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Transaction Oracle— A Timely Look at Transactions as They Happen
Monday, December 27, 2004
Reds - Signed Milton
Cincinnati Reds - Signed P Eric Milton to a 3-year contract worth $25.5 million.
Let’s put this the simplest way possible without resorting to foul language.
Imagine Carl Lindner taking $25.5 million in cash out of his bank account. After defecating on the money, Lindner proceeds to strangle the Filipino hooker that witnessed his currency defoulment in full view of a group of tourists with video cameras, Lindner then charges into a police station brandishing an empty shotgun. On top of this, he admits that he picked Sam Bowie in the NBA draft, pre-empted the Raiders/Jets game with Heidi, and advised Neville Chamberlain in the late 30’s.
Uncle Carl is likely to get a better return on his investment under the set of conditions laid out in the previous paragraph than from his investment in Eric Milton, who’s as overrated as Eric Gregg is fat.
Dan Szymborski
Posted: December 27, 2004 at 11:23 PM | 314 comment(s)
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There is no silk purse that can be made out of this sow's ear, fellas.
I put the over/under of Ortiz/Milton HR Allowed at: 69.5
Sorry, the "Are you the biggest idiot ever?" stuff that gets thrown at the Blazers for Sam Bowie is one of my pet peeves. I'd say drafting LaRue Martin was easily the more numbskulled decision. And I have wonderful pleasant dreams at night thinking about what those Blazer teams would have been like with Olajuwon at the five instead of... * shudder * Kevin Duckworth.
... or if Sabonis had come over in '88. That Portland finals team, but with Sabonis, on two healthy knees? Holy cow.
I loved Sam Bowie, so don't get me wrong, but he wasn't the same player after his leg injuries (plural) at Kentucky.
I want to know how giving up those Czech factories made appeasement work.
This argument holds no water. Take the best player, then work with what you have. That's what trades are for.
Due to the lingering world wide effects of the Great Depression and the lack of public support for military spending in the Western democracies, neither Britain nor France felt prepared to take on Hitler in 1938.
Even if they had been militarily prepared, there was little public support in Britain and France for war with Germany, particularly not over Eastern Europe. It is easy to mock this now, but the bloody legacy of World War I (which was almost universially seen a mistake by the 1930s) was a powerful check against any calls for a grand crusade against Hitler.
Finally, the United States had made it quite clear that it would not join, support, or encourage Britain or France in a war against Germany in 1938. In response to the deal struck at Munich in 1938, FDR sent Chamberlin a two work telegram: "Good Man."
In light of these three factors, it is not hard to see why French and British leaders sought to buy time through appeasement, both to build up their armies and to lobby the U.S. and their own reluctant publics to build political and diplomatic support for war.
This is not to argue that appeasement was the correct policy. It was an understandable and even defensible one, however, given the options facing European leaders in 1938.
I like the strategy the Reds are working on here... we have to outscore the opponents, so lets get them all worn out by allowing 13 runs by the fifth inning, then we'll put the decent bullpen guys in and start hitting line drives and bloopers into the outrfield - we can make a comeback!
Sorry, but a great leader should lead - should work to convince people that the man is a madman and a murderer and must be stopped.
I acknowledge that there were (are) many people in the world who were (are) quite happy that Hitler was busy removing a certain "problem" from society. But that doesn't mean we should kowtow to them and cling to a bad war as a reason not to act.
Amoral and indefensible. But easy decisions often are.
But ... Olajuwon, Barkley, Perkins, Jordan, Stockton. That's one hell of a starting five.
I remember an interview with Bobby Knight a few years back. He said he was talking to one of his friends on a team with a high pick (I guess either Houston or Portland) and told them to draft Jordan, the guy responded by saying the needed a center, Knight told him to play Jordan at center then just draft him.
Do you have them available? I'd love to read the viewpoint - I've yet to have that argument really hold water with me at least. Buying time can be nice, but I just can't see the price paid in Munich for that time to have been a good idea.
Dan, when I get my desktop up and running again- I'll send them to you.
to the lingering world wide effects of the Great Depression and the lack of public support for military spending in the Western democracies, neither Britain nor France felt prepared to take on Hitler in 1938.
Even if they had been militarily prepared, there was little public support in Britain and France for war with Germany, particularly not over Eastern Europe. It is easy to mock this now, but the bloody legacy of World War I (which was almost universially seen a mistake by the 1930s) was a powerful check against any calls for a grand crusade against Hitler.
