The ironic thing is that Boston did really well during the previous "safe" drafting regime.
Lester in 2002
Papelbon in 2003
Pedroia in 2004.

3 stars in 3 years. That's a fantastic record.

This is mostly a really good article with a lot of detail and a lot of reporting. You should read it.

So I'm going to mostly address a small disagreement I have with a couple lines in the excerpt:

The words were meant to serve as a reminder of a shift in draft philosophy. The Sox had focused in 2003 and 2004 on quickly rebuilding the upper levels of their farm system by drafting college players who were safe bets but who might not have the ceiling of a superstar. But by 2005, the team had accomplished that mission, and so wanted to use its picks -- including five first-round selections -- to find players with elite potential.

I'm very skeptical that the change in strategy in 2005 came about because 2003 and 2004 had "accomplished their mission". The simplest explanation is that they changed their strategy because they decided their old strategy wasn't as good. This is supported by the fact that the general stat community precisely at that time was undergoing a profound shift in their assessment of drafting strategy, and other teams with close ties to the community like the A's were also shifting their draft strategy at the same time.

The Sox did great by getting Papelbon and Pedroia in those first drafts, so we can hardly say they failed and fixed things, but it seems much more likely to me that the shift in strategy came about due to a change in the organizational understanding of the draft, concomitant with such a shift in the stat community more broadly, than that the Red Sox changed strategy from optimal strategy (a) to optimal strategy (b) entirely because of facts on the ground in their minor league system, and this merely happened to coincide with the rethinking of the draft in the stat community.

When one considers the success of the Red Sox draft record over the past five or six years, it seems much heavier on the pitchers (Lester, Paplebon, Buchholz, Masterson, Delcarmen, Bard, Bowden, Meredith) than on position players (Pedroia, Ellsbury, Lowrie). In fact, I would argue the one weakness of their organization right now is the lack of depth in their everyday player roster. There's nothing at AAA, and Lars Anderson is really the only high-ceiling prosect in AA. Why the discrepency between results - up to now - between developing pitchers and position players?

ekogan - the 2002 draft wasn't run by Epstein's team, but by old scouting director David Chadd. They drafted Lester, a HS pitcher, because they were looking for tools and high ceilings. It was just the 03-04 drafts that had a strong college/skills focus.

Unfortunately, in Pittsburgh, they've been writing "Wander" and "Dreck" on the board for the last several years.

"Impact" & "Dominate" don't work as stripper names quite as well as "Mystique" & "Aura".

(Could be good S & M role play names, though...)

"Up to now"-probably just random noise. They do have some position-player talent at single A, some of which may start to filter up the chain soon.

That said, I'd sure like to see a power bat or two on the left side of the defensive spectrum develop-Lars is currently spinning his wheels, but he's got time on his side (for now).

the 2002 draft wasn't run by Epstein's team, but by old scouting director David Chadd.

I'm working off memory here but my recollection of when they hired him as GM was that Epstein was lauded for his work on the draft in '02 (and for the Embree trade that by all accounts was his baby). I'm working off memory though which is always a sketchy bet.

Epstein wasn't hired by the Red Sox until after the 2002 season.

Lester was drafted in the Harrington/Duquette regime. MCoA is correct on all points as I recall.

Epstein wasn't hired by the Red Sox until after the 2002 season.

Lester was drafted in the Harrington/Duquette regime. MCoA is correct on all points as I recall.

In 2002, Henry was already the owner of the Red Sox. David Chadd has replaced Duquette's Wayne Britton as scouting director.
Theo Epstein wasn't officially named GM, but was in the front office as an assistant GM.
That's why I included 2002 with the 2003/2004 Epstein/Chadd drafts.

Kevin Youkilis was drafted by Duquette/Britton in 2001, but in the 8th round, so they didn't think much of him.

"Impact" & "Dominate" don't work as stripper names quite as well as "Mystique" & "Aura".

(Could be good S & M role play names, though...)

Very true.

Kevin Youkilis was drafted by Duquette/Britton in 2001, but in the 8th round, so they didn't think much of him.

That's an odd comment. The Red Sox used a single round draft pick on Youkilis, and then paid him a six figure bonus. If they didn't think much of him, they wouldn't have drafted him in the first place.

Theo Epstein wasn't officially named GM, but was in the front office as an assistant GM.
That's why I included 2002 with the 2003/2004 Epstein/Chadd drafts.

