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Well, if we're talking all-time here, there's the little matter of the Red Sox (sorry, kevin) handing the Yankees the foundation for the first wave of their 80 years of dominating the American League . . . . That's got to be as lopsided as Herschel Walker, doesn't it?
Hubbell was the Giants' Farm Director for all or nearly all of that period, so he deserves enormous credit for the tremendous production of the Giants' system. But Stoneham was Hubbell's boss, and so obviously deserves credit too.
Hubbell can't be blamed for the trades, although I suspect his input was sought on assessing the future development path of this or that player. Stoneham was the guy in charge, but he never made his decisions hastily or independently; he always sought and carefully considered the advice of the cadre of executives he employed for decades, which included (his nephew) Chub Feeney, Tom Sheehan, Jack Schwartz, and Rosy Ryan.
I read this article and Mike's one at lunch. Very interesting, but I don't really see a correlation between success at the trading desk and success on the field.
Any analysis of "trades" has to imply consenting, competing formally equal partners. The evil doings of the 1898-99 and 1899-1900 offseasons shouldn't count. (e.g., Cy Young and Jesse Burkett from the Cleveland Spiders to St. Louis, Honus Wagner, Fred Clarke, and Tommy Leach from the Louisville Colonels to Pittsburgh.)
I'm interested in the Whitey Herzog trading record in St. Louis from about 1980 to 1985. It shouldn't grade out by this method as particularly striking in either direction. After all, the biggest blockbuster, the Simmons/Fingers/Lezcano multiplayer trade with Milwaukee, has to score as a net loss for the Cardinals. But the whole series of trades did a good job of building the team he wanted, including such nice A for B, B for A shuffles like Sorenson for L. Smith, T.Scott for Andujar.
Giving up Keith Hernandez for Neil Allen and Rick Ownbey has got to kill his record, doesn't it?
I read this article and Mike's one at lunch. Very interesting, but I don't really see a correlation between success at the trading desk and success on the field.
Well, a few comments:
First, I need to correct the flaw in the data.
Second, did you actually run a regression analysis? Don't forget that we're talking about 40 years worth of data. If you run that regression, you'll have to adjust for expansion teams.
Third, even if you still find there's little correlation, my guess is there is more of a correlation once we look at the data broken out by five or ten year periods.
Fourth, if we get all that right, the squared error of each team would be an interesting indicator of something in itself.
BTW, Mike and I have the same data for free agents and draft choices. Down the line, we can probably put it all together.
Nah, I'm still at work. I was just eyeballing the article. But I'd take the last 40+ years history of the Mets, Red Sox, or Braves (teams that scored low) over the history of some of the teams that scored well.
BTW, Mike and I have the same data for free agents and draft choices. Down the line, we can probably put it all together.
I think Mike mentioned that in his article. I look forward to the next installments.
I'm not so sure...Lezcano was then involved in the trade for Ozzie Smith; and David Green and Dave LaPoint (also part of the Fingers trade) were later traded for Jack Clark, and Larry Sorensen (also part of the Fingers trade) was part of a trade to acquire Lonnie Smith. Ozzie Smith, Jack Clark and Lonnie Smith were all instrumental to the success of the pennant-winning teams of the '80s...
What happened to Green anyway?
The Giants traded for him, so of course he immediately turned to crap ...
When Green was doing poorly with the Giants, two rumors clouded around him:
1) He was older than advertised.
2) He was partying hearty.
Yeah, the trade to New York sure led Mex to clean up his act. A regular choir boy after that.
I'll tell you who he took with him: Darryl Strawberry. The Hernandez role model: late nights, lots of booze, party hard.
Rarely, if ever, has a player been such a good influence on the field and such a bad one off it. I don't know how many times I remember watching Hernandez, standing on second base with Darryl at bat, motioning to him to keep his front shoulder in and wait on the pitch. Thank God I never saw the "counsel" he was giving at the nightclubs . . . .
In any event, from a win shares perspective, the trade was a big, fat stinker for Herzog. And I don't care how bad Hernandez was in the clubhouse and late at night; you just can't trade him for Neil Allen and Rick Ownbey.
You're absolutely right that he was a much-hyped part of that deal. As to what happened to him:
1. Not all toolsy prospects work out.
2. Demon rum.
3. (Speculative) Baseball age?
Salvomania - you know I'd utterly forgotten that Lezcano was in the San Diego deal. I'd forgotten that he was still playing at that point. I tend to think of Sorenson/Smith as it's own very good trade, along with LaPoint & Uribe/Clark (together with its reverse twin trade, Hendrick/Tudor), rather than trying to make all of that part of the Simmons deal.
Sam M: Yeah, Hernandez was a talent loss. Love him or hate him for it, by dealing both Simmons and Hernandez, Herzog established the position that he was bigger than any of his players and the game would be played his way.
I expect the full analysis would be near-neutral on win shares exchanged, and that only because Whitey got very, very lucky on Templeton/Ozzie. On the whole, it worked anyway. Some of the biggest credit I give Whitey is for recognizing the disposabilty of such players as Ken Reitz and Tony Scott and getting value back for them anyway.
Templeton, too.
Of course, the sad thing is Herzog probably managed only one player in his whole career who "played the game his way" on the field to a greater extent than Keith Hernandez. Hernandez played a smart, patiently aggressive game who didn't give an inch away, took chances when it made sense, made very few mistakes (physical or mental).
It was Hernandez off the field that Whitey couldn't live with -- and that meant Keith had to go, period.
Looking at his numbers now it's incredible to realize that the guy NEVER had a full season with an OBP above .300 and he only cracked .400 slugging (.412) once.
I never would have pegged him as a guy with a career .640 OPS (+79).
Still, somehow, the Cubs saw something in him that made them want to trade Bruce Sutter for him...(okay, for him and Leon Durham).
actually come to think of it given that players switch leagues and switch to divisions in eras of unbalanced schedules, such an evaluation may give information as to how wins compare from league to league and division to division... it also might point out flaws in win shares. But Im probably just talking out fo my as$.
Good work Studes!
Smack on target.
Hernandez is, all things considered, one of the most intriguing figures in baseball over the past 30 years. He's obviously highly intelligent, an extremely articulate student of the game, dashingly handsome, a Seinfeld celebrity beyond the realm of baseball.
He's also got that very complex love/hate relationship with his domineering father, and the prediliction to addictions (coke, booze, cigarettes).
There's just an awful lot of stuff going on in trying to understand Keith Hernandez. I suspect there's a great book waiting to be written there.
I read this article and Mike's one at lunch. Very interesting, but I don't really see a correlation between success at the trading desk and success on the field."
By the way I was responding to this comment and studes reply. But I thought id add that it should not be too surprising if things do not correlate. There are two main reasons. A minor one is that teams get credit for WS that they loose through free agency, and loose credit for WS they would have lost through free agency anyway. Mainly this is only one of three major ways to build a team, and every team puts different amounts of resources towards each of these three methods (trades, farm, free agents). I would, therefore, expect the correlation between good trades and win/loss record to be low. The Giants are a good example given in this thread... lousy traders, great developers of talent in the farm system... Im guessing they then became great traders to erase most of that deficit from the 60's and early 70's...
Even the current book, Pure Baseball, is a beautiful dissection of the game. I'm reading it and Earl Weaver's book at the same time, finding similarities (and some disagreements) all over the place.
I don't know about great traders, but the Giants' trading record since Stoneham sold the club in 1975 has generally been good ... Darrell Evans, Jeffrey Leonard, Atlee Hammaker, Mike Krukow, Mark Davis, Kevin Mitchell, Bill Swift, Mike Jackson, Rod Beck, Darren Lewis, Rich Aurilia, Jeff Kent, Ellis Burks, JT Snow, Shawn Estes, Felix Rodriguez, and David Bell are among the many key players acquired in trade by the Giants who delivered net value added.
You also probably remember him as having a higher batting average than he really had. The man seemed to have a knack for going .400-for-April. If you search the press archives, you'll probably find national stories talking about that great Cardinals left side of the infiled, Templeton and Reitz. Reitz always had good press.
Oberkfell was as good defensively if not better, just less-celebrated for it. And Oberkfell had a lifetime .350 OBP. Maybe Oberkfell would have been in the lineup anyway, at 2B, so trading Reitz actually opened the lineup spot for another .350 OBP player, Tom Herr. Whitey may not have spent all that much time talking about OBP, but that doesn't mean he didn't value it.
OK, I'll bite, Steve. Who are you talking about here? George Brett? (The Cardinal fan in me wants to bring up Ozzie.)
I didn't say that, Sam did. I'm curious too.
Amos Otis?
George Brett?
Yeah, I meant Brett. Brett was different than Hernandez -- more intense, more aggressive -- but very much in that part of Herzog's mold that was demanded an in your face, ultra-competitive, screw-the-SOBs who stand in your way, attitude. Hernandez was also intense and intensely competitive, but in a more contained way. I think if you combined Hernandez's approach to the play of the game, with Brett's leatherneck attitude, you'd have Whitey's perfect player.
Are you planning an article on him at some point?
Mazzilli for Walt Terrell and Ron Darling
Neil Allen/Rick Ownby for K. Hernandez
Bob Bailor/Carlos Diaz for Sid Fernandez
Terrell for Howard Johnson
Hubie Brooks/Mike Fitzgerald., etc. for Gary Carter
Cal Schiraldi for Bob Ojeda
Ed Hearn for David Cone
It was just one slam dunk after another for a while.
The more I think about it, and realize how extreme his expected W/L to actual W/L split is, the more I wonder if I did frick up the math. I did a good job with it - double checking everyone's in season run support, but sometimes errors still help, or I'll type in the wrong number when I dump into excel to figure adjusted win/loss records, so .. . .
I double-check & sure enough -- I screwed up the math. In real life, he had 145 runs scored in 32, given the park factor of 109, and the league runs/game average of 4.01, that works out to an RSI of 104.
