ZiPS Projections - Ted Williams
From the Statistically Thinking thread:
a more interesting way of ‘testing’ would have been to take williams career line up to 1941, create a projection based on that, and his expected improvement/decline over the next seasons, and from there see how he would have faired in 1941…and even more interestingly, see how he would have done if the war hadn’t interrupted things the next few years.
So, thought I’d put ZiPS up to the challenge, in something I’ve never really used it for. Interesting if anything.
Ted Williams ZiPS Projections - 1943-1945, 1952-1953
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Year AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB SO BA OBP SLG
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1943 503 147 189 37 5 41 145 160 36 .376 .529 .714
1944 503 152 191 39 5 43 153 168 31 .380 .537 .734
1945 509 158 195 41 6 46 165 169 30 .383 .539 .758
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1952 495 132 154 31 3 31 127 133 40 .311 .458 .574
1953 465 128 140 28 2 28 116 123 35 .301 .447 .551
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Total 2477 709 880 176 22 197 718 748 176 .355 .506 .683
Actual 101 19 41 6 1 14 37 21 12 .406 .508 .901
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Gain 2376 690 839 170 21 183 685 727 164
RealTot. 7706 1798 2654 525 71 521 1839 2021 709
————————————————————————————————————
NoWars 10082 2488 3493 695 92 704 2524 2748 873 .346 .488 .643
Updated slightly! Dan R. caught my error. I was using Ted’s 1952-1953 projections as his new seasons, not a blend of his 123 real PA with the rest being ZiPS, cheating Teddy Ballgame out of 8 homeruns and a few hits.
Dan Szymborski
Posted: June 09, 2007 at 07:20 PM |
67 comment(s)
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1. greenbackI've been tempted to ask you run the 1990 Cardinals through ZiPs because I wonder if they really were underachievers or none of the experts back then knew what they were talking about. Maybe that's the kind of feature you could build into BTF PI or something.
Also, did Germany take over the world after the US didn't intervene? That might change the projection.
I'm sure it would have affected Sandy Koufax's ZiPS.
The Nazi leadership fell as the army refused to serve their masters, and the French and a small English expeditionary force, concerned about the Russians taking advantage of a brewing civil war, drove 125 divisions through the 30 divisions on Germany's west border, driving to Thüringen.
Canaris had the upper Nazi government arrested, Brauchitsch and Halder restored the Weimar Republic under Papen/Schacht once the allies made it clear that they would not accept a Hohenzollern restorations under any circumstances. The Russians annexed the Baltic states, the west didn't do anything, and the Soviets eventually went to war with Japan in 1948 over Manchuria, leading to Chaing Kai-shek falling a year earlier.
At least, that's how ZiPS sees it.
Too bad you didn't do this earlier; it would definitely have helped the Hall of Merit handle war credit, I think.
Zeile - 246/319/403 (actual - 244/333/398)
Guerrero - 295/383/434 (actual - 281/334/426)
Oquendo - 282/369/366 (actual - 252/350/316)
Pendleton - 270/325/396 (actual - 230/277/324)
Smith - 271/349/341 (actual - 254/330/305)
Coleman - 268/329/352 (actual - 292/340/400)
McGee - 274/309/374 (actual - 324/373/419)
Thompson - 292/348/382 (actual - 218/292/318)
DeLeon - 3.54 (actual - 4.43)
Magrane - 3.09 (actual - 3.59)
Smith - 3.50 (actual - 4.27)
Tudor - 3.32 (actual - 2.40)
Tewksbury - 3.85 (actual - 3.47)
It wasn't Job, but there were a number of disappointments which were magnified because the high-profile players, as a whole, were quite disappointing.
Willie McGee's big season definitely paid off. In return a single month of McGee, the Cardinals landed Felix Jose's 2 very good years, traded him right before he started sucking and got Gregg Jefferies's 2 awesome years, and let him go to start sucking for the Phillies (they got Jason Woolf with the compensation pick, so the value ended there).
If US didn't intervene the Germany would still lose, but they would have been speaking Russian in Paris for the last 60 years
I have to disagree. The UK could prevent an invasion, but I really don't think they had the military resources alone to have mustered a successful land invasion of the mainland.
