But I think that contradicts your earlier view. You think Zhukov's troops were at least somewhat effective when fresh and had been helmed by Zhukov for awhile. Then when the Soviets had its levee en masse they became less effective as they were less well trained. What Zhukov did early on is proof that given proper resources and a political branch that wasn't murderously paranoid he was a pretty good general.

I still don't think they ever were close to equal, man-for-man, battalion-for-battalion to the Germans.

If you want to say Zhukow was "pretty good", I won't make a fuss. My point is he's nowhere close to the ranks of great commanders.

#444 I'd start with the trilogy "The Coming Fury", "Terrible Swift Sword" and "Never Call Retreat"

Obliged.

Fair. But, I put the blame for that heavily on the Generals.

I'd put the blame for that on Stalin.
Not even Hitler churned through the German officer corps the way Stalin did to Russia's- except for the months after Valkyrie failed- but Stalin basically put that kind of pressure on the officer corps for several years without let up.

I think Stalin's Russia is a society that we here really can't imagine, perhaps N. Korea comes closest- people wonder, why didn't someone shoot him? why didn't the people rise up?

Because you and your family were dead if you did, period.

One reason that some German elites finally did take a crack at Hitler was because the old Prussian aristocrats really believed that if they could just knock off Hitler, the people would follow them- no one in Russia had or could have such a sustaining delusion - those who could possibly/remotely be seen as viable substantive leaders - those were the first ones Stalin had knocked off.

No uprisings? By the late 30s anything resembling resistance was met with massive disproportionate force- if too many workers called in sick at the same time? maybe it's an unauthorized job action? Arrest all their family members!

#449 That's advocating suicide. Stalin operated under the assumption that his generals were out to get him. Of course the rather comprehensive purges of the 30s are a big reason for the terrible performance of the army. When you murder the majority of the officer corp bad things happen to the army. Didn't help that one of the surviving Marshals (Budyonny) was aggressively anti-intellectual (against tanks in particular and thinking in general). Anything other than a head-on attack in offense or "die where you stand" on defense was unacceptable to him. (remember that the purges hit all ranks, though though the rates were highest at the senior levels)

When you make showing initiative a capital crime (and in practice it was something very close to this) you're going to get leadership that follows doctrine whether it makes sense at any given moment.

Zhukov really couldn't give complicated orders and expect them to be carried out. He had limited numbers of competent people. The best of the rest were modeled on Chuikov. Plenty of physical courage and that's never a bad thing, but strictly a point A to point B type of guy.

I'd put the blame for that on Stalin.
Not even Hitler churned through the German officer corps the way Stalin did to Russia's- except for the months after Valkyrie failed- but Stalin basically put that kind of pressure on the officer corps for several years without let up.

I think Stalin's Russia is a society that we here really can't imagine, perhaps N. Korea comes closest- people wonder, why didn't someone shoot him? why didn't the people rise up?

Because you and your family were dead if you did, period.

One reason that some German elites finally did take a crack at Hitler was because the old Prussian aristocrats really believed that if they could just knock off Hitler, the people would follow them- no one in Russia had or could have such a sustaining delusion - those who could possibly/remotely be seen as viable substantive leaders - those were the first ones Stalin had knocked off.

No uprisings? By the late 30s anything resembling resistance was met with massive disproportionate force- if too many workers called in sick at the same time? maybe it's an unauthorized job action? Arrest all their family members!

I think the answer is that the Soviet leadership was far more complicit in the Stalinist system than was true in the Nazi case. Most of the top Soviets were either true believers, or sociopathic thugs like Stalin. They believed that they benefited from the system. I think the proportionate of this "totalitarian hard core" was much smaller in the Nazi system than it was in the Soviet. Hell, Beck was ready to kill Hitler in 1941 when Barabrossa was working, Hitler just canceled his visit to Beck's army.

I think the answer is that the Soviet leadership was far more complicit in the Stalinist system than was true in the Nazi case.

The Stalin purges began 15-20 after the revolution- the old elites were long gone- the old Czarist Officer corps was gone- the old Prussian Officer Corp was still alive and kicking into the 1940s-
so yes the Soviet Leadership (civil and military) in the 1930s was in fact "Soviet" leadership, whereas German leadership was not entirely Nazi Leadership- you still had civil and military leaders in Germany even after the war started - who were not Nazi and were in fact holdovers from the pre-Nazi regimes-

but the Nazis weren't far off the Soviets' time scale- had that regime lasted it pretty much would have exterminated the entirety of the non-Nazi leadership class in roughly the same number of years it took the Soviets in Russia.

but the Nazis weren't far off the Soviets' time scale- had that regime lasted it pretty much would have exterminated the entirety of the non-Nazi leadership class in roughly the same number of years it took the Soviets in Russia.

