And the Beat Goes On: Derek Jeter and the State of Fielding Analysis in Sabermetrics - Part 7

Mike celebrates Turkey Day with a big helping of play-by-play data.

Part 7: Details, Details: A Look at the Play-by-Play Data

So what does the play-by-play data have to say about
Derek Jeter?

Because of the earlier problem with the 1998 data noted by Chris Dial, I
limited this section to analysis of the PBP data for 1999 and 2000 only. For
this analysis, I defined the hole area as zones z56 and z56D, the direct area
as zones z6 and z6D, and the middle area as zones z6M and z6MD. In each zone,
I counted the number of ground balls that were either fielded by the shortstop,
or that went through to the outfield (excluding the handful of plays where the
outfielder actually made a play). I did not include plays made by another
infielder in the same area - thus excluding all plays made by 3B in the SS
hole as well as the handful of plays made by other infielders in the direct
and middle areas.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 16. I included the
summary for Jeter and for all AL shortstops, broken down by zones.

Table 16. Plays Made by Jeter in SS Zones, 1999-2000, compared to
AL Average

As noted earlier, the distribution of GBIP around Jeter’s area
favors the SS hole; there were significantly fewer balls hit up the middle
than there were in the hole, as a percentage of the total. Note also that
Jeter was, as indicated, slightly below average in the percentage of plays
that he actually made in the direct and middle zones, and significantly below
average toward the holes. Finally, note also in that every assigned SS area,
Jeter had fewer opportunities per nine innings than the league norm -
significantly fewer in the case of balls hit up the middle. Had there been a
league-average number of opportunities in each area of the field, with all
else being equal (of course, it’s unlikely that all else would have been equal),
Jeter would have picked up about .4 more plays per nine innings.

Breaking the data down further, by LHB and RHB, we get Table 17.

Table 17. Plays Made by Jeter in SS Zones, 1999-2000, compared to
AL Average, by Batter Hand

Both LHB and RHB tend to hit fewer balls up the middle than
might be expected. Here we see that most of Jeter’s below-average conversion
percentage in the hole came from balls hit by RHB; he was much closer to
average against LHB, although there weren’t a whole lot of balls hit there
by LHB (about one every 6 games for Jeter), so standard sample size caveats
apply.

I also chose to take a look at the breakdown of plays made with a runner
on 1B, vs those without a runner on 1B. One might expect that the shortstop
would find it easier to make a play with a runner on 1B than when there is no
runner on 1B, on the theory that it’s sometimes easier to get a 6-4 force play
than it is to throw out a runner (especially when the ball is hit into the
hole). Since the Yankees had a very good pitching staff, one might also expect
that Jeter had fewer opportunities to make force plays than the average
shortstop might, eliminating some easier opportunities for plays. After looking
at the preliminary results from this analysis, I made a further division of the
1B situations into double play situations (outs<=1) and non-DP situations
(outs=2). Table 18 summarizes the results.

Table 18. Plays Made by Jeter in SS Zones, 1999-2000, compared to
AL Average, Various Baserunner Situations

The data contradicts the notion that SS should do better with a
runner on 1B than they do overall; in fact, they do better only when going up
the middle. Upon further reflection, these tendencies can be readily explained.
The shortstop is likely playing in and closer to the bag in a DP situation in
order to be able to cover. The move up has the effect of reducing the area that
the SS can cover, mitigating the effect of the possible shorter throw to make a
play. When going up the middle, however, the SS can get plays on flips to the
2B covering the bag where it would be difficult or impossible for him to turn
and throw to 1B, which gives the SS an extra range of plays to make; when you
throw in the fact that he is closer and has a shorter throw, the reduction in
range going up the middle is more than balanced.

Jeter actually saw more of his GBIP in DP situations (21.1%) than did the
average AL SS (20.0%). He did far worse in runner on 1B situations than he did
overall; he fielded balls in the direct and middle zones at a higher rate than the
league average without a runner on 1B, although when considering that he was
likely shading up the middle (as I discussed in part 6) that performance isn’t
quite as good. But the runner on 1B performance drags his overall fielding numbers
down.

I decided after looking at the runner-on-1B data to review Jeter’s fielding
in DP situations, to see whether there are secondary effects that might be
affecting those numbers. Table 19 provides a breakdown of Jeter’s numbers in
DP situations. I present the totals, the combination of hole+direct plays, and
the plays made up the middle (since Jeter was closer to the league average
there in DP situations). I broke the plays down into double plays (DP - if there
were any triple plays on GB they were included in this category), errors that
allowed a runner to reach base (Err), force outs at 2B (FO), plays on which
only the batter was thrown out (GO), hits (H), fielders’ choices that allowed
a runner to reach (FC), and plays where other runners besides the runner on 1B
were thrown out advancing (OA). The %Out column is the percentage of plays on
which an out was recorded (DP+FO+GO+OA/total).

Table 19. Plays Made by Jeter in SS Zones, 1999-2000, compared to
AL Average, in DP Situations

In almost all of these situations, Jeter was very likely positioned
at double-play depth in the infield. 

Going up the middle, Jeter was actually getting to more balls than his shortstop
peers in the AL, but making fewer plays because of a higher error rate. That would
be consistent (again) with the idea that he was shading in that direction. What’s
striking about this data, however, is how few DPs Jeter was able to get from those
plays, and how many FOs and (especially) GOs resulted. The up-the-middle data is
especially interesting - Jeter had about twice and many FOs and GOs as did the
average shortstop, and only about 2/3 as many DPs. The GO rate (and to a lesser
extent the error rate) suggests that Jeter was passing up opportunities to take
the easier throw to 2B in favor of the longer throw to 1B. It’s not particularly
clear why this might have been happening - the PBP data doesn’t suggest anything
one way or another - but I did note that Jeter had a relatively low rate of
unassisted putouts at 2B, which suggests that part of the problem might
be that Jeter was waiting for his 2B counterpart to cover rather than taking plays
that he could make himself.

With Jeter at DP depth, he had his usual problems going into the hole, but he
was also strikingly bad at handling balls hit directly at SS. This was mostly, as
far as I can tell, a 2000 problem; his 1999 out rate was a lot closer to average
(he had an 86.2% PM rate in 1999, a 74.1% rate in 2000). He still wasn’t turning
DPs in either case, though.

Finally, let’s take a look at the same breakdown in DP situations on the 2B
side of the diamond, comparing how Jeter’s DP partners did to the performance
of AL 2Bs. That data is presented in Table 20.

Table 20. Plays Made by 2Bs with Jeter at SS in DP Situations, 1999-2000, compared to
AL Average

I think it’s pretty clear here that the 2Bs on the Yankees
were shading toward the hole on the right side; the number of hits that go
through the middle, compared to the number that go through the hole, support
that assertion. The Yankee 2Bs were getting to more balls than their
counterparts when the ball was not hit up the middle on the 2B side. Here
again we see a similar pattern - fewer DPs, more force outs and ground outs,
more errors on the balls hit in the hole and directly at the 2Bs - and
certainly these plays were likely to involve Jeter in the pivot. On the
up-the-middle balls, on the other hand, the 2Bs actually turned a few more DPs
and force outs and had a few less ground outs and errors on balls that they
actually fielded (realizing that, here again, not that many balls went through
the z4M and z4MD zones in DP situations).

I think that the PBP data allows us to draw the following conclusions: