normally in the OCS and other Gamers/MMP forums, also Totaler Krieg and the crazy new Youst "GOSS" boardgames.

@106 I was mostly joking. Funny cause it might be a little true? I know (or rather, have read) that he had nothing but contempt for McClellan in particular and AoP commanders "in General" (nyuk, nyuk).

Speaking of ACW and consimworld --- if you like "real men's" board games you need to try the Gamers CW "Brigade" and "Regimental" series (the latter being replaced with "Line of Battle"). In these games, you actually have to write out (long hand!) orders to your Corps/Divisions/etc. and roll to see when (and sometimes if!) they are accepted and implemented.

for example "
"A.P. Hill's corps to advance to the sunken road and hold Dunker's farm" (I am mussing up my battlefield geography but you get the idea).

Orders are kept secret from your opponent - and it's just an honor system to keep to what your wrote.

#109 Many years ago I actually played "Terrible Swift Sword" with commanders not actually at the board. We got down to the corps level.

Very interesting. Very, very slow though. We never finished the first day.

#108 It's absolutely true that he mourned Mac's replacement in that he felt he could predict him totally. For somebody who was as naturally aggressive as Lee that's huge.

I know (or rather, have read) that he had nothing but contempt for McClellan in particular and AoP commanders "in General" (nyuk, nyuk).

Actually, I have read the opposite. I recall Lee saying he thought McClellen was the best Union general of the war.

edit: Well, I don't literally reacall lee saying that, but I did read it.

From wiki:

Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!"

The source is Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee.

Well, if you want to look me up I use my real name "Ben Hitz". Normally in the OCS and other Gamers/MMP forums, also Totaler Krieg and the crazy new Youst "GOSS" boardgames.

Wow, Ben Hitz? I know you very well from the TK forums. I'm the designer of Kingdom of Heaven.

For those who doubt wiki, here is the original source, at the top of page 416.

Great thread. As far as war books go, I recently read "This Kind of War", which was absolutely mezmerizing. It put me on a big kick of reading history written closer to the actual events. I'm reading The Best and the Brightest now.

Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!"

nice to see quality snark preceded the internet by at least 120 years.

Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!"

And yet Freeman has a quote of Lee saying something very different at the time.

I'm a consimworlder as well -- My real name is Jonathan Fellows -- although I'm mostly a lurker.

A couple of notes on reading the thread. Foote's "waif" comment may seem a little paternalistic and a tinge racist but it is in no way, I believe, meant to denigrate blacks as being incapable of citizenship as opposed to ignorant and unprepared. Foote's point is that emancipation without appropriate reconstruction (including protection) was a sin. He was right. He goes on to point out what a better reconstruction would have looked like. You can moan and groan about Southern Democrats stopping reconstruction, but the Republicans had huge majorities and had all kinds of trouble getting spending bills to help blacks passed. And the Army was pulled out of the South with agreement of the GOP for the expedient of the deciding votes in the 1876 presidential election. The political will for a reconstruction that protected blacks did not exist in the North. Foote did not say he would "still" fight for the Confederacy, he said he would have fought for it if he had been a southerner in the 1860s. Most southerners were not slave owners. They were largely pro-slavery and certainly what we would call rascist today. And as such they were no different than huge segments of the north. Lincoln himself had serious doubts about whether blacks would ever truly "fit in" or whatever term you want to use. He fiddled around with returning them to Africa as a "humane" policy option. Reconstruction was a disaster and Foote rightly says so. Lincoln was the only Republican who could have held the wings of the party together to work a reconstruction that would have protected and empowered the Freedmen without Stalinizing the South (what the Radical Republicans wanted). Without Lincoln the radicals tried to impose their will and they couldn't do it, no more so than the rebels could save the slave power.

Precision is really important here.

1) "the Republicans had huge majorities and had all kinds of trouble getting spending bills to help blacks passed." I'm not sure what "spending bills" you are referring to, but the timing is really important. Republicans had large majorities from 1861-1875. Let's leave off 1861-1865 for the sake of this discussion.