The big difference is that Stalin killed tons of people in what was nominally peacetime, while Hitler's truly mass killing didn't really start until the war. Without the war it's really hard to know how things would've gone in Germany, and Hitler might have lived to a ripe old age without ever fully purging the old elites. (It's also really hard to imagine Hitler not starting the war sooner or later, so the counterfactual is mostly moot.)

Where should one start when first reading Bruce Catton?

WillYoung -

If you want to read just ONE book (as opposed to a trilogy) of Catton's I would strongly, strongly recommend This Hallowed Ground.

I just can't rate a general very highly when with very good equipment (Russian tanks and planes were always at least equal to the German, and often better), and massive numerical superiority, they always suffered casualty rates of 3 to 5 times those they inflicted.

This got me thinking - how can anyone assess the effectiveness of modern US generals specifically Powell/Schwarzkopf and Franks? Obviously casualties were a lot less, but the technological, numerical and political advantages of the US side has got to be one of the most lopsided in modern warfare.

This got me thinking - how can anyone assess the effectiveness of modern US generals specifically Powell/Schwarzkopf and Franks? Obviously casualties were a lot less, but the technological, numerical and political advantages of the US side has got to be one of the most lopsided in modern warfare.

You can't. All you can say is they were competent enough not to screw up.

But, I think 95% of Army officers Captain and above would have won those wars handily too.

All spots have been filled in Diplomacy and now we are just waiting for Brian to confirm. Get ready to roll!

All spots have been filled in Diplomacy and now we are just waiting for Brian to confirm. Get ready to roll!

We better not be freaking Russia and Turkey again.

Game on!

I'm Russia

Snapper: Germany
BourbonSamurai: Austria
Whitebg: France
SHughes: Turkey
jigokumini: England
ManofHarlech: Italy
McCoy: Russia

If the Allies had the stomach to fight the Soviets in 1945, they would have cut through them like a warm knife through butter.

The same Allied army that was fighting the rump end of the Germans -- a German army that was more or less TRYING to lose to the west by 1945 and still took a year to punch through the Rhine?

The 1943 Russian army crushed the Germans to dust. The Germans of WWI-WWII were the single greatest effective army the world has ever known - so not being their equal is not particularly damning.

Yes, they suffered more casualties when on the offense than the Germans did. However, they didn't have the advantage of fighting the hopelessly ill-led 1941 Russian army. How well do you think the 1944 Russian army would have done against the 1941 version?

The same Allied army that was fighting the rump end of the Germans -- a German army that was more or less TRYING to lose to the west by 1945 and still took a year to punch through the Rhine?

The 1943 Russian army crushed the Germans to dust. The Germans of WWI-WWII were the single greatest effective army the world has ever known - so not being their equal is not particularly damning.

Yes, they suffered more casualties when on the offense than the Germans did. However, they didn't have the advantage of fighting the hopelessly ill-led 1941 Russian army. How well do you think the 1944 Russian army would have done against the 1941 version?


They would have done well, but the truth remains that the Soviet Army never reached the proficiency of the British, American, Canadian, Free French, or Polish Army, much less the Germans.

We better not be freaking Russia and Turkey again.

Nope. The curse of having to replay the nation you were just playing last game fell on jigokumini and myself. France again? Ah well.

Yes, they suffered more casualties when on the offense than the Germans did. However, they didn't have the advantage of fighting the hopelessly ill-led 1941 Russian army. How well do you think the 1944 Russian army would have done against the 1941 version?

They also took a severe beating at the Battle of Kursk when they were on the defensive. Any other army would have crumpled and folded after the beating they took but instead the Russians went on the offensive and permanently sent the Germans on the defensive for the rest of the war.

Game on!

I'm Russia

Snapper: Germany
BourbonSamurai: Austria
Whitebg: France
SHughes: Turkey
jigokumini: England
ManofHarlech: Italy
McCoy: Russia

I used to play Dip a lot, might start again. I did not want to play as NattyBoh. Italy sucks.

They also took a severe beating at the Battle of Kursk when they were on the defensive. Any other army would have crumpled and folded after the beating they took but instead the Russians went on the offensive and permanently sent the Germans on the defensive for the rest of the war.

