Yeah, the idea that they're guaranteed anything at all in 2013-2018 is utterly silly. These are speculative future wins. And what we do know they were guaranteed is a playoff run in 2012 with a 98 win team. They had precious little respect for that opportunity.

I'm anti-shutdown. I don't agree with his decision because I'm NOT confident that that window is anything.

But that's what he believes. That's what he's openly talked about -- even last week in his response to the anonymous GM who said he hoped the Nats never won anything ever because of the decision.

So he's making the 160 decision based upon his supreme confidence (or arrogance!). And if you're ceding him that, then you might as well give him the other part of his argument. If he didn't think he had a window opening up, then he wouldn't (most likely) have limited Stras to that extent this year.

So he's making the 160 decision based upon his supreme confidence (or arrogance!). And if you're ceding him that, then you might as well give him the other part of his argument.

No. There is no reason to do that. None.

Well then don't stick to the 160 either.

Well then don't stick to the 160 either.

Well, the 160 itself was the first wrong-headed idea, as was pointed out many times. But the arguments here have generally taken it as a given. Even if we take it as a given, we don't have to take every following wrong-headed idea as a given.

Well, sure. But then we're all arguing about nothing. Since 160 only makes sense in the context of Rizzo's other beliefs.

But then arguing about nothing is 99.76% of what this site's about!

(That and doing close reading analyses of other poster's comments and picking them apart...)

But then we're all arguing about nothing.

No, we aren't.

Since 160 only makes sense in the context of Rizzo's other beliefs.

No, it doesn't. It can stand on its own, as so many posts here have acknowledged.

One of the most bizarre aspects of this discussion is the people insisting that Rizzo's plan was not "160."

Zimmermann was shut down at 160.
Strasburg was said to be on the Zimmermann plan.

It was very likely they were going to be shut down within 10-15 innings of each other. Neither was likely to be shutdown before 160 or after 180, and 160 is probably within 5 innings of at least 33% of the distribution of possible endpoints. A pitcher on a plan like this, averaging 5.5 innings per start, will likely be shut down at points in series like 160, 165, 171, 177, with the lower numbers significantly more likely since you would expect the evaluators to have itchy trigger fingers when they get close to what they might consider a "minimum" maximum.

So the odds they both got shut down on their first start ending within the range? At least 1 in 10, maybe much much higher if Rizzo starts raising the bar for continued starts at 160.

News reports all over the place said Rizzo said 160.

Nope. I've seen reports that speculated he'd do it at 160 but I've never seen a report that said Rizzo said 160..

Davey Johnson said Rizzo said 160.

Nope.

I've seen Davey repeatedly answer the question, "After how many innings do you think he'll pitch before he's shut down" with "oh, probably about 160". Never have I seen him or anyone else quoted as saying Rizzo told them to shut Strasburg down at 160.

Rizzo in August nevertheless makes noise about there being no set limit.

I've never seen Rizzo quoted saying anything other than that.

Strasburg was shut down at 160.

After a very bad start, and what could be considered worsening performance over the 2nd half, at least in HR rate/ERA, etc.

Why in the bloody hell are people contesting that Rizzo's plan was 160?

Why in the bloody hell do are people contending it was when there doesn't seem to be a single quote establishing Rizzo ever had a 160 inning plan?

And why in the bloody hell do you and I even care? I mean if you disagree with Rizzo' decision, what difference does it make if he had flexible or inflexible plan?

And I agree with his decision, and if it turns out I'm wrong and his 50 page "plan" was just the sentence "Shutdown at 160 innings" typed over and over again, I'm not sure it matters to me.

The stuff from Andrews was really scary. A re-injury within the next year is very likely to be a career ender. Reinjury is happening to 15- 20% of MLB pitchers undergoing TJ.

Tedium.

I mean if you disagree with Rizzo' decision, what difference does it make if he had flexible or inflexible plan?

Really? You're serious with this question?

Detweiler would have been the guy who didn't start if Strasburg started. They still would have been trying to limit Strasburg's innings, so he wouldn't have been in the games 1 and 5 position. He'd probably have made only one start, and the start Detweiler made was as good as Strasburg's would have been. Not having Strasburg didn't cost them the NLDS. I think everyone here really knows that, though.