1865-1866 pass Civil Rights Bill, Freedmen's Bureau Bill, override Johnson's veto, pass 14th Amendment
1867--pass Military Reconstruction Acts requiring Southern states to enfranchise freedpeople
1868-1870 Bring in Southern governments with freedpeople voting and pass 15th Amendment
1871-1875--When voting comes under attack, pass Ku Klux Klan Acts, authorize most significant peacetime domestic military action in history that stamps out Klan. Create a Department of Justice in large part to prosecute Klan cases. Pass Civil Rights Act of 1875 that extends to hotels, restaurants, places of amusement, public accommodations.

In 1874 midterms, Democrats win a massive majority in the House, so large they begin trying to impeach Grant.

From then on, the Republicans at times have small majorities in each house but not "large majorities." During that time, with those small majorities they come agonizingly close to passing--twice a Federal Education Bill more radical than any that has ever passed a US Congress to this day, including NCLB, and an Elections investigation bill that would be brought into the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A few Republicans voted against these bills, but virtually all Democrats did. Despite the failure of those acts, the Republicans led major investigations into voting rights abuses in the South throughout this period.

It's tempting to say that Republicans should have had a magic wand and understand precisely what they should do at each step. Or that they should be able to override democratic processes. They worked through a faith in suffrage that was sincere even if it turned out to be misplaced. When that came up against problems, they passed the first major enforcement efforts in federal history. Then the Democrats beat them, shut them down with the Posse Comitatus Act. Then the Supreme Court started to roll back the laws the Republicans passed.

I'm not saying the Republicans were perfect, but your portrayal just doesn't conform with the timeline of what happened. If Republicans were omniscient and omnipotent, your claim would make sense. To say they weren't omniscient isn't to say very much.

I have no idea what it means to call Reconstruction a failure. It was the second large-scale enfranchisment of a formerly enslaved population in world history. Over the next decades, black land ownership grew at an unprecedented rate in the South; at times blacks were elected to thousands of small offices and helped rewrite land-lien laws, among other things. If your standard is Utopia, it was a failure, I suppose, but then everything under the sun is a failure.

That lasted for about 35 years. In the 1890s, Southern Democrats overthrew city and state governments and launched another wave of violent counterattacks then passed very effective disfranchisement laws which the Supreme Court validated. That launched the so-called nadir of Jim Crow from the 1890s-1950s. That stands out precisely because it is so unlike 1860s to early 1890s.

If the critique is that they couldn't build something in 1867 that would withstand assault in 1895, fine. But nothing can, including our own rights. There are no bulletproof vests out there for rights.

Things had changed by the 1890s--though still in 1891 the Republicans fought one last time for the Elections Bill and nearly passed it. The acquiescence of Northern Republicans to disfranchise after it was accomplished in the South and ratified by the Supreme court is not a proud moment in the party's history but is hardly to be blamed for Reconstruction since the leaders of the Reconstruction party were mostly dead by then.

In terms of the 77 withdrawal of the Army, it didn't have to do with any deal with the Democrats, but was part of a backpedaling after the 1874 midterms and the Democrats post-1875 efforts to defund the Army and cut it to a shell of its already reduced self. The Republicans nominated Hayes who said from the start he would withdraw troops and did.

In response to this fig branch, Democrats refused to pass any Army budget at all in the House and adjourned, leaving Hayes to try to raise money from private charity to avoid discharging the Army entirely.

In 1880, Republicans turned from Hayes to Garfield, no saint, but known as the most-ardent defender of the federal education bill in Congress, and his faction deposed the Hayes group. Garfield chose a conservative VP to preserve unity. Garfield was then assassinated and that conservative VP became president.

Interesting thread. I am a lurker but felt compelled to post in this thread to add my two-cents on a number of the opinions posted and to clear up some ambiguities about Shelby Foote. See below:

When Burns’ Civil War documentary was aired in the late 80s’s, Shelby Foote emerged as the superstar of the show. His slow, syrupy southern drawl was pitch perfect for the tone of the presentation and his perspective was different from all the other SMEs- he tended to focus on the individual soldier and had a lot of interesting anecdotes about the participants, famous and non-famous. But some of the things he said caused a great deal of consternation amongst professional historians. At the time, I thought this was mostly the result of jealousy and professional rivalry. But I have come around to their view. Foote’s Civil War views seem to me to be myopic, provincial and lacking in moral perspective. In fact, I don’t think it inaccurate to label him a petite racist. Let me provide support.

