The idea of 'replacement level' doesn't really work for defence, except to indicate the player who will be taken out in the late innings of a close game.

A replacement-level hitter might well field his position better than about a third of a league regulars.

Replacement level should always be thought of in terms of the overall player, not separately by offense and defense, because of this. But one contrast between Cabrera and Trout would be, if you suddenly had to replace Miguel Cabrera, you'd lose a ton of offense, but you might actually be able to replace him with a BETTER defender. If you had to replace Mike Trout, you'd almost certainly have to replace him with a player who was worse at everything: worse hitter, worse baserunner, and worse fielder.

That's at least -- at least -- double the number of extra good outcomes for comparably capable fielders. Moreover, Thome's good outcomes included 49 homeruns and a bunch of extra base hits. Other than the occasional robbed home runs, fielders can't "hit" homeruns (by aaving them). Middle infielders really can't even "hit" extra base hits, only singles.

OK. The difference between Thome and Perez in 2002 was 120 batting runs. WAR usually estimates the difference between the best and worst fielders as what, 40 or 50?

Edit: Also, a big chunk of Thome's advantage over Perez was in walks, which are actually less valuable than most fielding events.

If you had to replace Mike Trout, you'd almost certainly have to replace him with a player who was worse at everything: worse hitter, worse baserunner, and worse fielder.

Unless you were the 2012 Angels, who can replace him with a better defender.

One thing that I've been trying to fit is the idea that teams (especially in the AL) simply don't have the room to carry a backup 3B on their bench. If Cabrera missed a game every 2 weeks, he'd be replaced by a utility infielder. I wonder if durability is more valuable at certain positions.

We've tread over this ground for 10 years, but, obviously it's because the offensive stats count REAL things (singles, homeruns, etc) and we're not sure if the defensive ones do or not. You cannot deny that Neifi Perez just hit a homrun - but was that catch that Pete Incaviglia made a tough one? Who knows?

fra paolo already answered this, but defensive stats count the POs (or assists) made. Those are actual events. In the case of both offensive and defensive metrics, those actual events are then translated into runs. You can argue about the translation, but both begin with actual events.

This whole debate seems to me to be a diversion from the real issue, namely, that baserunning and defense should count for MVP balloting. WAR isn't the reason why Trout should win, it's an estimate of the extra value he provides by his baserunning and defense.

fra paolo already answered this, but defensive stats count the POs (or assists) made. Those are actual events. In the case of both offensive and defensive metrics, those actual events are then translated into runs. You can argue about the translation, but both begin with actual events.

Yes, that's right.

That's not really how it works, though. Even the best hitters make outs in at least half of their PA, Bonds excepted, and replacement level hitters don't make outs all the time. The difference comes in (1) the number of plate appearances that have positive outcomes, and (2) the magnitude of those positive outcomes.

The numbers isn't about the totals at the end of the year, but about the potential variance per play. With every plate appearance there is a wide range of potential variance, every single time. With fielded balls, that isn't the case. A routine fly ball to the fielder is going to be fielded 99+% of the time, regardless of how good of a player he is, and in a potential worse case scenario the range of potentials for most plays is a difference between an out and batter on first(maybe second). With fielding it's about trying to gauge which plays are the plays that have the widest potential of variance and measuring those plays only.

fra paolo already answered this, but defensive stats count the POs (or assists) made. Those are actual events. In the case of both offensive and defensive metrics, those actual events are then translated into runs. You can argue about the translation, but both begin with actual events.

The underlying assumption of every single defensive method (except fielding percentage) is that all other things being equal the better fielder will turn more balls put in play into outs.

The problem is sussing out the various things that skew this. Real position level park effects, dealing with discretionary chances as well as unequal distribution of difficult chances.

I'm doubtful we'll ever get a "true" answer (as in precision to the tenth of a run) though I'm confident we can eventually cut the level of uncertainty.

Replacement level should always be thought of in terms of the overall player, not separately by offense and defense, because of this.