Better than what I had it at, but at least now its average/slightly above average run support.
Still a lucky b@stard, but no longer such an all-time historiclly lucky one; just an incredibly lucky one.
He had 12 starts where the game was decided by one run. The Cards were 9-3 in those games (he himself won seven of them). The Cards were 4-1 in two-run games he started (he got all of those wins).
Sorry for the earlier error.
I don't think this is a bad trade at all. Boddicker was a key contributor in the 1988 and 1990 AL East division titles. You don't get to acquire a genuine #2 starter in a pennant race very often.
It took Schilling two more teams to finally figure it out, and it took Brady Anderson a good 3-4 years to figure it out (some say with supplemental assistance..). He was expendable anyway, with Burks playing CF. Granted, Anderson started to turn good right when Burks left, and he would have been useful in 1995 and 1996 (when the Sox missed the wild card by 3 games behind Baltimore, who had guess who). But I don't think you can really say that Brady Anderson cost the Red Sox anywhere near as much as Andersen for Bagwell did.
Gorman had to give up some legit prospects for Mike Boddicker. A B-/C+ prospect would have gotten it done for Larry Andersen (who WAS key in bringing a division title to Boston).
Sorry to take so long to respond on this, but I was watching my daughter play her last regular season varsity soccer game.
The deal with Mathewson went like this. Mathewson was pitching for a minor league team. Freedman made a deal to buy him, but insisted on a tryout first. After the tryout, he told the minor league team Mathewson wasn't good enough. Then he arranged to have the Reds buy Mathewson for about half the price Freedman had agreed to pay and trade him back to the Giants for the washed up Amos Rusie. The owner of the Reds was John T. Brush, who then bought the Giants soon thereafter.
All this to cheat some minor league club out of a thousand bucks or so.
I don't have the NBJHBA in front of me right now, but what was James's phrase for Freedman? Something like "a thug skating on thin ice over an ocean of lunacy."
Just goes to show you that at least some MLB owners were selfish pricks over one hundred years ago. As far as I can tell the only thing that has changed are the dollar amounts involved.
Tell that to the fans of the Cleveland Spiders, who averaged 22 games above .500 per year for a 7-year stretch from 1892 through 1898. Or the fans of the Louisville Colonels, perennial doormats but they'd just hit the talent sweepstakes big time and had come up with the potential foundation of a dynasty by 1899.
No, the idea of writing about Hernandez had never crossed my mind until today. Thinking about it some more, there might be an article in there, but truly Hernandez and his career are far too complex a subject for an article to deal with well. The Hernandez story deserves a full-length book, with extensive interviews with his family, teammates, etc., obviously vastly beyond the capabilities of an amateur like me.
If so, it won't be because Giles just stopped producing value; he's still a fine player. IOW, it's not a Jim Fregosi situation.
I'll give you a longer shot for a lopsided trade, but one I really think could happen: Vasquez, et al., for Randy Johnson. There's at least a decent chance, given Johnson's knee and age, that he could pitch 50 more innings and be fini. That is just the sort of trade that could turn into a nightarish imbalance fast -- Vasquez gives 8-10 more years of solid pitching, and Navarro turns out to be a decent ML catcher, and voila -- you have a -100 trade for the Yankees.
I read this article and Mike's one at lunch. Very interesting, but I don't really see a correlation between success at the trading desk and success on the field.
There have been several comments by now, but I'll go out on a limb and throw in mine as well: There is probably a negative correlation. Borrowing from my post in the other thread:
You're more likely to be "burned" by trading away a young talent if you've got a lot of young talent. (And you're especially likely to trade young talent if you have a similar talent blocking them, which tends to limit the damage.) In general, the best sign-and-develop teams are both more likely to be net losers in the trading and more likely to be successful on the field.
Or, what the bringeth giveth, the winter meetings giveth away.
Scott Kazmir for Victor Zambrano?
Thanks for putting it into words better than I could have.
That's an excellent observation. But isn't there now a force that would counter this tendency? That is, many teams nowadays with young talent coming up and "similar talent blocking them" have a big economic incentive to trade the blocker, rather than the blockee. For instance, in years gone by, the A's would have traded away a Bobby Crosby -- the young, "blocked" talent -- because they had Miguel Tejada. In this era, such teams have an incentive either to trade the Tejada or simply let him go, and utilize the cheaper, pre-arb alternative.
Theoretically, IOW, you should see fewer trades in which young talent is sent packing, especially by teams that have the strongest economic incentive to hold on to their cheap years. The teams that DO give up this financial advantage via dumb trades of young talent (the next person who mentions Scott Kazmir is a dead man . . . .) should be at a competitive disadvantage -- which means such trades should correlate to losing.
Posted by Arthur Miller on February 11, 2005 at 01:34 PM (#1139458)
Physical Graffitti was the best Zep album. That is all.
The Mets paid a terrible price for their savior at first base, and you have to wonder what might have happened if Doc n Darryl hadn't coked their heads into neverland.
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