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1. The Most Interesting Man In The World Posted: August 29, 2009 at 04:38 AM (#3308419)1. The Most Interesting Man In The World Posted: August 29, 2009 at 12:38 AM (#3308419)
Ok, I would love an explanation as to why Howry took the mound in critical situations in Cincinnati and Denver last weekend.
Its not an argument that Bochy is the best tactician in the game, its an argument that players wants to be his friend. And that makes him manager of the year. Friendship.
Bochy would be a fine choice. But if a guy takes over a club that's 10 games under .500 and proceeds to go 26 games over (at the moment) with them, he's going to be the logical choice for manager of the year.
Ken Macha has received brilliant seasons from Fielder and Braun, a fine season from Cameron, surprise seasons from Counsell and McGehee, Gallardo has been wonderful and Hoffman has been amazing.
And the team is 4 games under and has retreated the past 6 weeks playing the worst teams in the NL.
And while I try to not dwell on tactical items Macha's INSISTENCE on the intentional walk has blown up innings over a dozen times. It has been one of the more mind-boggling displays of a person adhering to an approach despite repeated and constant failures.
Very similar to Yost and his handling of the bullpen.
I fear Melvin may have swapped guys with the same basic flaw. A determined refusal to acknowledge facts that do not conform to their predetermined view.
Sigh....
They have the 2nd worst ERA in the NL (4.90) and the worst starters' ERA (5.26). The offense is solid, but it would need to be great for the Brewers to be anywhere near contention. This looks like a problem of roster construction and player development.
I was only pointing one of a host an items. Clearly there are other issues.
Macha completely mishandled Parra by giving in to Kendall's demands to catch every game possible. While Manny has struggled of late his performance has been far better with Mike Rivera behind the plate. It was incredibly obvious to anyone with a passing interest in the game and for Macha to completely ignore the situation is a clear sign that priorities were misaligned with club needs.
Carlos Villanueva drove in the ditch some time back and continues to get chance after chance. Meanwhile, Tim Dillard rots. Dillard may not seem impressive but the guy has 600 plus innings of pro ball with positive results. That's a curious use of resources.
Sure Dave Bush got hurt. And Jeff Suppan has missed time. But that has to be expected in any season. Doug Melvin seems to have been surprised by such things.
You will note that the bullpen, save Carlos, has been effective.
Third base has been a void.
Hardy and Hart have disappointed. Though Corey played hurt much of the season before the appendectomy struck.
As for Hardy, I think to some extent that also reflects poorly on Brewer management. JJ didn't cope well with Escobar's presence in Triple A and someone should have been able to address this issue.
On the plus side: He doesn't bunt too much. He manages the bullpen well, he might have a slight "slow" hook.
Here is is primary fault:
Rich Aurillia: 120 PAs
There is also the inexplicable Frandsen hate and Velez love (of course post facto justified by a hot month).
It's hard to say how much of the terrible offense is his fault, I mean he's got to play the cards he's dealt. The way the OF "rotation" has been managed is quite strange, with Fred Lewis (2nd best OBP on the team) relegated to a back up, and John Bowker (.343/.451/.604 at AAA Fresno) rejected after 36 PAs. But frankly, it's a bad crew.
The Giants would be nowhere without Sandoval and the pitching staff, and I guess you can say it hasn't been 'Boched' by the manager...
But Manager of the Year?
In the early aughts with homers flying that's bringing a rubber knife to a gunfight.
Bochy kind of reminds me of Buck Rodgers in that you give him something to work with and you get some results. Rodgers won 91 games with Tim Raines, Tim Wallach and a whole lot of nothin'.
Tactical moves are the most visible part of a manager's repertoire, but they're far from the most important. I could tell you 20 bad in-game decisions that Jim Tracy has made for the Rockies this year, but it would be awfully foolish for me to extrapolate from that into some argument that he's a bad manager.
Foolish, yet but remarkably commonplace.