Regarding the “because you’re down here” quote. First, it’s both anecdotal and inaccurate. It was the South that fired the first shot, on Ft. Sumter. Foote doesn’t seem to be cognizant of that fact, that the South was spoiling for a fight and actually wanted to settle things violently, thinking “one southerner is equal to 10 Yankees”. Secondly, it is not true on another level. A lot of the rank and file were in the Confederate army not because they wanted to, fighting for their way of life, but because they were forced to. The war from the southern point of view was fought to preserve the right to own slaves by the southern plutocracy. They were very plain about that when they drafted their constitution. Obviously, the right to own slaves was irrelevant to the poor southerners and the yeoman craftsmen and farmers. Many southern soldiers were conscripted, and would desert if they could. Sally Jenkins wrote an excellent history called The State of Jones, that puts the lie to the ridiculous romantic “Lost Cause” notion entertained by Foote and the other revisionist historians. Jenkins book documents a rebellion led by Newton Knight, a Battle-of-Shiloh deserter, who with his friends and relatives, waged an effective guerrilla war in Jones County, Mississippi against the Confederate establishment, in several instances killing Confederate officers sent there to impress the able-bodied male population. In a way, it’s a shame that Foote didn’t get to fight for the Confederacy. If he had, he could have witnessed firsthand how wretched the existence was for the average soldier and it would have purged from him forever any romantic notions about the war he might have entertained.

Then it’s his shocking opinions regarding the performance of the negro soldier. In the series, he really raised eyebrows when he said about the negro Union soldier that his collective contribution was “overrated” and the only thing they proved was that “they could stop a bullet as well as a white man”. This is shockingly untrue and shamefully denigrates their true worth. The negro soldiers made great contributions to the Union cause. The all-black 54th Massachusetts regiment is just one example. I could name a dozen more.

Then there is his admiration and support for Nathan Bedford Forrest. In one interview, he smiles as he recalls how much of a thrill he got on a visit to one of Forrest’s descendents, where he was allowed to swing his cavalry sword around his head. And how he said the Civil War produced two truly great men- Lincoln and Forrest. Unbelievable, comparing Lincoln and Forest as equals. From everything I’ve read about Forrest, he appears to be a nihilistic murderer, a fascist, a psychopath and an irredeemable racist. He sold slaves for money before the war, he had them mercilessly and needlessly killed during the war, and terrorized them after the war, when they had been freed. He should have been hung for the Ft. Pillow massacre alone, when the troops under his command bayoneted negro soldiers who had already surrendered. Foote buys in to the revisionist mythology erected around Forrest as propagated by the Nashville Agrarians, a preposterous group of writers centered around Vanderbilt who needed a symbol for southern male virility and the "Lost Cause" ethos. Foote evens apes that ethos, referring to Forrest “all man” and a “natural genius”. That’s Foote’s definition of manhood and genius I suppose, someone who thrives by the remorseless exploitation and slaughtering of a defenseless and despised minority.

Finally, to understand Foote’s “enlightened” views on race, here’s a quote that I lifted from a commentary he wrote that was published in the Wall street Journal a few years ago:

“There is something rather odd in the way America has come to fight its wars since World War II.

For one thing, it is now unimaginable that we would use anything approaching the full measure of our military power (the nuclear option aside) in the wars we fight.

[...]

Why this new minimalism in war?

It began, I believe, in a late-20th-century event that transformed the world more profoundly than the collapse of communism: the world-wide collapse of white supremacy as a source of moral authority, political legitimacy and even sovereignty. . . .Today, the white West--like Germany after the Nazi defeat--lives in a kind of secular penitence in which the slightest echo of past sins brings down withering condemnation. There is now a cloud over white skin where there once was unquestioned authority. I call this white guilt not because it is a guilt of conscience but because people stigmatized with moral crimes--here racism and imperialism--lack moral authority and so act guiltily whether they feel guilt or not.”