Finally, the United States had made it quite clear that it would not join, support, or encourage Britain or France in a war against Germany in 1938. In response to the deal struck at Munich in 1938, FDR sent Chamberlin a two work telegram: "Good Man."
In light of these three factors, it is not hard to see why French and British leaders sought to buy time through appeasement, both to build up their armies and to lobby the U.S. and their own reluctant publics to build political and diplomatic support for war.
This is not to argue that appeasement was the correct policy. It was an understandable and even defensible one, however, given the options facing European leaders in 1938
</I>
Bingo. To go further, the French and British militaries at those times did not have the capacity- In 1938, at the time of the Sudentanland, the British Airforce did not exist for all practical purpsoes - and approximately 6 divisions were all that existed. Appeasement bought them time- plane product was ramped up in 1938. The crisis bought them time- Germany's Keynsian policies had essentialy brought them a large loan that was going to come due sooner or later- the longer the war lasted, the worse for them. Eubanks wrote a paper that I used as my primary source.
It's certainly true that there were elements in British and French society who were sympathetic to the anti-Semetic (and anti-Communist idealogy) of the NADSP. Hell, Britain even had an active fascist party in Oswald Mosely's Black Shirts. But the primary reason for public opposition to war with Hitler in 1938 was not anti-Semitism but absolute terror at what the next war would bring.
The fact is that World War I was not seen as simply a "bad war." It was widely reviled by most Europeans and Americans as a tremendous and pointless human catastrophy that had cost millions of lives while stirring up the fires of radicalism in Russia and elsewhere. Think Vietnam only with a much higher body count. Combined with advances in military technology (particularly strategic bombing), it was (correctly) believed that the next war would bring mass death to civilians as well as soldiers.
In retrospect (and with full knowledge of the Holocaust), it is easy to say that WWII was worth fighting at any time and any price. That was a much tougher call to make in 1938 for the generation that had survived Flanders fields.
There were leaders (such as Churchill) who took the position you suggest and argued bravely against appeasement, but in 1938 that was a distinct minority position in both Western Europe and the United States. There was, after all, a reason that Chamberlin and not Churchill was Prime Minister at the time of Munich. Even as late as December 1941, Franklin Roosevelt, almost certainly the greatest American politician of the 20th century, had been unable to muster a consensus for war against Hitler. That is lamentable, but to pin the blame on a handful of leader is to too simplistic.
ahahhaerheioiehhHAHAHAHHA
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHHAHAHAHHA
Oh, that was good one!
They certainly knew enough to want to buy more time and knew they weren't buying peace - the Brits and French wouldn't have abandoned Abyssinnia if they really thought Hitler was just a neo-Bismarck goof.
But how secure is time from Hitler at that point when it involves conceding a great deal of military resources and a more easily defended eastern border? The fact that what Hitler wanted was precisely that which would make him more likely to break the deal should have been a red flag.
The British and French, at least the decision-makers, knew what Hitler wanted in the grand scheme of things, but step-by-step, I don't think they as correctly evaluated the consequences of Hitler getting things he wanted.
Because England was far more interested in maintaining the balance of power on the continent. They were very happy with their position in the world and they fought for the same reason most great European powers go to war, to maintain the status quo.
While Britain and France were in sorry shape in 1938, the German economy and military were by all accounts not ready for war either. As I recall, German military commaders were terrified that Hitler was going to drag them into a war in 1938 that they were not yet ready to fight. Appeasement also bought time for the Germans to build and train their forces and, as Dan mentions, secure additional resources and defenses by taking the Sudatenland. Thus morally as well as militarily, I think war in 1938 was a better option.
Still, for all the reasons mentioned above, I can understand why war looked like a very bad gamble at the time. Hindsight and all that.
Oh and for my money the biggest blunder of the West was not appeasement but the failure to strike a deal with the U.S.S.R. prior to 1939. As distasteful as it might have been to deal with Stalin, pre-empting the Nazi-Soviet pact would have effectively hemmed in Hitler and bought far more time (at a far cheaper price) than the dual game of appeasement and anti-Communism played Britain and France in the latter half of the 1930s.
A policy of appeasement only works, however, if you actually get the appeasement. Knowing you have to fight Hitler, I'd rather fight him before he gets what he wants rather than after. Giving Hitler the initiative made WWII a very close thing.
And as for Eric Milton, as a Ranger fan, I'm glad he's off the board, since I was afraid John Hart might try to bring him to Texas...