So while you can reallocate those innings, it doesn't make sense to do so unless you're also giving ground to the second part of his arguments and beliefs.

So again we have to be handcuffed to Rizzo's stupid decisions in order to show there was better options out there. That doesn't make sense.

Tedium.

The word you're looking for is 'piffle'.

Not that it matters at all to this argument, but Strasburg was supposed to have another start that would have put him over the mythical 160 if hadn't pitched so crappy after they told him that he had two left.

So again we have to be handcuffed to Rizzo's stupid decisions in order to show there was better options out there. That doesn't make sense.

No. But if you're handcuffing yourself to 160, you need to realize why Rizzo did it that way, and all the thinking that went into it. He didn't pitch him in relief because he was trying to train a starting pitcher to handle a regular turn for 75% of the regular season.

So reallocating those 160 innings doesn't make sense as an academic exercise unless you're coming from the mindset of Rizzo: that the limit is to help 2013-2018, and whatever happens this year happens. If you don't agree with that, then don't limit yourself to shuffling around those 160 innings.

The approach I think they should've taken was careful scrutiny of his delivery/mechanics/command. And evaluated him on a start-by-start basis, particularly as he got closer to the 25 or so start mark. If he started slipping, and showing signs that command was going out of whack, then make a decision to rest him or shut him down. And maybe that's what they did, with all the gum-flapping about innings limits being a sort of cover.

Rizzo really did talk a lot about the eye test. And while he never really said anything about an innings limit, he didn't do a whole lot to shoot it down either. Maybe they were doing things behind the scenes... scouting their own player closely, monitoring him with pitchfx... there are any number of ways they could've looked at the issue rather than just a simple count. We don't have any evidence that they were doing it that way, nor do we have any evidence that they don't. The team simply refused to talk about what they were doing, other than letting Rizzo stand out front, taking the heat on how he was "the one who decides" (or whatever phrase he used).

One can also view 160 as a proxy to keeping Strasburg from not pitching while fatigued or overworking him. I for one said shutting him down for a month would allow them to have Strasburg throw more than 160 innings if they needed him to. Others have said that 160 innings is false precision. Nobody is handcuffing themselves to Rizzo's silly notions. Which is our point. There were better options and he didn't employ them.

I don't really understand the notion that we should use him until he gets tired and then do something about it. Wouldn't a better plan be to keep him from getting fatigued period?

I don't really understand the notion that we should use him until he gets tired and then do something about it. Wouldn't a better plan be to keep him from getting fatigued period?

Yes - and this relates to my posts of Dr. Andrews and Dr. Yocum a long time back.

This decision was a short term vs. long term choice based on balancing the physical health and productive career of the player and the economic status of the franchise. A lot of money was paid up front for Stras and the team wants to be sure that they get yearly returns in the future on that investment. That's all!

Having thrown 5 1/3 innings in relief in game one and 2 innings in relief in game two of a doubleheader in a AAA playoff run and completely toasting my arm, I have a different view than the "go for it now" crowd posting here.

Having thrown 5 1/3 innings in relief in game one and 2 innings in relief in game two of a doubleheader in a AAA playoff run and completely toasting my arm, I have a different view than the "go for it now" crowd posting here.

To be fair, Bob, nobody is remotely suggesting such a thing for Strasburg. Most of us are perfectly fine with a ~160 IP limit as a precautionary measure, we just think those innings should have been allocated with some acknowledgment of the Nationals playoff chances/realities in 2012.

How much more confidence did the team gain in "getting yearly returns in the future on that investment" by pitching him April through August, as opposed to May through Sep/Oct? How much more confidence did they gain by not skipping alternate starts after the all-star break? How much more confidence did they gain by not giving him 2-4 weeks of rest in July/August, the same that he would have received if he had suffered a minor non-throwing injury during the season?

Rizzo left a non-injured all-star starting pitcher with a career 135 ERA+, 11.2 K/9, and 4.7 K/BB off his playoff roster (and effectively off his September pennant race roster). Call me naive, but I think that's going to have more effect on the Nationals fortunes 2012-2018 than any of the usage modifications I suggested above.

