OK, I didn't make it through the whole thing, and Manuel certainly has his problems tactically as a manager, but having Utley sacrifice with Werth on 1B is not remotely defensible. That tends to play out as SAC, IBB, Bruntlett (though they did start out pitching to Howard ultimately), ignoring the fact that Utley is averaging one SAC per 1000 PA for his career. We could argue about whether bunting for a base hit to the left side is worth trying, but if it is it's probably worth having Utley/Howard try in more conventional spots as well, which they don't and which may speak to whether they're comfortable/able to pull it off.

The Werth SB that actually happened looks far more like the way to go. Works better if he can avoid getting his sorry ass picked off, something he should have been prepared for given how much time he's already spent kissing the dirt in this series on attempted pick offs.

If Utley bunted and hit it hard enough, there was no way the Rays could have gotten him at first base. I was stunned myself, it would have been first and second with Howard up, maybe second and third. Longoria wasn't even close to the bag.

We do have to admit that last night's game was the rare occasion when replacing Pat Burrell with a pinch runner actually helped the team win.

as a baseball analyst and a cerebral person in general

...yeah yeah yeah, next you will tell us you are in your pajamas in your mom's basement...

We do have to admit that last night's game was the rare occasion when replacing Pat Burrell with a pinch runner actually helped the team win.

He didn't PR for Burrell, he was a defensive replacement for him in the top of the 7th with a 4-1 lead and Burrell due up 7th. I'd really like to see what the odds of Burrell hosing a defensive play that matters in the last 3 innings are compared to his coming up in a situation that might matter when he's likely to bat in the 8th. Not to mention which, Moyer was due up 2nd in the bottom of the 7th, and reserving the move for an inning to see if a double switch of some kind is appropriate might be handy, especially given that Bruntlett's the closest thing they have to a RH PH with Coste the last guy off the bench as the backup C.

I'm not sure what would have been a worse situation: the Rays winning because of a blown call, or the Phils winning because of putting Eric Bruntlett in the game. It's really a toss-up in my mind. Although, as a Rays supporter, I heartily endorse putting Bruntlett in early and often.

I don't get the argument for an Utley bunt w/o the shift - I don't think MGL offered the rationale, just the assertion that it was a good move - but with the shift on, P(hit|bunt to the left side) has to go through the roof.

Finally, we get to the bottom of the 9th, and Bruntlett gets hit by a pitch to lead off the inning. One wild pitch by Balfour and one throwing error by Navarro later, the Phillies have a runner on third and no outs. You have Victorino at bat with Dobbs on deck. You can pitch to Victorino with the infield (and outfield) in of course, trying to coax a strikeout or ground ball out of him. You can walk Victorino and bring in Price or Miller to face Dobbs (or a pinch hitter). Or you can walk the bases loaded and try and get Ruiz, arguably the worst hitter in the lineup, to strike out or hit a grounder.

I will never understand why managers walk the bases loaded with the winning run on third. It completely removes the pitcher's edge; the game immediately becomes whether the pitcher can avoid walking the hitter. So the pitcher's approach has to completely change, as avoiding the walk now becomes the number one goal. We know that hitters' stats improve in typical bases loaded situations; this situation -- game on the line -- is even worse than that.

And what have you removed the pitcher's edge for? So that you no longer have to tag the runner at home? For the fleeting chance at a double play? The tradeoff just isn't worth it; the slight advantage gained from that is swamped several times over by the fact that you've ripped the margin for error away from your pitcher.

And what have you removed the pitcher's edge for? So that you no longer have to tag the runner at home? For the fleeting chance at a double play? The tradeoff just isn't worth it;

I agree with your general point, but another advantage is often getting to face a worse hitter.

with the shift on, P(hit|bunt to the left side) has to go through the roof.

If - and it's a big IF - Utley can get the bunt down in fair territory without giving the defense time to react. If Utley squares around too early in an effort to make sure he gets the bunt down, he gives the defense (some) time to react and cover the play - not optimally, to be sure, but at least passably. If Utley tries to hide the bunt until the last possible minute, he reduces the probability of getting the bunt down fair.