And Milton is not a member of the White Sox.
That's all I got.
Neither Milton nor Ortiz is a member of the White Sox. YAY!
I guess I had a little more.
The French and British militaries were probably the equal of the Germans' in 1938. The British, French and Czechoslovak militaries combined were almost certainly superior. Czechoslovak tanks were definitely better than anything the Germans had. Throw in the fabulous defensive positions the Czechoslovaks had in Bohemia, and Germany would have been in a world of trouble.
Oh and for my money the biggest blunder of the West was not appeasement but the failure to strike a deal with the U.S.S.R. prior to 1939.
It wasn't for lack of trying. When it comes right down to it, it was a crappy fit. France and Britain didn't have anything to offer the Soviets that they wanted. As Dan pointed out, the Poles, for completely understandable reasons, absolutely would not go along with a Soviet alliance. It might have been possible to make a British/French/Czech/Soviet alliance in 1937 or 1938, but even this would have been difficult, and if the French and the British had wanted to stand up to the Germans, the Soviets wouldn't really have been necessary, particularly since Stalin was in the middle of purging the officer corps at that point.
Heck, he had trouble getting a concensus on December 8th to declare war on Hitler. Japan - oh sure - no problem there. But Congress stalled when it came time to declare war on Germany. Then Hitler declared war on us on December 11.
Well, I don't think Chamberlain's decisions were wrong because he was trying to buy peace - I think he underestimated the military value of the things Hitler wanted.
He also (greatly) underestimated just how much Hitler wanted - and how intent he was on getting it. Oh, they knew he wanted more, but they thought that a signed peace of paper would make him stop. Chamberlain was serious when he said that they had ensured "peace in our time." Of course Hitler couldn't care less about some scrap of paper.
The British and French, at least the decision-makers, knew what Hitler wanted in the grand scheme of things, but step-by-step, I don't think they as correctly evaluated the consequences of Hitler getting things he wanted.
IIRC, it was really more the British. The French didn't have the manpower to take on Germany alone and so got stuck going along with it because that's what England was doing. I once had a chance to read the Time magazine account of when the French head during Munich fell from power, and it mentioned that he was the one guy there who didn't seem to be at all happy with the proceedings.
When you consider the economic state of Britain by the late '30s, and the freshness of WWI in everyone's memories, it is hard to say how conceivable Chamberlain's not pursuing appeasement was. I've always thought that things proceeded in essentially the only way they "could" have
Yea, but Chamberlain wasn't just being driven by socio-economic forces. He believed in what he was doing and believed in it with a passion. That's partially why he's remembered, but the French guy ain't.
Unfortunately, for the government of either Britain or the U.S. to negotiate a treaty with the Soviets would possibly have been political suicide for those involved; in the U.S., particularly, it almost surely would have been for FDR
Heck, he couldn't even negotiate a US-UK military treaty prior to WWII. Can't imagine him getting an agreement with the USSR in the works. And as long as we're talking about how unready the British military was in 1938 - no nation took a backseat to military unpreparedness to the US back then.
I don't know that France didn't have the manpower. France was still considered to have the largest army at the time. When Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 he would have withdrawn immediately if the French had stood up to him. The French army was still a feared force. It was their unbelievabley poor defensive tactics that led to their almost immediate defeat, not their limited forces.
As mentioned before, France as a nation still remembered the horrors of World War I and that was the main driving force behind their appeasement strategy.
I maybe wrong on the size of the French army at the time, but the German army in '38 was much larger than it had been in '36.
One was that he deluded himself into thinking that the pact would deliver Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia as well as a substantial part of Poland to the Soviets.
How's that a delusion?
Too bad, the Bowie segment got toss to the side for appeasement sake.
Absolutely, but a better led French army (still one of the largest if not the largest) would have posed quite a problem for the German army.
"Stalin tried to accomplish two things at once with the The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact."
Fun fact about that pact, it was signed August 23rd 1939. Britain guaranteed Polands' independence on August 25th 1939. Both were important dates to remember in our history class that I just finished. And on the final, the teacher asked us to identify the importance of 8/23/39. I, of course, picked the wrong ####### date so I will never ever forget the difference between the two dates ever again.
WWII is far more relevant nowadays then the NBA.
WWII is far more relevant nowadays then the NBA.
If Bangkok9 were here, this thread would be about Filipina hookers for sure, although he may have more important things on his mind right now.
Reds get: Fully normalized political and trade relations with Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with Fr. and Gb.