BPro's writers picked the Nats to finish 4th. Only Adam Rubin at ESPN picked the Nats to win the division. Jon Heyman also predicted the Nats would win the division, and I wouldn't build a predictive model around his brand of logic.

So, I am at a bit of a loss as to when the team "knew" they were playoff bound and not merely spouting pre-season bromides.

So, I am at a bit of a loss as to when the team "knew" they were playoff bound and not merely spouting pre-season bromides

I would say they "knew" they were in the playoff hunt by some point in May.

I would say they "knew" they were in the playoff hunt by some point in May.

And by July their probability of making the postseason was high.

Pitchers are creatures of habit - they exist best on a set and regular schedule of throwing between starts and working out through the entire season. Anything that changes their schedule is deleterious to their performance.

The "best" way to play the July/August/September innings reduction game would have been to drop Strasburg from the rotation after off days and keep the other 4 starters on a regular rotation. But, would the other 80% of the rotation have performed as well in September and in the playoffs with this minor innings increase?

Strasburg would have needed to skip something like 3 starts before September 1st. They could have gone with Lannan on those days.

The likelihood of playing meaningful September games was a lock by the ASB. They shut Strasburg down September 7. My gripe is not only that he was not available for the playoffs but even moreso that he was unavailable for what could have been the most critical part of the schedule. Transition to relief at the ASB, when he had 99 IP, would have meant they could have easily kept him under 60 IP for the rest of the season and the post-season if there was one and still gotten a good return by using him in in high leverage situations. And if they had had him in the pen in the Cardinals series it may very well have turned out differently because their pen was a disaster. Their closer was hurt for a large part of the year. As I alluded in the first post of this thread I just couldn't understand why they just kept running him out there for 5-6 IP at a time when it was obvious to everybody in the baseball world that they could ration his use a little, still get a big impact, and keep the injury concern to a minimum. We are talking about what, 15 IP a month for a closer or set up guy? Insist on 2-3 days rest between appearances, whatever. Just keep him available because now you playing for real.

BPro's writers picked the Nats to finish 4th. Only Adam Rubin at ESPN picked the Nats to win the division. Jon Heyman also predicted the Nats would win the division, and I wouldn't build a predictive model around his brand of logic.

They were an 80-win team last season, without a full season of Zimmermann, without Gonzalez and Jackson, and only a token September performance from Strasburg himself. In fact, it's been mentioned on this thread that Rizzo signed Jackson to give them 3 good starters once Strasburg was shut down in September, suggesting that Rizzo expected some level of playoff contention.

Sure, pitchers are creatures of habit, I pitched some too (in high school, no big deal). But situations are not always optimal and adjustments are usually necessary. All the Yankee fans were sure Kuroda would get pounded on short rest Sunday because he had never done it and was better on long rest. Well, he was spectacular. Strasburg is not some fragile porcelain doll. And no one is asking him to pitch both ends of a doubleheader or do any Robin Roberts endurance contests. A change in his usage pattern is not necessarily in and of itself a risk of further injury. They could have shifted him to the bullpen and probably kept him stronger and under 150 IP for the whole season. And then have the whole off season to transition back to starting. I don't see the problem.

Pitchers are creatures of habit - they exist best on a set and regular schedule of throwing between starts and working out through the entire season. Anything that changes their schedule is deleterious to their performance.

The "best" way to play the July/August/September innings reduction game would have been to drop Strasburg from the rotation after off days and keep the other 4 starters on a regular rotation. But, would the other 80% of the rotation have performed as well in September and in the playoffs with this minor innings increase?

First of all, they had Lannan to take Strasburg's "skipped" starts. No re-shuffling of the rotation was necessary. I think most teams don't skip the fifth starter's spot on off-days anymore either, so aren't starters used to varying amounts of rest?

Secondly, this is really shifting the goalposts here. I thought the Rizzo plan was all about "getting yearly returns in the future on that investment" but now we're quibbling about how skipping the fifth starter on off-days affects the short-term performance of the other 4 starters on the staff?

