That was... not a good idea.

This is Maddon embracing his inner-Scioscia. He has to show that he's the smartest guy out there rather than trusting his players. I've always felt both with Scioscia and Maddon that as great as they were/are as managers (and both are legitimate top tier managers) that if you stay back and give them a chance to overthink a situation they'll do it.

And here's the thing. It's a bad move, but if you ARE going to do the bases loaded walk I think you have to do it with two outs. Doing it with one out you are still in the thick of a big inning. Add in that the on deck hitter is a good hitter and it's only the fourth inning this is just way overthinking it. Of course the Angels won the game so I guess alls well that ends well.

Seager career wise is about average to hit into DP, but last three years 13.4%. Seems significant enough to factor into this.

HE's been 10.3% career for XBH. the math just doesnt seem to check out. If you think he's so red hot that's he's like a .400 hitting Barry Bonds cant you just bring in your best LHP to face him?

at the start of Seager's AB TEX Win Exp was 77%. The IBB increased it 8%.

what if we pitch to Seager? Assuming any base hit brings in two runs, and assuming a HR/2B wont bump the WE much more. So rounding off lets say a base hit would increase the WE by 20% to 97%.

Seager's a career .300 hitter so thats about 6% WE. PLUS he could walk so there's another .8% WE. So pitching to Seager would average out to about to a gain of 7% WE not counting the value if we can get him out.

So lets say a DP is worth 6% WE and a force out 3%, that's in our favor 2.5% WE. (10% x 6% + 60% x 3%)

So net pitching to Seager is like a gain of 4.5% WE for TEX. (7% - 2.5%)

But IBB'ing him is a certain gain of 8% w/ no chance of getting the DP, or a force out.

I guess you have to feel that Seager is a .500 hitter vs Detmers the starter (so he's like 11.5% WE value of a likely hit MINUS 2.5% value if he make and out/DP). BUT if you feel that way then bring in Loup your best/only lefty to face Seager. Since the game is on the line now. But he's saving Loup, for the 6th as it turns out after LAA had tied the game.

Just doesnt make sense.

And here's the thing. It's a bad move, but if you ARE going to do the bases loaded walk I think you have to do it with two outs. Doing it with one out you are still in the thick of a big inning.

That's what got me. I can sort of see the logic (although I wouldn't do it myself) if there were two out. But with one out, I can't justify it at all.

Both previous bases-loaded IBBs (Showalter walking Bonds 5-28-98, Maddon walking Hamilton 8-17-08) came with two outs in the bottom of the ninth. In the former case the winning run was on first; Hamilton represented the tying run in his PA. Smart or not, the situation was extreme. One out in the fourth, as people have noted, not so much.

Although one does have to wonder about the less dramatic tactic of pitching around somebody with bases loaded. Bonds, for instance, drew 23 unintentional walks with bases loaded; you have to think some of those situations were "absolutely do not give him anything to hit." So it isn't as binary as walk-him/pitch-to-him.

Is this like how you have to accept Mantle's drinking or Ruth's overeating to get the benefits of their talents? Joe Maddon is an excellent manager who will, once every few years, walk a dude with the bases loaded intentionally?

Although one does have to wonder about the less dramatic tactic of pitching around somebody with bases loaded. Bonds, for instance, drew 23 unintentional walks with bases loaded; you have to think some of those situations were "absolutely do not give him anything to hit." So it isn't as binary as walk-him/pitch-to-him.

Good point. Though I would point out -- acknowledging, of course, that I'm not blowing anybody's mind with this observation -- that Corey Seager ain't no Barry Bonds.

that Corey Seager ain't no Barry Bonds.

Closer than you'd think (through age 27):

CS 297/367/504, 5.1 oWAR/650
BB 275/380/503, 5.4 oWAR/650

Of course nobody was IBB'ing Bonds with the bases loaded at 27. Bonds is way ahead on WAR/650 but that's mainly due to his +20 Rfield per 650. He's also way ahead on WAR with nearly twice Seager's # of PAs.

Of course nobody was IBB'ing Bonds with the bases loaded at 27.

Well, yeah. And the era was utterly different. Bonds through 27 had just led the league in OPS+ in three straight years, and led the league in slugging in two of the last three. Corey Seager has never done any of that.