And there you have it. In Foote’s view, supremacy precedes moral authority. And it explains why he is seemingly unaware of the racist roots of the war he is supposedly an expert on, why he can, without irony, favorably compare a murderous psychopath to one of the greatest figures in human history,

This is, indeed, an interesting thread. Too bad RETARDO isn't around much these days to chime in on it. I have a recommendation for light reading on the Civil War. Horwitz's Confederates in the Attic is a quick and fun look at reenactors and other buffs. I read it around the time of the Sabr Convention in DC.

I'm a New Englander, so I'm more of a Revolution and Early American history buff, but I prefer McPherson to Foote. I tried to read Foote, but it didn't take at the time. To be honest, I've learned more about the war at a little museum in Rockville, CT as well as some battlefield visits than I did from books. Same thing with the American Revolution. Visiting places like Yorktown, Lexington, Concord over the years were fun and informative.

I want to comment on this as well, because the assumptions embeded in it are so problematic:

And yet Lee outsmarted Grant on several occasions, as Grant himself admits. And I think it's wrong to claim that Grant was some uber-pragmatist. His famous saying was "I will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." It did take all summer. And the autumn. And the winter. And the following spring. It's pretty clear that Grant felt that taking Richmond would be a relatively easy job, but it proved to be much, much tougher than he planned.

Nowhere have I read anything that would indicate Grant thought taking Richmond would be easy. In fact, his intention was not to take Richmond at all. His target was Lee's army. Read what his standing order to Meade was when he became overall commander of the union forces:

...all the Armies are to move together and towards one common center … Sherman will move … [against] Jo Johnston … Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also."

In order to conclude the rebellion, Grant (and Sherman) decided that it wasn't territory that had to conquered but the rebelling armies arrayed against them. Additionally, where did Lee outsmart Grant? Grant would maneuver, Lee would make a guess as to his objective, and there would be periodic confrontations when the armies collided, such as the Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotslvania Courthouse. After a violent battle where Lee's line refused to crumble, Grant would disengage and maneuver again. Grant eventually did outmaneuver Lee, feinting to the right and then moving left across the James River to threaten Richmond from the rear by way of Petersburg. This forced Lee into a siege defense, which he could not survive for long. He ended up surrendering a few months later when the desertion rate became so high, his defensive line was fatally weakened. Grant knew exactly how to defeat Lee, and defeat him he did. It took him about a year.

Another poster asked what WWII book he could give dad for a gift. One I highly recommend is 1942 by Winston Groom. The description of the Coral Sea naval engagement is especially good.

I have a recommendation for light reading on the Civil War. Horwitz's Confederates in the Attic is a quick and fun look at reenactors and other buffs.

Seconded. I read it a couple of years ago (& was astonished to come across one vignette featuring, IIRC, the wife of an instructor at my very small alma mater in southwest Arkansas). The same author's much more serious recent look at John Brown is also quite good.

#122 While what you say about Forrest the man is true, his record on the battlefield was superb.

Brices Crossroads is still taught at Sandhurst (or was the last time I checked) and there are a heck of a lot of other fine battlefield performances. H`is coverage of the retreat from Nashville prevented the Army of Tennessee's complete destuction.

His raids were also extremely effective. In particular the one in the first Vicksburg campaign. (Started with about 2,000 green troopers -- only partly armed. Came back with more men than he'd started with -- armed with captured equipment)

I don't think there's any doubt he was the best cavalry commander of the war. Even then (like Cleburne) he was under-used.

All that to say that it's not a contradiction in term to see Forrest the man as you do and Forrest as one of the few truly great generals to emerge from the war.

Not precisely an equal opportunity maniac, but he's known to have killed at least one Confederate officer in addition to everything else on his resume.

I ended up ordering The Last Stand of Fox Company: A True Story of U.S. Marines in Combat by Bob Drury, Tom Clavin, and The Liberator: One World War II Soldier's 500-Day Odyssey from the Beaches of Sicily to the Gates of Dachau by Alex Kershaw for dad, but thanks for all of the ideas. I book marked this page so I'll use some other of the suggestions in the future.