Germany probably still wouldn't be able to conquer Russia, but they'd have more resources available in the East and while they still wouldn't be able to completely defeat the Soviets because of logistics, they'd more easily survive the Russian counteroffensive. I think a stalemate followed by a whole different kind of Cold War would have resulted.
Umm... good job?
By the summer of 1944, when the Western Allies entered the war, Soviet Union was outproducing Germany in both tanks and aircraft and had the biggest and the meanest army in the world. The Germans had about 2.5 times as many troops on the Eastern Front as on the Western Front, but even if you combine the forces on both, they had less than the Red Army. Compare the force levels, casualty numbers and the amount of territory gained in the Soviet Operation Bagration and the Western Battle of Normandy - the Soviets were operating on bigger scale and were both more ruthless and effective.
The really interesting 'what if' is would Stalin have started World War III if US didn't have an atom bomb? His chances would've been good - he had the best and biggest army in the world for at least 10 years after WWII, and world domination must have been tempting to him.
D-Day week, so WWII is on a lot of minds!
Compare the force levels, casualty numbers and the amount of territory gained in the Soviet Operation Bagration and the Western Battle of Normandy - the Soviets were operating on bigger scale and were both more ruthless and effective.
The Finns would disagree - they stood up quite a long time and lost very little territory with an army quite inferior to the Russians. The Russians could have held out defensively for a very long time, but invading Germany would have been difficult without allies. Don't forget, the Japanese wouldn't have been tied down, either, and while the Japanese lack of mechanized forces would've resulted in them getting murdered 1-on-1, they could be a nuisance in the East.
has anybody played that video game where the Soviet Union invades the United States, you're this plumber dude who turns into Guerilla fighter, and you kill Russians? That game is SOOO AWESOME, you see the Soviets spread propaganda in NY...
The quality of both equipment and personnel of the Soviet Army increased a lot during WWII - Stalin killed most of the senior officers in the 1937 Purge and it took a while for new leadership to develop. Compare the atrocious defeats the Red Army suffered in 1941 versus the successful operations it conducted in later years. Judging the Soviets by 1940 Finnish War would be like judging the US Navy by Pearl Harbor.
The Russians could have held out defensively for a very long time, but invading Germany would have been difficult without allies. Don't forget, the Japanese wouldn't have been tied down, either, and while the Japanese lack of mechanized forces would've resulted in them getting murdered 1-on-1, they could be a nuisance in the East.
The Japanese decided to leave the Soviet Union alone after they were decisively defeated in Khalkin Gol border incident in 1939. After their Army got their asses kicked, the Navy won support for a southern strategy, so even if they didn't get involved in a war with USA, they'd have just continued on to fight Australia and India instead of Russia. And even if Japan did get involved in a war with USSR, they had a much worse army than the Germans - consider that the Soviet Union conquered Manchuria in a month in 1945.
That's not even remotely true, the bombing campaigns and the battles for North Africa and Italy can't be brushed away that easily.
Not to mention the divisions that was tied up in France waiting for an invasion.
Lend-lease was also very important for the Soviet Union.
Touché. I still think they would run into problems invading the west by themselves, especially equipment issues. No US involvement costs the Allies a lot of swag and that includes the Russians. I'm not saying that it's a slam-dunk, but I feel that the odds favor a stalemate.
An American-British force (forget the french on this one) supplemented by the Germans would probably do a very good job of squashing Russia from all sides. It would probably result in a stalemate somewhere deep inside Russia but I think after the initial campaign most of the battle would be taking place on Russian soil.
I gotta be honest...as fun as this thread is, I'm a smidge disappointed.
Hell, Great Britain was outproducing Germany in aircraft in 1940 - by 58%! For the entire period 1939-1945, Britain produced 151,424 aircraft to Germany's 117,881, a 28% advantage for the British. Not to mention that the British were producing Spitfires, Mosquitos, and Lancasters, while the Germans were producing Me 210s and He 177s...
So was France I believe. The germans industrially were not really prepared to fight a war it is amazing to see what they did in fact do with what they had. It also goes to show you just how bad the Russian Army and Stalin were that they were not able to swat the Germans away and that it took them several years and several other secondary fronts just to get Germany back to Germany.