Which to my mind is a reason why, in certain debates, I still cling to old-fashioned league average as opposed to replacement level.

if you suddenly had to replace Miguel Cabrera, you'd lose a ton of offense, but you might actually be able to replace him with a BETTER defender.

This, though, suggests a problem that relates to issues with RBI and defensive statistics. It's not Miguel Cabrera's fault that he's been asked to move to 3b. At 1b, his defensive shortcomings had significantly less impact on the team, going by the 'advanced' metrics.

I'd give Cabrera a little bit of leeway on his defence for exactly that reason.

One thing that I've been trying to fit is the idea that teams (especially in the AL) simply don't have the room to carry a backup 3B on their bench. If Cabrera missed a game every 2 weeks, he'd be replaced by a utility infielder. I wonder if durability is more valuable at certain positions

Though I wonder (again, especially in the AL) whether many teams really have a backup SS or 2B either, anymore. The Rangers (the only team whose roster I can remotely keep up with), before rosters expanded in September, were carrying 12 pitchers, 2 catchers, 4 outfielders, 4 starting infielders, and a DH (usually), which left two roster slots. For much of the season these were held by Alberto Gonzalez, a generic 456 kind of guy, and Brandon Snyder, who can play first, third, the outfield, and catch in an emergency, and I bet if you asked him he'd play SS or 2B too. As a result, their depth depended a lot on the fact that one of their C can play 1B, one of their 1B can play RF, anyone can DH, and their DH can play everywhere badly (including 3B). This kind of musical chairs (even involving the catchers a lot of the time) seems to prevail nowadays, though my sample size is admittedly one team.

The numbers isn't about the totals at the end of the year, but about the potential variance per play.

No, it's about the actual variance per play. The fact that it's theoretically possible for Matt Wieters to hit a home run in each of his plate appearances will only matter if he actually does it someday.

Though I wonder (again, especially in the AL) whether many teams really have a backup SS or 2B either, anymore.

I think most of them do. Looking at stats, only the White Sox really didn't.

It's not Miguel Cabrera's fault that he's been asked to move to 3b. At 1b, his defensive shortcomings had significantly less impact on the team, going by the 'advanced' metrics.

In this case, at least according to the BBref metrics, Cabrera's WAR is helped by the move to 3rd base. Over the previous 4 years he averaged -5 runs as a 1B. Playing third, some predicted he'd be a disaster, but BBref has him at a very non-disaster rating of -5.

Looking at the most simple defensive stat, the same guy who made 13 errors at first base in both 2010 and 2011 has made only 13 errors playing third base this year.

at least according to the BBref metrics

Fangraphs
2011 1b -3 DRS, -3.8 UZR
2012 3b -5 DRS, -9.2 UZR

Relative to the league Cabrera is either the worst or one of the worst regular 3bs in 2012, depending on how one wants to define 'regular'. I would be surprised if he is plumbing the depths of the historically bad. At 1b in 2011, he was a below average 1b, but with a bit of distance between him and the bottom.

EDIT: Looking at some other seasons, Mark Reynolds for Baltimore in 2011 or Mark Teahen for KC in 2005 might be my definition of 'historically bad'.

whether many teams really have a backup SS or 2B either, anymore

I think most of them do

But is it the same guy, or truly one dedicated bench SS and one bench 2B? And how many also play 3B? I am truly clueless but curious.

#214 An AL team carrying 12 pitchers only has 4 spots on the bench. Unless your 4th OF or your backup catcher can play third there's just no way to carry two single position middle infielders. (even then it's probably tactically less than optimum. Can't do much platooning and it's tough to carry a good pinch-hitting option.)

But is it the same guy, or truly one dedicated bench SS and one bench 2B? And how many also play 3B? I am truly clueless but curious.

Almost all one guy. Usually a 2Bmen who's stretched at SS.