IANAWWIIE, but didn't Operation Husky distract Hitler and the Germans during July of '43?

IANAWWIIE, but didn't Operation Husky distract Hitler and the Germans during July of '43?

If you count a major offensive against a key ally on their home soil as a distraction, then yeah, he was distracted.

OTOH, how could Hitler NOT have been distracted by one thing or another? He was simultaneously managing two fronts, one that was 1500 miles wide and the other on another continent with fronts on both sides of his troops, all the while conducting a U-boat interdiction campaign in the north Atlantic. Against not one, not two, but THREE major powers, all of which could bring superior force in one form or another, either naval, or in material, or in human capital.

I still wonder, what the #### was Hitler thinking when he declared war on the US? He had no agreement with Japan to do so. And Japan didn't declare war on the Soviets when Hitler attacked them. So why did he do it, when he had nothing to gain and everything to lose? Barbarossa had already stalled. Did he just do it out of impulse, like "Hey, our little yellow fascist brothers just bombed the capitalists. Let's bomb them too!". Or was his mind so fevered by the early victories that he couldn't discern the possible from the impossible?

OTOH, how could Hitler NOT have been distracted by one thing or another? He was simultaneously managing two fronts, one that was 1500 miles wide and the other on another continent with fronts on both sides of his troops, all the while conducting a U-boat interdiction campaign in the north Atlantic. Against not one, not two, but THREE major powers, all of which could bring superior force in one form or another, either naval, or in material, or in human capital.

He could have started by listening to Guderian, letting Army Group Center continue on to Moscow after Smolensk, rather than ordering them south to support the lagging attack there... They might have still ended up in the same state as Napoleon - stranded deep in Russia in the depths of winter, but without the pause, there's at east a chance the Siberian reserves don't arrive in time and Moscow falls. It was a critical month of pre-winter weather (as well as more precious reserves and further attrition/losses) that this moronic decision cost the Wehrmacht.

I've seen no evidence that Zhukov's Siberian troops were particularly effective, except when in Dec-Jan '41-'42 when they were fresh fighting exhausted Germans.

But that winter counteroffensive probably saved Moscow...

It's completely understandable why the Japanese wanted no further part of the USSR after getting stomped pretty good a few years prior - besides having plenty on their hands as it was, there really wasn't much to be had from giving the Germans a hand by keeping a good chunk of the Red Army tied up.

I do wonder, though...

Let's say that the corporal lets the generals run the show and that Stalin's spies never learn that Japan has no plans to join the war against him (or even better, that Japan at least feigns the opposite).

You keep the Siberian reserves at least tied up... Presumably, Guderian takes Moscow. I would assume that rather than the slow strangle of Leningrad (also more, better diplomacy to convince the Finns to be more aggressive) - the north collapses as ell.

Army Group South was still in a bit of trouble, but it was also comprised to a greater degree by Germany's Balkan allies - at least, in '41.... If everything north of say... Bryansk collapses, I'm not sure it matters. Hold the line at Moscow - and there's not a whole lot east of it anyway, strategically speaking. Seal off the North Sea routes. So long as the south doesn't completely collapse, you can now wheel the full force south against a Red Army wholly on its heels.

It makes no difference if Hitler was distracted or not. The point was that the Russians took a severe beating, a beating that would have caused any other army on the planet to collapse and retreat, and yet withstood it and then went on the offensive afterwards and never stopped attacking at that point.

Just finished reading Grand Strategy and I think the author makes several good points and one of them in particular is relevant to the Eastern Front. The author talks about a nation's center of gravity and how for the Confederacy that wasn't really cities or land but their army. I believe that holds true for the most part for Russia in WWII as well.

Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad could all fall and it wouldn't put an end to the war or the lethality of the Russians. To knock the Russians out you had to destroy their armies, their will to fight, and their newly built industrial base in the East. Germany could do none of that thus they could never win the war.

The key for the Germans wasn't Moscow or Stalingrad or any other city. It was the Baku oil fields. If they could have gotten those and secured them, then they could have sustained their offensive. Without them, they were toast. Hitler never truly got that, the relationship between supplies and the sustainability of an offensive. I wonder what would have happened if they had made a mad dash for Baku first, then worried about Stalingrad later, instead of the other way around.

