I look forward to reading about your relief pitcher studies.

You are Coolidge!

At least he doesn't claim to be Warren Harding.

At least he doesn't claim to be Warren Harding.

This came out of the (soon-to-be) famous late-night session that we had Saturday. I had mentioned that a well-known older female SABR member, who had met me on a number of occasions in the past, failed to recognize who I was when I said hello to her in the corridor, at which point Giacolone chimed in that she probably thought I was Calvin Coolidge. For some reason everyone found that to be funny.

-- MWE

This is how Mike works on outdoors projects at his home.

This is how Mike works on outdoors projects at his home.

That would be funnier if I actually DID work on outdoor projects. As Paula would tell you, however, I don't.

-- MWE

Hmmm, sorry I missed it, Mike. No one ever clues me in on what the kewl kidz are doing.

(Not really. Dimino texted me, and many others, about plans on Thursday. Or was that Friday?)

(Not really. Dimino texted me, and many others, about plans on Thursday. Or was that Friday?)

Probably both. This meeting, however, occurred on Saturday, AFTER Dial and Paul and you and the others had your bar session.

-- MWE

As Paula would tell you, however, I don't.
One of the many things I like about you, Mike.

Jaffe, if you're here: TLR over Cox?

Jaffe, if you're here: TLR over Cox?

Yup.

Was this something you heard in the interview or something? In other words, did it air?

Didn't you post last week you thought TLR was the best (or maybe second-best) manager Post WWII following that ridiculous TLR is an idiot claim?

Oh, I probably did. I thought it might have been in response to something I said in the interview, given the nature of this thead. (I genuinely don't know if LaRussa came up in the interview).

But yeah, I do think LaRussa is the best manager of the last 60 years. Joe McCarthy was better. LaRussa's about even and possibly pulling ahead of Bill McKechnie. I suppose a case can be made for John McGraw over LaRussa. That's it, though.

Cox is better with pitchers, but LaRussa is better overall. (After all, LaRussa & Dave Duncan have been pretty good with pitchers, and TLR is much better with position players than Cox).

Yes, in fact, it was from the interview (see Mike's edit).

DN,

In your informal rating of managers, did you consider not just the players they had to work with, but the overall conditions and cooperation of the front office? Here I'm wondering just how many other managers (including LaRussa) would have been able to handle Steinbrenner the way that Torre did. Or are you only talking about his skill in terms of on-field strategy? I guess what I'm getting at is that some managers may be suited for some situations much better than others, and that on-the-field strategy isn't all that goes into being a successful manager.

In your informal rating of managers, did you consider not just the players they had to work with, but the overall conditions and cooperation of the front office?

That question has many different meanings over the history of baseball, as "front office" can refer both to the owner and to the general manager - not that the title of "general manager" always existed. And owners have been variously more or less hands-on baseball people themselves.

Managers like John McGraw and Connie Mack (back when Mack was good) were far more than on-field signal callers. They were team builders, and you cannot separate how they built and acquired their teams from how they led them once assembled. (And, speaking of owners - McGraw wouldn't have been free to become a great manager had the various powers swirling around the Giants not found a way to rid themselves of Andrew Freedman. You think Steinbrenner was a load to work for? What about Freedman?)

The long term trend has been for managers to have less influence over team construction and to be more limited to on-field duties. That makes those who bucked that trend and had more influence over team construction than their contemporaries particularly interesting. One case: Whitey Herzog in with the Cardinals in the early through middle 80's. I remember in one his Baseball Abstracts that Bill James commented on the true significance of the Cardinals signing Bob Horner as a free agent prior to the 1988 season - namely, that it was a sign that Herzog didn't have the power he once had and wasn't running the whole show any more.

In your informal rating of managers, did you consider not just the players they had to work with, but the overall conditions and cooperation of the front office? Here I'm wondering just how many other managers (including LaRussa) would have been able to handle Steinbrenner the way that Torre did. Or are you only talking about his skill in terms of on-field strategy? I guess what I'm getting at is that some managers may be suited for some situations much better than others, and that on-the-field strategy isn't all that goes into being a successful manager.

This is noted periodically throughout the book. In the first chapter, the most broad-ranging one in the book, I noted the central problems and flaws in trying to understand managers through statistical analysis and conclude the most important one of all is that coaching is an art and any statistical approach reduced it to a science. You can't really pinpoint with the precision you'd like what a manager does because what he does is always firmly tied to and enmeshed in his relations with the players, his coaches, the front office and the owners.

I was willing to write the book anyway because I note that flawed is not a synonym for useless. A lot of times in sabermetrics it seems like people think the goal is just to produce the numbers, and once you've done that the analysis is over and you can shut your brain off. In my opinion, the analysis really begins once you have the number, as now you have to determine what, if anything, they mean and try to separate what is illuminating from what is merely information.