Is this like how you have to accept Mantle's drinking or Ruth's overeating to get the benefits of their talents? Joe Maddon is an excellent manager who will, once every few years, walk a dude with the bases loaded intentionally?

There's probably something to that. Maddon is a great manager in part because of his willingness to be unconventional. At times that's going to include something dumb like this. My thinking on this kind of thing is I always like when a manager (or anyone really) does something with a specific plan even if I don't agree with it. I don't like this but if I were an Angel fan I'd like that my manager is doing what he thinks is the right move.

wrong thread

The OPS+ difference is not huge (16 points) and, as the oWAR shows, essentially negligible once you take position into account. (And y'know, WAR is WAR in all seasons, give or take, regardless of context.) The point you seem fixed on is that Bonds had his first big breakout at 25-26 which, indeed, is well above anything Seager has done. And that's true ... and ignores the fact that Bonds was just a good, not outstanding, hitter from 21-24 (124 OPS+, 17 Rbat/650) and Seager (131 OPS+, 26 Rbat/650) would seem to have been better.

But sure, so as not to get you more worked up about it, it is very, very, very, very, very unlikely that Corey Seager's ages 28-42 will remotely resemble Bonds ... even more unlikely than Bonds was gonna do it.

The OPS+ difference is not huge (16 points) and, as the oWAR shows, essentially negligible once you take position into account. (And y'know, WAR is WAR in all seasons, give or take, regardless of context.) The point you seem fixed on is that Bonds had his first big breakout at 25-26 which, indeed, is well above anything Seager has done. And that's true ... and ignores the fact that Bonds was just a good, not outstanding, hitter from 21-24 (124 OPS+, 17 Rbat/650) and Seager (131 OPS+, 26 Rbat/650) would seem to have been better.

But sure, so as not to get you more worked up about it, it is very, very, very, very, very unlikely that Corey Seager's ages 28-42 will remotely resemble Bonds ... even more unlikely than Bonds was gonna do it.

All true. But your posts have a hint of "He was comparable to a young Roberto Clemente " about it.

For the record:

league context for Bonds 21-27: 259/325/388 ... Seager 254/326/425 ... so 40 points of SLG/ISO difference. That's a "lot" (reflected in OPS+ and Rbat of course) but it's also about one extra HR per month.

damn - well, what Post 2 said.

I'm sorry, but other than a peek Bonds, Ruth, Sosa or McGwire, I can't think of any reason to intentionally walk a guy with the bases loaded... maybe a .400 hitter like Williams, Hornsby or Cobb? But I would pitch to peak Mays Musial or Aaron before I walk them... and Seager doesn't even remotely enter the discussion.

You have to wonder what it does for a pitcher’s confidence when his manager has him IBB a guy with the bases loaded. Especially when that guy isn’t Barry Bonds.

The OPS+ difference is not huge (16 points) and, as the oWAR shows, essentially negligible once you take position into account. (And y'know, WAR is WAR in all seasons, give or take, regardless of context.) The point you seem fixed on is that Bonds had his first big breakout at 25-26 which, indeed, is well above anything Seager has done. And that's true ... and ignores the fact that Bonds was just a good, not outstanding, hitter from 21-24 (124 OPS+, 17 Rbat/650) and Seager (131 OPS+, 26 Rbat/650) would seem to have been better.

I mean... WAR is giving Seager credit for being a shortstop. Which is fair, but not exactly a factor in the specific IBB decision. Young Bonds and young Seager are comparably valuable players, when healthy; they are not comparably capable hitters.

Yeah its a bit weird to compare Bonds at age 27 to Seager because the IBB to Bonds w/ bases loaded occurred when Bonds was age 33; a .300/440/600 bat at that pt. his age 27 season was also very similar but Walt averaging his first 7 seasons into that diminishes his real power on the day he was IBB.

Of course nobody was IBB'ing Bonds with the bases loaded at 27

well at least he mentioned it.

I'm sorry, but other than a peek Bonds, Ruth, Sosa or McGwire, I can't think of any reason to intentionally walk a guy with the bases loaded... maybe a .400 hitter like Williams, Hornsby or Cobb? But I would pitch to peak Mays Musial or Aaron before I walk them... and Seager doesn't even remotely enter the discussion.

I think it has to be a peak Ruth/Bonds, with an unusually weak hitter coming next, no good PH available, a 2-4 run lead, in the 9th inning.

In other words, once a century.