Its costing them a couple of games because Molina and Wynn aren't that good, and can replaced by better, younger talent. (Especially Molina with Posey), but it keeps the clubhouse in peace.
We'll see how long it takes him to lose the clubhouse - which happened in both LA and Pittsburgh.
-- MWE
Or maybe he's learned from those experiences and will handle the clubhouse better this time around.
At any rate, if Tracy loses the clubhouse sometime after he gets the Rockies back to the World Series, it will be OK by me.
Tactical moves are the most visible part of a manager's repertoire, but they're far from the most important.
Absolutely right. As in every other realm of human endeavor, the most important impact a manager has is in his handling of people, his setting and maintaining of an emotional atmosphere. The day-to-day tactical decisions generally pale in importance to this larger tone-setting.
And in thus regard, Bochy is clearly excellent. And as Dag Nabbit's extensive and elaborate research demonstrates, Bochy's long-term bottom-line results have been excellent as well. I was less than thrilled when the Giants hired Bochy, but he's won me over: the guy is one of the best at his profession.
Whenever I read a post filled with "Random successful manager is an idiot because of this unapproved tactical move" I start to think Dag's book should become required reading before one is allowed to participate in such a thread.
Of course, Dag's book should become required reading if you're a baseball fan in general.
If it becomes a big success, he'll be able to quit his job and hang around here more. Is that a net positive, do you think?
With all due respect, we are able to evaluate a manager based on what he does that's easily measurable, while acknowledging that there are aspects we can't measure. When the hitter who ranks 169th out of 176 in OBP in baseball is batting cleanup, you have a problem irrespective of other skills the manager brings to the table. When he consistently sticks with veterans (Vinny Castilla bring back any memories) over younger players unless forced not to do so, you have a problem. Making hoaky statements about required reading when you know jackshit about the situation is significantly more idiotic, as posts go.
Side note: anyone have a link to Dag's book/research? I'm curious.
So "worse than Felipe Alou" is now the ultimate insult. Really? But how does Bochy compare to a manager who is actually bad?
Oh, those do sound like bad tactical moves that you refer to, but how much do they mean over the course of a season? Winn bats one slot over Sandoval most times. That'll add up to - what? 15 plate appearances a year? That'll cost the Giants 1-2 runs a year.
Molina is a pretty putrid pick for a cleanup hitter with his OPS+ of 85, but good God that's a putrid offense. The entire stinkin' team has an OPS+ of 85. Four guys listed in b-ref's starting lineup possess better OPS+s, but one has half as many homers as Molina and another has a quarter as many longballs as the catcher. Molina is second on the team in homers, behind only Sandoval, who you want to hit higher in the order.
If you don't put Molina in cleanup, then where do you put him? He's got to bat somewhere. He's a guy with some pop in his bat but no OBP whatsoever on a team full of sad sack hitter. You don't dare put him in the top of the lineup: he's a slowpoke with a .283 OBP. Do you put a guy with an OPS+ three points higher than the team's at the bottom of the lineup? Then someone worse gurgles to the heart of the order. Given Molina's strengths and weaknesses on offense, and given San Fran's weaknesses and ohter weaknesses on the team's offense, I don't see how you don't put him in the heart of the order.
. . . ya know, a few paragraphs ago I said Molina was a pretty putrid pick for a cleanup hitter, but . . . that's probably the best place for him on that utterly dismal offense. Sandoval would be a better pick, but the guy can't hit in all nine slots and play every position.
http://www.amazon.com/Evaluating-Baseball-Managers-Comprehensive-Performance/dp/0786439203/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1251584319&sr=1-2
Not shipping yet; scheduled to sometime this fall.
I had the privilege of doing a fair amount of editing of Chris's book, and thus got a close look at the research. It is phenomenal, by far the hugest step forward in our objective understanding of MLB managers and their impact undertaken since -- well, almost certainly since forever.
I can say this with absolute, 100% confidence: no one in the world has ever known more about the history of baseball managing than Chris Jaffe does right now. He is absolutely, positively the world's number one authority on the subject.