It is not that easy to get a fair bunt down consistently.

-- MWE

It's also worth noting that this is Chase Utley we're talking about. The potential for Utley do something substantially better than a bunt single down the third base line is pretty good. There's a time and a place for a guy like Utley or Howard or Ortiz or Thome etc...to bunt but letting this caliber of hitter swing away is never a "bad" move in my view.

And what have you removed the pitcher's edge for? So that you no longer have to tag the runner at home? For the fleeting chance at a double play?

Well, yes.

When the winning run is at 3B with fewer than two outs, the odds are not good that the team will be able to extricate itself from the situation anyway. The manager has to make a decision - under what circumstances will we be MOST likely to get out without a run scoring? If there's a force play at the plate available, it's normally easier to get an out at the plate (which is almost always a necessary outcome if the team is to get out of the inning), and definitely easier to record a double play, which would be the most desirable outcome. The tradeoff is that you add some events (walks, HBP) which will lead directly to the winning run being scored - but at that point, the manager has no real choice but to trust that his pitcher will NOT walk or hit the batter, and that the increased pressure will NOT lead to his pitcher being more likely to give up something else that will lead directly to the winning run being scored.

It depends on the hitter(s), but normally managers don't walk the bases loaded with NO outs, because the DP doesn't get you out of the inning in that case. Most of the time, the "walk-the-bases-loaded" strategy is used with one out.

-- MWE

I must say, the MLB playoffs haven't really started for me until mgl calls one or more managers an idiot.

http://www.tangotiger.net/RE9902score.html

Using this runs scored frequency table, a runner in 3rd and zero outs results in zero runs 13.6% of the time, while bases loaded and zero outs results in zero runs 12.8% of the time.

I have no analysis to add, rip it apart.

It is not that easy to get a fair bunt down consistently.

Mgl is likely still stuck in the All-Star Baseball (designed by Ethan Allen!) world, where everyone bunts the same. But poor Joe "Frick" Maddon is unduly hampered by a mere supposition of Chase Utley's abilities.

Using this runs scored frequency table, a runner in 3rd and zero outs results in zero runs 13.6% of the time, while bases loaded and zero outs results in zero runs 12.8% of the time.

You can't use RE tables that way, because they lump *every* such situation together, and in many of those situations, trading the run(s) for the out(s) is more important to the defense than preventing the run(s) from scoring. If the bases are loaded with no one out in the top of the first, the defensive team will nearly always play the infield back, going for two while the run scores - they don't even TRY to cut the runner down at the plate unless the ball is his back to the pitcher.

-- MWE

The big problem with walking the bases loaded for me is that the pitcher isn't going to want to walk in a run. So he's basically just gonna lay it in there to the guy he ends up facing. Hitters' stats with the bases loaded reflect this. If you're transforming the hitter you end up facing into a much better hitter, it largely defeats the purpose IMO, unless said hitter stinks to begin with.

In general, IBBs seem to me, totally anecdotally, to be used more often in the past few years (do the stats bear this out?) I personally believe it's a strategy for a very specific and relatively rare occasion. But, again anecdotally, it seems like it's getting to the point where it's being done whenever the team would gain the platoon advantage, is behind in the game, and there's no one on first base.

As for this article... I agree that Greg Gross didn't hit lefties much... starting him against Moyer would probably¹ have been an even worse decision than starting Gabe Gross, which was bad enough. I agree that Utley and Howard shouldn't hit back to back, and I agree that I would have PHed for Moyer in the bottom of the 5th and gone straight to Madson/Lidge. All that said... it's weird to criticize Maddon for using a defense vulnerable to a bunt, when the opponent did not, in fact, bunt. Maddon's decision was correct! I guess the Moyer decision also "worked" insofar as Philly ultimately won the game, but I do understand a "process-based" criticism there. I don't understand a process-based criticism when the decision consists entirely of guessing what the other manager is gonna do.

Managing is also about a lot more than making in-game decisions. To say that Maddon is a "very poor manager" because you don't like his in-game moves in one game, or even an entire season for that matter, is very silly. Manuel seems to be doing a Brenly-esque job to me. I might have to give MGL that one.