You going to leave Stalingrad in your rear during this mad dash? The whole reason the Germans were in Stalingrad was to get to the oil fields south of it. Capturing oil fields without protecting your supply lines is rather pointless.

The key for the Germans wasn't Moscow or Stalingrad or any other city. It was the Baku oil fields. If they could have gotten those and secured them, then they could have sustained their offensive. Without them, they were toast. Hitler never truly got that, the relationship between supplies and the sustainability of an offensive. I wonder what would have happened if they had made a mad dash for Baku first, then worried about Stalingrad later, instead of the other way around.

Then the winter Red Army counteroffensive is centered further south - likely cutting off even more and costing more than "just" what was cut off at Stalingrad... and the Soviets cross the Oder (or more likely, further south through the Balkans crossing the Danube instead) in 44.

Even by '43 - the failed Kursk offensive, for example, which included the new fuel hog Panthers and Tiger tanks - the Wehrmacht still had the fuel available for a major offensive. They needed Baku long-term - but didn't need to seize it in '41 or even '42.... BTW - just a note on the over or underratedness of Zhukov -- he beat Manstein at Kursk, soundly, and presumably - no one is saying Manstein was merely cromulent.

I tend to agree somewhat with McCoy in 474 (and ironically, so did Hitler - it's why he insisted on temporarily diverting Army Group Center... there was more Red Army south to destroy than there was on Center's initially planned route to Moscow)... but you still have to take key strategic points.

Soviet industry was more than able to feed tanks into the Red Army -- but they were relatively reliant on lend-lease trucks...

If the initial Barbarossa plan that Guderian/von Brauchitsch had devised had been followed, I think it had a better chance (again - it was Hitler than interfered and demanded the same -- more emphasis on the southern attack, through the Ukraine and into the Caucasus).

The focus of the thrust should have remained knifing through the center - into Moscow, perhaps continuing all the way to the Volga... Dissolve and reallocate Army group center - setting up the eastern defensive edge, with the infantry component splitting off to move north, perhaps all the way to Archangel or at least hooking up with Army Group North and the Finns, while most of the Center Armor turns south to link up with South -- aiming for either Kursk, Kiev, Rostov, or Stalingrad, depending on how much success Manstein and south had had on their own.... even if it meant the west-most target (Kiev), the Axis is in a much better position... Moscow has fallen, Soviet lend-lease shipments are either in serious trouble or nearly halted, Stalin is probably sacking generals left-and-right, and maybe you even stymie the 'Great Patriotic War' ethos without the backdrop of Stalin staying in Moscow. You've also either cut off and encircled almost the whole remnants of the northern forces.

Most of this could have been accomplished by the '41/'42 winter - without the turn south, Moscow certainly could have been taken.

Come spring - and assuming, too, the Germans don't hold to the silly idea that they'll be in and out of Russia in 3-5 months (i.e., planning all along that the army is going to need winter gear), you've then got the full weight of the panzers to hurl south at the remaining Russian army... whether the Siberian reinforcements are brought to bear or not.

The other big thing I'd have changed -- not stupidly sending in the Einsatzgruppen (SS death squads)... In the Baltics and particularly south in the Ukraine -- there were plenty of areas where the local population was perfectly willing to give it a go of trading Soviet dominance for German. That changed pretty quickly once the death squads showed just how indiscriminately murderous they could be, particularly in the south.

Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad could all fall and it wouldn't put an end to the war or the lethality of the Russians. To knock the Russians out you had to destroy their armies, their will to fight, and their newly built industrial base in the East. Germany could do none of that thus they could never win the war.

I think you undersestimate the importance of Moscow. It was the center of the whole Russian rail network.

I'm not saying the Soviets magically fall if Moscow was taken, but, it would have been a huge hit to their ability to move troops, and resources around the country.

Surely Grand Moff Tarkin is the worst Grand Moff ever.

What about Snodgrass's $30,000 moff?

I've seen suggestions above like, "What if the colonel had let the generals run things" and "It was a bad idea to send in the Einsatzgruppen." But that's asking Hitler not to be Hitler. And if he's not Hitler, then "Let's not have a war at all" becomes something to seriously consider in terms of the national interests of Germany.

I've seen suggestions above like, "What if the colonel had let the generals run things" and "It was a bad idea to send in the Einsatzgruppen." But that's asking Hitler not to be Hitler. And if he's not Hitler, then "Let's not have a war at all" becomes something to seriously consider in terms of the national interests of Germany.