NYY - Nix: SS and 2B
BAL - Flaherty at 2B and if they needed to (pre-September) I assume Andino would have moved to SS so he covers that spot too.
TB - Sean Rodriguez at SS and 2B (though they have dozens of guys who can play either)
TOR - Vizquel at both
BOS - They had Punto at both for most of the season
DET - Ramon Santiago at SS and 2B
CHW - None
KC - Yuni for most of the year at 2B. I assume he would have covered SS too.
CLE - Jason Donald, I guess. Really boring team.
MIN - Jamey Carroll at both.
TEX - Alberto Gonzalez at both even though they don't really need him with Young on the team.
OAK - They have three guys (Rosales, Hicks, Sogard). I assume only one was on the team at a time.
LAA - Maicer at both.
SEA - Munenori Kawasaki at both.

Relative to the league Cabrera is either the worst or one of the worst regular 3bs in 2012, depending on how one wants to define 'regular'. I would be surprised if he is plumbing the depths of the historically bad. At 1b in 2011, he was a below average 1b, but with a bit of distance between him and the bottom.

Using UZR, he's -4 as a 1B in 2011, but also gets a -10 positional adjustment. In 2012, he's -9 at 3B, so worse compared to his competition, but now gets a +2 position adjustment. So by either WAR calculation he rates higher after the move. That's a credit to Cabrera, for playing the position better than most people expected he would.

I've been lurking, but I'd like to say that this is one of the most interesting baseball threads on the site in ages. What are the odds?

Replacement level should always be thought of in terms of the overall player, not separately by offense and defense, because of this.

I agree with this statement mainly because the theoretical replacement player would have to play both sides of the ball. It also seems that, at premium defensive positions, there are more guys who are passable defensively and not remotely passable offensively than the other way around. I suppose that is a byproduct of guys being pushed down the defensive spectrum if the bat can play, but having no where to put them if only the glove can play.

The difference between passer rating and WAR is that passer rating is an official stat. Link. Once Elias starts calculating WAR, Madden will use it. I don't think Madden and company would quote something like DVOA if they were writing about football.

The difference between passer rating and WAR is that passer rating is an official stat. Link. Once Elias starts calculating WAR, Madden will use it. I don't think Madden and company would quote something like DVOA if they were writing about football.

And also plenty of writers mock passer rating. Any time a quality QB with a low rating runs up some wins you see the mockery come out. So it's not like Passer Rating is treated as the be-all and end-all by these same writers.

But coaches seem to seek to maximize QB ratings the same way that managers maximize SVs.

6-1, 2 outs in the 9th, 2 on, wow, the card tells the MGR he can actually hand out a SV here - so yes, here is my closer entering the game. But at 4-1 in the 9th, no out after a setup man allows a leadoff HR - no closer against this meat of the order, but no closer appearance at that point because the card correctly notes "not a SV situation" (tying run not on deck, didn't start the inning, and the dumb rule doesn't know or care how many outs there are or who is coming up).

NFL coaches are even dumber, so they don't as consciously bow to the QB rating. But look at how much the completion PCTs have soared. Down 14 pts with 8 minutes left, you'll almost never see that QB throw a 40-yard pass in the air, even though two of the three Truest Outcomes are CATCH and Pass Interference on the defense (granting that INC is the most likely of the 3).

Instead, the coach will work the clock methodically, to the delight of the defense, picking up 3-5 yards at a time as the clock runs. Great for the QB passer rating, bad for Win Probability. The typical NFL coach seems to try to score a TD with as little time left as possible, then fail in an onside kick scenario at a point where he'll likely lose even if his team recovers the onside kick.

I'm not going to say that this 2012 QB with the better QB rating is better than the one from 1965, given how the game was played.

1. Darwin Barney isn't a better player than Josh Hamilton.

That is not self evident to me. I like how people can throw out a metric they don't like without proving why. And this is a one season stat you are comparing. Barney may not be a better true talent player than Hamilton, but Barney is having a hell of a year. I was skeptical of his defensive stats until I actually saw him play defense for about quite a few games this season. He is an incredible defensive infielder. I haven't seen Hamilton play as much, but what I have seen this year wouldn't lead me to question negative defensive metrics. As others have said, WAR is not the be all, end all stat. But I don't throw it out just because the result isn't what I'm predisposed to believe.