The old saw is that amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics. But in 1940-41, it was all about tactics. In France in 1940, the combined Anglo-French armies had far more tanks than Germany, but the Germans concentrated them into 7 tank divisions, and concentrated those divisions on the critical front. The French and Brits scattered most of their tanks among their infantry divisions, and what few tank divisions they had (The French had 3 I believe), were also scattered along the front.
In Russia, it was all about the Soviet Air force being destroyed on the ground in the firsat few days of the attack, which allowed the Stukas, an otherwise obsolete aircraft, to rule the day.
As for WWII, Hitler would have continued west and negotiated a peace where he leaves England alone in exchange help vs the USSR. Then two years later he'd have taken England. By then he'd have nuclear capability and we'd all be in trouble.
Sounds like a race to the oil. If Hitler doesn't have to worry about a western front, does he remedy his failure to secure oil in the Stans?
Wasn't one of the reasons (there were obviously several) to drop the bombs on Japan that we wanted to demonstrate to Stalin that he should behave after the war?
Germany simply did not have the resources and logistical capabilities to carry out a successful invasion of Britain. They had no realistic chance way of defeating the RAF or Royal Navy on their home territory, or the physical capabilities of transporting a large army across the English Channel.
Granted now could the Germans lauch and maintain an invasion of the UK even with the RAF destroyed? Possible , they would still have to deal with the navy, the gas attacks, the mines, and the home defense. Highly doubtful if Hitler wished to attack the USSR sometime in the near future but probably had a realistic chance if they did things slightly different. Especially when you consider that Stalin was supplying Hitler in his attempts to subjugate Europe.
Absolutely not, no. The success of the Luftwaffe attacks on RAF airfields and facilities has been greatly puffed up over the years. Dr. Alfred Price has pointed out that the Germans destroyed only about 20 British fighters during the entire segment of the attacks on the airfields.
My source is the two-part article in Aeroplane Monthly, October and November 1997, by Price called "Myth and Legend", in which Price debunks ten well-known myths about the Battle of Britain. The first myth that he shows is not true is:
"Myth 1. By the beginning of September 1940 Fighter Command was in poor shape following repeated attacks on its airfields. Goering made a big error in shifting the forces of the attack to London, instead of continuing to hit the airfields. That saved the defenders.
This notion rests on the supposition that the German attacks on airfields were considerably more effective than was the case. During August and the first week of September the Luftwaffe mounted an intensive 3-1/2 week campaign against Fighter Command airfields in Southern England. On each day that weather permitted there were attacks on two or more airfields. Yet despite the scale of this effort, the attacks were largely ineffectual as a means of putting Fighter Command out of action.
First, consider their effectiveness in destroying RAF fighters on the ground. RAF fighter squadrons based in the South of England maintained high states of readiness throughout the daylight hours. Backing them was an excellent control and reporting organization, using information from radar sites and Observer Corps posts. Almost invariably the fighter squadrons were airborne and clear of their airfield before an attack on it could develop. Aircraft able to fly but not fight took off and headed for a safe area to the north of the Thames until the threat had passed. Aircraft unable to fly were pushed into revetments or otherwise dispersed around the airfield, making them unsuitable as targets for a pattern-bombing attack.
The most reliable source, The Battle of Britain, Then and Now (Ed. Winston Ramsey, After the Battle Publications, 5th Ed., 1989) reveals that during the series of attacks fewer than 20 Spitfires and Hurricanes from front-line squadrons were destroyed on the ground."
True, damage was being done to the airfields, but Spitfires and Hurricanes could operate from any grass strip, and there were enough farmers' fields around! The attacks on London didn't start solely because Hitler wanted revenge; they started in part because the Luftwaffe realized the airfield attacks were having little effect. Luftwaffe intelligence was so poor that the most devastating attacks came against trainer and bomber bases, which hardly helped defeat the fighters, but that's another story. Attacking London, which the RAF was going to defend at any cost, may actually have been a good strategy. The Luftwaffe certainly wasn't winning a war of attrition, as far as aircraft were concerned, by attacking the airfields.