¹ But not necessarily.

You can't use RE tables that way, because they lump *every* such situation together

I know. But I don't have any tables for zero outs, runner on 3rd, 9th inning, game 3 of the world series.

Another thought on the walkathon the other night. Would Bruntlett run on the squib if the bases weren't loaded? probably not.

Not that the squib would have happened if the walks didn't.

I've seen teams work out of the leadoff-runner-on-3rd situation by walking the bases loaded, playing the infield way in, bringing an outfielder as a fifth infielder, and playing the other two outfielders way in, maximizing the chance for the first out to be a force at the plate or a "single" turned into a shallow fly ball with no SF. With one out, then, the infield goes to DP depth and three outfielders play shallow. Again, as Mike E says, it's a desperation move. At least you don't concede a typical groundball or soft-line-drive single that might result from the pitcher having no place to put the batter.

While I don't agree with the walking the bases loaded move I think that Maddon is the best manager in baseball. He does everything well.

First, he's obviously a good baseball guy, he's been around for years which gives him experience and he's demonstrated his teaching ability by taking a young team to unprecedented performance levels.

Second, he's good at dealing with people. The Rays had as much adversity as anyone this season and we're able to weather the storm. Maddon deserves credit for that.

Finally, he's not a slave to convention. He's willing to do what he thinks is right even if it is risky and opens himself up to criticism. He uses his bullpen very will and is willing to use his good pitchers like Howell against both lefties and righties. He also plays matchups well with his lineup. He understands the platoon advantage but he also understands that it isn't generic and depends upon the particular players involved.

Basically, I think he's great. There isn't anyone I'd rather have managing my team.

Typical MGL. This should have been titled, "An article from a very poor writer."

I must say, the MLB playoffs haven't really started for me until mgl calls one or more managers an idiot.

And reminds us of how smart he is, just in case we had all forgotten.

When was the last time he saw a manager he liked, anyway?

When was the last time he saw a manager he liked, anyway?

he's part of the stathead community, they don't like any managers. I mean it's hilarious how often times people like to make fun of the book, but then they turn around and create their own personal book and expect the managers to go 100% of the time based upon that, not realizing that doing anything 100% of the time is going to get the other team to defend against that particular tactic, decreasing it's value as a tactic.

Of course on this bunting thing, I agree with him about Utley should have been bunting when the runner was on first and they had that massive shift, as long as he bunted it towards third base it would have been first and second or with luck first and third. the shift was massively stupid in my opinion and should not have been employed in the situation it was used.

Utley shouldn't have bunted in the World Series. He should have bunted back in May (or whenever) the shift started being played. After giving up 7 or 8 singles in a row to him, teams would play him straight up. Unless, perhaps, he's waiting for that ONE moment. He comes up with a runner third with two outs in a tie game in game 7 of the world series and then he pokes it through the SS position for the series winning run.

Anyway, I see nothing wrong with Maddon playing the shift because Utley has proven he won't bunt/slap it to left. I do see something wrong with Utley not doing so as soon as it was presented to him as an option if, for no other reason, than to get them to stop giving him the option.


Of course, is there any data that says the shift actually helps?

Unless, perhaps, he's waiting for that ONE moment. He comes up with a runner third with two outs in a tie game in game 7 of the world series and then he pokes it through the SS position for the series winning run.

you have to assume that the shift would be different, otherwise there would be a huge danger of the runner stealing home (especially if the opposing manager brought in a lefty to face Utley/Howard)

...then they turn around and create their own personal book and expect the managers to go 100% of the time based upon that, not realizing that doing anything 100% of the time is going to get the other team to defend against that particular tactic, decreasing it's value as a tactic.

There's an entire chapter of the book about this.

I mean it's hilarious how often times people like to make fun of the book, but then they turn around and create their own personal book and expect the managers to go 100% of the time based upon that, not realizing that doing anything 100% of the time is going to get the other team to defend against that particular tactic, decreasing it's value as a tactic.

As Eric J says you aren't paying attention. One of MGL's biggest points is that tactics in baseball are iterative and contextual. MGL's analysis on this score is very nuanced and perceptive.