When disucssing individual managers there are times I discuss what you mention, but I don't make a fetish of it. I'll discuss how the organizational fit affects the manager, most directly in the Dusty Baker section. I also use it to look over Jim Leyland's career. I'm sure there are others but I'm too lazy to look over the entire manuscript right now and ferret out every time. Also, as post #15 notes, the role of manager changed drastically over the years, so the modern manager didn't emerge until around the mid-20th century. (In fact, Chapter 7 is titled, "The Modern Manager Emerges, 1950-1976").

In the radio interview, which I've now listened to (thanks Der K for pointing out Mike's link to me) I mention the role of the fit as well.

Mike, are these the same RP studies you mentioned a few times some months ago and provided data from, or are they new?

Mike, are these the same RP studies you mentioned a few times some months ago and provided data from, or are they new?

I've been gradually extending them over the past 18 months, but they are essentially the same ones, yes.

The basic conclusions I've been able to draw are:

1. The situations in which relief pitchers were used changed minimally between 1960 and 1975. Teams were more *willing* to use relievers over those periods rather than relying on starters to get them through, which is why complete games dropped and relievers per game rose, but the *choice* of which reliever to use in a situation changed not at all.

2. Relief pitcher usage patterns changed very rapidly between 1975 and 1990, both in terms of when relievers came into a game (more often to start an inning, less often in mid-inning) and in terms of which relievers were used (less use of the ace reliever when the team was trailing or tied, more use of other relievers in high-leverage situations).

3. Since 1990, mid-inning relief appearances have continued to decline, to the point where somewhere between 85% and 90% of relief appearances occur at the start of an inning (whereas in 1960 the percentage was reversed). There has been little movement in the usage of the end-of-game reliever (with the only real change being the introduction of the ninth-inning closer, primarily by Phil Garner and Johnny Oates); almost all of the changes in relief usage since 1990 have involved redistribution of situations between relievers other than the end-of-game guy.

-- MWE

I really wish if you douche bags were going to put my name on something it would be the least bit funny, entertaining or state some fact. Stop hiding behind my moniker to make your jackass comments. Thanks to the boys that came to my defense last week – another simpleton with no talent.
Annuity

That's freaky spam right there. But it is spam, dude has spammed in his only other post, so banhammer, plz.

Since 1990, mid-inning relief appearances have continued to decline, to the point where somewhere between 85% and 90% of relief appearances occur at the start of an inning (whereas in 1960 the percentage was reversed).

Huh? All the LOOGYs and ROOGYs and ilk only make up 10-15% of mid-inning relief appearances by raw count, and that's *less* than 20 years ago?

I've just looked at two teams, the 2009 Rangers and Orioles. I had to use an imperfect proxy for mid-inning appearances (Sean doesn't track that), games entered with runners on base. So it undersells but doesn't include any incorrect. The Rangers have 115 Rnr / 361 Games in Relief, the Orioles have 127/393. Am I missing something?

Okay, I just quick totaled the 2009 AL. I get an average of 33.09%, a standard deviation of 5.15%, and only two teams even in the 20s, the Mariners at 24% on the nose, and the Jays at 26.7%. So I'm sure I'm figuring something wrong here...are you only looking at top/ace relievers?

I don't really get the 10-15 even for main/ace reliever, but that;s much more subject to definitions.

See, the problem is that MWE will never notice these posts in order to respond. It's a vicious cycle. Kind of like free annuity rates.

Since 1990, mid-inning relief appearances have continued to decline, to the point where somewhere between 85% and 90% of relief appearances occur at the start of an inning (whereas in 1960 the percentage was reversed).

I do see these eventually - my ability to spend time on the site varies with my workload and the time of year.

That's what happens when you post from memory. This was in fact the usage pattern for end-of-game relievers AKA closers, adjusted for use of pinch-hitters (to remove the non-discretionary factor). In 1960, closers entered mid-inning 88.5% of the time when they weren't following a pinch-hitter; by 1990, the percentage was 45.1% and by 2008, that percentage was 17.5%. For non-closers, the percentage entering mid-inning was 84% in 1960, 56.5% in 1990, and 39.2% by 2008.

It's usually pretty easy, on most teams from 1960 forward, to identify a primary end-of-game reliever. I tried to capture in-season role changes wherever I could, and when teams were truly using something like closer-by-committee I didn't designate anyone as the primary end-of-game reliever. Even on teams like Pittsburgh and Philadelphia in the 70s with multi-reliever bullpens, one guy usually got the ball at the end.

-- MWE

I do see these eventually - my ability to spend time on the site varies with my workload and the time of year.

Oh, that wasn't directed at you, that was continuing a conversation from Jim's Lab Notes about promoting original material on the front page, etc.

Okay, good, because I remember thinking "If he meant that the way it was phrased and he has numbers to show it, then one of us has forgotten how to do very basic math and/or apply reasoning skills, and it's more likely me than him." I'm too young to completely lose my mind, I was saving that for my 40s.