NFL coaches are even dumber, so they don't as consciously bow to the QB rating. But look at how much the completion PCTs have soared. Down 14 pts with 8 minutes left, you'll almost never see that QB throw a 40-yard pass in the air, even though two of the three Truest Outcomes are CATCH and Pass Interference on the defense (granting that INC is the most likely of the 3).

Instead, the coach will work the clock methodically, to the delight of the defense, picking up 3-5 yards at a time as the clock runs. Great for the QB passer rating, bad for Win Probability. The typical NFL coach seems to try to score a TD with as little time left as possible, then fail in an onside kick scenario at a point where he'll likely lose even if his team recovers the onside kick.

Uh ... this is the optimal strategy.

SugarBearBlanks can suck my balls.

But at 4-1 in the 9th, no out after a setup man allows a leadoff HR - no closer against this meat of the order, but no closer appearance at that point because the card correctly notes "not a SV situation"

Just to be picky, this is a save situation, as the rule has an exception carved out for pitching the final inning with a three-run lead. (And thank God for that.)

In terms of the actual point here... it doesn't strike me as odd that Trout's defensive WAR is so high. And as many have said, I think it's a red herring to even be discussing fielding WAR in terms of the 2012 AL MVP, when the larger point is that Trout is a comparable offensive player to Cabrera and no one is seriously disputing that Trout has far more defensive value. I think what does strike people as odd -- including me -- is when a guy who isn't a CF or SS is being rated as one of the most valuable defensive players in baseball. And to be honest, I suspect that those evaluations are simply incorrect. But even just in terms of trying to understand the old guard's perceptions, I'd definitely distinguish between situations where it's being claimed that Andruw Jones or Ozzie Smith is adding more value solely with his glove than most guys do with their entire game, as opposed to situations where it's being claimed that Carl Crawford, Darwin Barney or Brett Lawrie are doing that.

BTW, I do hate the name "WAR", and I hated Bill James' idea to rename assists "baserunner kills". Baseball is pastoral. (Not to mention we wouldn't have to hear that ####### Edwin Starr joke.) Anyway.

The problem with WAR is the name. No one wants to buy into a concept that celebrates the killing of small innocent children holding puppies. My suggestion is to rename it:

PEACE
Perfect
Evaluator (of)
Actual
Comprehensive
Excellence.

You left out the "R" - that should be "PEARCE" - Perfect Evaluator (of) Actual Remeasurable Comprehensive Excellence. It would be easy to remember, too, since it so clearly reminds us of the perfect replacement level player - Steve Pearce!

I confess I had no clue who Darwin Barney is, and I've finally looked him up. A .661 OPS (80 OPS+) at 2B. 4.5 WAR and 1.4 oWAR. So if I'm doing this right, 31% of his value has been in his offense, and 69% in his defense.

What about doing something like dividing the weight of the defense component by, say, 3? So make the weight of the defense only 23% of his total value, to account for the fact that we are far less confident in evaluations of defense than we are of offense. Then he'd be something like 2.5 WAR (1.4 oWAR + 1.0 dWAR) instead of 4.5 WAR (1.4 oWAR + 3.1 dWAR).

Comments? Am I off the reservation here?

EDIT: Or at least do something like use an average of the other defensive metrics rather than just relying on one.

EDIT: Or at least do something like use an average of the other defensive metrics rather than just relying on one.

That's sort of what I do in my (patented) end of season assessments. Take defensive numbers from a couple different places and just arbitrarily pick a number that seems to make sense. Not especially scientific but I'm ok with a degree of uncertainty about these things.

I confess I had no clue who Darwin Barney is, and I've finally looked him up. A .661 OPS (80 OPS+) at 2B. 4.5 WAR and 1.4 oWAR. So if I'm doing this right, 31% of his value has been in his offense, and 69% in his defense.

It might be even more than that depending on how you break things down since oWAR includes a positional adjustment.