I may very well know jackshit about the situation. You may very well know jackshit about the situation. But if Chris Jaffe says that Bruce Bochy is one of the ten most underrated managers in MLB history, I listen to him very, very intently.
Sorry, I missed the part of Post 11 where you recognized the aspects of managing that can go unmeasured and other potential skills Bochy brings to the table, but I suppose you might have been employing a different definition of "idiot" than I'm familiar with.
I'm with Tom and Steve. Tactics have little to do with how successful a manager is. On top of that, genuine above-average tactical acumen, as far as I can tell from fans who know all there is to know about a situation, is possessed by 0 percent of major league managers. When TLR is called an idiot by one BTF Cardinals fan, for example, then I'm going to stick with the idea that a few people may want to stop watching the game and start pickup Dag's book, coming soon to a store near you.
With all due respect, of course.
Edit: And what Steve said in 29.
So where should he go?
When he consistently sticks with veterans (Vinny Castilla bring back any memories) over younger players unless forced not to do so, you have a problem.
This is a fair knock. The biggest problem (by far) Bochy's had in his career has been developing young players. The most obvious flop was Sean Burroughs, but there are others, such as Ben Davis). He's made up for that because (at least in San Diego) his main strength has been getting unexpectedly good production out of his veterans.
Bruce Bochy's made a career of turning 75-win teams into 80-win seasons. (His career winning percentage is about 80-82). That's a decidedly unglamorous trait, but it's interesting.
Here was your typical Bochy team in San Diego: take a starting rotation whose best pitchers are people like Sterling Hitchcock and Brian Lawerence, place them before an absolutely brutally bad corps of middle relievers, stick on a great closer to toss 60 innings a year. Now combine them with an offense anchored around Phil Nevin and Ryan Klesko. That's what Bochy had for a dozen years in San Diego. Usually mediocre teams are pretty talented at some aspect of the game, but Bochy's clubs only had a closer. Not to knock Hoffman, but again, it's only 60 stinkin' inning a year (and all after the team already has the lead).
The more I looked at Bruce Bochy, the better he came off. I came in expecting him to be utterly banal, and by the end I was surprisingly impressed.
Side note: anyone have a link to Dag's book/research? I'm curious.
Some bits and pieces are online - for example it turns out this stuff was able to get put in the book (much to my surprise) and part of this column inspired some rather productive research into Billy Martin, but only bits and pieces are online. The heart of the math-type-stuff came out in an article in the 2008 THT Annual.
If you're curious, e-mail me and I'll send you a chapter.
Yeah, it does. I just felt like making a hit-and-run comment above
Pop quiz: without looking, how long did Bruce Bochy manage the Padres? Ready for the answer – no peeking unless you have a guess – twelve seasons. A dozen years! That was longer than Whitey Herzog lasted in St. Louis. It was more games than Casey Stengel ran the Yankees. Switching sports, Bochy lasted longer than Bill Walsh’s entire NFL coaching career. In his tenure, Bochy had a losing record overall, and went to only one World Series, in which the Yankees swept his club. Bochy’s other postseason trips saw San Diego face St. Louis in three different NLDS, in which the Padres won only one out of ten games. The Padres had not been so abjectly powerless before the Cardinals since the time of Pope Innocent III. He is a good manager, but not many last twelve years with such scant qualifications. He is Tom Kelly without the rings, and Wilbert Robinson without the personality. If Bruce Bochy fell in the woods, he would not make a sound. Has anyone ever lasted so long with one franchise and done so little to draw attention to himself?
Looking at it a bit more seriously, Bochy is one of only 22 men to last at least a dozen years on the job with one team. In their extended stints, that bunch won over 30,000 games with a .548 winning percentage while claiming 95 pennants and 44 world titles. Only four had losing records – Connie Mack, Tom Kelly, Jimmy Dykes, and Bochy. Mack merely claimed nine pennants in his first 31 seasons. Kelly delivered Minnesota its first two world championships in his first five seasons. Only Dykes had a less impressive tenure than Bochy. Even there a catch exists. Dykes made it to a dozen years during WWII, a time when teams were unusually reluctant to fire their managers.