My understanding of the history is that Epstein didn't have significant authority over the drafting strategy until 2003. In 2002, I believe Chadd was the person who laid out what the Sox would look for, whereas in 2003 and beyond Epstein directed strategy. I look at 2002 as Chadd's draft, and 2003 onwards as Epstein's draft.

My understanding of the history is that Epstein didn't have significant authority over the drafting strategy until 2003. In 2002, I believe Chadd was the person who laid out what the Sox would look for, whereas in 2003 and beyond Epstein directed strategy. I look at 2002 as Chadd's draft, and 2003 onwards as Epstein's draft.

Can we just lump 2002-2004 together as Chadd drafts? It's simpler that way.

Looking at Britton era drafts is a really gruesome experience.
The Sox haven't drafted a star from Nomah in '94 to Youk in '01. The 2002 draft contributed to the team, ergo it's not a Duquette era draft

While I don't have at hand the citations to back up my claim that Epstein wasn't in charge of the draft in 2002, I think I can show quite definitively the vast divergence in drafting strategy between 2002 and 2003.

In the 2002 draft, the Red Sox picked as their first five choices: High School P, High School 3B, College P, High School SS, High School P. And their 6th pick was Jason Neighborgall. In the 2003 draft, it went: College OF, College OF, College P, High School OF, College P.

The 2002 draft is a heavy HS draft, the 2003 draft heavy on college players. The 2002 draft is heavy on tools, the 2003 draft featured Abe Alvarez, supplemental round pick.

I can't find the sources to show that Epstein was in charge of one and not the other - though I'm quite sure that's the case - but I don't think it makes sense to lump them together as part of a unified draft strategy.

EDIT: I didn't see post #14 until after I posted, but I think my post serves as my response - 2002 is very very different from 2003 and 2004.

How are the decision making powers on draft day distributed between a scouting director and a GM?
I thought the scouting director was the more important one.

The Sox had focused in 2003 and 2004 on quickly rebuilding the upper levels of their farm system by drafting college players who were safe bets but who might not have the ceiling of a superstar.

I hear this kind of thing a lot, about the choice between going after players with more upside or those who are safer bets, but I wonder how often it really pans out that way.

The Sox' 2004 draft ended up netting them one player with huge upside - Dustin Pedroia - and only one other guy who's done anything at the major league level, Cla Meredith. That looks more like a "high ceiling" draft than a safe bet draft. The 2005 "high ceiling" draft doesn't have anyone who now projects as a superstar, but has more people making an impact at the major league level, like Ellsbury and Lowrie and Clay Buchholz.

It's too early to really assess that 2005 group, but at the moment it looks like they got their superstar in the safe bet draft, and a handful of useful players in the high ceiling draft.

I am far from a draft expert, so I could be totally wrong about this. But my sense is that the draft is enough of a crapshoot that there really is no way to distinguish the high ceiling guys from the safe bets.

The Sox' 2004 draft ended up netting them one player with huge upside - Dustin Pedroia - and only one other guy who's done anything at the major league level, Cla Meredith. That looks more like a "high ceiling" draft than a safe bet draft.

That's not really what "upside" means. Pedroia was universally viewed as a skills pick, a guy without big tools who would have a very good shot at playing in the majors but not much of a shot at being a star. He lacks speed, power, and arm strength. This turned out to not be the case, basically, but it was the evaluation at the time.

I don't know to what degree "ceiling" is a useful term looking forward (though I highly doubt it's worthless), but it's very easy to identify who was believed to have a higher or lower ceiling, based on tools, at the time of the draft. The 2003 and 2004 drafts show a team paying relatively little attention to these factors, and that changes in 2005 and beyond.

And I have no idea how one would describe Clay Buchholz as a player lacking upside. Everyone calls him a potential #1 starter with at least two plus pitches.

This turned out to not be the case, basically, but it was the evaluation at the time.

Well, that's the point, isn't it? It's hard enough to distinguish between guys who will make an impact at the major league level and guys who will wash out, so it's even harder to tell the difference between someone who will become a useful major league regular and an MVP.

And I have no idea how one would describe Clay Buchholz as a player lacking upside.

Did someone describe him that way?

There's nothing at AAA, and Lars Anderson is really the only high-ceiling prosect in AA. Why the discrepency between results - up to now - between developing pitchers and position players?