Well that's not a very interesting hypothetical ;-)

I think the point is that a lot of Hitler's actions were driven by irrational hatreds. It's not far fetched to think he could have been a little more controlled by better advisors, or irrational in slightly different directions, e.g.,

1) What if his hatred was confined to Jews and Bolsheviks, and he viewed the Slavs as potential "junior partners" rather than potential helots?
2) What if he had been convinced to settle for exiling the Jews rather than exterminating them? There were serious debates about this among the Nazis.
3) What if he had been a tradition meglomaniacal imperialist w/o the racial undertones? i.e. a smarter, more charismatic, Kaiser Wilhelm.

I still wonder, what the #### was Hitler thinking when he declared war on the US?

He actually didn't give it a lot of thought. Didn't think much of America or Americans.

The only consideration seems to have been that he could allow the U-boats free reign.

The only consideration seems to have been that he could allow the U-boats free reign.

Yes. He seems to have believed that American neutrality was providing major cover for shipment of British war supplies. The U-boats did have a fantastic run in early '42 against unprepared US shipping. But, talk about being penny wise and pound foolish.

Well that's not a very interesting hypothetical ;-)

I think the point is that a lot of Hitler's actions were driven by irrational hatreds. It's not far fetched to think he could have been a little more controlled by better advisors, or irrational in slightly different directions, e.g.,

1) What if his hatred was confined to Jews and Bolsheviks, and he viewed the Slavs as potential "junior partners" rather than potential helots?
2) What if he had been convinced to settle for exiling the Jews rather than exterminating them? There were serious debates about this among the Nazis.
3) What if he had been a tradition meglomaniacal imperialist w/o the racial undertones? i.e. a smarter, more charismatic, Kaiser Wilhelm.

Precisely...

He needed better puppet masters!

...someone/some body of someones to use his evil charisma to rally the nation around singular purposes, but prevent him from having any real control over the course of policy... Heh... a better von Papen!

I've seen suggestions above like, "What if the colonel had let the generals run things" and "It was a bad idea to send in the Einsatzgruppen." But that's asking Hitler not to be Hitler. And if he's not Hitler, then "Let's not have a war at all" becomes something to seriously consider in terms of the national interests of Germany.

Also - to add to 484 --

Don't forget Foch's statement after Versailles -- "This isn't peace, it is an armistice for 20 years". I tend to agree with Foch that war was inevitable -- the composition of the alliances might have been radically different... Maybe a non-Hitler solely looks east or solely looks west.

I think it was inevitable that someone was going to take Germany to war in the 30s or 40s.

Don't forget Foch's statement after Versailles -- "This isn't peace, it is an armistice for 20 years". I tend to agree with Foch that war was inevitable -- the composition of the alliances might have been radically different... Maybe a non-Hitler solely looks east or solely looks west.

I think it was inevitable that someone was going to take Germany to war in the 30s or 40s.

Concur.

I think you undersestimate the importance of Moscow. It was the center of the whole Russian rail network.

Russia doesn't collapse because Germany takes a rail hub. That simply doesn't happen. In war people and armies adapt. Like Russia moving its industrial base east. The Russians built miles and miles of new railway during the war.

I think it was inevitable that someone was going to take Germany to war in the 30s or 40s.

If the Germans didn't go to war the Russians would have. Europe at some point in the 40's was going to be aflame.

He seems to have believed that American neutrality was providing major cover for shipment of British war supplies.

He was right. The US Navy was basically an active participant in the war at that time and it was driving Donitz and company nuts.

Russia doesn't collapse because Germany takes a rail hub. That simply doesn't happen. In war people and armies adapt. Like Russia moving its industrial base east. The Russians built miles and miles of new railway during the war.

Rail hub, and largest industrial and population center.

If the Germans can take and hold Moscow, it become impossible for the Soviets to supply, reinforce Leningrad, the whole north likely falls. Leand Lease can't be moved from Archelangel/Murmansk, even if the north doesn't fall, b/c all the rail line go through Moscow.

Then in '42, the Germans take the Ukraine, easily. Even with Moscow under control, the Soviet armies took a beating in early '43.

I'm not saying the Germans get an automatic win, but taking and holding Moscow in '41, I think they have a 50:50 chance, at least, of fighting the Allies to a stalemate, where they controlled much/all of Central and Eastern Europe.

He was right. The US Navy was basically an active participant in the war at that time and it was driving Donitz and company nuts.