#26, I haven't watched a lot of Phillies games this year, so someone who has will have a better answer than me here, but I don't think Utley has really seen a shift like that during the regular season. In fact, i thought I heard it mentioned somewhere (on the broadcast or around here) that Maddon is, in fact, the first guy to try an "Utley shift" in the same way that teams have used a "Howard shift" all season long... If all of this is true, it would be a bit harsh to criticize Utley for not slapping/bunting the other way against the shift, when he's never had to do it all season long (since the shift was never used against him).

And, FWIW, bunting Utley seemed as bad an idea as bunting Victorino with Bruntlett at 1B, no out in the 9th with Feliz/Ruiz/PH coming up... but then I happen to be an AL guy who dislikes the mad bunting mentality of the NL.

Weird, I don't think that was all that bad a managed game...but MGL doesn't even mention the worst move, the one that had me jumping out of my seat screaming: pinch-hitting Dobbs for Feliz in the 9th.

The entire stadium knew Maddon was going to walk the bases loaded; why waste your best PH when the pitcher's spot is only two spots away?

As Eric J says you aren't paying attention. One of MGL's biggest points is that tactics in baseball are iterative and contextual. MGL's analysis on this score is very nuanced and perceptive.

I don't doubt MGL's abilty to think of the game as nuanced etc, but the point is the stathead community constantly bashes each and every manager on the planet for sticking to absurd "book" rules and insist they should instead follow their personal book.

TLR is a great manager because he tries to experiment with his own personal book during the season, he'll allow his lefty specialist to pitch to righties earlier in the season to gauge whether they have improved in their ability to get righties out (MGL and other stat guys will of course blast this for ignoring the numbers and that a 5 year history is 100% of all the evidence he will ever need to evaluate, instead of looking at newer results, maturity of the pitcher, or any of a host of other factors that could have changed in the off season or previous season) there is zero managers the stat community loves or likes or even tolerates. I mean I think Torre is quite possibly one of the worse managers in baseball but it seems everyone loves him (around St Louis people were rooting for the Dodgers in spite of Manny because of Torre) but outside of whatever tool the A's and Red Sox hire, there is likely to be nobody that is actually a good manager that the stat community will agree is good, because a good manager is going to go against the grain time and again, not rarely but frequently.

MGL (I think it was him that wrote the chapter) argued that you need to bunt sometimes to keep the defense on their toes. Otherwise, the infielders could play back all the time and turn more ballis in play into outs. But you have to do it randomly.

In fact, i thought I heard it mentioned somewhere (on the broadcast or around here) that Maddon is, in fact, the first guy to try an "Utley shift" in the same way that teams have used a "Howard shift" all season long... If all of this is true, it would be a bit harsh to criticize Utley for not slapping/bunting the other way against the shift, when he's never had to do it all season long (since the shift was never used against him).

But batting in front of Howard for 2+ years he's witnessed it enough. Plus unlike Howard, or David Ortiz, or Jason Giambi, Utley can run a bit.

Charlie Manuel has never had a team he has managed the full season, finish lower than 2nd place but he is a poor manager? I doubt the personnel was so superior that even though he was a poor manager they still were able to finish that high in the standings.

Then to add insult to injury, he brings in his worst pitcher to pitch in a now high-leverage situation with runners on 2nd and 3rd and no outs—Chad Durbin.

Durbin. 2.87 ERA in 87 IP this year. Durbin. 5.29 ERA in 552 career innings. Can you say, "Fluke season?"

This was an incredibly stupid point too. Anyone watching the Phillies this year knows Durbin has been pitching in this situation all year and with great success. Can you imagine the Q&A;if he used, say Clay Condrey or J.A. Happ, who according to MGL are both better pitchers than Durbin?

Q: Charlie, why Condrey there when Durbin's been getting it done all year?
A: As you know gentlemen, Chad Durbin was a very poor pitcher at age 22 and 23 as a starter for the Kansas City Royals, and I find his 87 2/3 innings of 152 ERA+ this year to be a statistical anomaly. It is of course impossible to believe that his true talent has changed at all in his age 30 season, and his first exclusively in the relief role. I find the numbers he posted as a starter from 2000-2007 to be the best judge of his current abilities. Hence, Clay Condrey.

