#598 Rocket armed fighter-bombers were the weapon of choice in the west. (Though I recall reading an after action report saying that the allies considerably overestimated how effective these were)

Also, naval bombardments were extremely effective against strong static defensive points. Naval support pretty much prevents massive gathering of tanks.

In the action McCoy describes the Mayo came to within 500 yards of the coast and did indeed engage specific targets. The Brooklyn was much bigger and had many more guns (15 six inch guns as well as 8 five inch as opposed to the Mayo which I believe had only 5 five inch guns) but couldn't come in nearly as close as the Mayo.

Rommel's experiences in North Africa made him extremely fearful of Allied air power. Thus, he wanted to position his forces so as to neutralize that as best he could. Rundstedt knew the invasion would be fast and hard, and he wanted to maintain a flexible response, and he feared naval bombardment. In truth, the Germans were between and a rock and a hard place. They were at the choose your poison stage, podnuh.

Was it his experience in North Africa -- or -- his own experience, but from the other end, in the invasion of France?

One of the other advantages the Wehrmacht had in 1940 was that their tank columns were able to call in air support via radio in then-amazingly quick timeframes (15 minutes to 45 minutes, depending on which sources you use). The allies didn't quite have that advantage during the Normandy landings but would once they were able to secure a few airstrips.

#600 Large guns were called in to specific map coordinates. As at Salerno, the destroyers worked much closer in and could potentially go after a specific target. (typically fixed emplacements like pillboxes_

#602 He talked about his own experience on the receiving end.

And during the Normandy campaign as long as the weather cooperated it was pretty common to have fighter-bombers lurking -- waiting for targets of opportunity (or to be called in). The allies often had more tactical air power than they could effectively use. The extreme example being Falaise -- where the fighter-bombers had to queue up waiting their turn to attack.

The other thing restricting the German armor in Normandy was lack of fuel... but they could barely even move during the day because of the allied planes.

I've been on a war jag the last couple of weeks but I'm slowly running out of books to read. Wouldn't mind reading something about the Spanish American war but I can't seem to get my hands on any good ones. Also wouldn't mind reading some of Mosier's books but again I can't get my hands on any of them.

#605 The effectiveness of the resistance is generally overplayed, but they also did a good job here. I remember reading that Das Reich encountered so many sabotaged bridges and what have you that it took them more than two weeks longer than expected to reach Normandy.

Wouldn't mind reading something about the Spanish American war

My favorite thing I read about the Spanish American War was how during the Battle of Cavite/Manila, Gridley was worried that they were running low on ammo and wanted to do a weapons check, but Dewey didn't want to worry the crew, so he called off firing and had the gun crews go to breakfast...

So what it sounds like was irregardless of what the Germans did, the Allies were going to be successful because of the amount of men and material they had. It was just going to be the question of how much casualties they were going to run into on that first day because there was no way the Germans would have been able to knock them off that beach head.

This link supposes what might have happened had it failed.

What if D-Day had failed?

It's possible that the Allies could have failed on D-Day but under the conditions they did fight the battle under it was highly unlikely that they would fail and we only know that because we get to look back in hindsight and have all the information from both sides.

It was just going to be the question of how much casualties they were going to run into on that first day because there was no way the Germans would have been able to knock them off that beach head.

Omaha went as badly as it was possible to go- the preliminary bombardment (both Naval and Aviation) completely missed- the shore defenses were untouched- but we still took and held the beach area (and even if we hadn't Omaha would have been untenable for the Germans after a few days anyway- we had 5 landing beaches and Point du Hoc - the Germans would have to have outright repelled at least 3 of those landings (if not all of them)to have chance- but they only came close at one.

Te Japanese defended quite few more naval landings than Germany, they eventually decided that defending the beach given our naval and air superiority was futile - so they adopted the "cornered rat" defense- which was basically designed to inflict as many casualties on us as possible- while simultaneously conceding that the battle was going to be lost. Bad strategy/tactics- if the enemy has naval and air superiority that does in fact make to tougher to repel the initial landing- but it ALSO make repelling it imperative- when the guy with air and naval superiority gets toehold- he's in fact won the damn war- you can never dislodge him and he can build up and build up without you being able to prevent it

I see commercials for a movie about MacArthur starring Tommy Lee Jones.

#613 Interesting casting. I think it rates to work.

MacArthur, the general, has not been served well by cinema. I don't see that changing with this movie. Now, had Daniel Day-Lewis taken the role...? Part of the reason the MacArthur representations in film are unsatisfying is that MacArthur is not an easily accessible character like, oh, say, Patton.

Also, as to the movie's subject itself, I don't think MacArthur ever seriously considered doing away with the emperor. He thought the emperor had a real use. He understood what symbolism meant to a culture like Japan--indeed, he had been something of a symbol like that.

Was this the thread that spawned some Diplomacy games?

If so - did anyone catch the news that Allan Calhamer, inventor of the board game -- died a week or so back?

Sure, this thread is old. But it's still possibly one of the greatest OT threads in the history of Primer, at least for history buffs.

what Eso quotes in 25 is straight out of the Faulkner playbook.

Withdrew in 12 years to assure compliance the law. Well, that's one way of euphemising it.

Brooks Simpson came up in this thread and his blog post today shows what he can do when he is not distracted by stomping on every neo-Confederate commentator but instead shows his own analysis to argue that the decisions 150 years ago today in Mississippi have a better case to be turning points than the simultaneous action near Chancellorsville. link