Gb. and Fr. get: Pledge to end Comintern activitiy in Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with U.S.S.R.
Poland, Czech. get: Border guarntees from Gb., Fr., and U.S.S.R.
In short, the U.S.S.R. gives up any designs on Poland in exchange for a defense pledge from the West. Poland and Czech. get reassurances from East and West (and the threat of being cut loose by both sides if they balk). Gb. and Fr. get a bulwark against Nazi expansion in the West.
A bridge too far, perhaps. I'll fully admit this is outside my area of expertise (U.S. diplomatic).
P. S. Eric Milton sucks.
This is not something Stalin would have given up based on what I've read about him (which is more then I cared to, you ever read the book Hitler and Stalin, holy #### its long).
Filipina hookers appeasing Sam Bowie?
It's the untold story of why Bowie's career went south. The injuries were just the cover story.
It is not SIZE that matters.....The French lacked the will-power and resolve to act...They are the millitary equivelant of the 1991-1992 Detroit Tigers...All the power bats in the world couldn't acheive more than a 4th place finish....
What could be more important than Filipina hookers?
There is just no way that could happen. There was as much chance of Stalin trusting British promises as there was of finding a French commander to invade Germany in 1936 over its violations of a treaty (j1F-#56). None.
Are you knocking the Maginot Line? How dare you.
Is that that Allen Bullock dual biography of Stalin and Hitler or that new one by Richard Overy? Anybody read the Overy book? Good?
The one defense that was more overrated in its time then Jeter's.
The Allen Bullock dual biography. Good stuff, but so unbelievabley long. Haven't heard about the Overy (hehe, ovary) book.
The Overy book was reviewed in this Sunday's NYT. 849 pages. Ouch.
Churchill was just a fearmonker when he warned of the Nazis and, later, the Soviets.
After every post like this, I think it would be a good idead to point out that Eric Milton still blows.
Carry on.
I'll tie the two threads together: sometimes you have to make a decision, and none of your choices are all that terrific. Stalin had to sign an alliance. O'Brien had to sign a #2 pitcher. Neither guy liked his options, but he had to make the move.
And with Perez still out there, I really don't see how Milton is the only logical alternative. . . .
There were lots and lots of dreadful picks back in the 1980s, most of them seven-foot or so stiffs who had no chance in the NBA. Teams have had a Moneyball-like epiphany as seven footers who would've been top-10 or even top-5 picks twenty years ago moved down to the middle of the first round to the end of the first round and then into the crap that is the NBA second round (and sometimes out of the draft altogether).
The NBA in the 70s was awful.
The NBA seems to be slowly improving. There are a number of young, exciting stars (James, Anthony, Wade, among others) who actually are enjoyable to watch beyond the highlight reel, scoring is up. It still sucks, but its better than it was 3-4 years ago.
I don't think this contract is as bad as the one the D-Backs gave Ortiz. To the guys here who follow AZ, man, no one can ever claim you aren't true fans to stick with that club the way its being run right now.
They couldn't draft Jordan, they already had Clyde Drexler
This argument holds no water. Take the best player, then work with what you have. That's what trades are for.
Sounds a lot like the Blazers circa 1998-present. And look how well that's working out for us now.
... or if Sabonis had come over in '88. That Portland finals team, but with Sabonis, on two healthy knees? Holy cow.
I say the same thing about Sabonis, but it's bad for my health to combine the Olajuwon and Sabonis fantasies. A frontline of Olajuwon scoring, Sabonis dishing to him and Buck Williams there to clean up the boards, the already great Drexler/Porter backcourt, AND Jerome Kersey coming off the bench? This kind of fantasizing is bad for the heart and breeds bitter resentful contempt.
(A) There is a tendency on the part of American thinkers to overlook the role of the white Dominions in Chamberlain's decision-making. Canada and Australia in particular had made significant contributions to Britain's war effort during the last conflict. Neither was particularly enthusiastic about another European war, although for different reasons.
(B) The British government knew very well just how expenseve another war would be. Britain was, in fact, in no financial shape to sustain a major European war, as evidenced by the fact that in the spring or summer of 1940 someone (I can't remember who) presented the bare facts to the Cabinet. By January 1941, at the present rate of expenditure, Britain would have exhausted ALL of her financial reserves. Basically, even after the Battle of Britain, all Hitler had to do was wait and Britain would be forced to sue for peace unless the United States somehow got involved in the conflict - which, through Lend-Lease, was what happened.