EDIT: As a comparison of oWAR v. WAR, Ozzie Smith looks like he maxed out at about 50% by that calculation. Adam Everett hovered around the zero mark in oWAR most of his career so he gets wonky things like over 100% of his value coming from defence at times. Similarly Mark Belanger had 37.6 career WAR with 11.3 oWAR - 70% coming from defence. For Smith and Belanger their WAR totals seem in accordance with how they were perceived as players at the time (Smith anyway, Belanger was before my time).

"Uh ... this is the optimal strategy."

for the team that is ahead, agreed.

For the team trailing, better to try to score a TD more quickly, then stop the other team so that you can get the ball back via punt, and with more time on the clock.

If that wasn't obvious already, take a cue from what the defense seeks to allow. They don't do charity. They allow the 3-5 yard passes precisely because it eats clock and optimizes their chances at winning. At least that's something NFL coaches get right; I suppose both sides can't be wrong, so someone had to be sensible.

Once a team is within 7 points, then yes, it is better to score with minimal time left than so quickly that it gives ample time for the other team to try to drive for a field goal. But that's not the scenario I gave.

..........

"Just to be picky, this is a save situation,"

not picky, fair point. Thought you had to start the inning, but looks like that's not the case, just not have any outs with the 3-run lead. A dumb rule, still.

Comments? Am I off the reservation here?


No, you're firmly on the reservation. As noted above, the scale and magnitude of baserunning and defense are off, when compared to offense. The Trout 2012/Bonds 1992 comparison makes the point indisputably. I liked your description -- the components seem "reasonable" viewed separately, but mixing them all together into "WAR" doesn't work well.

The other problem is the lack of dependability of defensive data and statistics, which practically every serious analyst attests to. Even .3 as an adjustment factor might be too high, but it's certainly a good starting point.

Miguel Cabrera kind of makes the point. As AROM noted, his defense at 3B has been adequate, and better than most people expected. So his dWAR is plausible but would it shock anyone to learn that his dWAR is way off and he has actually been horrible there, even embarrassingly bad? That's what I'm talking about. But WAR swallows his defensive evaluation whole.

You left out the "R" - that should be "PEARCE" - Perfect Evaluator (of) Actual Remeasurable Comprehensive Excellence. It would be easy to remember, too, since it so clearly reminds us of the perfect replacement level player - Steve Pearce!

Genius. Can't believe I didn't think of this.

Actually, for players around 0 dWAR like Cabrera, my 1/3 correction wouldn't work, because 1/3 of 0 is still 0 and so if Cabrera is much worse (or if a player rating at 0 dWAR was much better), the overall WAR would still be off.

My correction would work for an Andruw Jones (or Darwin Barney) if he was rating much better than he was, or for a Gary Sheffield if he was rating much worse. So... back to the drawing board. Maybe taking a composite number for defense from the available metrics would be better. Or just throwing out the garbage and not pretending that we're currently capable of evaluating defense ot this degree would be better. In that case it's back to oWAR.

But some recognition that we can't do this is in order.

Thanks very much for #216! It's very interesting stuff.

I haven't seen Hamilton play as much, but what I have seen this year wouldn't lead me to question negative defensive metrics

Just from observation, Hamilton should not be playing CF anymore, and is just adequate in LF. Theoretically, Hamilton could certainly be bad enough in CF to compensate for being an exceedingly better hitter than Barney, but as many here have said, it's all in the calculations. There's nothing inherently absurd about the proposition.

Theoretically, Hamilton could certainly be bad enough in CF to compensate for being an exceedingly better hitter than Barney, but as many here have said, it's all in the calculations. There's nothing inherently absurd about the proposition.

Yes, there is.

Barney has 584 PA of a 79 OPS+ and negligible SB value, playing ~154 games at 2B. OBP/SLG = .301/.357.

Hamilton has 627 PA of a 140 OPS+ 93 with no SB value, playing 146 games (93 in CF, 85 in LF/RF, 10 at DH). OBP/SLG = .356/.580.