Also, I'm sure pitchers love to set their schedules, and agents love to determine their client's usage, but when those things fully override even the most simple, uncontroversial approaches to optimal postseason roster construction, it's bound to generate complaints. Both by fans, media, and other GMs. I'm sure Rizzo will be fine, though.

Again, the reason Rizzo refused to transition him to relief is because he wanted Strasburg to build up a starting pitcher's tolerance. This wasn't about getting Strasburg 160 innings. It was about getting Strasburg 160 innings as a starting pitcher, working every fifth day and getting into that rhythm so that they could cut him loose NEXT season.

Switching him to relief was not something they actively considered because they believed that he would most benefit NEXT season by being a starter full time THIS year.

Yes, there are other approaches they could've and perhaps should've taken... but you have to also realize the reason why they resisted a move to relief.

We can cite how the Rays handled Price and the tradition of many other rookie SP starting in the pen, but they would just counter that this case is different because of the recovery aspect.

We all realize why Rizzo did what he did. The debate isn't about his motivations, well, other than there being an issue of Rizzo valuing future unknown years over a known present year.

We all realize why Rizzo did what he did. The debate isn't about his motivations, well, other than there being an issue of Rizzo valuing future unknown years over a known present year.

Right. The criticism is not that he developed a plan; it's that he developed a plan and then showed a total lack of flexibility thereafter (despite the fact that it was clear at least by July where the Nats were headed) assigning false precision to the plan in the face of other options that were just as reasonable. And in so doing he scoffed at a championship run with perhaps the best team in the league while prioritizing speculative future runs over the run that was already in the queue.

And at that, Yocum's initial statement basically said that he was not consulted, with his second statement attempting to walk that back a bit while contradicting his first statement in a number of key respects that led to a bizarre juxtaposition.

But Rizzo totally had a 50-page binder, man.

You guys are still at it? A few years from now, some screenwriter will write a scene with a character who's revealed to be an obsessive and somewhat crazy baseball fan when he frantically insists "You know, the Nationals would have been World Champions in 2012 if only they hadn't sat down Strasburg. I sent Mike Rizzo my plan to start Strasburg's season in May, skip some starts in June and July, make him a reliever in August, and put him on the DL for September -- but he just wouldn't listen."

Unfortunately, the line falls flat with audiences, because no one has any idea what he's talking about....

You're still at it?

Unfortunately, the line falls flat with audiences, because no one has any idea what he's talking about....

I don't know about that. If Strasburg blows out his arm in 2013 and the Nationals don't make the playoffs for the rest of the decade, I think people will be talking about the shutdown and the lost opportunity for quite some time.

I don't know about that. If Strasburg blows out his arm in 2013 and the Nationals don't make the playoffs for the rest of the decade, I think people will be talking about the shutdown and the lost opportunity for quite some time.

If Strasburg blows out his arm next year, you think fans will consider that vindication for the "stop coddling Strasburg and increase his workload" view? That's more than a little counter-intuitive. Evidence of Strasburg's fragility makes Rizzo's case at least as much as his critics'. That's like arguing the Nats were wrong to "baby" Strasburg in 2010 because he ended up needing TJ surgery -- an argument that's been persuasive to virtually no one.

As for not making the playoffs the next few years, that would obviously be very disappointing and presumably hurt Rizzo's reputation. But if that happens, then the view that the 2012 Nats were the "best team in baseball" will seem far less credible (since the same core of players, sans SS, will have failed to be even one of the top 33% of NL teams for multiple years), so 2012 will seem less like the magical opportunity that some now see. And to the extent anyone spends time thinking about 2012 could-beens, the name "Storen" will come up about 10x more often than the name "Rizzo" (with "Davey" somewhere in between). (Not fair, but the reality.)

And Rizzo will also be protected by the more general trend that as time goes by the notion that "we should stop babying pitchers and let them pitch" will become an increasingly marginalized view, understood as something said by cranky old men who don't understand the modern game. Younger fans will wonder "did people really used to argue about whether young pitchers need to be protected?", just as they will be puzzled to learn of global warming deniers and opponents of gay marriage. Whether Rizzo was right or wrong in this case, he will be seen as being on the right side of baseball history.