Bochy lasted as long as he did because he is a quality manager. As noted in Chapter 1, the Birnbaum Database lists him as the greatest manager in history with a losing record: a dubious distinction, but impressive nonetheless.
Not only has Bochy attained a losing record, but he garnered little attention for himself in San Diego. People rarely mentioned him as one of the most prominent managers, and rarely even noted him as an underrated one. Though it is largely inevitable someone with a poor record would gain minimal acclaim, Bochy did not even receive the credit given to other prominent sub-.500 managers such as George Stallings and Gene Mauch, who also score quite well in the Birnbaum Database.
Bochy’s problem (aside from losing) was that he never did the things that cause the public to notice skippers. The best way for a manager to gain popular acclaim is postseason success. Stallings’s 1914 October glory cemented his reputation, for instance. However, the Padres lost two-thirds of their postseason games under Bochy. Many fans will gravitate to a manager who makes brilliant in-game strategic decisions, as was the case with Gene Mauch. Bochy rarely engaged in intense levels of in-game strategy. In fact, as Chapter 2 showed he is the game’s all-time opponent of the bunt. Finally, many people laud managers who are especially willing to work with young talent. While Bochy did a very good job handling young pitchers in San Diego, ranging from the highly touted Jake Peavy to the little heralded Brian Lawrence, his record with young hitters is rather poor. Well-regarded prospects Ben Davis and D’Angelo Jimenez floundered and most notably super-prospect Sean Burroughs flopped. In a dozen years with the Padres, Bochy developed only one position player, Khalil Greene. The things the general public most readily notices were not Bochy’s strengths.
Yet the Padres did far better than they should have under Bochy. They posted a .494 winning percentage under his watch – equivalent to a 80-82 single-season record – despite possessing very little talent. Bochy’s San Diego lineups centered on players like Mark Loretta, Ryan Klesko, Phil Nevin, Ken Caminiti, Chris Gomez, and Damian Jackson. All were useful, but they make a rather meager all-star lineup over a dozen-year period. Tony Gwynn and Rickey Henderson were the only great players Bochy had, but both were in their late 30s under him. That collection of second-tier hitters was supported by an even less impressive group of starting pitchers. Aside from a sole spectacular season by Kevin Brown in 1998, Bochy relied on a flock of journeymen in his starting rotation. Only seven pitchers started 70 games for San Diego in Bochy’s dozen years there: Andy Ashby, Brian Lawrence, Jake Peavy, Woody Williams, Adam Eaton, Joey Hamilton, and Sterling Hitchcock. Peavy is a great talent and Ashby had his moments, but the rest were just innings eaters. On the whole, Bochy presided over an inferior stable of starters with the Padres. San Diego possessed a terrific reliever in Trevor Hoffman, who was not only in his prime, but also with the franchise for every season of Bochy’s tenure. However, getting to Hoffman could be a chore as San Diego’s middle relief was routinely a shambles. From 1995-2006, San Diego’s non-Hoffman relievers posted a combined ERA of 4.30. In those same years, the overall bullpen ERA for the rest of the NL was 3.85. Admittedly, that is not quite a fair comparison as the closer’s numbers were removed from San Diego but not the rest of the league. Since the relief ace should be the best arm in the bullpen, that should cause the remainder of San Diego’s relief corps to underachieve. However, it does not explain a nearly half-point difference in ERA. Actually, that underestimates how bad San Diego’s middle relievers are because the Padres’ parks (first Qualcomm and then Petco) suppress scoring. Adjust for park factor, and San Diego’s middle relievers would have posted an ERA of 4.66.