MGL (I think it was him that wrote the chapter) argued that you need to bunt sometimes to keep the defense on their toes. Otherwise, the infielders could play back all the time and turn more ballis in play into outs. But you have to do it randomly.

I agree with this comment, and it's something that is easy to say, but of course the time that a manager actually does something like this they will get blasted by the stathead community. It's great that they recognize the need for keeping the defense on their toes, but I guarantee anytime that a manager does it, someone from this board will say "this wasn't the time for that".

of course, again I agree with MGL about the Utley situation, you take the base if they are going to give it too you. Heck it is entirely possible that he could have bunted a double there.

There were 16 occasions in 2007 in which a defensive team loaded the bases with no outs with the score tied in a walkoff situation. The results on the following play were:

FO at home plate: 1
GDP via the plate: 1
Error/run scored: 1 (5E2, should have yielded at least a force play)
Strikeout: 3
Single/run scored: 5 (4 ground balls, one line drive - I'd bet that nearly all of the GB singles would have been FOs or DPs had it not been a walkoff situation)
SF: 2
BB: 1
HBP: 2

IOW, the pitching+defense converted five of 16 and should have converted a sixth one - granting that they were not yet out of the woods, so to speak. (Interesting that there were no FB outs without a run scoring, or FB DPs - no walkoff WP or PB, either).

There were 174 occasions where the score was tied, the bases were loaded with no outs, and the defense was NOT in a walkoff situation. On 59 of those occasions, the batter was retired without a run scoring, including 8 force plays at the plate, 7 GDPs via the plate, and 1 FB DP. There was one other occasion where there was a force play at the plate, but the catcher threw wild to first allowing a run to score from 2B. There were eight walks, and one hit batter, that forced in a run.

Now in the latter situations, there were a lot of runs that scored on outs. What I found interesting is that, in around 1/3 of the situations in BOTH cases, the defense got at least one out without allowing a run to score - and that there were only a handful of bases-loaded walks and HBP.

-- MWE

eh, managerial strategy is a minor part of a successful manager's duties.

In baseball, just being able to manage the players egos is far more important to success.

and that there were only a handful of bases-loaded walks and HBP.

These were Met games, I assume. Wait, you said 2007. They did this in 2008.

You usually have a fresh and excellent bullpen at your disposal in the postseason. Unless you have an absolute ace starter on the mound, you should use your bullpen early and often. A fresh reliever is almost always better than a stale starter, no matter how well or poorly that starter is pitching. That is especially true since you can mix and match your right-handed and left-handed relievers.

agree with the premise, disagree with the suggestion. The more a team sees a reliever the better chance they have being able to find a weakness. I'm sure MGL has numbers to refute this, but it seems that teams do a better job than expected against relievers they see a lot. Seven games may not be enough for this difference to come into play though.

have to agree with the other posters about the picking on Durbin, his career stats don't reflect the pitcher that he is currently, use his last three seasons if you want, but to include his 22 year season is ludicrous.

On six occasions in 2007, a runner reached 3B with no outs and the score tied in a walkoff situation. The manager of the defensive team intentionally walked the next hitter twice - you may recall that one of them was by Trevor Hoffman to Todd Helton with Jamey Carroll on deck, after Matt Holliday had tripled in the tying run in the 13th inning of the wild card tiebreaker - and the pitcher issued an unintentional walk twice. On the other two occasions, the winning run scored once on a wild pitch, and the defense recorded an out without a run scoring on one occasion.

In neither case after the first IBB did the opposing manager issue a second IBB (the other IBB was to Daryle Ward in a 9/17 game against Cincinnati, with Mark DeRosa on deck, following a game-tying triple by Aramis Ramirez) - and in both cases the game ended with the next batter.