And I think it's wrong to claim that Grant was some uber-pragmatist. His famous saying was "I will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." It did take all summer. And the autumn. And the winter. And the following spring....

You miss the real kicker to that one. This exchange between Grant and Lincoln occurred during Jubal Early's raid on Washington. Now as I recall it, perhaps in reading Battles and Leaders or somewhere, was that Grant was all set to pack up the entire army and head back north to stop Jubal Early. Rawlins, his chief of staff, and a man who closely managed Grant before during and after the war, told him; "That is exactly what Lee wants you to do.." And convinced him to send Sheridan and whoever else went there.

So this quote is often repeated as some sort of testament to how determined Grant was and yet it seems he could be distracted. Rawlins was a great factor in his success. For his part: Grant was a great writer and communicator of orders. If you read any of his messages or his accounts, it is all very clear and concise what is occuring. YOu can constrast those with say Stonewall Jackson and if you read his orders, it often vague or confusing just exactly what he is saying.

As for Forrest, I think what Foote was saying was that he was a military genius and Lincoln the political genius of the war. Forrest does seem to be some sort of military genius. But it might go to far to say he was the very best cavalryman of the war. Jeb Stuart turned up a lot of information and cause a great deal of confusion on many occasions.

Forrest's escape from the siege at Ft. Donelson is another excellent example of his leadership skills.

Another poster asked what WWII book he could give dad for a gift.

Another one is The Pacific War by Costello, which is probably the best single volume treatment of that half of WW II. He has an interesting style his narrative moves quickly from being in with a company commander in Guadalcanal back to high command in Washington. All without getting too distracted by the details. It's pretty good on that score.

RonJ,

Acknowledged he was an excellent cavalry commander. But what he was being asked to do wasn't decisive. His units were relatively small and on horseback. Unlike an infantry commander, if he felt he was in too tight a spot, he could always disengage. But being a great cavalry commander and being a great man are two entirely different things.

It's difficult to compare the confederate and union commanders because their tasks were so different. The nature of the conflict favored the confederates because they were just trying not to lose, and so hit-and-run, guerrilla-style tactics suited the strengths of a cavalry unit better.

It's a truism that the confederates had the advantage in cavalry at the beginning of the war but by the end, the union cavalry was better, both because of better arms and commanders. Forrest got beat up pretty good by Wilson near the end.

And convinced him to send Sheridan and whoever else went there.

I think it was Wright's corp. Early was significantly delayed at the battle of the Monocacy by none other than Lew Wallace, the guy who was late to Shiloh.

I think it was Wright's corp. Early was significantly delayed at the battle of the Monocacy by none other than Lew Wallace, the guy who was late to Shiloh.

He was probably busy writing "Ben Hur".

Obviously, the right to own slaves was irrelevant to the poor southerners and the yeoman craftsmen and farmers.

The po' whites did have a vested interest in preserving slavery -- less competition for lands and jobs. Exactly how much that figured into their thinking on a day to day basis, I don't know.

Well, that works both ways. Slavery was taking jobs from them, and depressing their earning. The planters and their associated support groups had good direct cause to secede, but the poor whites? What were they fighting for except racism and a figment of the imagination when it came to bottom-line liberty--just the idea of telling people what to do and trying to make them do it can make them dig in their heels, whether that's in personal relationships or political ones. We shouldn't pooh-pooh this as a trivial made-up pretext. It's everywhere when it comes to groups (racial, ethnic, class).

Tactically speaking, what you'uns say is the most brilliant Confederate and Union victory on the battlefield? Second question: the most exciting?

Most brilliant, for the Confederates, it would be Chancellorsville. For the Union, Vicksburg.

Most exciting? That's an ambiguous question. What do you mean by exciting?

I suppose I should explain my reasoning for the above.