I wonder just how bad this decision was relative to other managerial blunders. It would seem difficult for an individual decision to be much worse.

I wonder just how bad this decision was relative to other managerial blunders. It would seem difficult for an individual decision to be much worse.

Maddon pulling Kyle Hendricks in game 7.

McNamara NOT pulling Bill Buckner in game 6.

From a change of win probability standpoint, I doubt either of those come close.

I can see Grady's eighth-inning shitshow in Game 7 matching it, but that was a series of blunders, not one.

Maybe not. But from a standpoint of doing something really dumb and having it immediately blow up in your face. Hendricks was the Cubs best pitcher, he was cruising and in total control. Only 63 pitches. Maddon explicitly said that Lester would not come in in the middle of an inning with runners on base ad that's precisely what he did. Lester and ross, who came in with him, both immediately ###### up and let the Indians back in the game. The cubs went from an 89% WP to 77% in the span of 2 batters. more importantly, by bringing Lester in in the 5th, that meant that a gassed Chapman had to come in in the 8th.

In the other one, there was one reason and one reason only why .128 hitting Dave Stapleton was on the WS roster. For late inning defense at 1B. But Johnny Mac wanted to let Buckner be on the field for the celebration. When the ball went through Buckner's legs, the WP went from 50 to 0.

I wonder just how bad this decision was relative to other managerial blunders. It would seem difficult for an individual decision to be much worse.

Some of that hinges on how you want to evaluate. I suspect the "worst move ever" probably is something we haven't even heard of or just forgot about but it happened in a nothing game somewhere along the lines (I feel like Maury Wills in Seattle might have a good chance). Just using Maddon as an example he somehow filled out his lineup card wrong and wound up with Andy Sonnanstine hitting for himself in a regular season game.

If you want to go by importance then yeah, Grady, McNamara, other stuff in the post-season where a title was on the line that day.

Or maybe we are looking at lineup or roster decisions. Recently I stumbled on the Joe Kerrigan Era (6 weeks of it) as manager of the Red Sox. He had a game where he had Darren Lewis (Gold Glover) in the lineup and decided his center fielder needed to be Trot Nixon. Or how about the 1940 Yankees who had as their most common lead off hitter Frankie (.194/.299/.273) Crosetti.

Hey, that's a better OBP than Bobby Richardson in 1961.

Some of that hinges on how you want to evaluate.

I'm trying to evaluate at the time the decision was made, not after the results of the decision became apparent. Maddon intentionally walked in a run, in the fourth inning, with fewer than two outs, by walking a very good but not historically great hitter. McNamara's decision was stupid, but there's no way the decision itself lowered the win expectancy that much. Lester did #### up, but it wasn't like that was predictable given Lester's a pretty good pitcher.

Lester did #### up, but it wasn't like that was predictable given Lester's a pretty good pitcher.

The missing piece is that Maddon explicitly said that Lester would not come in in the middle of an inning with runners on base. He brought Lester in unnecessarily*, into a situation where he was uncomfortable and not expecting. That he (and his battery mate) ###### up immediately was not inevitable, but man, talk about setting him up for failure. The totality of the situation just screams "Don't do this" (which I did in real time).

*Again, Hendricks was the Cubs best pitcher, and he was cruising. He had just walked a batter who should have been rung up the pitch before. He had thrown just 63 pitches through 4.2 innings.

*Again, Hendricks was the Cubs best pitcher, and he was cruising. He had just walked a batter who should have been rung up the pitch before. He had thrown just 63 pitches through 4.2 innings.

I had the same reaction you did (and probably all Cubs fans did) at the time. But in the conversation about when the Rays pulled Snell a couple years ago, it came out that studies pretty reliably show that “cruising” isn’t really a thing, i.e. that success in earlier innings of a game isn’t predictive of continuing success. That still doesn’t absolve Maddon in my mind, but it’s something to consider.

Hey, that's a better OBP than Bobby Richardson in 1961.

Is that you, Repoz?

a 2-4 run lead, in the 9th inning.

That is the other thing, You have to have the lead when you make that move. And as you pointed out, it needs to be 2-5(not 4 runs) The inning ins less important I think. You cannot give the team that is currently ahead a free run without opposition.