Thus in his dozen years in southern California, Bochy possessed a corps of solid but generally unimpressive hitters, journeymen starting pitchers, toxic middle relievers, and a superlative closer. Yet that bunch played .494 ball for him from 1995-2006. Somehow, 75-win talent transformed into 80-win results. Though below average, it was still an impressive achievement. Bruce Bochy’s ultimate season was probably 2001. The Padres finished a hair under .500 for him despite an offense centered on 30-year-olds Phil Nevin and Ryan Klesko while the ace of the starting rotation was Kevin Jarvis, whose main claim to fame is having fewer career Win Shares than any hurler who ever started 100 games (and yes, I have done the research to confirm that).
Bochy produced those results because he had an impressively effective track record coaxing unexpectedly strong performances from veteran hitters. Ryan Klesko came to San Diego in his early 30s, yet defied the aging curve to improve. Phil Nevin erupted under Bochy. Mark Kotsay had two of his three best seasons for him. Upon arrival in San Diego at age 33, Mike Cameron probably had his best offensive season in five years. Wally Joyner had a nice resurgence in his mid-30s, as did Mark Loretta. Tony Gwynn, 35 when Bochy arrived, won batting titles in three of the four seasons he had enough plate appearances to qualify for one. Ken Caminiti’s steroid-fueled MVP occurred under Bochy. This does not mean Bochy waved a magic wand that made all veterans suddenly improve, but enough did for Bochy to score +270 runs in the Birnbaum Database’s individual hitter component, one of the best marks of all-time.
If this had been La Russa...
We're going to get a few WOWY cases now that Bochy's moved on to San Francisco. I guess that's not even perfect, since some folks have theorized that pleasant weather can help veteran ballplayers, particularly ones who play every day.
In addition to not doing a lot of things that draw attention, Bochy has got to be one of the most boring interviews ever. Of course, Felipe Alou was cliche-laden and hard to understand, so I am not sure if he's necessarily worse to listen to. It does make me appreciate Dusty Baker that much more, though.
I found it ok to read, for what it's worth.
Good to know, thanks.
An extraordinarily antiquated and awkward line from this program, made in reference to the Moros of the southern Philippines.
You'll face the panel and you'll like it, Kulak.
Rich Aurillia 358 PAs, OPS 672
2008 Giants 72-90 (68 Pythag wins)
Rich Aurillia 440 PAs, OPS 745
2009 Giants (to date) 71-59 (~68 Pythag wins)
Rick Aurillia 120 PAs, OPS 560
While one could argue that there were other (bad) veterans on these three teams getting PT, it is very hard to argue that those left on the bench were significantly better. One might make a case for Fred Lewis, and although his UZR is OK, he "looks terrible" so ... It does *seem* that a 1st or 2nd year player gets about 1-2 weeks to hit or get benched (or sent down) but a vet gets several months to hit out of his slumps.
I just don't see anything to be excited about. Now THIS year they are way out playing expectations, but that's a few wins worth of Zito's ressurrection, Sanchez' maturing, and Sandoval leaning to take a pitch. Throw in some magical bullpen pixie dust (a Sabean speciality... only works once every 3 years or so), and quite a bit of clutch hitting (they have scored a good 20 runs above what you'd expect from their putrid components)... and voila' wild card condender.
I have no complaints about his handling of the pitching staff... but unless it took him 3 years to "straighten out" Zito and Sanchez, I find it hard to give him much credit.
I think, this year, he's caught a little lightning in a bottle, and hasn't ###### it up. I guess that'll get you Manager of the Year.
$39.95 for a paperback book? How big is this book?
McFarland books normally cost about $30, but a good chunk they price higher. No, I don't know how they decide it. The book length is about 172,000 words (including front matter, as well as back stuff like appendixes, glossary, et al). I believe McFarland's stock'n'trade is selling to libraries; maybe that plays a role in pricing.