Chancellorsville was Lee's masterpiece. He was outnumbered by a significant and yet still had the courage to split his army, sending Jackson's corp on a forced march around the enemy flank to the rear of the enemy without being detected (how Hooker allowed that to happen is one of those mysteries of history that I suppose will never be satisfactorily answered).


But Vicksburg is the masterpiece of the entire war. Thinking about it now, it is almost unbelievable what Grant accomplished, getting both his army and navy south of Vicksburg, crossing the river successfully without getting mauled by an enemy attack, and then curling his army around to the rear of Vicksburg with a hostile army to the front and another to the rear, all while cut off from a supply line, is just a tour de force of daring and organization (now there's a campaign, not a battle but a campaign, that is still studied at Sandhurst).

It's a truism that the confederates had the advantage in cavalry at the beginning of the war but by the end, the union cavalry was better, both because of better arms and commanders. Forrest got beat up pretty good by Wilson near the end.

The more I study the Civil War the more I come to believe that cavalry was what dominated it. The Confederacy whipped the Union repeatedly with mostly inferior numbers and supplies for the first two years largely because they had excellent cavalry under Stuart's command, whereas the Union's cavalry was spotty and often misused by its commanders. Result: McClellan and his successors really didn't know how many men Lee had or where the hell they were much of the time, whereas Lee usually knew exactly where his enemy was and in what strength. By Gettysburg and its aftermath the Union finally got around to assembling real cavalry and a commander who knew how to use it, Stuart got killed, and the Confederacy lost one of its largest advantages.

But Vicksburg is the masterpiece of the entire war. Thinking about it now, it is almost unbelievable what Grant accomplished, getting both his army and navy south of Vicksburg, crossing the river successfully without getting mauled by an enemy attack, and then curling his army around to the rear of Vicksburg with a hostile army to the front and another to the rear, all while cut off from a supply line, is just a tour de force of daring and organization (now there's a campaign, not a battle but a campaign, that is still studied at Sandhurst).

This was my thought as well, both in terms of the most impressive Union victory and, in a strategic sense, one of the most exciting. But it's not a battle, as you point out, rather a long campaign. Every aspect of the Vicksburg campaign is fascinating, particularly on a command level: the multiple failed early attempts at scoring a breakthrough revealed much about Grant's character (namely his willingness both to come up with creative plans and move on from them when they proved impracticable rather than becoming fixated or befuddled), and the execution of the actual overland march confirmed it (i.e. his constant adjustments and on-the-fly improvisations once he was over the river).

In terms of a single battle that just excites me, I will again say that there is nothing quite so improbable in the entire Civil War as the Union army under Thomas climbing up what is essentially a cliff, unbidden, to rout the Confederates on Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga.

Thanks to whoever recommended Grants memoirs. I've had that book on my shelf for years and never felt like reading it. It's quite easy to read.

As for why the south won so much, dont over look that most of these battles were fought on southern soil where they had a significant advantage in enemy intelligence. WHen southern armies moved north, it was often a different story, e.g. Gettysburg, Antietam (a tactical draw), Perryville. Also, defenders seemed to win a good proportion of these battles and of course the south was mostly fighting defensive actions.

I find the assigning of winners and losers to every ACW battle problematic. Many of the battles, even the largest battles, were indecisive and so no winner or loser should be assigned. For instance, Lee is often credited with winning The Wilderness or Spotsylvania Courthouse because his army failed to yield the field when the fighting stopped. But he was also failing to stop Grant from continuing on to his objective, which was to destroy the Army of Virginia. Every battle that was fought between Grant and Lee between the spring and fall of 1864 you could describe as a tactical victory for Lee but also a strategic defeat except for, I think, Cold Harbor. Lee kept losing men and real estate he couldn't afford to lose, even as he kept Grant from shattering his line. Grant forced him into a bloody confrontation he couldn't hope to win. When Lee and Grant faced off against one another in The Wilderness, Grant had a personnel advantage of a little less than 2:1. Less than a year later, it was about 10:1, and Lee was practically out of supplies and ammunition.

You can argue credibly that Lee was the better tactical commander (and I have my doubts about that) but there is no doubt that Grant was the superior general strategically.