(c) Today's so-called cheese-eating surrender monkeys in France had been clamouring for military intervention against Hitler almost from the beginning in 1933. The British, however, possibly influenced by Keynes and his Economic Consequences of the Peace book, believed the Versailles Treaty had done an injustice to Germany, and refused to enforce its provisions. (And broke them in 1935 by agreeing to allow the Germans to build submarines.) France refused to do anything without British support.
So to blame Chamberlain is wrong, the whole British foreign policy establishment was at fault. As as side note, some of the same logic in (a) had brought about the abdication of Edward VIII, which Churchill opposed. It's just the way business was done in the British empire.
(d) I'm a little more sketchy about Soviet foreign policy, but I believe that from 1933 to 1938, the Soviets kept making enthusiastic noises about some kind of alliance against Hitler. Indeed, prior to 1933, Stalin believed that international forces had been steadily shifting to favour the USSR. It was the appointment of Hitler as German chancellor that changed all that. However, the French were reluctant to do anything because their 'Little Entente" allies in Eastern Europe were terrified of Soviet long-term aims, and may very well have come to some kind of accommodation with Hitler if the French had embarked on an accommodation with the Soviet Union. After Munich, Stalin gave up waiting for France and Britain to see his point of view (indeed, thought they never would, and would let Poland go the same route as the Czechs), and signed his pact with the Devil instead.
The lesson drawn from the appeasement policy is usually the wrong one: 'Let's stand up to [insert tinpot dictator's name of your choice] now or he'll turn into Hitler. The correct lesson is that successive governments should consider themselves rigidly bound by treaties signed by their predecessors, rather than change their mind because of a change in conventional wisdom. If Britain had backed France over the Rhineland in 1936 (a crisis which occurred, I believe, around the same time as the Abdication Crisis was bubbling away), Hitler would probably have been ousted from power by the German Army. The Second World War would almost certainly have never happened.
I may never stop... The HRA record is in jeopardy next year.
Reds get: Fully normalized political and trade relations with Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with Fr. and Gb.
Am I the only one who read that and though the post was going to be a hilarious three-way trade proposal involving Eric Milton and late 1930's European nations?
I mean, don't get me wrong, it was a fine post. But if anybody wanted to post that hilarious three-way trade, I wouldn't complain...
One wonders whether -- overall -- "home run parks" increase their totals more by causing "home run pitchers" to give up even more homers (and home run hitters to hit more), or whether they increase their totals more by increasing the home run total of "non homer" pitchers and hitters (even the most extreme groundball pitchers give up 20-30% fly balls).
If the latter, then Milton may be the most perfect fit in a "high homer" park, since he'd be giving them up anyway, and the park only drags other pitchers down to his level.
Reds get: Fully normalized political and trade relations with Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with Fr. and Gb.
Gb. and Fr. get: Pledge to end Comintern activitiy in Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with U.S.S.R.
Poland, Czech. get: Border guarntees from Gb., Fr., and U.S.S.R.
France doesn't get enough. Throw in a prospect, maybe Dioner Navarro, and maybe cash to cover the Mutual Defense Pact and it evens out. Doesn't the British Parliament have to waive its "no-border guarantee" clause for this to work?
And I love talking 80s NBA. And reports of its current demise are greatly exaggerated, much like the late 90s demise of MLB.
At the time, Poland was sort of France's AAA affiliate, France was the champion of Polish independence, so Poland's border security would essentially be a prospect that they could bank on in the future. Of course, Poland as a French satelllite turned out to be a bust.
French defensive tactics were fine. Very good, in fact. In the encounter battles along the Dyle, the French proved at least the equal of the Germans. Their problem was one of military intelligence and very poor second line units, which combined to produce disaster at Sedan. The tactics weren't the problem; it was the 71st and 55th Infantry Divisions not having practiced them and not having enough equipment.
As for the Maginot Line, it was a great success, and did exactly what it was supposed to do: allow the French to hold their frontier with Germany with minimal troops, allowing for the maximum forces to participate at the decisive point. For a country with a much smaller potential army, the Maginot Line was a very good solution to France's problems. The defeat came about because the French (and, to a lesser extent, the British) did such a terrible job of identifying the decisive axis of the German attack, and then reacted very slowly to it.
Well, they never adjusted to the speed of war at the time. Their leaders thought they were still fighting WWI, and the German blitzkreig was the perfect strategy to take advantage of France's military weaknesses, thats what I meant by poor tactics. Perhaps management would have been a better word.