I had the same reaction you did (and probably all Cubs fans did) at the time. But in the conversation about when the Rays pulled Snell a couple years ago, it came out that studies pretty reliably show that “cruising” isn’t really a thing, i.e. that success in earlier innings of a game isn’t predictive of continuing success. That still doesn’t absolve Maddon in my mind, but it’s something to consider.

On the other hand, in the entire 2016 regular season, Hendricks was never once removed before finishing the 5th inning; his season low in pitches was 69, and that was a game in which the Cubs trailed 1-0 and Hendricks was lifted for a pinch hitter with two runners on base. Apart from that, he threw at least 80 pitches in every regular season start. He was pulled early in one playoff game because he was hit in the leg by a line drive; apart from that, his other three postseason starts all went at least 80 pitches as well. And he WON THE ERA TITLE, so it's not like the pitches between 60 and 80 did the team any particular harm when he threw them in 32 of his 34 previous starts.

So, even if you ignore that Hendricks was pitching well in this particular outing, there's still nothing approaching a justification for yanking him when he wasn't even in trouble (two outs, runner on first) to put Lester in a situation that EVERYONE, including Maddon, knew was specifically to be avoided.

So, even if you ignore that Hendricks was pitching well in this particular outing, there's still nothing approaching a justification for yanking him when he wasn't even in trouble (two outs, runner on first) to put Lester in a situation that EVERYONE, including Maddon, knew was specifically to be avoided.

Agreed. As I said, it doesn't absolve Maddon.

Agreed. As I said, it doesn't absolve Maddon.

Fair. Apparently I still haven't recovered from that game five and a half years later. Maddon is probably the best manager the Cubs have had since I've been paying attention, but he handled Game 7 unbelievably badly and it's a credit to the players that they won anyway.

but he handled Game 7 unbelievably badly and it's a credit to the players that they won anyway.

He had help from Tito, who handled the whole damn series badly.

I thought it would be interesting to recap the IBB situations prior to Bonds 1998 to see if any of them made sense mathematically. so here goes:


PLAYER(ba.slug) DATE..SITU...Oppo Mangr/TEAM...ON DECK/his ba.slug... change WE afterIBB


Abner dalrymple (320/440) 8.2.1881....top 8th/0 outs/up 5 ...ORourke/BUF ?? 11.5%
Lajoie (370/570) 5.23.01... top 9th/0 outs/up 4..Griffith/CWS ...S.Seybold .320/.500 +9.4%
Ruth 385/750 6.14.23 .... bot 3rd/2 outs/tied ... Fohl DET... W.Pipp 315/430... +11.8%
Bissonette 5.2.28.. bot 9th/2 outs/up 2 ...McGraw NYG.... H.Riconda 200/300 +7.8%
BNicholson (.300/.540) 7.23.44... top 8th/no outs/up 3...Ott NYG...V.Goodman 280/400 +22.5%


NOTES:

Win Exp: based on Gregstoll website using empirical data 1960-2020 this can often vary a bit from what is given on the baseballref site; for instance BRef gives only 15% to the Nicholson IBB, but even if we extend the data to go from 1905-2020 Stoll still gives it as +19%

IBB not kept as a stat until 1955, so these seem to be from news accounts.

ba/slug.: best guess based on two year average. I discounted Ruth's clunker 1922 season

Lajoie game: play by play info from baseball roundtable site, its not on retro sheet.

Ruth game is from discussion on baseball fever forum. Apparently the count was 3-2 when manager signaled for a wide one.

The supposed Mel Ott 1929 IBB seems to have been debunked see the baseballfever site discussion

Bissonette was a rookie w/ only 15 games played hitting .345/.707 at the time

Nicholson had 4 HRs on the day already (and 6 in the last 48 hrs) this was the 2nd game of a doubleheader

OK lets put the three modern situations up there, as well as one more from the legendary days of Ruth.

Ruth 8.6.23 ... bot 8th/1 out/up 2..Fohl/DET.... Elmer Smith 285/475 6.7%
B.Bonds 5.28.98 ...bot 9th/2 outs/up 2 Showalter AZ 6%
JHamilton 8/17/08 ..bot 9th/2 outs/up 4...Maddon TBD 5%
Seager 4.15.22 ..bot 4th/1 out/down 1(!) Maddon LAA 10% (from 78 to 88)


NOTE the Ruth game here they did not actually IBB. Fohl told Shocker to walk Ruth but Shocker went against orders and pitched to him anyhow. Ruth hit one off the wall and NYY went on to win.Fohl was fired the next day. But its a good one to analyze.