IT's very difficult to compare them on their strategic grasp because Lee was never given strategic command whereas Grant more or less had control of all union armies by I think 1864 It is hard to say what Lee would have done in place of Davis/Bragg and whatever else passed for confederate high command.

OTOH it does seem that Lee had little impact on the big picture. Invading Penna. as a way to relieve pressure on VIcksburg makes no sense at all for example. Other than sending Longstreet west in the fall of 1863 there was little in the way of strategic concentrations that characterize generals like Napoleon or Frederick the Great.

My guess it that Lee felt it was not his place to suggest this to the president. Lee seems to be a pretty humble character. But just a guess.

As for assigning w/l in it is always problematical, but you are focusing on a time in the late war when attrition became a viable strategy and it makes these battles difficult to assess. Earlier in the war it is a little easier to assign w/l. THere seemed like a great many battles that were victories for the defender: Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Antietam, Fredericksburg, etc.

It was always easier then to hold your ground and to inflict intolerable casualties when on the defensive. Mobile infantry with air cover and armored support hadn't been invented yet.

Agree about Chancellorsville.

Vicksburg isn't really a tactical success but an operational one. If that counts, does Sherman's march? Or Stonewall in the Valley?

I guess the Union, generally having numerical superiority, didn't have a lot of opportunities for a true tactical victory.

Sherman's March was both a tactical and strategic victory, though there was relatively little actual fighting that went on. Franklin was certainly a tactical victory for the Union. Jackson's campaign in the valley was a tactical and strategic victory, in that it kept the Union forces from preventing Lee from obtaining his supplies there and Lee didn't have to be worried about being attacked from the west, at least for awhile.

How many forces one has to work with doesn't really have anything to do with being credited with tactical victories, beyond that it makes it easier to have them. When you have the better of it despite being outnumbered, it does tend to burnish ones reputation, which is why Lee's is so high. But Lee got his clock cleaned both times he went on the offensive. He even lost to McClellan at Antietam, who gave him every opportunity to win by being so hesitant and timid.

On strategy, people might like The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War by Donald Stoker. It makes some counterintuitive claims, especially about McClellan's strategic sense (which he values highly) and does a good job breaking down different levels of tactical and strategic planning involved in generaling during the war.

When Lee and Grant faced off against one another in The Wilderness, Grant had a personnel advantage of a little less than 2:1. Less than a year later, it was about 10:1, and Lee was practically out of supplies and ammunition.

You can argue credibly that Lee was the better tactical commander (and I have my doubts about that) but there is no doubt that Grant was the superior general strategically.

I think the fact that is lasted almost a year, when Lee started out outnumbered 2:1, shows he was the better tactician. If the superior tactician had 2:1 odds, you'd expect a very quick ending.

Lee couldn't just dig in, he didn't have enough density of troops. If Grant was superior in the operational/tactical realm, he would have maneuvered Lee into a quick defeat.

McClellan would have been much better off if had been given the job of a senior staff officer like the job Halleck had, instead of a field commander. He just wasn't suited to lead an army in battle (nor was Halleck). When he was made overall commander by Lincoln, he should have had the good sense to do what Grant did, and make a subordinate the field commander. But he was probably too inexperienced and full of himself to do that.

What was amazing about the Civil War was how many high profile generals got killed. For the South, you had Polk, Stuart, Cleburne, Jackson, Johnston, AP Hill, Pender, Walker, Rodes and Ramseur. On the Unions side, you had Reynolds, Sedgwick, McPherson, Lyon, Kearney, Stevens and Berry. Unreal, considering the size of the forces involved.

Wat was amazing about the Civil War was how many high profile generals got killed. For the South, you had Polk, Stuart, Cleburne, Jackson, Johnston, AP Hill, Pender, Walker, Rodes and Ramseur. On the Unions side, you had Reynolds, Sedgwick, McPherson, Lyon, Kearney, Stevens and Berry. Unreal, considering the size of the forces involved.

And an interesting co-incidence, the son of a high ranking Confederate general, Simon Buckner Jr., was the highest ranking US officer (Lt general) killed in action in WWII.