"For a country with a much smaller potential army, the Maginot Line was a very good solution to France's problems."
Except that the Germans just went around it, so it turned out to be a tremendous waste of resources and left the French out of position to defend against the invasion.
"The defeat came about because the French (and, to a lesser extent, the British) did such a terrible job of identifying the decisive axis of the German attack, and then reacted very slowly to it."
I agree with that.
I read Henry Kissinger's "Diplomcacy" several years ago & Kissinger thought that Stalin's foreign policy manueverings prior to/early on in WWII was masterful. He called Stalin a 20th century Richleau.
I bet they both finish their contracts with ERA+ of roughly 95. Ortiz will have been paid 8.5 million more for another year of lousy #4/okay #5 starter performance.
That's getting ridiculous. Most teams don't have a real #5 - just a revolving door. Many barely have a #4. If he's a solid innings eater (and he'd been at least that much in recent years) then he's a good number 3. Still overpriced, but he's a heckuva lot better than an OK #5.
Reds get: Fully normalized political and trade relations with Western Europe; Mutual defense pact with Fr. and Gb.[/]i
Are we talking the Cincinnati Reds or the Soviet Reds?
No. The French never imagined that the Germans would try to go through the Maginot line. The French were out of position for the thrust through the Ardennes, but that wasn't because of the Maginot Line, which was to the south of the Ardennes. The bulk of the French army moved into Belgium up to the Dyle River, to the north of the Ardennes.
The entire goal of the Maginot Line was that when the Germans tried to go around it, the French wouldn't have to leave very many troops along the Franco-German border, and could meet the main German thrust with as large a force as possible. In this, the Maginot Line was completely successful; only a very small portion of the French army was left to defend it. The Maginot Line wasn't the problem; the Dyle-Breda plan was the problem.
As for refighting World War One, this is incorrect. There were very large command and control problems in the French Army, and it left them unable to deal with the speed of the German attack, but the origins of these problems were rather different than simply refighting WW1.
I read that book too, and if memory serves me, Kissinger (in a chapter named Stalin's Bazaar or some such) pointed out that Stalin was playing both sides (UK/FR v. Ger) against the middle to see who gave him more.
We should bear in mind that for the longest time, whenever there was a European war, territories would shift back and forth between powers (in theory, that was one of the things that had been precluded in the Versailles treaty thanks to W. Wilson, but this was still a very new concept in world affaris, which rogue states did not follow). So for Stalin to have tried to drive as hard a bargain as he could is not at all strange (in some ways, the way Stalin conducted the Soviet Union's foreign affairs is very similar to how a Romanov would have conducted them - which reminds me of Lord Palmerston's famous epigram/bon mot about countries having permanent interests before anything else).
Harking back to the earlier discussion, the remilitarization of the Rhine was the one time when Hitler could have been nipped in the bud. Other than that, I would say that Munich's failure was a little different that what everybody else claims: if Hitler had not been appeased, he would have had to attack Czechoslovakia, and that would not have been a good war for Germany at all..... (the Czechs probably would have lost in the end, but for the Western Allies and Poland, there would have probably been much more than 1 year of preparation for the big war itself).
Ambrose is even more overrated than Milton.
The causes of the French defeat were threefold. One was gambling that the Germans were coming through Belgium, as J Michael Neal has been saying. The second was deploying the armoured forces they did have inefficiently.
But the biggest cause was losing the air war. The Germans had a huge superiority in numbers of aircraft, and in most cases their aircraft were technically superior to those of the French. The French air force never stood a chance. I believe the French leaders at the time recognized this, as the last Prime Minister of the Third Republic, Paul Reynaud, called on the US to supply 'clouds of aeroplanes'. The French never asked for tanks or artillery from the Arsenal of Democracy.
Of course, in terms of MLB pitching, Milton is more an M.S. 406 than an Me 109.
a shout out to Jeremy B. for:
Had Chamberlain not appeased Hitler, he never would have had the time to sleep with 20,000 women.
HA!!!
"The correct lesson is that successive governments should consider themselves rigidly bound by treaties signed by their predecessors, rather than change their mind because of a change in conventional wisdom."
This strikes me as an ad hoc lesson. Obviously, its a positive thing for a nation to make good on its promises, but you have to be able to change course if it becomes clear that you're following the wrong path. I still believe that "standing up to tyranny and agression" is a better lesson from WWII.
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