So I think you first have to presume how good is the best hitter on a day in his prime. There's no real objective way I can do that since: sample size; what does it mean biologically to be at your peak? etc. are always open to question. Looking at the best 60 game sequences in history it shows like Bonds, Hamilton, Pujols with about 15-16% chance of XBH. I think Hamilton once batted 450 or something in that stretch but I'm going to assume a max of .400. So you get at peak performance something like:

.400/.500/.750 (assuming a lot HR say 10%)

obviously debatable. But take Bissonette he's on a mere 15 game hot streak and he's what slug .770? If we take Nicholson's last ten days of July '44 when he was red hot its: 340/440/780. And that's a very small sample size, probly more flukey than a real change in skill.


Well the Bonds game maybe that's easiest to analyze. If we pitch to Bonds that's basically a 20.5% WE gain (in simple terms a base hit wins, and presumably he's a .400 hitter at this pt. THe visitors have 80% WE at that pt so 40% chance he wipes out the entire 80WE so +32%. But then we have to MINUS 60% he ends the game. Ending the game is 20% added WE so thats -12%. The net is 20% (there's also a chance he walks 6% change, so 0.6%; perhaps that can be added, but I think BB do go down in bases full situation. It might be easier to just assume he's a .400 hitter w/ little chance of walking since the pitcher has to throw it over the plate).

So its pretty obvious you give up the run that's only 6% change vs letting him hit which is 20% change in WE. Its a good decision. Interestingly even with only one out the analysis doesnt change cause while the visitors have less chance of winning at that pt. So that does diminish the first part of our equation, the chance of winning the game, but also means making the second out does not end the game so the second part of our equation there is not that much to subtract. Its still nets out to about 20% gain to if we pitch to Bonds w/ one out..

with no outs different story. He's 40% to win the game, but visitors only are 52WE at this pt. so 20% gain MINUS if he makes the first out. 60% chance x 16% decrease in WE or -9.6%. So NET: 10.5% gain to home team if we pitch to Bonds with no outs. VERSUS if we IBB Bonds, that's a 16% WE gain for home team.

SO "no" with no outs you can't IBB walk anyone.

EDIT: on the out situation, I forget the DP ends the game. Assuming 10% chance of that, it nets out to about 18% WE gain if we pitch to Bonds w/ one out.

This is a fun discussion but kind of off topic. Maddon knew it was not mathematically optimal to walk Seager; he did it on old-school "lighting a fire under his team" logic.

And the Angels came back and won, so we're likely to see this again. Confirmation bias is strong.

But Ardo you cant just say it was not optimal (it was bad) and then insist more teams are going to do this. That doesnt really make sense

THe Hamilton game is the next game of interest. In most cases the only really interesting decision is when you're up 2 or 3 runs, but obviously Hamilton is a HR threat so lets assume he's on the level of peak Pujols/Bonds/Ruth 400/750. Also since the HR is the big threat here lets boost him to 10% HR rate and mere 5% for a bases clearing Double.


The expected gain if Hamilton bats there there is +11%.

Allowing IBB, the gain for home team is +5%. Marlon Byrd was the next batter a decent no. 5 hitter at 120 OPS. I dont think that changes the analysis much.

So yeah brilliant decision by Maddon there.

Even if we drop Hamilton to say 10% doubles/5% HRs, (say a .400/.650 hitter) it still better to walk him. Expected gain for batting 9%.

If we drop him to like 5% doubles/5% HRs say .350/.550 hitter its probably still better to walk him. Expected gain say 7.5% to pitch to him vs 5% gain if we IBB.

In the Lajoie game, it pretty much makes no sense. Pitching to him w/ no outs in the top of the 9th is basically 0% expected gain. Lajoie at peak is 15% XB but only 3% HR in these less lively ball days. So even if he hits the unlikely GS the home team will still get to bat, and at that pt. game tied, top of the 9th its still 52% home team favored (per empirical data set from 1920-2020; the baseball ref site will give 50% as that seems theoretically based).

Comiskey as player manager, came into the game as pitcher to throw the IBB, I guess to shoulder the blame if the strategy went south. But it was a bad move giving the As a free 9.5% WE gain.

Even if we make Lajoie 15% XB and 10% HR, it barely changes things. its like 0.5% gain if we pitch to him. So no.