As for radar, the Luftwaffe didn't have the necessary weapons to take out the radar stations. As Price has stated about the radar stations, "The diminutive buildings housing the transmitter and receiver equipment were protected by revetments and it required a direct hit inside the blast wall to cause serious damage."
The aerials themselves were very difficult to hit or bring down; in fact among the weapons in the Luftwaffe arsenal they could only be hit by accurate Ju 87 Stuka strikes, which were only possible under conditions of air superiority - something the Luftwaffe didn't have. When the Ju 87 was taken out of the BoB after August 18, due to horrendous losses, any option at all of hitting the radar stations disappeared. On August 18, 17 of 109 attacking Stukas (not all attacking the radar stations) were lost, a rate that obviously was not something the Luftwaffe would be able to keep up.
The first major attack on the radar stations, on August 12, saw five stations attacked; all except one were back on line the next day. On August 18, Poling station was attacked and put out of operation, but a mobile unit was moved into the area, with only a very small interruption in service. As Price notes, "Thus, of the six radar stations attacked, only two were put out of action for more than a day, and those two were soon replaced by mobile radars set up nearby."
Germany was losing a war of attrition to the RAF; the RAF destroyed 1,733 aircraft during the BoB for the loss of 915, a ratio of 1.89 to one. Even with the overall numerical superiority that the Luftwaffe had at the start of the Battle, it would have been unable to keep up that attrition for long. For example, the Luftwaffe opened the BoB with 237 serviceable Bf 110s - and lost 223 of them.
Although pilot strength was more of a problem than replacement aircraft, at no point during the BoB did Fighter Command operational pilot strength drop below 1,000 pilots. The number of trained, operational pilots actually increased at all stages during the BoB, from 1,094 on June 15 to 1,422 by August 31 to 1,737 by October 19. By October 12, the RAF actually had a surplus of trained operational pilots, with not enough operational squadrons to send them to.
British fighter strength during the BoB (their production of new fighters, incidentally, outstripped the Germans by a considerable margin) actually increased from the beginning of the BoB to the end. On June 22, Fighter Command had 565 aircraft available for operations; on October 26, it had 747. At no point during the Battle did Fighter Command have less than 127 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes in storage, ready to go to the squadrons as replacements; this was in the first week of September, and by late October, the figure was up over 200.
The Germans lost because they were fighting a strategic battle with tactical weapons that were not capable of destroying their assigned targets; had extremely poor intelligence and high-level leadership (their leadership at squadron level was exceptional); and were facing a foe that had prepared for this exact situation, and had the proper weapons, infrastructure, and leadership to repel it. The Germans never really had a chance of achieving their objectives...
In France in 1940, the combined Anglo-French armies had far more tanks than Germany, but the Germans concentrated them into 7 tank divisions, and concentrated those divisions on the critical front.
Actually, I'd say that the German victory was won in the planning stages. The French gambled that the Germans would advance through Belgium, hurled all their forces against them there, and lacked sufficient reserves to tackle the German surprise through the Ardennes. The Germans could have advanced through there with infantry divisions supported by tanks in penny packets and still done quite well, although whether they would have won so quickly is another matter. They also had near complete command of the air after a few days, I think, which would have prevented the French from concentrating a counterforce even if they had been able to shift divisions out of Belgium quickly.
An American-British force (forget the french on this one) supplemented by the Germans would probably do a very good job of squashing Russia from all sides.
I'm not convinced. I think the ability of the Red Army to maneuver in massed formations might result in a stalemate to the west of the 1941 Soviet border. The 1945 Red Army was a far more capable force than the 1941 one, and the 1941 army defeated the Germans even in conditions of air inferiority. The question is one of logistics, though. I'm not sure the Soviets could sustain a war against the West once their American trucks start breaking down.
That could be Myth No. 1 about Barbarossa.
Well, if the germans are only advancing 10 miles per day after the breakthrough instead of 50, that opens a whole new world for tha Allies. Maybe they couldn't have recovered, but their chances would have been increased greatly.
LOSS+ of 131 according to WW2-reference.com, though I'm not sure if they adjust for home airfield.