1. They drafted a lot of pitchers. From 2003-06 in the first 5 rounds they had a total of 28 picks, of which 17 were pitchers. As a point of reference, the Cubs didn't even have 17 picks.

2. The drafting of pitchers was skewed more toward college players than were the position players. Pitchers: 14 college, 3 HS. Other positions: 7 college, 4 HS. It could be argued that the pitchers they drafted were already closer to the major league level on draft day.

3. They've traded away a fair number of position player prospects in that time - Hanley Ramirez, Kelly Shoppach, David Murphy - who are amounting to something elsewhere, and another (Matt Murton) who had been expected to be very useful. The number of drafted + useful pitching prospects traded away doesn't strike me as a long list. Cla Meredith and...?

Did someone describe him that way?

You lumped him in with low-upside guys like Lowrie and Ellsbury who are unlikely to be more than solid regulars. Buchholz has the stuff to be an ace.

To the general point, I am extremely, extremely skeptical that identifying tools and stuff does not have significant utility in projecting the likelihood of a player being a star.

It's a fair point that several useful major league position players were developed by the Red Sox, but traded away. It is clear that the Red Sox - along with everybody else - recognized Ramirez as having tremendous potential, as this is how they got a frontline, established, young starting pitcher (Beckett). As a reference, here are the major-leaguers produced by the Red Sox since the 2000 draft:

2000: Delcarmen, Freddie Sanchez, Kason Gabbard
2001: Shoppach, Youkilis
2002: Lester, Brandon Moss
2003: David Murphy, Matt Murton, Paplebon
2004: Pedroia, Meredith
2005: Ellsbury, Craig Hansen, Buchholz, Lowrie, Bowden (opinion: Mark Warner still has a chance of having a career of some kind at catcher)
2006: Bard, Masterson (Others with a shot at a big-league career: Lars Anderson, Dustin Richardson, Ryan Kalish...they also drafted Matt Laporta that year, FWIW)
2007: Nick Hagadone was the 1st round pick, and is highly-regarded, but I believe he had Tommy John surgery, and is just coming back...is there anybody else from this class that people are high on?
2008: Casey Kelly was the 1st round pick, and is moving successfully through their system, up to now...

Unrelated, about the Rays:
In 1999, the Rays' first two picks were Josh Hamilton and Carl Crawford. It took a while, but that's two-thirds of a pretty darned good outfield. In 2000, they pick Baldelli in the 1st round, and in 2002, BJ Upton. In 2003, they draft Delmon Young in the first round, then flip him for Bartlett and Garza. In 2006, the 1st round pick is Longoria, and in 2007, it's David Price.

With the exception of James Shields, there really aren't a lot of other successful picks from that period, but it clearly forms the core of the current group. If you look at the Rays' pick prior to this period, there aren't a lot hits, despite the fact that they were often drafting very high (Aubrey Huff is one of the few draftees from the 1996-1998 who had a good ML career). Is this run of successful high picks by one team highly unusual? (I understand that Hamilton is an unusual case, but he has turned out to be the player they thought he would be...). I figure that if a team hits the jackpot on a series of top-5 picks, they won't be drafting in the top 5 for much longer, but maybe there are other examples out there...

As a general strategy, what's the point of playing it safe to "stock the upper levels of the system". What do you really get out of improving your triple A team if doing so isn't the right strategy for building a championship caliber major league team?

You build up prospects quickly that you can use as trade bait to acquire impact players. It becomes much easier to swing trades for top-caliber players if you actually have enough 'prospects'.

Once you've got enough of those that you can trade from depth, it makes sense to then switch focus to drafting high-ceiling players, since by that time, you've hopefully started winning enough that you'd be drafting in much lower slots.

You build up prospects quickly that you can use as trade bait to acquire impact players. It becomes much easier to swing trades for top-caliber players if you actually have enough 'prospects'.

It does not work that way. Middling or low end prospects do not have good value in impact deals. A high school draftee in low-a with several plus tools has much more value than a player in double-a who profiles as a fourth outfielder.

But by 2005, the team had accomplished that mission, and so wanted to use its picks—including five first-round selections—to find players with elite potential.

This is laughable. In those two drafts, they did well to get Pedroia and Papelbon but most of their other picks did nothing, which is what happens in most drafts but it was worse because most of them had zero trade value. In 2004, their next three picks after Pedroia were Andrew Dobies, Thomas Hottovny and Ryan Schrober. You're not stocking your minor league system with anything with those types of players.