Yes, that's why I said penny wise and pound foolish. They traded a short term gain in the U-boat war for a long term nightmare of US entry.

As I said before land isn't what truly mattered. If the Germans take Msocow without destroying the Soviet army it doesn't mean anything. Look at Napoleon. He absolutely conquered Russia and Moscow but had to slink away because his supply lines were overextended and the Russian army was still out there and still deadly.

People and armies don't just throw up their hands and give up, well, besides the French, because of a setback. Russia would adapt to the new circumstances. The war would be more costlier and probably longer but the end result would be the same. Russia had no incentive to surrender. To surrender meant to die so why do that?

Just catching up with what I supposed, foolishly, was a Royals thread :) Anyway, a bit of sports trivia: first-class football continued to be played in Germany until 23 April 1945, when Bayern Munich defeated 1860 Munich 3-2. It's hardly odd to us in retrospect that major-league baseball was played right through WW2, but to imagine a soccer match in Munich ten days after the Soviets took Vienna is extremely bizarre. But it shows how "normal" life continued to be in unoccupied parts of Germany till the last days of the war.

As I said before land isn't what truly mattered. If the Germans take Msocow without destroying the Soviet army it doesn't mean anything. Look at Napoleon. He absolutely conquered Russia and Moscow but had to slink away because his supply lines were overextended and the Russian army was still out there and still deadly.

Did you see this article that was on Slate recently?

The take away:


What incredible circumstances could have caused the defeat of one of the greatest armies on the European continent, led by one of the greatest generals of all time? Surprisingly, it wasn’t enemy soldiers or the normal privations soldiers experience that devastated Napoleon’s army. Most of his soldiers were battle-hardened young men, so they should have been able to tolerate the cold, hunger, long marches, and fatigue. No, it was a microscopic organism that wreaked havoc and annihilated Napoleon’s army and his grand plans for conquest. A microbe called typhus, spread by a scourge of lice.

As I said before land isn't what truly mattered. If the Germans take Msocow without destroying the Soviet army it doesn't mean anything. Look at Napoleon. He absolutely conquered Russia and Moscow but had to slink away because his supply lines were overextended and the Russian army was still out there and still deadly.

I specifically said "take and hold", Napoleon couldn't hold b/c his army was dying on their feet as CoB points out.

The issue is not land, it's transport, industry and manpower, all of which were heavily concentrated in Moscow.

With the country split like that, it would have been very, very hard for the Soviet Army to maintain its strength. Lend Lease becomes much more complicated, and as it is, the Soviets were flat out of manpower by '45.

Did you see this article that was on Slate recently?

Yes, fascinating. It answers a question I've long had; "How did Napoleon's army go from 500K to 120K, before Borodino, without a major battle?"

Germany by the time they reached the outskirts of Moscow had overrun vast amount of Soviet land. Under their thumb was a vast amount of Soviet manpower and industry and they destroyed or captured most of the Soviets transportation network. Despite that Russia had millions of men in reserve, still had an incredibly large industrial base, one which was largely protected from German encroachment, and their transportation stock was quickly replaced. Moscow itself played virtually no roll in any of that.

Despite the typhus claim Napoleon couldn't take and hold Russia because he would never be able to support his men in that country and destroy the Russian army. Even in the Slate article they state that Napoleon was running into problems well before typhus reared its head and disease is a natural offshoot of the kind of war the French and Russians were waging. The Russians as they retreated devestated the land in front of the French. Impoverishing the area and making an outbreak of a disease a certainty.

According to the Slate article of the 35 bodies they took samples from only 3 of them had traces of typhus.

If the Germans didn't go to war the Russians would have. Europe at some point in the 40's was going to be aflame.

C&C: Red Alert!

Though that scenario is somewhat unrealistic (even setting aside the whole time travel aspect) too, the assumption that Germany without Hitler falls easily onto the side of the western allies is probably incorrect.

the assumption that Germany without Hitler falls easily onto the side of the western allies is probably incorrect.

I would see a more "tradtionalist" Germany forming a bloc of Central and Eastern European countries and leading them in a fight against the Soviets, while France and Britain sat it out.

The great flaw of German statesmanship, for hundreds of years, was viewing the non-Russian slavs as enemies rather than allies. An independent Poland and Ukraine, allied to Germany, and linked by a trade union, would have been a much greater increment to German strength than possessing those same lands by force.

As one historian said, if the Germans raised the Ukranian flag over Kiev instead of the Swastika, they beat the Soviets.