Yes. Sending one of his finest mobile units into a house to house hell was incredibly foolish, but holding Stalingrad to anchor the left flank of the Caucasus army was vital.
Zeile line? Maybe I'm living in one of those Diamond Mind simulations.
If we are talking about 1941, then American support was of little value. The Germans had already been stopped outside Moscow.
It is a myth that Hitler diverted resources and men to a futile campaign against the Brits?
I'm not sure what you mean here.
It is a myth that Hitler and the Germans largely did not prepare for an extended campaign in Russia?
This is the strongest point supporting your argument, but it only applies to 1941 in the sense that the Germans were not at all well prepared for fighting during the winter of 1941-2. However, by that stage the Germans had already lost.
So it is a myth that Hitler went for STalingrad for largely political reasons?
Hitler went for Stalingrad in 1942.
When I was writing about Barbarossa a year ago, I discovered that not many general western histories really talk about the campaign in operational detail, preferring to focus on the strategic dimension. However, looking at such descriptions of individual battles that I could find, and constructing my own detailed chronology of the fighting made it clear that the Germans were surprised by how long it took to eliminate the pockets formed by their advancing armor spearheads. Thus, these didn't have the impetus to make the rapid advances expected, and therefore the lack of winter preparations became a factor. So in that sense the Red Army halted Barbarossa short of its geographical objectives, thus winning a military victory regardless of any other mistakes made by Hitler.
if the germans are only advancing 10 miles per day after the breakthrough instead of 50, that opens a whole new world for tha Allies. Maybe they couldn't have recovered, but their chances would have been increased greatly.
This is true, but my point is that the Allies were bound to suffer a major setback based on their optimistic planning. The Germans would have ended up controlling a significant portion of France after six weeks anyway. Could France have sustained another strategic situation like 1915 for any length of time? We're talking about withdrawing the main strength of the French army from a kesselschlacht in Belgium in conditions of air inferiority, and I don't fancy their chances.
And you would have a point, if that were true, but it wasn't. The greater German effort was in the T-C region, towards the Azeri oilfields.
And never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line.
This is a really interesting idea...
Great fun, these threads.
Amazingly, I actually have his real stats:
Career stats for Georgi Zhukov (Washington, Years 8-16; Portland, Year 17)
Age AB R H RBI 2B 3B HR SB CS BB K Avg. OBP Slg. OPS
20 Year 8, Was 105 24 33 26 5 1 9 2 0 10 29 .314 .374 .638 1.012
21 Year 9, Was 171 34 56 48 8 4 15 4 3 8 44 .327 .356 .684 1.040
22 Year 10, Was 128 22 34 24 3 3 5 2 1 16 40 .266 .345 .453 .798
23 Year 11, Was 68 13 23 17 5 1 3 1 0 5 18 .338 .384 .574 .957
24 Year 12, Was 137 20 32 18 6 4 5 4 0 11 41 .234 .291 .445 .736
25 Year 13, Was 152 36 56 41 8 2 14 0 0 19 32 .368 .434 .724 1.157
26 Year 14, Was 165 24 53 28 13 1 3 2 0 13 37 .321 .371 .467 .837
27 Year 15, Was 144 25 37 30 4 1 11 0 0 11 50 .257 .308 .528 .835
28 Year 16, Was 137 26 37 34 6 0 15 2 0 8 43 .270 .308 .642 .951
29 Year 17, Por 49 8 12 6 4 0 2 0 0 2 14 .245 .275 .449 .723
Totals 1256 232 373 272 62 17 82 17 4 103 348 .297 .349 .569 .918
This is a league where players are designed to peak at 25, tend to have careers from 20-29, and there is a _lot_ of offense (in Zhukov's peak season, league averages were .290/.376/.500; his EqA that year was .330, 13th in the league among qualified players.)
Joe DiMaggio
Stan Musial
Bob Feller
Sandy Koufax
I thought ZiPS didn't project playing time?
I thought ZiPS didn't project playing time?
Ain't nobody said that ZiPS didn't project fightin' time.
It hurts too much.
Tearing both your and his rotator cuff in the process?
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