Gio, Edwin Jackson and Zimmermann all made two appearances in the series. Strasburg probably would have been available for at least one relief appearance, even if he had made only one start.

Valid point. I doubt it moves the dial on the expected winning % though.

If Strasburg blows his arm out in 2013 it will show that Rizzo's plan was faulty and that a different route could have been chosen. Rizzo punted 2012 specifically so that he could protect Strasburg's arm. His arm falling off will be a sign that he failed to do that, big time. Especially when you factor in that recovery from TJ surgery is extremely high. 2012 will be viewed as a wasted chance for a title so that the Nationals could gain absolutely nothing in the future.

If Strasburg blows out his arm next year, you think fans will consider that vindication for the "stop coddling Strasburg and increase his workload" view? That's more than a little counter-intuitive. Evidence of Strasburg's fragility makes Rizzo's case at least as much as his critics'. That's like arguing the Nats were wrong to "baby" Strasburg in 2010 because he ended up needing TJ surgery -- an argument that's been persuasive to virtually no one.

Not at all. The whole idea of limiting Strasburg in 2012 is based on balancing present value with potential future value. If the future value part of the proposition ends up a bust, it certainly makes the decision look very bad in hindsight. (I'm not saying that we should evaluate the intelligence of the decision based on hindsight, but we certainly can evaluate the results that way.)

2010 is an entirely different animal: there was really practically no present value to be sacrificed. The Nationals lost 93 games that season, and that's an entirely different risk-reward calculation.

If Strasburg blows out his arm in 2013, it would further establish that even the most cautious approach is still far from a guarantee of future health, but a highly speculative proposition. The thing we know best is the now; without the benefit of hindsight, it is very likely that the 2012 Nationals are a better playoff team with Strasburg than without him. (With the benefit of hindsight, considering the bad start from Jackson and the bullpen issues, having even another reliable live arm on the staff certainly would have been of value.)

Also, it's not about whether or not Strasburg should be coddled. I have yet to see any poster in this thread suggest that the Nationals shouldn't have had some sort of reduced-work plan for 2012. The questions are whether this was the most effective strategy for limiting Strasburg's risk in 2012, whether such a strategy should be more flexible that this one was, and whether a shot at a title should factor into that risk/reward calculation. To most of us here, the answers appear to be NO, YES, and YES. If Strasburg blows out his arm in 2013, it's hard to say this strategy worked in preserving his arm (making the first two answers seem more reasonable). If the Nationals never get to the playoffs again, it makes the 2012 chance for a title more precious (making the third answer seem more reasonable).

And Rizzo will also be protected by the more general trend that as time goes by the notion that "we should stop babying pitchers and let them pitch" will become an increasingly marginalized view, understood as something said by cranky old men who don't understand the modern game.

This is really an argument directed at Sir Not Appearing In This Thread. It's not particularly helpful to the discussion.

Also, it's not about whether or not Strasburg should be coddled. I have yet to see any poster in this thread suggest that the Nationals shouldn't have had some sort of reduced-work plan for 2012.

CrosbyBird: the question I raised, and you responded to, is whether large numbers of fans (or Nats fans) will be upset about this decision some years from now. I think that is exceedingly unlikely, for the reasons I gave. You provide the reasons that Rizzo's critics will feel vindicated under your scenario, and I'm sure you are right. But that's the point: both sides can and will take any outcome as justification for their view. In the end, I don't see very many Nats fans feeling this is a black-and-white issue -- it's balancing unknown risks against a small advantage. It just isn't that a big deal and will be mostly forgotten about. This isn't Bartman or Grady Little leaving Pedro in too long. On a 1-10 outraged fan scale, it's maybe a 2. And that's under the conditions you stipulate (Strasburg gets hurt, Nats achieve squat).

I don't really get your final point. The issue at hand is how Rizzo's decision will be judged by "history," and my point is entirely germane to that.

But Rizzo totally had a 50-page binder, man.

But it was only one binder and it wasn't full of women.