It is inherently absurd to think that Barney has been more valuable this year, beating Hamilton 4.6 to 3.5 in WAR.

Isn't Barney getting huge shift credit? His UZR is only 12 compared to 29 DRS.

I confess I had no clue who Darwin Barney is, and I've finally looked him up. A .661 OPS (80 OPS+) at 2B. 4.5 WAR and 1.4 oWAR. So if I'm doing this right, 31% of his value has been in his offense, and 69% in his defense.

What about doing something like dividing the weight of the defense component by, say, 3? So make the weight of the defense only 23% of his total value, to account for the fact that we are far less confident in evaluations of defense than we are of offense. Then he'd be something like 2.5 WAR (1.4 oWAR + 1.0 dWAR) instead of 4.5 WAR (1.4 oWAR + 3.1 dWAR).

Comments? Am I off the reservation here?

At that point, why bother with WAR? You aren't actually trying in any real sense of the word to accurately measure defensive value. You've just basically marginalized it out of existence. At that point why not just go look at offense only metrics. We have tons of those. Good ones too.

That aside, yes you are off the reservation (as you seem to have begun to realize in #234). The weight of offense and defense is the same for each player*. Just because one number is higher than the other does not mean it has more weight. Consider for example WAA. The weight of offense and defense is the same as in WAR, yet the offense numbers have all dropped by some 2 wins, while defense numbers remained the same.
*excepting for different opportunities on offense and defense

As noted above, the scale and magnitude of baserunning and defense are off, when compared to offense. The Trout 2012/Bonds 1992 comparison makes the point indisputably.

They're "off" because they "seem" off to you, not for any tangible reason you can actually point to.

I do agree with the idea that defense should be regressed in some way.

The weight should be the same in a perfect world, but we're trying to measure value with somewhat inaccurate tools. If the offensive value is estimated at 50, but is really somewhere between 42 and 58 and the defensive value is estimated at 25, but is really somewhere between 1 and 49, then it makes sense to weigh offense more heavily.

#237 I thought BIS had adjusted their methods. I know Brett Lawrie went from defensive god to merely extremely good.

There's Something going on though since I think UZR andDRS have the same data source.

At that point, why bother with WAR?

That's what I'm trying to determine - what the uses of WAR are, given that its defense component breaks the stat.

I can see these uses:

* A tool for doing specific and narrow player comparisons, e.g., for MVP races. If you have a narrow set of players you can break down the components and see whether the components are reasonable... but again, the problem here is that we need to do better than "reasonable" if we are ranking players in this way, because "reasonable" could still be "wrong" and "wrong" throws everything out of whack.

* A blunt tool for broadly classifying players. But VORP does this too, or oWAR. Those assume average defense at the position, so in some respects WAR is better because it takes defense into account... but that introduces a whole new set of problems. If WAR at least gets the defense vector in the right direction I agree it's an improvement, but still not by much, given the complexities.

The best I can say for WAR is this: if the defense component is accurate for Player X, you will get a good approximation of his value. But if it's not, you won't. And right now the "if" is a huge problem. And when you are dealing with a list of several players, the errors are compounded.

At that point, why bother with WAR? You aren't actually trying in any real sense of the word to accurately measure defensive value. You've just basically marginalized it out of existence. At that point why not just go look at offense only metrics. We have tons of those. Good ones too.

And they're orders of magnitude more dependable and systemetized than the defensive ones.

You can't just add offense over replacement, as determined in every PA, to defense over average, as determined by a whole bunch of subjective decisions not involving every defensive chance, and expect to come up with a single definitive number that makes sense. You're adding an actual set of numbers -- offense -- to a subjectively-determined "virtual" set of numbers -- defense. You're also using different baselines. Not to mention that defense isn't even calclated the same way pre and post-2003.

I'll quote the Fangraphs UZR primer for more illumination:

"Just because UZR, or any other defensive metric "says" that someone is X, even if that X is based on many years of data, does not make it so. When you are dealing with sample data, as we almost always are with every metric in baseball that we encounter, there is a certain chance that the metric is going to be 'wrong.' Sometimes, you can use other information (such as scounting and observation, or physical attributes like size and speed) in order to adjust your "conclusions" and decrease your chance of being "wrong" and sometimes you can't (because the requisite information is not available.)"