Long as I'm here and bored, here is the conclusion to the Bochy commentary. (Basically you get everything in this thread except the stuff at the very top of the Bochy entry, which mostly covers basic info anyhow). Here's what comes immediately after the stuff from post #34:
Since joining the Giants, Bochy has found himself mired in second division, but the roster the front office assembled made that inevitable. Before Bochy arrived, the Giants were an aging and subpar team relying too heavily on stars Barry Bonds, Moises Alou, and Jason Schmidt. The team lost Schmidt and Alou the same off-season Bochy became manager; under the circumstances, it was an achievement that they only declined by five games. What happened in 2008 was more impressive. Despite losing Bonds, easily their best player, they improved by a game. Forecast by many to be one of the worst teams in all of baseball, the Giants narrowly missed placing third in the NL West.
Home runs have been Bochy’s Achilles heel as his teams lack power. Only six times has someone hit 30 homers in a season for him, while the entire NL contained 249 such performances since 1995. Meanwhile, his pitchers give up their share of longballs. While his hitters have only had 22 different twenty-homer seasons, individual pitchers have allowed 20+ homers 29 times. That difference is especially distinctive because across baseball as a whole, individual hitters are more likely to bash twenty homers than specific pitchers allow that many. When the results from the Tendencies Database’s results for hitting and allowing home runs are added together, Bochy’s teams are historically bad:
Combined Home Runs
Tom Kelly 2.836
Jimmy Dykes 2.728
Phil Garner 2.574
Bruce Bochy 2.555
Jimmy McAleer 2.545
Bochy’s offenses have never hit more than 161 homers in a season while his pitchers have allowed greater than 161 long balls eight times. Only twice have his hitters blasted more longballs than his staff has allowed. Overall, his pitchers have allowed 393 more homers than his hitters have allowed; only Kelly and Dykes have a larger negative split. The 2003 Padres gave up 203 while hitting a mere 123, the worst differential in National League history.
-----------
Note: the tendencies database is designed to rank how teams performed at any stat you want over a manager's entire career. It's centered at one for each stat looked at. Since the above chart combines two (Homers hit and allowed), an average score is 2. It might seem backwards that a larger scorer means a manager's teams did worse at homers, but the tendencies database is based on rank, not raw numbers. A team ranking 16th in homers has the larger score, but you sure wouldn't want to be that team. Same here. Also, I should note, I look at rate stats instead of raw numbers (in other words, HR/9IP, not pure homers allowed) when dumping things into the tendencies database.
The book should come with the database. (or at least a link, although a CD with it would be cool)
Looking forward to this book (have been for at least a year or so)
Do you think Bochy had nothing to do with any of that? That's a serious question.
Also, I can understand why people wouldn't want to give Bochy credit for the one-two punch of Lincecum and Cain, but it's not automatic that great young arms turn into great pitching careers. Just ask Prior and Wood, or Isringhausen and Wilson.
I don't know, with the Giants it seems like the GM has a stronger grasp on getting the players he wants than with other organizations, I'm not sure there is much give and take there.
I'd agree with the notion that managers have input into the roster. Actually, that's one reason why I brought up the HR differentials at the end.
I'd also agree he fails to develop young players, but think saying that means he's very poor at identifying talent is a mis-statement. That statement rests on the assumption that the younger player is inherently better. Sometimes, yeah. To that extent the failures of Sean Burroughs should be held accountable. Sometimes, no. Phil Nevin, for example, was a substandard bench player until coming to San Diego at age 28. A whole bunch of managers wouldn't have identified that particular offensive talent. Bochy's strongest point in San Diego was getting his offenses to perform. He has strengths and weaknesses, but overall he's done good.
-- MWE
I could see Tracy, TLR and Bochy. But I don't generally quibble over down ballot votes. It's got to be Tracy at the top.
I was wrong. Bochy may not be perfect, but I think the 2010 Giants performance (on top of his prior trackrecord with SF and SD) -- particularly an average offense and lights-out bullpen -- indicates that whatever oddness shows up in his lineups, he's a great manager.
He's also managed like a mafia hitman in the last couple weeks as well. Banishing Rowand to Alcatraz, briefly benching Pablo and yanking Cain and Lincecum were impressive, decisive moves I didn't think he had in him, and he can really manage a bullpen.
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