Following one of the two unintentional BB, the manager did issue an IBB to load the bases to the next hitter. That game also involved the Cubs as the beneficiary, this time against the Phillies on August 1, 2007. Matt Murton led off the ninth inning against Brett Myers with a double and was wild-pitched to third. Ronnie Cedeno drew an unintentional walk, and Myers followed with an intentional pass to Jacque Jones. Myers did then strike out Jason Kendall, but with PH Cliff Floyd at the plate, Myers threw a second wild pitch that led to the winning run.

-- MWE

Mike: good research on the 190 times you have the score tied, no outs, and bases loaded in 2007. Of those, how many times did the defense get out of the inning unscathed (no runs)?

Cards: your statements regarding "100%" may apply to some community in general, but it doesn't apply to everyone, and certainly not MGL in particular. He wrote the chapter on Game Theory and he constantly blogs about how you have to do some things randomly to keep the other side honest. And his sac bunt chapter is laced with such commentary.

As for Utley: if you have a runner on 1B, and the manager is daring you to bunt yourself on, if you can be safe just 40% of the time, you break even. For a hitter of Utley's caliber, it's more like 50%. Seeing that normal hitters can get a bunt hit, with no shift, 30% of the time, and good bunters, with no shift get it 40% of the time, I think it's very easy to see how Utley should be safe far more than 50% of the time if he bunts against the shift. Furthermore, by bunting against the shift, you now force your opponent to not play the shift so extreme on you.

Ortiz was 3-4 in 2006, and 4-8 since 2002 bunting (all presumably against the shift), according to Fangraphs.

Furthermore, by bunting against the shift, you now force your opponent to not play the shift so extreme on you.

Ortiz was 3-4 in 2006, and 4-8 since 2002 bunting (all presumably against the shift), according to Fangraphs.

I wonder how much you have to bunt to alter your opponent's degree of shift.

You mention Ortiz, but I dont think teams have shied away from the shift because of those bunt attempts (maybe they have). Or maybe he would have needed to do it more.

Does anyone recall whether the Rays shifted less versus Papi in games 6 & 7 after he tried to bunt for a hit in game 5?

Of those, how many times did the defense get out of the inning unscathed (no runs)?

In the 16 times the defense loaded the bases with the score tied and no outs in a walkoff situation in 2007, they escaped twice. Oddly enough, both games occurred in Oakland.

On June 4, the A's were playing Boston. Travis Buck walked to start the inning and advanced to third when Eric Hinske (playing first) booted Nick Swisher's grounder. Dan Johnson drew a walk to load the bases, but JC Romero fanned Eric Chavez and got Bobby Crosby to ground into a 5-2-3 DP. Oakland eventually won 5-4 in 11 on Chavez's HR off Kyle Snyder.

On September 2, the Tigers took a 7-5 lead into the bottom of the ninth at the NAC. That lead disappeared quickly, as Marco Scutaro walked and Kurt Suzuki homered off Todd Jones. Oakland then got a single from Shannon Stewart and Swisher drew a free pass. With Jack Cust hitting, Jones wild-pitched the runners to second and third, and Jim Leyland opted to give Cust an intentional walk at that point to load the bases. But Mike Piazza hit into a 6-2-3 twin killing and Johnson flied to center to end the inning. The A's also won that one in the 10th.

In the 174 situations in which the defense loaded the bases with no one out and the score tied in a non-walkoff situation, the offense was held scoreless from that point forward on 27 occasions (15.5%).

There's no significant difference between walkoff and non-walkoff situations - although the walkoff sample size is small. The more important point is that not one of the 16 walkoff situations with bases loaded/no outs/score tied resulted from a runner on 3B and no one out, followed by two IBB; the closest one was the one I mentioned before in Chicago, which went double/WP/UBB/IBB. As I mentioned earlier, the walk-the-bases-loaded strategy is usually a one-out strategy, when a DP gets you out of the inning.

There were 25 instances of a runner reaching 3B with one out and the score tied in a walkoff situation in 2007. On seven of those occasions, the offense was held scoreless. The walk-the-bases-loaded strategy was employed on five of those occasions, with the offense failing to score twice. There were also two cases where the first batter after the runner reached third drew an unintentional walk and the next batter was walked intentionally to load the bases; the offense scored on both of those.

-- MWE