This "other information" is what needs to be turned to in situations like Bonds 1992/Trout 2012. Nothing about those players would lead you to believe that Trout made up on defense the entirety, and 60% on top of that, of the difference between an ultra-elite 205 OPS+ and an excellent 168 OPS+. Bonds was very fast, a very good defender, and an outstanding CF when he played CF. The defensive differential is almost certainly wrong and very likely dramatically so.

re 241. BIS did change their methods but the Cubs don't do the same kind of shifts that get filtered out by Dewan. Their adjustment was to set aside all plays in which 3 infielders are on one side of second base. The Cubs don't really use that kind of shift so when the adjustment was made it didn't really effect the Cub fielders all that much.

It is inherently absurd to think that Barney has been more valuable this year

No, not "inherently." Hamilton could have been so incompetent in CF, butchering so many outs or singles into doubles and triples – while Barney could have so sealed off his sector of the Cub infield – that the difference could have been made up. I'm not saying it actually has been. But it's no more inherently absurd than thinking that Carlos Peña in 2010 (.196 BA, 1.7 WAR) might have been a better player than Dmitri Young in 2007 (.320 BA, 0.1 WAR). Nothing in the logic of the calculations, or the nature of baseball, prevents it.

RE #65

but unless I'm missing it the play index doesn't let you pull up a list of players ranked by oWAR rather than WAR.

2012 Player Value Batting

Not sure if it is in the play index, but is in the seasons - batting - player value

Edit - sorry - I see this has been answered at least twice.

No, not "inherently." Hamilton could have been so incompetent in CF, butchering so many outs or singles into doubles and triples – while Barney could have so sealed off his sector of the Cub infield – that the difference could have been made up. I'm not saying it actually has been. But it's no more inherently absurd than thinking that Carlos Peña in 2010 (.196 BA, 1.7 WAR) might have been a better player than Dmitri Young in 2007 (.320 BA, 0.1 WAR). Nothing in the logic of the calculations, or the nature of baseball, prevents it.

How many singles would Barney have to "prevent" to catch up to Hamilton's offense? If he went, say, 50 for his next 50, all singles (since that's really all he can prevent), would he?

I get his SLG going up to .494 and his OBP going up to .334. (All math caveats apply.) An OPS of .828. Hamilton's OPS is .936. He'd have to butcher a lot of balls in CF to drop 100 OPS points (and of course, Barney almost certainly didn't convert 50 more outs into hits than a typical 2B)

Sometimes, you can use other information (such as scounting and observation, or physical attributes like size and speed) in order to adjust your "conclusions" and decrease your chance of being "wrong" and sometimes you can't (because the requisite information is not available.)"

And this is what I have been pointing out is a problem, particularly when pulling up a list of players sorted by WAR.

A career WAR of 50 could easily be wrong by 10 WAR in either direction due to defense. See, e.g., Sheffield, who has a 76 career oWAR that is gutted by defense such that he ends up with just a 56 WAR. That seems highly implausible to me. No, I can't point to a specific error.

Edit - sorry - I see this has been answered at least twice.

Answered twice but unsatisfactorily both times (and now three times with your answer), as Play Index doesn't allow a search by oWAR which was my point.

I'm still hoping Sean F comments on this. Actually, I had hoped he'd be more active in this thread, seeing as he made a lot of noise about nobody in the media asking him anything about WAR, and now the discussion is being had here and he's been silent for the past couple of days.

How many singles would Barney have to "prevent" to catch up to Hamilton's offense? If he went, say, 50 for his next 50, all singles (since that's really all he can prevent), would he?

But you'd have to add 50 hits in 0 at bats to really compare hitting to fielding. If he's turning singles into outs in the field, to approximate that you need to turn outs into singles at the plate. That gives him a .387 OBP and a .448 SLG.